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)
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Respondent/Defendant.
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and MARIAN DOLE, husband and wife; MIKE ANDERSON and RA YELLE ANDERSON,
husband and wife; JOE CULBRTTH and SHARON CULBRTTH, husband and wife; KIRK
HOBSON and KIMBERLY HOBSON, husband and wife; SETH MOULDING and JENNIFER
MOULDING, husband and wife; CASY NEAL and KRISTIN NEAL, husband and wife; and
WILLIAM GIRTON and DOLLY GIRTON, husband and wife (collectively "CISZEK").
PETITIONERS'/PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DECLATORY
JUDGMENT, filed herewith, contains citations oflawand authorities from jurisdictions outside
the State ofIdaho. Copies of those cases are attached for the Court's review.
DATED this

~ay of August, 2009.
WETZEL, WETZEL
& HOLT, P .L.L.C.

_________________
Dana L. Rayborn Wetzel
Attorneys for CISZEK

By~~
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Attorney for Defendant
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Michael Ryan Chapman
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due to "excusable neglect." The trial court
denied respondent's motion, concluding
that her motion was not filed within a
reasonable time after entry of judgment,
that she had not shown excusable neglect,
and that she had not pled a meritorious
defense. Respondent appeals.
Legal Services of the Blue Ridge, Inc. by
Louise Ashmore, Boone, for respondent-appellant.
Rebecca B. Knight, Asheville, for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Dept. of
Social Services.
Richard Schumacher, Asheville, for petitioner-appellee guardian ad litem.
EAGLES, Judge.
[lJ Rule 60(b)(l) of the North Carolina

Rules of Civil Procedure allows the trial
court to relieve a party from a final judgment for "[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." G.S. lA-I,
Rule 60(b)(1). A Rule 60(b)(1) motion must
be made within a reasonable time, Brady v.
Town of Chapel Hill, 277 N.C. 720, 178
S.E.2d 446 (1971); G.S. lA-I, Rule 60(b)(1),
and the movant must show both the existenc'e of one of the stated grounds for relief,
and a "meritorious defense." Howard v.
Williams, 40 N.C.App. 575, 253 S.E.2d 571
(1979). Even if we were to assume that
respondent filed her motion within a reasonable time and had pled a meritorious
defense, respondent failed to show "excusable neglect."
[2-4J Although the decision to set aside
a judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) is a matter
within the trial court's discretion, Sawyer
v. Goodman, 63 N.C.App. 191, 303 S.E.2d
632, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 823, 310
S.E.2d 352 (1983), what constitutes "excusable neglect" is a question of law which is
fully reviewable on appeal. Thomas M.
McInnis & Assoc., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C.
421, 349 S.E.2d 552 (1986). However, the
trial court's decision is final if there is
competent evidence to support its findings
and those findings support its conclusion.
Wynnewood C01·p. v. Soderquist, 27 N.C.
App. 611, 219 S.E.2d 787 (1975). Whether
~~ the movant has shown excusable neglect
;)

:)

must be determined by his actions at or
before entry of judgment. Norton v. Sawyer, 30 N.C.App. 420, 227 S.E.2d 148, disc.
rev. denied, 291 N.C. 176, 229 S.E.2d 689
(1976). Here, the relevant findings of the
trial court show, as a matter of law, an
absence of excusable neglect.
[5,6] When a party is duly served with
a summons, yet fails to give her defense
the attention which a person of ordinary
prudence usually gives her important bUsiness, there is no excusable neglect. East
Carolina Oil Transport v. Petroleum
Fuel & Terminal Co., 82 N.C.App. 746,
348 S.E.2d 165 (1986), disc. rev. denied, 318
N.C. 693, 351 S.E.2d 745 (1987). The trial
court found that respondent was personally
served with the summons, and a copy of
the petition. Respondent also received an
enclosed notice, which informed her of her
right to have a court appointed attorney if
she could not afford to hire counsel, and
provided a telephone number for her to call
to have an attorney appointed. The court
found that respondent saw the telephone
number but failed to call, either to get an
attorney or to request a continuance. The
trial court also found that respondent was
unemployed at the time and was receiving
money, food and gas from police and charitable organizations. Respondent returned
to North Carolina in February 1987, in her
own car, by obtaining food and gasoline at
various police stations and churches. The
court found no evidence that respondent
was unable to return to North Carolina by
that method in December or January.
These findings establish that respondent
failed to use ordinary prudence to defend
the action against her. Consequently, the
trial court properly concluded that respondent did not show excusable neglect.
Respondent does not argue that the trial
court's findings are unsupported by the
evidence. Instead, she contends that the
court's findings, and other evidence not
addressed in the findings, regarding her
poor financial situation and her limited ability to understand the importance of the
petition, establish excusable neglect. We
do not agree.

1
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I.

The trial court found that respondent
was unemployed and was receiving food
and money from charitable organizations.
Other evidence shows that she was living
in a trailer, rent-free, was caring for her
nine year old daughter, had lost her driver's license, had tried calling DSS on two
occasions, a?d had no mone~ to trav~1 to
~orth C~r?hna. Respondent spoor frnanCIaI condl~lOn, however, d~es not account
~~r her faIlure to call or wrIte court authorItles, or to make further attempts t? contact DSS. Moreover the record con tams no
.
eVIdence
that respondent made any effort
to seek local legal counselor attempt to get
f ·manCIa
. ta nce f rom th e Tex. I or 0 th er asslS
. IS
'
as D.epart men t ?f S.ocla
.ervlces,
or th. e
charItable organIzatIOns which were prOVIding her with money, food, and gasoline;
nor can we speculate that such efforts
would have been unavailing. In addition,
her return to North Carolina in February
belies her argument that she was financially unable to return for the hearing in January. In fact, respondent testified that she
could have returned to North Carolina in
January but did not think about it because
she was worrying about finding work, caring for her other child, and the termination
of her relationship with Douglas' father.
Respondent's financial situation may, indeed, have been a difficult one but, under
the circumstances, it does not constitute
excusable neglect.
[7] Respondent's claim that she was
confused about the summons and what she
should do in response also fails to establish
excusable neglect. A party may not show
excusable neglect by merely establishing
that she failed to obtain an attorney and
was ignorant of the judicial process. See
Gregg v. Steele, 24 N.C.App. 310, 210 S.E.
2d 434 (1974). Similarly, the fact that the
movant claims he did not understand the
case, or did not believe that the court
would grant the relief requested in the
complaint, has been held insufficient to
show excusable neglect, even where the
movant is not well educated. See Boyd 11.
Marsh, 47 N.C.App. 491, 267 S.E.2d 394
(1980). Respondent could read and write
and there is no evidence she was suffering
from a mental incapacity. Cf Wynnewood

885

Corp. v. SoderquiI;t, supra. The evidence
shows that respondent knew both the nature of the proceedings against her and her
obligation to return to North Carolina for
the hearing. Under the circumstances, respondent's failure to take action to defend
her case is not excusable neglect.
Absent a showing of excusable neglect,
whether the movant pled a meritorious defense becomes immaterial. Bundy v. Ayscue, 5 N.C.App. 581, 169 S.E.2d 87, appeal
dismissed 276 N.C. 81 171 S.E.2d 1 (1969).
Th f '
d ' t dd
d ere
t' ore, we
. . nee no at ress d'responth
en .s .remammg argu~en regal' I~g e
admISSIOn
eVIdence
. of allegedly
. Irrelevant ..
concernmg
termination. the meflts of the petItion for
Affirmed.
COZORT and SMITH, JJ., concur.

John Michael ALDERMAN and Gloria R.
Alderman; Rupert L. Bynum, Jr. and
Joyce lU. Bynum; George Bowie and
Anne Bowie; F.C. Burgner; Elsie C.
Goff; William C. Fischer and Sandra
Fischer; Robert P. Blair; James E.
Pruchniak; Joseph K. Ward and Charlotte Ward: George Clark Thompson
and Carol S. Thompson
v.

CHATHAM COUNTY and the Board of
County Commissioners of Chatham
County, including Earl D. Thompson,
Henry Dunlap, Jr., Gus Murchison. Jr.,
C.W. Lutterloh: Carl Thompson and
Calvin Roberson and Wife, Mary C. Roberson.
No. 8715SC401.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
April 19, 1988.
Surrounding landowners brought suit
alleging that countv onrt ;'0 h~ __ .J ~P

',86 N.C.
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y commISSIoners acted unlawfully in reoning tract from Residential Agricultural
,0-30 to Mobile Home District and sought
leclaratory judgment that commissioners'
Lction in that regard was illegal, invalid
md void. The Superior Court, Chatham
:;ounty, Thomas H. Lee, J., declared the
rezoning invalid, and applicants appealed.
rhe Court of Appeals, Johnson, J., held
that rezoning amendment constituted illegal spot zoning and contract zoning.

Affirmed.

mitted owners to utilize property without
having to meet subdivision requirements,
and there was no reasonable basis for
county's action.
6. Zoning and Planning <;::=>160
Rezoning amendment, whereby 14.2
acre tract was rezoned from Residential
Agricultural 40-30 to Mobile Home District, constituted illegal contract zoning,
where rezoning was accomplished as direct
consequence of conditions agreed to by applicant rather than as valid exercise of
county's legislative discretion.

1. Zoning and Planning <;::=>675

This is a civil action by plaintiffs for a
declaratory judgment invalidating an
amendment to a zoning ordinance adopted
by the Chatham County Board of Commissioners.
2. Zoning and Planning <;::=>21.5, 34, 155.
Gunn & Messick, by Paul S. Messick, Jr.
156
and
Robert L. Gunn, Pittsboro, Faison,
Legislative act of enacting or amending zoning ordinance is invalid if it is un- Brown, Fletcher & Brough by Michael
reasonable, arbitrary, or unequal exercise Brough, Chapel Hill, for defendants-appellants.
of legislative power. G.S. § 153A-344.
Epting & Hackney by Robert Epting,
3. Zoning and Planning <;::=>35, 162
Chapel Hill, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Illegal "spot zoning" is defined as zoning ordinance, or amendment, which singles
JOHNSON, Judge.
ou t and reclassifies relatively small tract
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that defendowned by single person and surrounded by
much larger area uniformly zoned, so as to ant Chatham County and its Board of
impose upon small tract greater restric- County Commissioners had acted unlawfultions than those imposed upon larger area, ly in rezoning Calvin and Mary C. Roberor so as to relieve small tract from restric- son's 14.2 acre tract from Residential Agritions to which rest of area is subjected. cultural 40-30(RA 40-30) to Mobile Home
District (MH District) for 14 lots and
See publication Words and Phrases
sought the court's declaratory judgment
for other judicial constructions and
that defendant commissioners' 17 March
definitions.
1986 action in that regard was illegal, inval4. Zoning and Planning <;::=>35
id, and void, on grounds, inter alia, that
Spot zoning is beyond authority of
the action of the County Commissioners
county or municipality unless there is clear
constituted spot zoning and contract zonshowing of reasonable basis.
ing.
5. Zoning and Planning <;::=>167
The trial court's findings of fact estabRezoning amendment, whereby 14.2 lished the following:
acre tract was rezoned from Residential
The Robersons are owners of 14.2 acres
Agricultural 40-30 to Mobile Home Disof land located south of State Road 1700
trict, constituted illegal spot zoning, where
and west of Mount Gilead Baptist Church
~14.2 acre tract was part of much larger
Road. The 14.2 acre tract is adjacent to
:care a of over 500 acres which was zoned RA
the south side of Parker's Creek which
40-30 for low density single fa/nily resiflows into the Parker's Creek impoundment
...j.dential and agricultural use, rezoning per-
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As a legislative function, county's act
of amending its zoning ordinance is entitled
to presumption of validity.
G.S.
§ 153A-344.
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on Jordan Lake, where the Parker's Creek Commissioners took further action on this
campground and recreation areas are locat- request because they failed to present any
ed. Some of the plaintiffs are owners of surveyor other evidence to support their
single family homes located on lots which claim that the land was located in an unare contiguous with and adjoin the south- zoned township. On 29 September 1983,
ern boundary of the Robersons' 14.2 acre defendant Calvin Roberson requested that
property, and the remaining plaintiffs are their 20 acres located west of Mount Gilead
owners of single family residences located Church Road (including the 14.2 acres at
on lots in the same nearby vicinity and issue) be rezoned from RA 40-30 to Mobile
generally south and west of the 14.2 acre Home District.
On 11 October 1983, before the Planning
tract.
Plaintiffs' lands and the Robersons' 14.2 Board, defendant Calvin Roberson stated
acre tract are a small part of a much larger that the purpose of the request was to
area of land totalling 500 acres which was spread out the existing thirty-two trailer
originally zoned Residential Agricultural 20 lots and add 18 more on larger lots, which
(RA-20) when the county first adopted its on its south side bordered the plaintiffs'
zoning ordinance in 1968.
lots and homes. In addition, he stated that
Prior to defendants' 30 January 1986 re- he had State approval for a package treatzoning request for the 14.2 acre tract, de- ment plant to serve the trailer park.
fendant Calvin Roberson had sought to
On 8 November 1983, the Planning
have their land (including the 14.2 acre Board considered the request again. Plans
tract) rezoned from low density residential submitted at the meeting showed that the
use to mobile home park use on six differ- parcel for which rezoning was requested
ent occasions. On 23 July 1973. defendant contained sixteen acres. It was learned
Calvin Roberson requested that the county that no approval for a package treatment
rezone 40 acres then zoned RA-20 (includ- plant to serve the proposed trailer park had
ing the 14.2 acre tract at issue) for a trailer been given by the State. After the County
park. On 1 October 1973, this request was Planner advised the Board that the rezondenied by unanimous vote of the defendant ing request (for twenty-four units on 16
Chatham County Commissioners.
acres) did not conform to the density recOn 17 October 1974, defendant Calvin ommended in the Land Development Plan,
Roberson sought to have 20 acres (adjacent the Board voted 5-3 to deny the request.
On 9 January 1984, the Chatham County
to the 14.2 acre tract at issue) rezoned to
mobile home use for a trailer park of 40 Commissioners again considered the rezonmobile homes. The County Planning ing request. At that meeting, defendant
Board opposed the rezoning on grounds Commissioner Carl Thompson made the
that such use could jeopardize the planned motion to deny the rezoning request, and
Parker's Creek impoundment and recrea- "strongly recommended" that the Robertion area at the Jordan Reservoir. How- sons submit a plan that would provide an
ever, on 9 June 1975, the County Commis- adequate buffer between their property
sioners, by a 3-2 vote, voted to rezone 16 of and the adjoining property owners. Two
the 20 acres for a mobile home park at a commissioners voted to approve the rezondensity of not more than two trailers per ing request and two voted to deny the
request.
Defendant Chairman Earl
acre.
On 13 September 1983, the Chatham Thompson broke the tie and voted against
County Planning Board considered the Ro- the rezoning request, stating that his conbersons' request to expand their trailer cern was a larger buffer zone and the
park from the 16 acres rezoned on 9 June potential density in the proposed trailer
1975, into the adjacent portion of their park.
property south of Parker's Creek, which
On 9 April 1985, the Planning Board
included the 14.2 acre tract at issue. Nei- considered their request that a 16.2 acre
ther the Planning Board nor the County tract (including the 14.2 acre tract at issue)
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med from RA 40-30 to MH District
mobile homes. The Planning Board
this request pending State action on
"bersons' permit application for a
~e sewage treatment plant. On 14
"y 1986, before the Planning Board,
~ant Calvin Roberson requested that
zoning request not be taken off the

derman reiterated his position that he
would not have purchased his lot but for
the Robersons' assurance that they would
not build on the 14.2 acres unless they
decided to build for their children. Other
persons had opposition to trailer parks being built but not individual mobile homes.
These parties stated that they were against
an increase in density allowed in MH District; that the expansion of the trailer park
was unwarranted because the Robersons
had not utilized the land rezoned in 1975;
that their attempts to have the land rezoned had been denied during the last ten
years; that there existed no change of circumstances in condition to warrant the rezoning; that there were a number of lots
off Mount Gilead Church Road zoned for
mobile homes; that there already existed in
the community another trailer park in addition to the Robersons', and that any additional trailer parks would affect the single
family character of the area.

30 January 1986, the Robersons subthe rezoning request at issue, asktat the 14.2 acres (adjacent on its
side to plaintiffs' lands, which was
·act that was part of the property
ered in the five previous rezoning
,ts) be rezoned from RA 40-30 to MH
~t for 14 mobile home lots. On 11
ary 1986, the Planning Board cond the request. At that meeting, deGt Calvin Roberson stated that they
ed their request from 24 lots to 14
lecause they felt that the 14 lots
be more in line with the Land Devellt Plan. He also stated that they
On 17 March 1986, the rezoning request
trying to get a package treatment was granted by the defendant County Comapproved by the State to serve the missioners. The minutes of the meeting
rty, including the 32 units already simply indicate that "Commissioner Dunlap
ved on the 16 acres which he and his moved, seconded by Commissioner Murchiowned.
son and passed unanimously to approve the
intiff John Alderman stated that he request .... that 14.2 acres on the south
lurchased his lot (adjacent to the 14.2 side of SR 1700 (Mt. Gilead Church Road)
tract's south boundary) from the Ro- be zoned from Residential Agricultural to
ns. Plaintiff Alderman stated that at Mobile Home District for fourteen lots."
me he purchased his lot, Calvin RoberOn 22 April 1986, plaintiffs filed their
lad verbally promised him that no mo- complaint against the respective defendlomes would be placed behind Alder- ants. On 23 June 1986, defendants filed
s lot. The Planning Board voted to their answers. On 14 October 1986, the
omend that the 14.2 acres be rezoned case was tried by the trial judge, sitting
RA 40-30 to MH District for 14 lots. without a jury. After reviewing the evi13 March 1986, the Chatham County dence and stipulations of the parties, and
nissioners held a public hearing to after making findings of fact and conclupublic comment on the Robersons' sions of law, the trial court declared that
est. Defendant Calvin Roberson stat- the rezoning by the Board of Commissiontat they sought to have the 14.2 acres ers was invalid and enjoined the Robersons
led so that they could expand their from developing a mobile home park unless
ing trailer park. He stated that the validly rezoned by the Board of Commisning Board had approved their request sioners. From the judgment of the trial
that they had met all requirements court, defendants appealed.
as buffer zones, low density, and sewDefendants bring forth three Assign:§ystems.
ments of Error for this Court's review.

a.ny persons spoke in opposition to the
~sted rezoning change.
)

Plaintiff AI-

For the following reasons, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

1
ALDERMAN v. CHATHAM COUNTY
Cit. as 366 S.E.2d 885 (N.C.App. 1988)
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By their first Assignment of Error, de- ants argue that since the 14.2 acres refendants contend that the trial court erred zoned adjoins the Robersons' existing 16
in concluding that the rezoning of the Ro- acre tract zoned MH District, then the rebersons' property was illegal spot zoning. zoning was merely an extension of the exWe disagree.
isting MH District. Defendant's argument
[1-3] G.S. sec. 153A-344 expressly is misplaced.
gives counties the power to amend their
zoning ordinances. As a legislative func[5] It is undisputed that at the time the
tion, the county's act of amending its zon- application came before the Board, the ROo
ing ordinance is entitled to a presumption bersons' 14.2 acre tract was part of a much
of validity. A-S-P Associates v. City of larger area of over 500 acres which was
Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 zoned RA 40-30 for low density single fam(1979). The legislative act of enacting or ily residential and agricultural use. Trailer
amending a zoning ordinance is invalid if it parks were not a permitted use in the RA
is unreasonable, arbitrary, or an unequal 40-30 zone, although individual trailers
exercise of legislative power. [d.
could be used as single family residences
"Spot zoning" is defined as:
within the RA 40-30 zone. If mobile
[a] zoning ordinance, or amendment, homes were to be used for single family
which singles out and reclassifies a rela- residences, subdivision requirements had to
tively small tract owned by a single per- be met, which included surveying and platson and surrounded by a much larger ting the individual lots upon which trailers
area uniformly zoned, so as to impose would be placed, and paving the subdivision
upon the small tract greater restrictions roads. The rezoning of the property by the
than those imposed upon the larger area, Commission to MH District permitted the
or so as to relieve the small tract from Robersons to utilize the property without
restrictions to which the rest of the area having to meet the subdivision requireis subjected, ...
ments. Thus, the rezoning singled out a
Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, "relatively small parcel owned by a single
549, 187 S.E.2d 35, 45 (1972).
person ... so as to relieve the small tract
from restrictions to which the rest of the
[4] Zoning generally must be accomplished in accordance with a comprehensive area is subjected." Blades, supra.
plan in order to promote the general welThis was the basis for the trial court's
fare and serve the purposes of the enabling finding of fact No. 24 which states:
statute. G.S. sec. 153A-341; Godfrey v.
The development standards applicable to
Union County Bd. of Commissioners, 61
Mobile Home Districts under the ChatN.C.App. 100, 300 S.E.2d 273 (1983). Beham County Zoning Ordinance are differcause it zones a small area differently than
ent from and less stringent than the dea much larger area surrounding it, spot
velopment standards applicable to the dezoning, by definition, conflicts with the
velopment of subdivisions under RA 40whole purpose of planned zoning. 2 Rath30 zoning; in particular, individual lots
kopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning
do not have to be surveyed for developSection 28.02 (1987). Therefore, unless
ment in a Mobile Home District, while
there is a "clear showing of a reasonable
such
surveys are required for lots subdibasis," spot zoning is beyond the authority
vided in a RA 40-30 subdivision; and, in
of the county or municipality. Blades, 280
an RA 40-30 subdivision with as many as
N.C. at 549, 187 S.E.2d at 45.
four lots, roads would have to be paved,
First, defendants argue that a relatively
while in a Mobile Home District with less
small area is required for spot zoning per
than 15 lots, the roads do not have to be
Blades, supra, and that the 14.2 acres inpaved. Thus, the March 17, 1986 rezonvolved is part of a larger tract of approxiing of Defendant Roberson's 14.2 acre
mately 41 acres owned by the Robersons.
tract from RA 40-30 to MH District for
(emphasis supplied). Furthermore, defend14 mobile home lots relieved that tract
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from restrictions to which the remaining zone and that trailer parks were not a
RA 40-30 area, including the Plaintiffs' permitted use in the RA 40-30 zone.
said properties, were and remain subjectFinally, in determining whether a rezoned.
ing was invalid as spot zoning, our courts
Thus, the rezoning amendment here have also considered the classification and
clearly constitutes spot zoning. The re- development of nearby land. In the case
zoned area was only 14.2 acres and was sub judice, the majority of the land suruniformly surrounded by property zoned rounding the rezoned 14.2 acres was uniRA 40-30. The remaining question then is formly zoned RA 40-30, and consisted of
whether there was a reasonable basis for 500 acres. The classification and developthe county's action in spot zoning the 14.2 ment of nearby land is not consistent with
MH District considering the fact that moacre land.
bile homes may be used as single family
An examination of the record reveals residences within the RA 40-30 zone. Furthat the county has failed to show a reason- thermore, in 1986, the county turned down
able basis for rezoning the 14.2 acre tract an application to rezone property to MH
from RA 40-30 to MH District. Among District within two miles of the 14.2 acre
the factors to be considered when deter- tract.
mining whether there is a reasonable basis
[6] In its second Assignment of Error,
for spot zoning are: (1) change in condi- defendants contend that the trial court
tions, (2) particular characteristics of the erred in concluding that the rezoning conarea being rezoned, and (3) the classifica- stituted illegal contract zoning. We distion and development of nearby land. agree.
Chrismon v. Guilford County, 85 N.C.
A county's legislative body has authority
App. 211, 354 S.E.2d 309 (1987).
to rezone when reasonably necessary to
In their brief, defendants give no analysis as to whether there was a reasonable
basis to justify the rezoning. Nevertheless, there is no indication of any change in
conditions in the immediate area of the
property which ~ould justify the rezoning.
The record reveals no increase in Mobile
Home use within the 500 acre tract with
the exception of the 16 acre tract adjacent
to plaintiffs' land. At the time defendants
were not using all of the 32 spaces allowed
in their existing trailer park.

~

OJ

eN

In reference to the particular characteristics of the area being rezoned, G.S. 153A341 states that, among other things, zoning
regulations should be made with reasonable consideration to "the character of the
district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses." An examination of the
record reveals that there is no indication
that the 14.2 acre lot was unsuitable for
residential use for which it was previously
zoned. In fact, the evidence established
that: the recommended tract was in an
area designated, rural and low density, that
the individual trailers could be used as single family residences within the RA 40-30

do so in the interests of the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. Ordinarily[,] the only limitation upon this authority is that it may not be exercised
arbitrarily or capriciously. However[,]
to avoid contract zoning, all the areas in
each class must be subject to the same
restrictions. If the rezoning is done in
consideration of an assurance that a particular tract or parcel will be developed
in accordance with a restricted plan this
is contract zoning and is illegal.
Willis v. Union County, 77 N.C.App. 407,
409, 335 S.E.2d 76, 77 (1985).
The record establishes that on 9 April
1985, the Planning Board considered the
request that 16.29 acres (which included
the 14.2 acres at issue) be rezoned from RA
40-30 to MH District for 24 lots for mobile
homes. Subsequently, on 30 January 1986,
the Robersons SUbmitted the rezoning request at issue, requesting that 14.2 acres
of their remaining land be rezoned from
RA 40-30 to MH District for 14 mobile
home lots.
On 11 February, 1986, before the Planning Board, when asked why they changed

,
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their request from 24 lots to 14 lots, Calvin
Roberson stated that he felt the 14 lots
would be more in line with the Land Development Plan. The Land Development Plan
does not specifically address mobile home
parks but instead addresses density of land
. use. Subsequently, on 17 March 1986, after having denied their five previous rezoning requests the rezoning request was approved by defendant Board of County Commissioners. The record reflects that at
that meeting, no discussion was made of
the rezoning request.
We believe that the record reveals that
the only justification for allowing the rezoning of the property was only if the
amount of lots was reduced to coincide
with the density requirements of the county. There was no determination that the
Board based its rezoning on the basis that
the site was suitable for all uses permitted
under MH District Zoning.
The land was rezoned in consideration of
an assurance that the 14.2 acre tract would
be developed in accordance with a restricted plan. The rezoning here was accomplished as a direct consequence of the conditions agreed to by the applicant rather
than as a valid exercise of the county's
legislative discretion. As a result, such
action by defendant Commissioners constituted contract zoning.
We have reviewed defendants' final Assignment of Error, and find it meritless
and without need for discussion.
For the reasons herein assigned, the
judgment of the trial court is
Affirmed.
WELLS and COZORT, JJ., concur.
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PANNILL KNI'ITING COMPANY, INC.
v.
GOLDEN CORRAL CORPORATION,
Edenton Housing Partnership, Bernard
P. Burroughs and wife, Anne J. Burroughs and Thurman E. Burnette,
Trustee.
No. 871SC783.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.
April 19, 1988.
Appeal was taken from judgment
the Superior Court, Chowan
George M. Fountain, J., entered in action
challenging second foreclosure sale of
property described in deed of trust. The
Court of Appeals, Orr, J., held that evidence was insufficient to establish that second foreclosure sale on portion of property
described in deed of trust violated statutory provisions.
Affirmed.
Phillips, J., filed dissenting opinion.
Mortgages <P369(7)
Evidence was insufficient to establish
that second foreclosure sale on portion of
property described in deed of trust was
void on theory it violated statutory provisions; party challenging sale faile'
present evidence indicating whether {l
of trust foreclosed upon expressly
rized trustee to sell property in
upon default or whether property was actually described in separate parcels in the
instrument. G.S. §§ 45-21.8, 45-21.9.
This case arises out of the second foreclosure sale instituted under a purchase
money deed of trust dated 14 January 1982
from L.F. Amburn, Jr., and William B.
Gardner to Max S. Busby, trustee for Bernard P. Burroughs, grantee. This deed of
trust, duly recorded in Book 137, page 672
of the Chowan County Public Registry, created a lien upon all of Amburn's and Gardner's interest in the property described
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Elections for New Castle County and leave have sufficient bearing on that question to
the people of that County without any pro- require some consideration. Both involved
vision for exercising their ri,ght of fran- the acts of political parties in primary elecchise at subsequent general or special elec- tions, and in each it was argued that such
tions heM in that County. On the contrary, committees were mere private organizathe provisions of Chapter 182 of Volume tions, not subject to the equal protection
46 of the Laws of Delaware di'sc\ose the in- clause of the Federal Constitution. The
tention of the Legislature to continue in contentions made were rejected.
In Smith v. Allwright, supra, the court
existence the Department of Elections for
New Castle County but to change its mem- said [321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 765]:
bership from nine members to eleven mem"We think that this statutory system for
bers. The method adopted by the Legisda- the selection of party nominees for incluture to bring about this change having been sion on the general election ballot makes
found to be unconstitutional, the Depart- the (political) party which is required to
ment of Elections for New Ca'stle County follow these legislative directions an agency
consisting of nine members, as provided for of the state in so far as it determines the
by Paragraph 1746, Section 2 of Chapter participants in a primary election. The
57, of the Revised Code of 1935, as amend- party takes its character as a state agency
ed, is still in existence and is the legally from the duties imposed upon it by state
constituted Department of Elections for statutes; the duties do not become matters
of private law because they are performed
New Castle County.
We find the case of Equitable Guarantee by a political party."
and Trust Company v. Donahoe, supra, to
The principle stated in Nixon v. Condon,
be contrary to the weight of authority in 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88
this country and for that reason it is here- A.L.R. 458, was, therefore, applied.
by overruled.
In Rice v. Elmore, supra, the legislature
had repealed all statutory provisions relatHARRINGTON, Chance.J\or:
As I view it, the determination of this ing to holding primary elections by political
case does not require any consideration of parties, but the court said [165 F.2d 391] :
"When these officials participate in what
the rule stated in Equitable GUarantee and
Trust Company v. Donahoe, 3 Pennewill is a part of the state's election machinery,
191,49 A. 372; but if the question is perti- they are election officers of the state de
nent, I agree with the conclusion of the facto if not de jure, and as such must obmajority of the court that it was incor- serve the ,limitations of the Constitution.
Having undertaken to perform an imporrectly decided.
I am, however, unable to agree with the tant function relating to the exercise of
majority conclusion that Section 3, Chap- sovereignty by the people, they may not vioter 18?, Volume 46, Laws of Delaware, vio- late the fundamental principles laid down
lated the Constitution, and with their re- by the Constitution for its exercise."
Applying these cases to the Delaware
fusal to permit a reargument of that quesstatutory provisions set out in the earlier
tion.
One of the conclusions in their original minority opinion, it seems reasonable to
opinion was that the legislature could not conclude that the chairmen of the execuprovide for the selection of statutory State tive committees of the major political parofficers by persons having no connection ties, to whom the power to name certain
with the State government, and that com- statutory officers was given by Section 3,
mittees of political parties were mere pri- Chapter 182, Volume 46, Laws of Delaware,
vate corporations not within that rule. The are in some respects State agents. If that
...:l>
recent cases of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. be true, that Act would seem to be conS. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987, 151 A. sistent with the Constitution even under
~
L.R. 1110, and Rice v. Elmore, 4 Cir., 165 the theory of the majority of the court.
~
F.2d 387, cited by the petitioners in support
TERRY, J., concurs.
of their motion for a reargument seem to

l

ANSCHELEWITZ v. BOROUGH OF BELMAR
Cite as 65 A..2d 825

ANSCHELEWITZ v. BOROUGH OF
BELMAR.
No. A-282.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

May 2, 1949.
I. Municipal corporatio.ns <8=>225(5)

A municipality cannot act as an individual does, but it must proceed in conformity
wi'bh statutes, or in absence of statute
agreeably ,to the common law by ordinance
or resolution or motion, and this is especially so where real property is concerned.
2. MuniCipal corporations <$=719(4)

Where borough minute book showed resolution authorizing borough attorney to
draft lease of boardwalk concessions, and
thereafter lease prepared by concessionaire
and not by borough solicitor was executed
by mayor and clerk, and schedule of payments under lease was never pa:ssed upon
in public meeting, and municipality never
expressed itself officiadly 'On termS thereof,
lease was 'Void, and commission could properly authorize advertising to lease concessions to others.

Appeal from former Supreme Court.
Certiorari proceeding by Leon Anschelewitz to set aside a resolution of the Borough of Belmar, a municipal corporation,
authorizing advertisements for bids to lease
certain concessions on the Borough's
boardwallk. From a judgment of the former Supreme Court, 137 N.J,L. 617, 61
A.2d 293, prosecutor appeals.
JUdgment 'affirmed.
Milton M. Unger and Milton M. & Adrian M. Unger, all of Newark, for appellant.
Ward Kremer, of Asbury Park, and
Harry R. Cooper, of Belmar, for respondent.
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at a renl:al of $6,700 for the entire term.
By hi·s own admission the prosecutor conceded that he received more than this sum
through subletting for merely a single Summer season. In February, 1947, while the
1945 lease was sti~l effective, the prosecutor requested the borough officials to consider a new lease to him. Pursuant to a
suggestion of the then mayor and the other
borough commissioner (the third commissioner having died in January) the prosecutor .appeared at a regular meeting of
the Borough Commission held on February 4, 1947, bringing with him a draft of .
a new lease for a four year period commencing, singularly, February 4, 1947, and
terminating February 4, 1951, at a total
rental of $11,500. The lease was executed by the mayor and acting borough clerk
on behalf of the borough and by the prosecutor that same evening in a side room
after the public meeting.
Although the minute book 'Of the borough, which was introduced in evidence
on the taking 'Of depositions in this matter,
shows a notation 'Of a resoluti'On having
been passed by the may'Or and his fellow
commissioner at ,the meeting of February
4, 1947, authorizing the borough attorney
to dra ft a lease of the concessions, two
experienced newspaper reporters, who testified that they were present fr'Om the
opening of the meeting until adjournment,
said that they heard no such resoluti'On
introduced or adopted. Their accounts 'Of '
the meeting published in their newspapers
bear them out for they c'Ontained no reference whatever to any such resolution or
1e:lse. They also attended the next commission meeting held on February 11th and
listened to the reading of the minutes of
the meeting of February 4th, but there
was no mention of the resolution or of the
lease. All this is significant because of the
interest in the community in a wideJ1y
publicized case in nearby Asbury Park
involving the leasing of certain of its
boardwalk concessions without adver'tising,
and in the bearing of that 'litigation 'On the
same problem in Belmar. The 'Oncoming
municipal eJ1ection in May was ca.sting its
shad'Ow before it.

VANDERBILT, Chief Justice.
The prosecutor, Leon An:schelewitz, had
for some years leased fr.om the defendant,
Borough of Belmar, all of its boardwalk
concessi.ons and then sublet them at substantial profit to himself. One of these
leases was made in March, 1945, for a term
During the succeeding months a hotly
of three years, expiring November 1, 1947, contested election campaign was waged,
65A.2d-52161
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with one of the chief issues centering on al agreed to be paid by the prDsecutor for
the practice of the incumbents of leasing the full four years under the 1947 lease.
the boardwalk concessions without adverThe prosecutor thereafter applied for
tising for bids. At various campaign meet- and was granted a writ of certiorari to reings and in 'a number of cam.\laign releases view the resolution of March 9, 1948, conthe then mayor stated only that the con- tending that it was invalid in view of the
cessions leased to the prosecutor were held prior commitment made by the borough to
by him under the three-year lease of him under the lease of February, 1947.
1945, Not once did he mention the .lease After argument the former Supreme Court
executed on February 4, 1947. In April, held (1) that there was no statl1tory reone of the opposition candidates, Howard quirement that the bOrDugh could lease only
H'lyes, sought to e.."Camine the municipal upon advertisement and bids, {2) that the
minutes and re,cords, but was refused per- resolution of February 4, 1947 awarding the
mission by the then mayor until after the lease to prosecutor "was not publicly and
election on May 13th. Following an appli- legally adopted and therefore of llO force
cation by Hayes fOT a writ of mandamus and effect," and, (3) that the rule of law
to permit such inspection, the mayor cap- prohibiting a collateral attack upon 11111itulated and Hayes and a companion ex- nicipal ordinances or resolutions did not
amined the minute books. Hayes testified prevent the court in a case involving fraud
on the taking of depositions that he looked and bad faith "from looking to evidence
at the minute book with care, but found no concerning the approval of the resolution
reference whatever to the February, 1947, beyond the minute book of the municipallease. When he asked the acting borough ity," 1948, 137 N.J.L. 617, 61 A.2d 293, 296.
oIerk to show him all leases, ,the 1947 lease From this judgment the prosecutor appeals.
was not produced.
It will serve no useful purpose to reThe incumbents were defeated at the view at length all the ex'traordinary cirelection ,and a new board of commissioners cumstances surrounding the ,lease and the
took office on May 20, 1947. On the oc- resolution of February 4, 1947. Too many
casion of the organization meeting, the acts and statements are left unexplained.
1947 lease came to public light for the first Why execu,te a lease in February, 1947, eftime, when the acting borough derk turned fective immediately, w.hen the existing
it over to the new mayor with the state- lease of 1945 did not expire until Navel11ment that she had put it in her general ber? The prosecutor explains that he
files at the time of its execution and had wanted securi'ty in order to make improveforgotten to refile it with the other leases ments on the leased property. The borough
of the borough and that while dleaning out officials on ,their part, feared another deher files preparatory to turning over he'r pression. But where in the new aease is
duties to the new borough clerk she had there any provision for such improvejust run across it. In her testimony she ments? Except for dates and amounts
claimed she had forgotten all about it it is identical with the old lease. The resowhen asked by Hayes ,to produce all leases. lution of February 4th authorized the
Thereupon the new board. of commis- borough solicitor to draw up a lease and
sioners, .although recognizing the 1945 lease provided for "payments 'Outlined in lease,"
and accepting the prosecutor's tendered but where is the proof of compliance with
rental in payment only to the amount due the resolution? The borough solicitor was
on this lease for the summer of 1947, re- 110t even called as a witness. But why
'fused to consider itself bound by the 1947 such a resolution at all, when the prO'seculease. On March 9, 1948 the board adopted tor had brought a new lease with him and
a resolution authorizing the leasing of the the borough officials had obligingly signed
boardwalk concessions on bids after public it? Why did the borough commissioners fail
advertisement and directed the borough to act on ,the lease at a public meeting?
oIerk to advertise for bids. The bids re- Why did the then mayor refuse to permit
ceived on all of the concessions in the ag- an inspeotion of the minute book and leases
gregate for a single year exceeded the rent- by an interested citizen until subjected to

ANSCHELEWITZ v. BOROUGH OF BELMAR
Cite as 65 A.2d 825

judicial pressure? Why did the acting municipal clerk thereafter conceal the resolution and the lease unti;! the election waS
over and the new commission was about
to organize? Why did the then mayor
throughout !:he campaign conceal the existence of the 1947 lease? Why if ,the 1947
lease were to take effect immediately, notwithstanding the fact that the 1945 lease
did not expire until November, 194i, was
there no release of the unexpired term
of the 1945 lease? Was the prosecutor to
pay rent from February to November under each lease? One might continue indefinitely asking pertinent questions n0where answered by the evidence.
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to be prepared by the borough solicitor.
Apparently the borough solicitor never prepared a lease, why not we are not told.
It may weill be he was never asked to d'O
so. In any event, it is significant that he
was not called as a witness. Moreover,
the resolution goes no f,urther than to authorize the borough solicitor to prepare a
lease, which the commission was free toaccept or reject. The actual execution of a
lease is nowhere aubh-orized by resolution.
Nor have the schedule 'Of payments under
the 1ease, which were to emerge for the
first time in the lease to be prepared bv
the borough solicitor, ever been pas
upon in public meeting by the bo
commission. That obviously would be
[1,2] We agree wltih the former Supossible until the borough solicitor submitpreme Court that the lease of February
ted his draft of a lease to the commission.
4, 1947, with the prosecutor, was illegally
The schedule of payments of rent ina
executed, but we prefer to base our j udglease is one of its most vital terms. Conment on the single ground that there never
ceivably the lessee might have had in
was any municipal action authorizing the
mind p'ayment of the entire rent on the
execution of the lease presented to the
last day of the four-year term, the lessor
borough commission on February 4, 1947
on the first day. The municipality has
and executed by it on that day. A munever expressed itself officially on one of
nicipality cannot act as an individual does.
the most impol1tant terms of a lease, nor
It must proceed in conformity with the
had the prosecutor been ,heard on that substatutes, or in the alYsence of statute agreeject. At no time was the municipality
al:ily te the common law, by ordinance 'Or
bound to accept the lease to be submitted
resolution or motion. City of Burlington
to it by the borough solicitor. H necessarv. Dennison, Err. & App. 1880, 42 N.J.L.
ily follows that the I~ase of February 4,
165, N. J. Good Humor, Inc., v. Bradley
194i, prepared by the prosecutm and signed
Beach, Err. & App. 1939, 124 N.J.L. 162,
by the mayor and aoting borough clerk on
11 A.2d 113. Especially is this so where real
February 4, 1947 is entirely una,uuhor;-·..rl
property is concerned. The only official acand therefore void and illegal!.
tion that purports to justify the lease of
Having reached this conclusion O'n
February 4th is the res01ution of that date.
But the resolution did not autfuorize the basis of the inadequacy 'Of the resolution
lease brought to the meeting by Anschele- February 4, 1947, a conclusion which is
witz. The resolution merely authorized "the peculiarly inescapable in view of the many
borough solicitor to draw up (sic) lease suspicions and entirely unexplained cire
with Leon Anschelewitz for the following cumstances surrounding the transaction, we
concessions (,listing eight) all located ad- do not find it necessary to pass at >this time
jacent to the Boardwalk in the BOl'Ough of on the specific holdings of the former SuBelmar, New Jersey, for the term com- preme C'Ourt, but they will be reserved
mencing February 4, 1947, and expiring on for later consideration in appropriate cases.
February 4, 1951, at the term rental of
The judgment below is affirmed.
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred ($11,500.00) Dollars, payments outlined in lease."
For affirmance: Chief Justice VANThe lease in controversy is not the lease DERBILT and Justices CASE, OLIBURLING
and ACKERauthorized in the resO'lution. The lease in PI-IANT,
controversy was prep.ared by Anschelewitz ; SON-5.
the lease the resolution contemplMes was
For reversal: None.
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.'LexisNexis·
LEXSEE 3 NY.2D 434
Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Association, Inc., et aI., Respondents, v. Town of
Hempstead, Appellant
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Court of Appeals of New York

3 N.Y.2d 434; 144 N.E.2d 409; 165 N.Y.S.2d 737; 1957 N.y. LEXIS 903
April 4,1957, Argued
July 3, 1957, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:

Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Assn. v. Town ofHempstead, 1 A D 2d 1028, reversed.

Appeal, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in
the second judicial department, entered May 31, 1956, unanimously affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in Nassau County upon a decision of the court at Special Term (D. Ormonde Ritchie, J.), granting an injunction to
plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION: Judgment reversed and matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the opinion herein, with costs in all courts.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant town challenged an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in
the Second Judicial Department (New York), which affirmed a judgment granting an injunction to respondent association in respondent's claim to uphold the restrictive covenants accompanying park land granted to and accepted by the
town.
OVERVIEW: The association granted certain land to the town to be used exclusively by its members and to be maintained by the town. The association sought enforcement of the restrictive covenant on grounds that the covenant contained in the dedication deed required the town board to maintain these beach areas in perpetuity as a public park district
for the benefit of its lot owners and to the exclusion of property in other tracts or of other members of the public for
whose benefit the town board was authorized, in its discretion, to extend the park or the park facilities under statute. The
appellate court affirmed the judgme.qt in favor of the association and the town sought review. The court reversed the
judgment and found that the town board could not legally have accepted land for park purposes on condition that the
board renounce powers and duties which the legislature had conferred upon town boards in the creation, enlargement, or
administration of town park districts.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment in favor of the association with costs and dismissed the association's
complaint without prejudice to any rights which it may have to damages or other compensation by reason of the
appropriation of easements or other property rights inhering in them under the grant, or to any other and different relief
to which they may be entitled.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
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Governments> Local Governments> Administrative Boards
Real Property Law> Ownership & Transfer> Transfer Not By Deed> Dedication> Procedure
Real Property Law> Restrictive Covenants> General Overview
[HN1] Hempstead, N.Y., Town Law §§ 190-194 and Nassau County, N.Y. Civil Divisions Act § 222.0 authorize
enlargement by town boards of the boundaries of park districts and other public districts. Hempstead, NY., Town Law §
198(4) empowers town boards to sell any property acquired for park purposes and to apply the proceeds to the purchase
of other property for park purposes, and allows town boards to fix reasonable charges for the use of parks by persons
other than inhabitants and taxpayers of such districts.

Governments> Local Governments> Administrative Boards
Governments> Local Governments> Ordinances & Regulations
[HN2] Agreements by which the public powers of a municipality are surrendered without express permission of the
legislature are beyond the powers of the municipality and void.

Governments> Local Governments> Property
Real Property Law> Ownership & Transfer> Transfer Not By Deed> Dedication> General Overview
Transportation Law> Bridges & Roads> General Overview
[HN3] Grants of land to a town for parks, buildings or structures, or for any other public use are put on a parity. Land
may be limited in dedication deeds to use for streets, parks, athletic fields and buildings may be dedicated for art galleries, sports or civic center purposes, but the use must be public. A use is not public where public benefit is incidental to a
private benefit.
HEADNOTES

Municipal corporations -- authority over parks -- Town of Hempstead may not be enjoined from permitting
use of beach areas by persons other than owners or resident tenants of land within beach tract on theory that
covenants contained in deed to town require town to maintain beach areas in perpetuity as public park district
for benefit of lot owners only -- gifts may be made to town on conditions but use must be public -- power to extend park district (Town Law, §§ 190-194; Nassau County Civil Divisions Act, § 222.0) cannot be curtailed by
conditions in deed to town.
1. Plaintiff association and its grantor, in 1941, executed and recorded a "declaration" setting aside nine parcels of
land abutting on the ocean at Atlantic Beach in the town of Hempstead as "beach areas" for the exclusive use of residents of lots designated on a map of a subdivision developed by the Association's grantor. In 1951 the Association
deeded these beach areas to the Town of Hempstead for park purposes subject to a covenant by the town not to permit
use of the park by any persons except owners or resident tenants of lots in the Atlantic Beach tract, their families or
guests. A town park district was organized as a public district under article 12 of the Town Law. Thereafter, by resolution of the town board an area known as Inlet Estates, to the east of this park district, was admitted into the park district.
In this action injunctive relief has been granted solely against the Town of Hempstead and based entirely on the theory
that the covenants contained in the dedication deed by the Association to the town require the town to maintain these
beach areas in perpetuity as a public park district for the benefit of lot owners in the Atlantic Beach tract and of them
alone. The Town of Hempstead has been enjoined from permitting the use of these beach areas by persons other than
the owners or resident tenants of land within the Atlantic Beach tract. The complaint in this action in which plaintiffs
sought such an injunction should be dismissed.
2. Under subdivision 8 of section 64 ofthe Town Law, gifts may be made to a town upon terms or conditions but
the use thereof must be public.
3. The power to extend the park district conferred on the town board by the Town Law ( §§ 190-194) and the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act (§ 222.0) cannot be and is not abrogated or curtailed by the covenants or conditions
contained in the dedication deed by the Association to the town in 1951.
4. The dismissal ofthe complaint is without prejudice to any rights which plaintiffs may have to damages or other
compensation by reason of the appropriation of easements or other property rights inhering in them under the "declaration" or to any other and different relief to which they may be entitled.
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COUNSEL: John A. Morhous. Town Attorney, for appellant. I. The covenant restricting the use of the beach and bay
areas cannot be construed to limit such use to the residents of the original district. (Ward v. Union Trust Co .• 172 App.
Div. 569; People ex rei. City o/New York v. Nixon. 229 N Y. 356.) II. The restrictions in the deed as construed by the
courts below prevent extension of the park district and are void. (Parfitt v. Ferguson, 159 N Y. 111; Wells v. Village of
East Aurora, 236 App. Div. 474; Belden v. City ofNiagara Falls, 230 App. Div. 601; Witmer v. City ofJamestown, 125
App. Div. 43.) III. The injunction puts an inequitable burden on the residents of the extended area.

Charles E. Lapp, Jr., for respondents. I. The threatened action of defendant violated the plain meaning of the covenants
in the deed. Were the terms of the deed to be considered ambiguous, their purpose, intept and proper interpretation are
apparent from the nature of the property and the circumstances under which the deed was delivered. (Beth Israel Hosp.
Assn. v. Moses, 275 N Y. 209; Campbell v. Town ofHamburg, 156 Misc. 134; Wei! v. Atlantic Beach Holding Corp.,
285 App. Div. 1080, 1 NY 2d 20.) II. The covenants and restrictions are valid and enforcible. (Beth Israel Hosp. Assn.
v. Moses, 275 NY. 209; Campbell v. Town ofHamburg, 156 Misc. 134.)
JUDGES: Dye, Froessel and Burke, JJ., concur with Van Voorhis, J.; Desmond, J., dissents in an opinion in which
Conway, Ch. J., and Fuld, J., concur.
OPINION BY: VAN VOORHIS
OPINION
[*436] [**409] [HN1] [***738J Sections 190-194 of the Town Law and section 222.0 of the Nassau County
Civil Divisions Act authorize enlargement by town boards of the boundaries of park districts and other public districts.
Section 198 (subd. 4) of the Town Law empowers town boards to sell any property acquired for park purposes and to
apply the proceeds to the purchase of other property for park purposes, and allows town boards to ftx reasonable
charges for the use of parks by persons other than inhabitants and taxpayers of such districts. The issue on this appeal
concerns whether the Town Board of the Town [**410] of Hempstead is deprived of these powers by negative covenants, exclusive easements or restrictions contained in a dedication deed of land for park purposes accepted by the town
in 1951.
Plaintiff Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Association, Inc. (hereafter called the Association) and its grantor in
1941 • executed and recorded what is termed a declaration, setting aside nine parcels of land abutting on the ocean at
Atlantic Beach in the town of Hempstead, Long Island as "beach areas" for the exclusive use of residents of lots designated upon a map of a subdivision developed by the Association's grantor. This was a private transaction between private individuals and corporations. In 1951 the Association deeded these beach areas to the Town of Hempstead for park
purposes, but subject to covenant by the town not to permit use of the park by any persons except owners or resident
tenants of lots in the Atlantic Beach tract, their families or guests. A town park district was organized as a public district
under article 12 ofthe Town Law. Several years later a new subdivision was developed by others known as Inlet Estates
alongside of this park district upon the east. The lot owners oflnlet Estates did not object to helping to pay necessary
charges for the park district, but they wanted to get into it upon any reasonable terms, consequently they circulated a
petition for the annexation of Inlet Estates to the Atlantic Beach Park District which was ordered, pursuant to statute, by
a resolution of the town board admitting [***739] Inlet Estates into this park district on June 9, 1953. The Association
and some of the owners of lots within the Atlantic Beach subdivision object to the extension of this park district so as to
annex any land which was not part of the Atlantic Beach [*437] tract. The town board takes the position that the owners oflots in Inlet Estates are citizens and property owners in the town of Hempstead, entitled to the equal protection of
the laws along with the Association and owners oflots in the Atlantic Beach tract. They contend that the Town Law and
the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act contemplate that growing communities like the Town of Hempstead will not
remain static, and that in the wisdom of the Legislature the town board has been empowered to extend and enlarge park
districts which is its duty if the occasion requires. It is argued that the town board is a public body organized for the
govemment of the town and the securing of the common interests of the people of Hempstead and of the public. These
are public officers and their statutory powers, it is contended, cannot be abrogated or curtailed by private agreement.
Consequently it is asserted that the restrictive covenants contained in the deed by the Association to the town purporting
to limit these beach areas for the use of people in the Atlantic Beach tract are ineffective to limit the power of the town
board to extend the park district in the interest of the whole community.
* In 1942 a similar "declaration" was made respecting certain "bay areas" which are not at issue in this action.
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The situation thus disclosed resolves itself into several components: by private covenant in the declaration executed
and recorded in 1941, these beach areas were limited to use by lot owners in the original tract, their families and guests,
after which the Association appears to have been powerless to devote them to other uses without their consent. This
declaration was in the nature of a restrictive covenant or a grant of exclusive easements running with the land. Having
entered into this private agreement with its predecessor in title and the lot owners, the Association could not deed these
beach areas to the town except subject to these exclusive easements or restrictive covenants. The dedication deed delivered by the Association to the Town of Hempstead in 1951, by assuming to impose parallel restrictions, probably
amounted to a conveyance of these areas subject to the declaration made by the Association in 1941 provided that the
town could legally accept the lands on those tenns. The town had [**411] constructive notice of the declaration from
its having been recorded. We entertain little doubt that whatever private rights became vested in lot owners in the Atlantic Beach tract by this declaration could have been enforced and perhaps may [*438] yet be enforced against the town
and against owners oflots in the new subdivision known as Inlet Estates. Neither the Association nor the town board
could absolve these beach areas from private restrictions to which [***740] they were subject except by the lot owners'
consents or by condemnation of their exclusive easements to the use of the areas.
The difficulty with plaintiffs' position in this action, as it seems to us, is that the injunctive relief asked and granted
is not based on private easements reserved for the benefit of lots in the Atlantic Beach tract by the declaration of 1941.
That declaration is not mentioned in the complaint nor in the opinion of the trial court. The relief granted is solely
against the Town of Hempstead and is based entirely upon the theory that the covenants contained in the dedication
deed by the Association to the town in 1951 require the town board to maintain these beach areas in perpetuity as a public park district for the benefit oflot owners in the Atlantic Beach tract and of them alone. It may be that without extinguishing these private easements to exclusive use of the beach areas the town board lacked power to form this park district in the beginning, or that by extending it in derogation of their rights these property owners became entitled to damages or to be otherwise compensated for the appropriation of their property rights. The town board could not legally
have accepted land for park purposes on condition that the board renounce powers and duties which the Legislature has
conferred upon town boards in the creation, enlargement or administration of town park districts. [HN2] Agreements by
which the public powers of a municipality are surrendered without express permission of the Legislature are beyond the
powers of the municipality and void 00 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations [3d ed.], § 29.07, p. 190 et seq.; Parfitt
v. Ferguson, 159 N Y. 111; Wells v. Village o/East Aurora, 236 App. Div. 474; Belden v. City o/Niagara Falls, 230
App. Div. 601; Witmer v. City ofJamestown, 125 App. Div. 43). This town board could not divest itself of powers which
the Legislature has deemed advisable to adapt park districts to the needs of growing communities. Unless power to
enlarge such a district had been included in these statutes the Legislature might have seen fit to withhold power to form
park districts, rather than to grant it in such manner as to enable public parks to be limited by agreement to the use of
particular private individuals.
[*439] Plaintiffs do not allege any unlawful exercise of power by the town board in establishing the park district
in the beginning due to these clauses in the private declaration instrument of 1941 imposing restrictions running with
the land which may have been inconsistent with the acceptance of the property by the town board for a park district at
the outset; plaintiffs in their complaint assert no right, title or interest in the land, but on the contrary want these areas to
be used as a public park district with whatever benefits accrue from town maintenance, but they wish this to be done
exclusively for themselves and others in the Atlantic [***741] Beach tract to the exclusion of property in other tracts
or of other members of the public for whose benefit the town board is authorized, in its discretion, to extend the park or
the park facilities under statutes in such case made and provided.
The relief granted by the judgment appealed from consists, to be sure, in restraining the Town of Hempstead from
permitting the use of these beach areas by persons other than the owners or resident tenants of land within the Atlantic
Beach tract, but the opinion of Special Term and the factual allegations in the complaint as well as the stipulation of
facts on which the action was tried demonstrate that the town is not restrained as a trespasser, or by reason [**412] of
any right or easement in the land arising from the declaration document, but that the effect is to grant mandatory relief
to compel the town board to administer these areas as a public park for plaintiffs' private benefit and to the exclusion of
all others who are entitled to participate under the subsequent action of the town board in admitting Inlet Estates pursuant to power conferred by the Town Law and the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act.
To be sure, the basis for Special Tenn's decision, affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, is section 64
(subd. 8) of the Town Law, which provides: "Gifts to town. May take by gift, grant, bequest or devise and hold real and
personal property absolutely or in trust for parks or gardens, or for the erection of statues, monuments, buildings or
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structures, or for any public use, upon such terms or conditions as may be prescribed by the grantor or donor and accepted by said town, and provide for the proper administration of the same."
[HN3] Grants ofland to a town for parks, buildings or structures, or for any other public use are put on a parity.
Land may be [*440] limited in dedication deeds to use for streets, parks, athletic fields or the like. Buildings may be
dedicated for art galleries, sports or civic center purposes. But the use must be public, and a use is not public where
public benefit is incidental to a private benefit (Denihan Enterprises v. O'Dwyer, 302 N Y. 451,458, per Froessel, J.).
Under section 64 (subd. 8) of the Town Law, for example, a dedication deed ofland to a town could limit its use to
street purposes, but could not have a condition attached that the street shall be used only by inhabitants of a designated
tract or subdivision (People v. Grant, 306 N Y. 258).
It is possible that plaintiff Association and the lot owners in the Atlantic Beach tract might obtain an injunction
preventing the use of these beach areas for park purposes unless the Town of Hempstead perfects its title by condemning or otherwise acquiring the exclusive easements which vested in the lot owners by the declaration instrument recorded [***742] in 1941. We are not required to pass upon that issue on this appeal. Here plaintiffs have obtained
what is, in effect, a mandatory injunction compelling the town board to operate these areas as a public park for the benefit of these lot owners alone, being forever prohibited from exercising the statutory power of enlarging the boundaries of
the park district or admitting others to the use of the park on a suitable financial basis.
We do not pass upon whether the owners oflots in the Atlantic Beach tract are entitled to damages or compensation
in some form for the appropriation of whatever exclusive private easements they acquired under the declaration of 1941,
nor on any question of reversion due to possible breach of condition by the town in enlarging the district. We hold
merely that the power to extend the park district conferred on the town board by sections 190-194 of the Town Law and
section 222.0 of the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act cannot be and is not abrogated or curtailed by the covenants or
conditions contained in the dedication deed by the Association to the town in 1951.
The judgment should be reversed with costs, and the complaint dismissed without prejudice to any rights which
plaintiffs may have to damages or other compensation by reason of the appropriation of easements or other property
rights inhering in them under the declaration of 1941 (Ex. 2) or to any other and different relief to which they may be
entitled.
DISSENT BY: DESMOND
DISSENT
[*441] Desmond, 1. (dissenting) In 1951 defendant town accepted from the corporate plaintiff, without consideration, a dee,d of certain water-front property. The deed contained this language:
"This conveyance of the foregoing lands to the Town of Hempstead is made for the [**413] establishment of the
above described lands as parks within the Atlantic Beach Park District, said District to include all lands shown on the
aforementioned maps.
"And the party of the second part does hereby covenant and agree with the party of the first part as follows:
.. 1. That it will not permit the aforesaid beach areas to be used by any persons except the owners and! or resident
tenants of land within the district and situated north of the center line of Ocean Boulevard as shown on the aforementioned map, together with the immediate families and non-paying house guests of the said owners and!or resident tenants;
"2. That it will not permit the aforesaid bay areas to be used by any persons other than the owners and!or resident
tenants ofland within the district and situate north of the center line of Ocean Boulevard as [***743] shown on the
aforementioned map, together with the immediate families and non-paying house guests of said owners and!or resident
tenants and other than the owners and!or resident tenants of land within the district and situated south of the center line
of Ocean Boulevard as shown on the aforementioned map, together with the members of any and all beach clubs located
on said land."
In direct violation of that covenant the town in 1953 extended the Atlimtic Beach Park District to include a new
subdivision adjoining the Atlantic Beach area for the benefit of whose residents the above covenants were made. This
suit is brought to restrain that violation. The courts below validly granted the injunction.
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The facts are undisputed. The Atlantic Beach community was founded in 1926 by the filing of subdivision maps
including the beach-front lands the use of which is in dispute here. The developer of Atlantic Beach, selling several
hundred lots, reserved to itself title to the beach. In 1941 and 1942 a corporation which had acquired title to the beachfront lands executed and recorded a "declaration" restricting the use of those beach areas to the owners and residents of
lots shown on the Atlantic Beach subdivision maps. Later there was formed by and for the benefit of those property
owners, plaintiff Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Association, Inc., which took and held title [*442] to the reserved
properties until 1951. Meanwhile boathouses and other facilities had been built on the beaches for the use of the owners
and occupants of the benefited area. All other persons were kept off the beaches. The large expense for maintenance of
these facilities was borne by plaintiff Association but some of the residents of Atlantic Beach failed or refused to pay
their shares of those costs. Someone thought up the idea of establishing a park district so that title to the beach areas
would be in a public corporation empowered to assess the Atlantic Beach property owners for their proportions of the
expense burden. Pursuant to statute (see Town Law, art. 12, and Nassau County Civil Divisions Act, § 222.0) and after
public hearings, etc., the town board in 1950 established the Atlantic Beach Park District. The new district comprised
the Atlantic Beach subdivisions. Pursuant to the plan, plaintiff Association in 1951 conveyed the beach front to the
town, for the park district, by deed containing the restrictions set forth in the first paragraph of this opinion. In 1953 the
town, acting under section 190 et seq. of the Town Law and section 222.0 of the Nassau County Civil Divisions Act,
extended the Atlantic Beach Park District to include a new, adjoining subdivision owned by persons not associated in
interest with plaintiffs. The purpose of the park district extension was, of course, to allow the residents of the newly
developed residential area to use the beaches in defiance of the restrictive covenants.
[***744J There is no doubt as to the meaning of those restrictions and there should be no doubt of their validity.
Express authorization for the acceptance by a town of such a conditional gift is in subdivision 8 of section 64 ofthe
Town Law: "8. Gifts to town. May take by gift, grant, bequest or devise and hold real and personal property [**414]
absolutely or in trust for parks or gardens, or for the erection of statues, monuments, buildings or structures, or for any
public use, upon such terms or conditions as may be prescribed by the grantor or donor and accepted by said town, and
provide for the proper administration of the same." Such a grant as this is no new thing (see Campbell v. Town of Hamburg, 156 Misc. 134 [1935J, and cases cited). The arrangement made in 1950 did not produce the anomaly ofa "private
park" maintained by public funds for the use of a few. The Atlantic Beach subdivision lot owners, several hundred in
number and already owning the right to use the beaches to the exclusion of the public, continued that situation and preserved [*443] that right by setting up the park district consisting of their properties only. They themselves continued
as before to pay the expense, the only difference being that it was now collected through assessments levied by those
same lot owners against themselves through the park district. The town did not provide them with a park. They provided it for themselves. The deed to the town was a mere step in accomplishing all this. The town had no interest of its
own, paid nothing for the deed and has been put to no expense. Plainly, the town in attempting to destroy the restrictions by the device of extending the park district is guilty of wrongdoing.
The attempted justification is that pertinent statutes have always authorized the extension of park districts and that
the 1950-1951 transaction was subject to that power. But those "Improvement District" sections (§ 190 et seq.) of the
Town Law must be read with subdivision 8 of section 64 ofthe Town Law (supra). The latter statute, authorizing the
town to take a conditional gift of real property, must in common sense and good morals mean that the town is bound to
comply with the conditions in the grant. For that purpose and to that extent subdivision 8 of section 64 of the Town Law
must override section 193 ofthe Town Law when necessary to enforce the conditions of this valid gift. This does not
mean that the town in accepting the gift voluntarily and illegally surrendered its governmental power to extend this park
district. It never had any power, governmental or otherwise, to open up the Atlantic Beach water front to newcomers.
Its general authority to enlarge park districts was by law subject to its obligation to comply with the conditions it had
agreed to in the grant. The power to extend and the duty to live up to the conditions are here mutually exclusive. Ifwe
must make a choice, we should hold legal that course of official conduct which is in accord with right and morality.
[***745] Plaintiffs are entitled to court protection of their rights and injunction is the proper remedy. The injunction here granted did no more than restrain the town from permitting the use of the beach areas by persons other than
owners and residents of Atlantic Beach. Such was the burden the town assumed by acceptance of the deed. It is not for
us to tell the parties how or whether the town by condemnation or otherwise may remove that burden.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
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Tax Court indicated that the term was to
be given its "usual meaning in law," citing
State Tax Comm. v. Whitehall, 214 Md.
316, 320, 135 A.2d 298 (1957). The Tax
Court correctly noted that, contrary to
MSBA's contention, the issue of the proper
construction of the term "educational" was
not addressed by this Court in Md. State
Fair v. Supervisor, 225 Md. 574, 172 A.2d
132 (1961). That case involved taxes
sought to be levied against certain property
of the Maryland State Fair and Agricultural Society, Inc., which operated the
Maryland State Fair. It was conceded that
the Society was an educational institution;
the concession was based largely on an
opinion of then Attorney General Hall
Hammond that the Society was an educational organization entitled to a sales tax
exemption under the statute. 36 Op.Att'y
Gen. 303 (1951). It was there noted that
the Society, in its conduct of the State Fair,
was a nonprofit organization incorporated
"to save the State Fair for the benefit of
Maryland farmers, breeders and those interested in the conservation of natural resources, as well as of the general public
and the citizens of the State." ld. at 304.
The opinion sets forth a number of cases
throughout the country holding that a
State Fair is an educational institution or
organization, notwithstanding its incidental
amusement programs. Those cases, according to the Attorney General, found
State Fairs to be educational because they
were planned and managed for the general
welfare of the people to inform them about
the resources of the region in matters pertaining to agriculture and industry, and
methods by which they may be conserved,
utilized, and improved. In finding the Society exempt from sales tax, the Attorney
General stressed that the State Fair had
been exempt from property taxes since
1867 and that this was a "clear indication
of a public policy that such organizations
are entitled to exemption" to further educational purposes. ld. at 309. Finding no
such indication of a similar public policy in
favor of exempting the MSBA, and after
considering the evidence, the Tax Court
concluded that that organization was not
primarily educational.

the general rule that exemption from taxation must be for a public purpose. Wilson
v. Board of Co. Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 44,
327 A.2d 488 (1974); Katzenberg v. Comptroller, 263 Md. 189, 197, 282 A.2d 465
(1971); Kimball-Tyler v. Balto. City, 214
Md. 86, 97, 133 A.2d 433 (1957). See also
71 Am.Jur.2d State and Local Taxation,
§§ 307, 362, and 382 (1973). Manifestly,
the term "educational institution or organization" in § 326(i) is not limited to
schools, colleges or universities. Through
its various functioning parts, the MSBA
does provide a measure of systematic instruction to and for its members to enhance
their ability to better serve the public good,
a well·recognized public purpose. And
some of the Association's educational pursuits are aimed more directly at educating
the public on law-related matters of substantial public importance. We thus look
to the entity seeking exemption as an educational organization as a whole to ascertain its primary or dominant purpose. See,
e.g., Annotation, Exemption of Charitable
or Educational Organization from Sales
or Use Tax, 59 A.L.R.3d 748-773 (1974);
Annotation, What are Educational Institutions or Schools within State Property
Tax Exemption, 34 A.L.R.4th 698-754
(1984). And see generally 68 Am.Jur.2d.
Sales and Use Taxes § 116 (1973). We
therefore shall direct that the case be remanded to the Tax Court to apply the proper legal test to the facts as it finds them in
making this determination.

While the Tax Court purported to apply
the "usual meaning in law" of the Word
"educational," as used in § 326(i), we are
unable to glean from its opinion what it
found that meaning to be. In determining
that the MSBA was not primarily an edu.
cational organization, the Tax Court emphasized that the Association has a "professional orientation," that the bulk of its
services are provided to its own members,
and that the members pay dues to receive
them. Upon this premise, the Tax Court
appeared to make a per se determination
that the MSBA's educational activities
were but an incidental by-product of the
Association's overall function to promote
and protect the professional interests of its
members. To apply such a test, we think,
would constitute an error of law; it would
propogate too restrictive a view of the "ed.
ucational organization" exemption of
§ 326(i), one plainly at odds with the legis.
lative intention.
[3] As in Supervisor v. Group Health
Ass'n, supra, involving the meaning of the
word "charitable," whether an organization
is primarily educational requires a careful
examination of its stated purposes, the actual work performed by it, and in particular
the nature and extent of its educational
activities. Merely because education is
provided to dues paying members of the
Association and not directly to the public
does not, contrary to the intimation in the
Minnesota State Bar case, disentitle the
organization to the exemption. In other
words, because the MSBA's educational ac·
tivities may be predominantly for its memo
bers is not alone determinative of whether
the Association is an educational organization in the sense contemplated by § 326(i).

[4] To be entitled to an exemption
based solely on the educational organization exemption, the organization's focus
must be shown to be primarily educational.
In the context of a tax exemption statute,
Black's Law Dictionary 461 (5th ed. 1979)
defines "educational purposes" of an educational organization to encompass "systematic instruction in any and all branches
of learning from which a substantial public
benefit is derived." This is consistent with

I
I

I

--l

The Tax Court's opinion does not indicate
with any degree of clarity whether it considered the MSBA's charitable and educational activities as a combination, or only
separately, in making its decision. We
think the correct test for measuring an
organization's tax exempt status under
§ 326(i) is to consider its charitable and
educational activities in combination in de·
termining its exempt status. See City of
Nome v. Catholic Bishop of No. Alaska,
707 P.2d 870, 880 (Alaska 1985). Accord·
ingly, the case will be remanded to the Tax
Court to determine (1) the degree to which
the MSBA conducts educational programs
and activities within the ambit of § 326(i);
(2) whether education is the Association's
primary purpose; and (3) if the Association's focus is not primarily educational,
whether the combination of its charitable
and educational activities together mount
up to an organization engaged primarily in
educational and charitable pursuits under
the statute.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

III.
[5] The MSBA argues that the Tax
Court also made an error of law in interpreting § 326(i) to require that it be primarily charitable or primarily educational, as
opposed to being primarily a charitable and
educational organization. In this regard
the MSBA points out that the parties are in
agreement that the organization must be
primarily educational or charitable or a
combination of both, to be accorded the
exemption; and that if it spends over half
its budget on either educational or charitable activities, or both, it is an organization
which qualifies for the exemption.

FOR BALTIMORE CITY VACATED;
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS THAT IT REMAND
THE CASE TO THE MARYLAND TAX
COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION;
COSTS TO ABIDE THE RESULT.
GILBERT, J., concurs in the result.

314 Md. 675
ATTMAN/GLAZER P.E. COMPANY

v.

MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF
ANNAPOLIS.
No. 115, Sept. Term, 1986.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 8, 1989.
Motion for Reconsideration Denied
March 28, 1989.
Company brought three appeals from
decisions of city council denying its applica-
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tions for conditional use of property and
denying temporary use and occupancy permit. The Circuit Court, Anne Arundel
County, James C. Cawood, Jr., J .• affirmed.
Company appealed to Court of Special Appeals which also affirmed. Petition for
certiorari was granted. The Court of Appeals. McAuliffe, J., held that while municipality could enter into binding agreement
concerning aspects of case when case was
on appeal, it could not lawfully bind itself
to future zoning or conditional use decision.
Affirmed.

on appeal, it may not contract away the
exercise of its zoning power.

sponding changes to the zoning map, and
apparently without the necessity of resubdividing the property before construction.

The property in question is bounded bv
Northwest, Calvert, and Clay Streets in th~
City of Annapolis, and is currently improved by a four-story office building. The
property has had a rather difficult development history, involving the urban renewal
efforts of the city, litigation between the
city and the developer, and a cloudy zoning
classification picture. The property Consists of two parcels, 7D and 17, which were
acquired and assembled by the city as 3
part of an urban renewal project. When
originally placed in the city's Urban Renew1. Zoning and Planning <e:=>13
Mayor and aldermen could not by al Plan,1 parcel 7D was designated for
agreement lawfully bind themselves to fu- neighborhood commercial and business use,
ture zoning or conditional use decision and parcel 17 for residential use. Attsince municipality could not contract away man/Glazer P.B. Company (hereinafter
<lAG") successfully bid for the right to
exercise of its zoning powers.
develop the land, and in 1977 filed an appli2. Estoppel <e:=>62.4
cation for a change in the Urban Renewal
A municipality is not estopped to as- Plan. Proposing construction of a commersert its own illegal action.
cial office building, AG asked that the two
parcels be designated for commercial use
Steven R. Migdal (Manis, Wilkinson, Sni- and that approval be given for construcder & Goldsborough, Chartered, on the tion.
brief) Annapolis, for appellant.
AG's 1977 application is not in this
Gary M. Elson, Asst. City Atty. (Jona- record. We infer from the records which
than A. Hodgson, City Atty., on the brief), are before us that AG originally sought
two things: a change in the classification
Annapolis, for appellee.
of the property in the Urban Renewal Plan,
Argued before MURPHY, C.J.,
and approval of a conditional use. PreciseELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY,
ly what effect a change in classification in
COUCH' and McAULIFFE, JJ ..
the Urban Renewal Plan was intended to
CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Associate
have on the underlying zoning classificaJudge of the Court of Al?peals
tion of the property is not clear. It does
(retired, Specially Assigned).
not appear that the various use designations approved in the Urban Renewal Plan
McAULIFFE, Judge.
ever found their way onto the city's zoning
Weare here concerned with the extent to map by means of a comprehensive (or othwhich a municipality may "settle" the ap- er) map amendment. Rather, it appears
peal of a zoning or similar land use case. that at the time, all parties considered the
We conclude that although a municipality changes made in the Urban Renewal Plan
may enter into a binding agreement con- to be fully effective for purposes of develcerning certain aspects of a land use case opment, without the necessity of corre-

-,
.c
N

• Couch. J .• now retired. participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pur·
suant to the Constitution. Article IV. Section 3A.
he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

1. Code provisions dealing with urban renewal
were codified at Chapter 20A of the Annapolis
City Code (1969). Following recodification. the
current provisions are now contained in Chap.
ter 2.56 of the Code of the City of Annapolis
(\986).

We note that the procedures followed in
the amendment of the Urban Renewal Plan
were virtually the same as those prescribed
for a zoning map amendment. These procedures involved consideration and recommendation by the Annapolis Planning and
Zoning Commission, notice to the public,
and a public hearing before the ultimate
zoning authority, the mayor and aldermen
sitting as the city council.2 For purposes
of this case, we need not decide the current
zoning classification of this property, or the
effect of any inconsistency that may currently exist between the requirements of
the city's urban renewal code and its zoning code. 3 Nor need we decide whether the
conditional use mechanism was properly or
necessarily utilized in this case.· The parties proceeded on the assumption that reclassification of the property in the Urban
Renewal Plan was sufficient in lieu of formal rezoning, and that conditional use approval was required. Indulging those
same assumptions in this case allows us to
reach the question of a municipality's right
to "settle" a zoning appeal, and we therefore proceed on that basis.

AG's initial request was granted, and by
Resolution 58-77 the mayor and aldermen
amended the Urban Renewal Plan to
change the designation of Parcels 7D and
17 to commercial use. The resolution also
permitted the erection of a professional
office building, on the condition that the
owner of the building provide 252 parking
spaces. Those spaces could be located onsite, or on other property within 500 feet of
the building. By Resolution 66-77, a conditional use for the proposed office building
was approved. That conditional use authorization expired when AG was unable to
undertake construction within a prescribed
time. A new application for conditional use
was filed, and by Resolution 1-81 the ma)
or and aldermen granted a new conditional
use, requiring 18 on-site parking spaces
and 238 additional parking spaces within
600 feet of the property. The resolution
further provided that in lieu of providing
some or all of the 238 additional spaces, the
owner could make available to the building's tenants or their employees a comparable number of passes for use on the city's
shuttle bus system.
Construction of the building commenced,
albeit only after AG obtained a writ of
mandamus from the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County directing the city to issue
a building permit. s Shortly thereafter, AG

2. Prior to 1985. the name and style of the mu·
nicipal corporation was "mayor and aldermen
of the City of Annapolis." As a result of
changes in the city charter. the name of the
municipal corporation is now "City of Annapo·
lis."

3. At the time the city approved AG's initial reo
quest for redesignation. § 22-30(f) of the Code
of the City of Annapolis provided that in the
event of an inconsistency between the Urban
Renewal Plan and the zoning code. the provi·
sions of the plan would govern. However. that
language was repealed by Ordinance 12-81. effective November 17. 1981.
4. The term "conditional use" is not defined in
Article 66B of the Maryland Code (1988 Rep\.

i

i

I
I

II

J

Vol.). which comprises the grant of authority
from the State to municipalities to exercise zon·
ing powers. A conditional use is. however. essentiaJly the same as a special exception. which
is defined by state law at Article 66B. § 1.00.
According to the Annapolis City Code. a condi·
tional use is one which. because of its unique
characteristics. cannot properly be classified as

a permitted use in any particular district or
districts. Accordingly. in addition to the uses
Ihat are expressly permitted in each zone. the
Annapolis zoning code specifies conditional

uses that may be appropriate in that zone
certain criteria are met and appropriate con,
tions imposed. The problem in this case
from the fact that an office building is a
ted use in a commercial district, and is neither a

permitted nor conditional use in a residential
zone. The city suggests that at the time permission was being sought for the construction of
this office building. the city code required that
the application be treated as if it were a part of
a planned development. and thus the conditional use process was required. Although § 2.08 of
Article 66B contemplates that the power to hear
and decide special exceptions will be reposed in
a board of zoning appeals. and the City of Annapolis has created such a board. conditional
use applications in the city are decided by the
city council.

5. The director of planning and zoning had refused to approve the issuance of a building
permit. for reasons not apparent in this record.
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sought an amendment to the conditional
use to permit active use of a portion of a
basement which had theretofore been approved only for housing of mechanical
equipment. The mayor and aldermen approved the active use of 15,480 square feet
of the basement, on condition that AG provide 51 new off-street parking spaces and
comply with the parking requirements set
forth in Resolution 1-81. One week later,
the mayor and aldermen filed a modified
resolution, declaring that the new conditions and those remaining from Resolution
1-81 were interdependent and, if any condition of either resolution were declared invalid or modified by any court, the entire
conditional use would stand rescinded. AG
appealed, contending that the requirement
of creating new parking spaces was arbitrary, capricious, and impossible to fulfill,
and challenging the attempt of the modified resolution to insulate the actions of
the mayor and aldermen from judicial review. s
The mayor and aldermen, in their capacity as the municipal corporation, were
granted leave to intervene, and filed a demurrer and answer. From a memorandum
of law filed by AG, we learn that it did not
argue that the requirement of providing 51
additional parking spaces was arbitrary.
Indeed, such an argument would likely
have been futile, because the requirement
followed § 22-122(21) of the city zoning
code, which reqqired one off-street parking
space for each 300 square feet of gross
floor area of business and professional office buildings. Rather, AG argued that the
requirement of providing 51 new spaces
within 500 feet of the building was unreasonable and virtually impossible to perform, due to the lack of land in that area
which might be purchased and converted to
off-street parking. AG argued that it had
produced testimony demonstrating the reasonableness and feasibility of developing 51
additional but existing off-street parking
spaces. It pointed out that its tenant, the
Department of Economic and Community
Development, a state agency, required the
6.

C

:::..

The in terrorem provision of the modified res·
olution was subsequently declared invalid by
the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, and

additional active space in the basement,
and that the State could probably be persuaded to release 51 of the 300 spaces it
controlled in the county-owned parking garage directly across the street from AG's
building. AG claimed the evidence also
showed that the average occupancy of the
parking garage was 80 percent of capacity,
and therefore the allocation of 51 spaces
for its building would not adversely impact
the public parking in the area. In response, the city pointed to testimony that
demonstrated a critical need for off-street
parking in the immediate area of AG's
building. The city argued that the reasonableness of imposing the condition of 51
new spaces was at least fairly debatable.
Shortly before the appeal was to be
heard in the circuit court, AG and the city
reached an agreement that was designed to
avoid further court proceedings. The parties cannot now agree concerning the precise terms of that agreement. Both parties
concur that they agreed to seek a continuance of the court hearing, and that they
agreed AG would file a new application for
a conditional use. They also agree that
they discussed the feasibility of substituting the following conditions for the requirement of 51 new spaces:
1. AG would procure a release from the
State of 25 spaces of the State's 300
space allocation in the county parking garage across the street from the
building.
2. AG would pay $75,000 to the city, to
be credited to the off-street parking
capital improvement budget as a contribution toward eventual parking
improvements in the area.
AG contends that the city flatly agreed to
approve the application on th~se conditions,
and that the requirement for the filing of a
new application was intended to be a mere
matter of form. AG finds some succor for
this argument in the language employed by
the mayor in his memorandum to the aldermen proposing the settlement:
no appeal has been taken from that determina·
tion.
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I .recommend immediate acceptance of the mayor and aldermen should grant the
thIS o!~er. If accepted, developer will amended conditional use on the terms disexpedltJo~sly ap~l! for a formal amend- cussed by the parties, the motion to enforce
ment of Its condItIOnal use to reflect the the agreement would become moot
settlement. In addition, the trial would
.
be postponed until the conditional use is
The gears of the city's conditional use
approved at which time developer would p~ocess we~e again engaged. The commisdismiss the case, paying the costs.
slon ~ade Its recommendation to the city
The city, on the other hand contends that council (comprised of the mayor and alderit agreed only to a postpdnement of the men), .and that. body held a public hearing.
circuit court hearing to allow AG to at- Th: cIty counCIl t~en ~enied the new applitempt to secure an amended conditional use catJo~, thus leavmg m place the earlier
upon the conditions discussed by the par- requ~rement of providing 51 new off-street
ties. It says the mayor and aldermen act- parkmg spaces. Concerning the earlier
ing solely in their capacity as the municipal agreement, the council acknowledged that
corporation, thereby signified that they felt the ~a!or and aldermen had reached a
the proposed conditions were fair and "p~ehmmary understanding" with AG, but
would likely be approved, but that the may- saId that t~e entire agreement was subject
or and aldermen did not, and in fact could to the zonmg process, and that the council
not, enter into a binding agreement that was t~erefore free to exercise its indepen!hey, in their capacity as the zoning author- d.ent Judgment on the application. AddiIty, would approve the conditional use on tlOnally, the council found: that the prothose terms.
posed amendment did not conform to existThe amended conditional use was not ing zoning regulations because 51 spaces
granted on the terms contemplated by the we~e required, a?d those spaces were reparties in their agreement. In fact, when qUlred to ,be on-sIte; that the city code did
AG presented its revised application to the not perr~\1t monetary remuneration in lieu
Planning and Zoning Commission (a body of . r:qUlred off-street parking; that the
separate from the mayor and aldermen), bUlld:ng ,;as constructed on land which
that commission refused to make any rec- re~amed m .the residential zoning c1assifiommendation. Acting on the advice of its cation and It would be inappropriate to
staff, the commission held that before the enlarge an unlawful use; that the proposed
application could be approved the property amendment would be detrimental to the
wo~ld have to be rezoned, and the zoning health, safety, and welfare of the public
ordmance would have to be amended to because the area was "woefully lacking" in
permit payment into the off-street parking public parking facilities and any reduction
fund as an alternative to providing spaces of the 51 new spaces originally required
otherwise required. The commission said would exacerbate a parking situation that
the proposed conditional use was illegal, wa~ already over capacity; and, that alloand therefore it had no jurisdiction to ac- catmg 25 spaces in the county parking garage to the use of the tenants of AG's
cept it or to act on it.
AG returned to court, and filed in the building would likely send 25 all-day parpending appeal a "Motion to Enforce Set- kers who then used the garage into the
t1ement Agreement." Judge James C. Ca- stree.ts, thereby aggravating a difficult
",:,ood, Jr., after first finding that the par- parkmg and traffic congestion problem
ties had entered into a settlement agree- that had. only grown worse since the origiment, deferred action on the motion to en- nal reqUIrement of 51 new spaces had been
force that agreement. He held that the imposed two years before.
AG filed an appeal from the latest denial,
Planning and Zoning Commission could not
refuse to act on the application, and that and the circuit court consolidated that apAG should be given a reasonable time to peal with the earlier appeal involving Resosecure a court order compelling the com- lution 1-81. In the meantime, a third apmission to proceed. He reasoned that if peal, involving the action of the city board
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of appeals in denying a temporary use and
occupancy permit to AG, had reached the
circuit court, and was consolidated with the
other cases for hearing.
Judge Cawood heard the consolidated appeals, including the motion to enforce the
settlement agreement. No request was
made to the court for leave to introduce
testimony bearing on the terms of the
agreement, nor was any testimony taken.
Judge Cawood held that the city was estopped from using the zoning of the property as a bar to the issuance of an occupancy permit. He also held that unless the
existence of the settlement agreement compelled a contrary result, the action of the
city council in 1) requiring 51 new parking
spaces as a condition to the active use of
the basement area, and 2) denying the
amendment which would have substituted
25 existing spaces and a $75,000 payment
for the 51 space requirement, would be
affirmed. Turning to the agreement,
Judge Cawood again assumed the existence
of a binding settlement agreement, but
found that AG had not performed its end of
the bargain because it had not obtained
from the State a release in perpetuity of
the 25 spaces in the parking garage. The
net result was that AG was found to be
entitled to continue the use and occupancy
of the building in accordance with the conditional use granted by Resolution 1-81,
but was denied its request to conduct any
active use in the basement area of the
bUilding.
AG appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Although it appealed generally
from the dispositions made in the three
consolidated cases, AG limited the scope of
its appeal by presenting to the intermediate
appellate court only the question of whether the circuit court erred in refusing to
enforce the settlement agreement. The
Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported
opinion, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court. We granted AG's petition for certiorari, and we now affirm.
As we have indicated, there is J serious
disagreement between the parties I with re-

ATTMAN v. MAYOR
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speet to the terms of their settlement
agreement. Clearly, there was an agreement of some kind, and the objective of the
agreement was to settle the controversy.
The parties made no attempt to reduce
their agreement to writing, and no one has
testified concerning what was said. Both
sides have relied upon a memorandum sent
by the mayor to the eight aldermen, setting
forth his understanding of the proposed
agreement and requesting their concurrence. We think the memorandum is ambiguous with respect to the terms that are
in dispute. Resolution of the ambiguity is
not required, however, because the result is
the same with either of the two possible
constructions.
[1] If, as AG contends, the agreement
was intended to require the city council to
grant an amended conditional use on the
conditions specified, the agreement was invalid. Without reaching the contentions of
the city that 1) the mayor and aldermen
acting in their capacity as the municipal
corporation could not bind the mayor and
aldermen acting in their capacity as the
designated zoning authority, and 2) the action was in violation of the state "sunshine" law requiring open meetings,7 we
hold that the mayor and aldermen could not
by agreement lawfully bind themselves to
a future zoning or conditional use decision,
We do so on the familiar premise that a
municipality may not contract away the
exercise of its zoning powers. Baylis v.
City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 170, 148
A.2d 429 (1959); 10 McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, § 29.07 (3d ed. 1981); 2
Anderson, American Law of Zoning 3d,
§ 9.21 (1986); 4 Yokley, Zoning Law and
Practice, § 25-11 (4th ed. 1979).

AG recognizes the existence of this general principle, but argues that it applies
only to cases involving contract or conditional .zoning, and has no application in
cases involving conditional uses. It is true
that the principle most frequently has been
cited in cases involving the contractual imposition of conditions or restrictions where
zoning reclassification has been sought and
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conditional zoning was not permitted. This when the zoning code specifically contemCourt has uniformly condemned the prac- plates the imposition of conditions, as in
tice of conditional or contract zoning in the the case of special exceptions and condiabsence of statutory authority for the im- tional uses. We conclude, however, that
position of conditions. See, e.g., Mont. Co. because one of the several reasons for the
v. Nat'l Capital Realty, 267 Md. 364, 373- general prohibition against contract or con75, 297 A.2d 675 (1972) (reliance by zoning ditional zoning does not apply in conditional
~utho~ty upo~ a?reement to file .cove?ants use cases, that does not, a fortiori, mean
Impo~l.ng hmlta.tlOns upon use mvahd as that an entirely separate reason-the prohiconditional zomng); Rose v. Paape, 221 bition against contracting away the exer~d: 3~9, 375-78, 157 A.2d 6~~ (1960) (mu- cise of zoning power-is similarly inappJicamClpahty cannot attach ~ondltlons to p:op- ble. If that were true, where conditional
erty zone~ or rezoned If those co~dltIo?s zoning is specifically permitted by statute 8
are
the zonmg dls- th e zomng
.
bl' t e I'ts eIf
. not umform
.throughout
. .
auth'ty
on couId olga
.
.
tnct); Baylts v. Ctty of Balttmore, supra,
219 Md. at 170, 148 A.2d 429 (rezonin
by advance contract ~ prOVide zonmg .and
'th
. g thereby render meamngless the prescnbed
.
based on agreemen ts WI owners are m-al"d)' Wakefield v Kraft 202 Md 136
zonmg procedures. We hold that the
~4~50, 96 A.2d 27' (1953) '(condition~1 re: sound policy ~hich proh~bits a .municipali~y
zoning not permitted). And cf City of from contractmg away Its zomng power IS
Baltimore v. Crane 277 Md. 198 205-06 as applicable to special exception and condi352 A.2d 786 (1976) (ordinance 'grantin~ tion.al use cas~s. as .it is to those involving
additional density upon dedication of land zomng reclaSSifications. These closely renot contract or conditional zoning where lated functions, often grouped generically
offered to all similarly situated property under the broad topic of zoning, involve the
owners); Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, exercise of the power of land use regula249 Md. 311, 323-29, 239 A.2d 748 (1968) tion that was delegated to the city by Arti(agreement by town to make favorable rec- cle 66B of the Maryland Code. Just as the
ommen dation to county zoning authority zoning authority is required to follow prodoes not violate the general rule because cedures mandated by statute, West Mont.
the zoning authority was not a party to the Ass 'n v. MNCP & P Com 'n, 309 Md. 183,
agreement); Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 186, 522 A.2d 1328 (1987), and to exercise
210, 215-17, 236 A.2d 1 (1967) (same); its unconstrained independent judgment in
Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County, deciding matters of reclassification, so too
229 Md. 42, 50-52, 181 A.2d 671 (1962) must the appropriate authority, whether
(general rule inapplicable because zoning the zoning authority or a duly authorized
authority clearly did not impose conditions board of appeals, follow required proceor rely upon representation of applicant dures and exercise independent judgment
concerning site development).
in deciding requests for special exceptions,
These cases rest, in part, on the rationale conditional uses, or variances. The carefulthat permitting conditional zoning by con- Iy structured provisions for public notice,
tract destroys the uniformity that is re- public hearings, and, in many cases, required in each zoning district. As AG quired consideration of staff or planning
points out, this rationale does not apply commission recommendations, would be
8. Conditional zoning, once roundly condemned,
appears to be in the ascendency. In Maryland,
the concept has evolved indirectly through the
use of various zoning devices such as planned
developments, and has found at least limited
favor with the state legislature. See Article 66B,
§ 4.0I(b) permitting a county or municipal corporation to impose certain conditions at the
time of zoning or_ rezo~ing ~and: ~nd_er cer!ain

(1987); and Bd. of Co. Comm'rs v. H. Manny
Holtz. Inc., 65 Md.App. 574, 579-86, 501 A.2d
489 (1985) (holding that § 4.01(b) of Article 66B
authorizes the imposition of conditions applicable to structural and architectural character of
the land and improvements thereon, and does
not authorize conditional use rezoning). We
need not, and do not, offer an opinion concernins! the intermediate annellate court's internreta.
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stripped of all meaning and purpose if the
decision-making body had previously bound
itself to reach a specific result. This principle is not limited to agreements of questionable legality, or to those made in
smoke-filled rooms; it applies as well to
those made openly, in good faith, and containing terms and conditions that would
otherwise be appropriate.
The potential for harm that would be
present in the absence of the rule is well
illustrated by the facts of this case. AG
and the mayor and aldermen undoubtedly
acted with the best of intentions in attempting to agree upon conditions that
they believed would not only accommodate
the needs of the public, but also could be
reasonably met by the developer. However, when subjected to the illumination of
planning commission recommendations, citizen input, current information, advice of
the city attorney, and careful reflection,
the conditions once thought appropriate
were seen by the zoning authority to be
woefully inadequate.
We need not reach the question of
whether the conditions agreed upon in this
case were themselves legally impermissible. The prohibition against contracting
away the exercise of the zoning power applies whether the conditions were valid or
invalid. Even if the mayor and aldermen
agreed to be bound to the conditions discussed, they had no authority to do so, and
the agreement cannot be enforced.

~

[2] AG further suggests that even if
the agreement is invalid, we should apply
the principle of equitable estoppel to prevent the city from relying upon that invalidity. The short answer to that contention
is that a municipality is not estopped to
assert its own illegal action. Permanent
Fin. Corp. v. Montgomery Cly., 308 Md.
239, 247-50, 518 A.2d 123 (1986); Salisbury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 63-65, 300 A.2d 367
(1973); Berwyn Heights v. Rogers, 228 Md.
271, 279-80, 179 A.2d 712 (1962).
9. See the cases collected under the annotation,

"Power of city, town. or county or their officials

We turn to the alternative possibility_
that the agreement between the parties
was simply to postpone the trial of the
zoning appeal in order to permit AG to
attempt to obtain an amended conditional
use upon conditions that at first blush appeared to be reasonable to the mayor and
aldermen. If indeed that was the agreement of the parties, we find no vice in it.
Settlements of controversies are favored.
General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md.
714, 726, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Chertkof v.
Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 550,
248 A.2d 373 (1968). cert. denied. 394 U.S.
974, 89 S.Ct. 1467, 22 L.Ed.2d 754 (1969).
It is not uncommon for the parties in litigation, particularly after each has had an
opportunity to carefully review the relevant facts and law, to discover that there
may be a common meeting ground between
them. Under certain circumstances, a municipality may agree to compromise a contested matter.9 The city in this case clearly had the authority to enter into an agreement to request a postponement of the
judicial hearing and to entertain a new or
amended application for conditional use,
provided it did not surrender or impair the
right and obligation of the city council to
independently and impartially consider the
application in accordance with procedures
established by law.

If we accept the city's construction of the
agreement, which is the construction favored by law because it results in a valid
agreement, Garfinkel v. Schwartzman,
253 Md. 710, 720, 254 A.2d 667 (1969), the
outcome of this case does not change. The
agreement was fully performed by both
sides; nothing remained to be enforced.
AG was entitled to pursue a new application for conditional use, and it did so.
When the city council denied the application, AG was entitled to pursue its original
appeal, and, if it wished, appeal the rejection of its latest application. It did both,
and the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County affirmed the action of the city
council in each case. On appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals, and before us,
to compromise claim," 15 A.L.R.2d 1359.

AG did not argue that the actions of the

1. Frauds, Statute of *",129(1)
city council were arbitrary, capricious, or
Doctrine of part performance is pecuwithout adequate support in the record. liar to chancery and is not regarded at law
Rather, it rested its right to relief upon the to take case out of statute of frauds.
proposition that the city council had obligated itself to grant the amended condi- 2. Frauds, Statute of ~129(1)
Unless facts relied upon by party seektional use upon the conditions set forth in
the agreement, and upon the notion that it ing to enforce alleged oral contract present
was entitled to judicial enforcement of that case for equitable relief, party has no basis
obligation. For the reasons previously to argue part performance, and no remedy
stated, that contention cannot be sustained. on oral contract.

C~~~~MENT

AFFIRMED,

WITH

314 Md. 689

Anthony J. UNITAS, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of Raymond V. Rangle

v.
Janet M_ TEMPLE.
No. 47, Sept. Term, 1988.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 9, 1989.

3. Frauds, Statute of ~129(12)
Act constitutes part performance, such
as would warrant enforcement of oral
agreement to transfer realty, if court can,
by reason of act itself, without knowin~
whether there was agreement or not, find
parties nnequivocally in position different
from that which according to their legal
rights, they would be in if there were no
contract.
4. Frauds, Statute of ~129(12)
Woman's renewal of professional and
personal relationship with fiance did not
constitute part performance such as would
warrant enforcement of alleged oral contract under which fiance was to provide
for woman in his will, in that there was
nothing in woman's acts themselves which
indicated that they were only referable to
fiance's alleged promise; woman's acts
were objectively explainable without reference to alleged agreement.

Woman who had personal and profesJames K. Archibald (Edmund P.
sional relationship with fiance sought to
enforce oral contract after fiance's death, dridge, Jr., Venable, Baetjer and
in which he had allegedly agreed to provide Baltimore), on brief, for petitioner.
financially for her. The Circuit Court, BalM. Albert Figinski (Franklin Goldstein,
timore City, Martin B. Greenfeld, enforced David R. Sonnenberg, Julie C. Janofsky,
oral agreement, and appeal was taken. Melnicove, Kaufman, Weiner, Smouse &
The Court of Special Appeals, 74 Md.App. Garbis, P.A., Baltimore), on brief, for re506, 538 A.2d 1201, affirmed. On certiorari spondent.
review, the Court of Appeals, Rodowsky,
J., held that woman's renewal of profesArgued before ELDRIDGE, COLE,
sional and personal relationship with fian- RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, ADKINS,
ce did not constitute part performance BLACKWELL, JJ., and CHARLES E.
such as would warrant enforcement of al- ORTH, Jr., Associate Judge of the
leged oral contract.
Court of Appeals of Maryland (retired),
Specially Assigned.
Reversed and remanded.
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in the briefs here submitted are noted and
aligned in their places for or against the
respectively espoused doctrines. Taliaferro v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 80 F.
368, 25 C.C.A. 494, 49 U.S.App. 275, is
cited as the leading case in the one school
of thought, while Lovelace v. Travelers'
Protective Ass'n, 126 Mo. 104, 105, 28 S.W.
8il, 30 L.R.A. 209, heads the opposition.
[1] In our jurisdiction, the decision was
made and the die cast by Korfin v. Continental Casualty Co., supra.

In the case

drawn therefrom in his favor. Visaggi v.
Frank's Bar & Grill, Inc., 4 N.J. 93, 71
A.2d 638 (1950). In Bachman Choc. Mfg.
Co. v. Lehigh Wrhse. & T. Co., 1 N.J. 239,
62 A.2d 806,808 (1949)", It was said: "It is
well established that a case should be submitted to a jury unless there are no disputed facts or disputed in ferences to be
drawn from undisputed facts."
Similar sordid and turbulent outbursts
had admittedly occurred frequently before and were an integral part of the final
culmination. The circumstances as here
developed, in our opinion, did not as a
matter of law factually forecast death as
a natural and probable consequence, as the
record bespeaks the frequency of parallel
and almost identical disturbances over a
long period of time when death was not
adumbrated nor did it occur. Threats to
kill were made so often they became commonplace and no attention was paid to
them. "He always did threaten to kill me
anyhow."

sub judice, therefore, the query is whether,
under the existing circumstances, the husband should have foreseen that his conduct would probably result in his death.
In denying the appellant's motion, the
court below observed:
"Now, the question in this case is whether or not the deceased should have anticipated the result of his attack upon his
wi'fe. And our latest decision says,
"'It is sufficient to render the means
accidental if the act which precedes the
On the fatal occasion there was a variinjury was something unforeseen, unex- ation to the established long-term pattern
pected, unusual, although the act be volun- -the use of a rifle which the wife "astary and intentional.'
sumed did not work" and "thought was
"Now, in this case we do not know that out of order." The husband had it "before
the husband actually intended to shoot his we were married" and "allowed the chilwife, because' there is a question as to dren to play with it." There is no proof
whether or not the gun was loaded, or he knew it was loaded.
whether or not he knew it was loaded.
There was also a deviation for the first
There is also the further fact that this time when the wife attempted to fight back
deceased weighed 207 pounds, a man whose and do something about the abuse and
daily work was that of a mechanic, which threats heaped upon her. "I just struggled
developed his muscles, he was a man ap- with him trying to get the gun away from
parently in good health, and it would aphim. *
* I guess he didn't expect
pear that he was very much stronger than that because I was so afraid of him I aIhis wife.
ways took everything. l ne\'er tried to
"There is a question raised by these facts fight him off."
as to whether or not the deceased could
VI e cannot, under the circumstances
have foreseen the result of his act,"
narrated here, decide as a matter of laW,
[2 J The rule is settled that upon mo- even with the intoxication and his threats,
tions for a dismissal, the equivalent of mo- that the husband intended to kill his wife
tions ,for a nonsuit or directed verdict un- because a quarrel ensued or that the natder the fonner practice, the court cannot ural or probable consequence was that the
weigh the evidence but must take as true wife, who had submitted docilely to the
all evi'dence which supports the view of same utterances and abuses over the years,
the party against whom the motion was would, when she was again threatened and
made and must give him the benefit of all assaulted by her drunken husband, unexlegitimate inferences which are to be pectedly turn upon him and struggle for

*
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possession of the gun, resulting in his being feet from highway, but intervening area
was zoned for residential uses only, a larg<"
shot to death.
[3] Although there is no conflicting sign erected in the intervening area to
testimony, nevertheless disputed inferences advertise nature of business in building
can be drawn from the undisputed facts constituted a business use in violation of
and reasonable men might well differ as zoning ordinance.
to the conclusion to be reached. Under the
circumstances here present, we see no error
in the submission of the case to the jury,
whi ch was the course pursued by the trial
judge below.
The judgment is affi rm "d.
For affirmance: Ch'ief Justice VANDERBILT, and Justices WACHENFELD,
BURLING and ACKERSON-4.
For reversal: Justice HEHER-I.

2. MuniCipal corporations

~631(2)

Where contract with township permitted erection of business building ISO feet
from highway, but intervening area was
zoned for residential uses only, a driveway
to be used as means of ingress and egress
was within contemplation of permission to
erect building and did not constitute a violation of zoning ordinance.
3. Appeal and error

~173(IO)

Where theory of laches was not pleaded, was not among issues stated in pretrial order and did not appear to have been
raised at trial, reviewing court could not
consider that theory of case.

6 N.J, 530
BECKMANN et al. v. TEANECK TP. et aI,
No. A-78.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued Jan. 29, 1951, Feb. 5, 1951.
Decided March 19, 1951.
Suit by George H. Beckmann and others
against the Township of Teaneck and others
to compel the township and its officers to
alter zoning ordinances and to enjoin them
from interfering with the plaintiffs' use of
certain premises. From a judgment of the
Superior Court, Law Dh'ision, Bergen County, in favor of the plaintiffs, the defendants
appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, and the case was certified to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, Case,
J., held that wbere contract with township
had permitted construction of business building 150 feet from highway, a driveway for
purpose of ingress and egress over interven-

ing residence area was permissible, but that
erection of advertising sign in tbat area
would be in violation of zoning ordinance.
Judgment modified and, as so modified, affirmed.
I. Municipal corporations ~631(2)

Where contract with township permitted erection of business building ISO

Warren Dixon, Jr., Hackensack, arguea
the cause for plaintiffs-respondents.
Dominick F. Pachella, Hackensack, argued the cause for defendants-appellants
(John J. Deeney, Teaneck, attorney).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CASE,].
The Township of Teaneck caused the
several plaintiffs to be summoned before
the Municipal Court of the township on
complaints charging them with violations
of the local zoning ordinance in that, within a residence zone, they maintained a large
advertising sign and also a driveway for
business purposes. Plaintiffs thereupon
filed their complaint in the Superior Court,
Law Division, Bergen County, charging
that the township, in prosecuting its complaints, had breached agreements earlier
made with the Estate of William WaIte':'
Phelps, a corporation, and with Garden
State Developers, Inc., a predecessor of
the corporate plaintiff George H. Beckmann, Inc., and, upon the basis of the alleged breach, plaintiffs prayed that the
township and its officers be directed to
adopt an ordinance authorizing the matters
complained of or take appropriate action

.---
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'l arge part extrinsic to, or at least unneces_
sary and confusing in the determination
of, the issues, and we shall endeavor to
confine the discussion to what we regard
as the controlling elements.
The land was originally a part of a tract
owned by the Estate of William Walter
Phelps, deceased. On April 15, 1947, following authorizing resolutions, the township entered into a contract with the estate
and another contract with Garden State
Developers, Inc., the prospective purchaser
and developer of th.$ tract with which we
are concerned. (Cf. Fraser v. Teaneck
sent to a non-conforming use, or take other Township, 137 N.J.L. 119, 58 A.2d 610
effective action to permit the use of the (Sup.Ct.l948), affirmed 1 N.J. 503, 64 A.2d
site on which plaintiff's office building is 345 (1949), which, however, did not Conerected * * *- so as to be lawfully usa- sider or pass upon the issues here presentble for the transaction of real estate, mort- ed.) Those contracts contained the folgage, insurance and building contractors' lowing clause bearing upon the proposal
husiness", and (3) that the township and its which was later realized by the construcofficers be restrained from interfering with tion of plaintiffs' building : "The Townthe use of plaintiff's property because of an ship will, by rezoning or consent to a varialleged "paper" street known as Hancock ance, or grant of an exception, or consent
Avenue. The appeal by the township and to a non-conforming use, or by other efits associated defendants to the Superior fective action, permit the erection of one
Court, Appellate Division, was certified to office building on the area lying on the
southerly side of State Highway Route No.
us on our own motion.
4 and easterly of Decatur Avenue if proThe Township of Teaneck has consistjected southerly, which is marked on the atently endeavored to prevent the invasion of
tached map as 'Business-Proposed Office
business on either side of State Highway
Site,' to be used for the transaction of
Route 4 running from George' Washington
real estate, mortgage, insurance, and buildBridge westerly through the township.
ing contractors' business provided howThe corporate plaintiff lawfully constructever that no part of any such building shall
ed, maintains and uses a one and one-half
be closer than 150 feet of the center line
story structure for specified business purof said State Highway Route No.4. It
poses at a distance of at least 150 feet
is understood and agreed that the buildsoutherly from the center line of the highing shaU not be used for any purposes exway. The territory between the building
cept as an office for the transaction of
and the highway is zoned for residences
real estate, mortgage, insurance and buildand against business. The controversy,
ing contractors' business, and that no constated in its simplest terms, is whether the
struction material shall be stored on the
corporation and the associated plaintiffs
site outside the main walls of the building."
may (1) erect and maintain adjacent to
Neither of the agreements had provithe highway a large business sign announcing the presence of the building and sion regarding the erection of a sign or
the business conducted therein and (2) the construction or use of a driveway.
use for entrance to and exit from the The building, when constructed, was so
building a driveway which the plaintiffs placed that the land upon which it stood
have constructed between the highway and was in an area already zoned with a clasthe building over their lands zoned against sification that permitted the lawful conbusiness use. The arguments present facts struction and use of the building for its
and contentions which we think are in business purposes. The highway ran ap·

to grant variances or exceptions with respect thereto, and that they be enjoined
from interfering with the plaintiffs, their
successors or assigns, in the use of the
premises. The court, having by consent
heard the matter without a jury, made a
determination of the facts and rendered
a final judgment which (1) restrained the
township and its officers from prosecuting
the summonses and the complaints issued
thereon, (2) directed that the members of
the township council, "in the exercise of
their discretion rezone or consent to a
variance, or grant an exception, or con-
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proximately 150 feet to the north of the be frustrated. On or subsequent to June
building, and the north line of the building 17, 1947, an ordinance was adopted which,
was coterminous with the north line of the as stated in respondents' brief, rezoned
area within which the business use was "the entire tract in accordance with the
permitted. The area between the north agreements". We find it difficult to deduce
line of the building and the highway is from the exhibits just what changes were
owned by plaintiffs and was then and is effected from the earlier ordinance in
noW zoned for residential uses and against order to accomplish that result, but there
business uses. There, immediately adjacent appears to be no dispute over the two esto the highway, is where the sign was sential propositions that the site of the
erected. It is a structure 8 feet high and business office is so zoned as to permit
16 feet wide. It proclaims the neighboring that use, and that the land from there
presence of plaintiffs' business structure north to the highway is zoned against busiand the character of business conducted ness and for residences. The only argutherein. It is an announcement of, and in ment for the sign is that without it the .
effect an invitation to do, business. It is traveling public will not be adequately in·
clearly and exclusively a business struc- formed of the business conducted in the
ture put to a business use and is a violation building ISO feet away; but such an arguof the provisions of the zoning ordinance. ment, generally applied, would quite undo
Not only so, it is not within the purview the whole purpose in suppressing business
of the contract provisions and is contrary and its restless distractions in beautiful
to the spirit thereof. To what point was rural areas.
the "business site" specifically kept at a
(1] The trial court gave an effect to
distance of 150 feet if by signs and adthe agreement which we do not give and
vertising features it was to be projected
assumed an authority on the part of the
immediately along the highway? We find
municipal corporation to contract for the
nothing in the agreement which calls upon
exercise of legislative powers and of the
the municipality to do more than to percourt to control the municipality in the permit the construction of the building which
formance of its legislative functions which
is now constructed and to permit the buildwe do not concede. Cf. McQuillin, Municiing, when constructed, to be used for the
pal Corporations, 2nd Ed. (Rev.) Vol. 3,
operation of the business that is now being
sec. 1271, p. 1112; 63 c.J.S. Municipal
conducted there, and we find nothing in the
Corporations, § 979( c), page 534; Hoagreement inconsistent with the proposiboken Local No. 2, New Jersey State Pation that the area between the building and
trolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of Hothe highway shall not be used for business
hoken, 44 A.2d 329, 23 N.J.Misc. 334, 340
purposes. No rezoning or consent to a
(Sup.Ct.194S), affirmed on the opinion bevariance was necessary to legalize the conlow, 134 N .lL. 616, 48 A.2d 917 (E. & A.
struction of the building and the use of the 1946); Potter v. Borough of Metuchen,
structure for the designated business pur108 N.lL. 447, 155 A. 369 (Sup.Ct.l931).
poses. After the agreement was entered
But whether the matter of the sign be apinto, the corporate plaintiff applied to the proached by way of, or without, the agreebuilding inspector of the township and, on
ment, the effect is the same; the claim of
June 11, 1947, obtained a permit for the
a right to maintain it in the area concedconstruction. After the construction was
edly and lawfuUy zonen against business
completed a certificate of occupancy was
is without support. It is a business use,
issued and the appropriate use followed
is a violation of the ordinance and is not
and is continued. But neither the permit
provided for by the agreement.
to construct the building, nor the certificate of occupancy after construction, may
[2) The driveway presents a different
be warped into a consent that the town- question. Certainly, for whatever value
ship purpose to keep the lands along the foreknowledge may have, the agreements
highway free of business structures should anticipated the erection of a business struc-
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ture and the conduct of designated busi- called Hancock Avenue. Hancock Avenue
nesses therein and must have anticipated has no real existence; it is said to be a
that there would be a practical meanS of "paper" street, that is, "laid out on the
ingress and egress; and the amending or- map". The proofs are very hazy to that
dinance was adopted in the light of the end. Our study of them leads to the conconditions then shaped for realization. The clusion that what was once indicated on the
driveway was constructed with permission maps in suggestion of a street has, in this
from the State Highway Department, the vicinity, been obliterated by the lines of the
public authority under whose administra- state highway and the ramp leading thereto
tion the highway is and the propriety of and therefrom.
the driveway from an operational standOur answer to the posed questions is that
point must therefore be conceded. That the erection and maintenance of the sign
permission was prefaced by a letter from violate, and !'he construction and Use of the
the township manager advising that the driveway merely as a means of ingress and
township was agreeable to the location of egress do not violate, the zoning ordinance.
the driveway. A driveway in itself is
[3] Appellants now charge respondents
neutral. It is neither business nor otherwise. It takes color from the uses permit- with laches; but laches was not pleaded,
was not among the issues stated in the preted by the zoning ordinance of the lands
trial order and does not appear to have been
in the area. The land between the building
raised at the trial. The court will not now
and the state highway was classified by
hear the appellants on a new and different
the zoning ordinance as a B Zone, which
permitted the erection of two family theory or issue than that on which the cause
houses with the exception of a small por- was tried. State ex reI. Wm. Eckelmann,
Inc., Y. Jones, 4 N.]. 207, 214, 72 A.2d 322
tion immediately adjacent to the highway
(1950). Estoppel by conduct against the
which was zoned as a Class A residence
township was stated by the pretrial order
zone. Thus it would have been consistent'
as an issue for trial; but we find negatively
with the ordinance for plaintiff to develop
as to it.
the intervening tract with houses and in
So much of Paragraph (I) of the judgconnection therewith to build such a driveway. It seems clear therefore that the ment under review as restrains and enjoins
existence of a driveway in that location is the prosecution of the existing summonses
not inevitably to be condemned as a vio- and complaints charging a violation by
lation of the ordinance. We reach the reason of the driveway is affirmed; and the
conclusion that under the circumstances remaining portions of Paragraph (1) and
of the case and particularly in view of the all of Paragraphs (2) and (3) are reversed,
events immediately preceding, concomitant We are in accord with the finding that there
with and directly following the consider- is nothing in the alleged existence of Hanation and adoption of the ordinance, and cock A venue that is pertinent to present
so connected therewith as to be chapters in issues and have so indicated; but we disthe same panorama of municipal incidents, cover no necessity for an injunction to
the reasonable and consistent interpretation enforce that finding.
The result is that the jndgment below is
of the ordinance and its several parts
negates the charge that the construction to be modified to conform to our findings,
,and use of the driveway, strictly as a and, as so modified, affirmed. Costs are not
means of ingress and egress, without sign allowed.
or advertising matter, are a violation.
For modification: Chief Justice VAN
It is said on behalf of the township that DERBILT, and Justices CASE, HEHER,
the driveway as constructed, in leading to OLIPHANT, W ACHENFELD, BURthe state highway from the plaintiffs' lands, LING and ACKERSON-7.
passes over an intervening dedicated street
Opposed: None.
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186 FEDERAL REPORTElt
BOISE CITY, IDAHO, V. BOISE ARTESIAN H, & C. WATER CO.

In reply to the foregoing letter of June 27th, the defendant wrote as
follows:
"Seattle, 7'-2-Q8.
"Chas. S. Brent & Bro., Paris, Kentucky-Gentlemen: Answering your
furor of the 27tb, we wisb to correct your understanding of our order. This
called for minimum cur of 15 tons and not for 325 bags. We would like to
baH~ shipment between August 15th and September 15th providing new crop
is harvested by that time, but notify ns and send sample before sbipping SQ
that we will be ready to take care of tbe seed."

Subsequent correspondence occurred between the parties in relation to the dispute that arose between tbem, but the contract is to be
found in the correspondence already set forth, commencing with the
plaintiff's offer to sell the defendant the seed at "$1.40 per bu., f. o. b.
cars" Paris, Ky., with a guaranty that the seed would "test 21 pounds
to the measured bushel." 'What is the meaning of the word "test" as
here used? There is nothing in the letter expressly indicating its
meaning. The defendant seems to have understood it as meanin"
"weight," for in its written requisition or order of June 22d, conlirn~
ing its telegram of the same date, it ordered one minimum car load of
the seed offered "weighing 21 lbs. to the btlShel at $1.40 per bushel.
£. o. b. cars Paris, Ky. Per your quotation June 17th." The view of
the court below was that the defendant was bound to "treat fourteen
pounds as a bushel." because of the plaintiff's letter of June 27th acknowledging receipt of the defendant's requisition or order, and th~
latter's failure to make any objection to the description of the thing
sold therein contained, while calling attention to the fact that the
order called for one "minimum car of 15 tons and not for 325 bags."
The letter of the plaintiff to the defendant of June 27th upon the
point in question is as follows:
"Yours of tbe 22d (yours No. 7.2(2) confirming purchase of Blue Grass
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the defendant had for a number of years issued a seed catalogue in
which it listed, among other articles, Kentucky Blue Grass Seed as containing H pounds to the bushel; but there was evidence on the part
of the defendant tending to show that this was inserted only for the
purpose of informing farmers and others using such seed -that 14
pounds in weight should be sown where the directions called for the
sowing of a bushel. It is manifest that such considerations were for
the jury if the contract was ambiguous.
When the plaintiff first offered the defendant tbe seed, he said nothing about 14 pounds, but that it would "test" 21 pounds to the busheL
W11en the defendant gave its order in pursuance of that offer, it ordered one minimum car load "weighing 21 Ibs. to the bushel, at $1."10
per bushel," which interpretation by the defendant of the meaning of
the word "test," as used in the offer, the plaintiff said in his letter of
June 27th "Seems to be correct," and made no objection unless it can
De found in the next succeeding terms, to wit: "325 bags Fancy
Cleaned True KentUCky Blue Grass Seed, testing 21# to the measured
bushel, at $1.40 per bu. (1~1#) f. o. b. cars."
The figures and symbol in parentheses (meaning 14 pounds) so
mserted by the plaintiff, taken in connection with the preceding correspondence between the parties. and for the first time appearing
therein, are, in our opinion, ambiguous, and their meaning, taken in
connection with the balance of the correspondence, should ha\'e been
left to the determination of the jury, in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case, under appropriate instructions from the court.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded to the court below for a new trial.

Seed frolli us duly to hand and seems to be torr eel. 325 bags Fancy Cleaned
True Keutucky Blue Grass Seed. testing 21# to the measured busbel, at

$1.40 ]Jer bu. (14#) f. o. b. cars bere" Paris, Ky,

:i,

1.:;.
iJ)'

),

The plaintiff knew by the requisition which he received that the
defendant understood the word "test," as applied to the seed in tlie
plaintiff's original offer of it, to mean "weight," for the oreler was ior
one minimum car of seed "weighing 21 Ibs. to the bl1shel at $1.40
per bushel." There is certainly no ambiguity about that language.
The court below said in its opinion denying the defendant's motion for
a new trial that "there can be no question but that the plaintiff at all
times understood the contract to call for 14 pounds to the bushel."
\Ve are unable to discoyer any ground for that statement. If the
plaintiff did not understand the defendant's order, or did not think it
therein correctly interpreted the word "test" in his original offer of
the seed for sale, OL1ght he not to have frankly said so? Instead, in
his letter of June 27th acknowledging receipt of the defendant's order,
he said that it "seems to be correct," and proceeded to add in his letter: "325 bags Fancy Cleaned True Kentucky Blue Grass Seed, testina- 21# to the measured bushel, at $1.40 per bu. (14#) f. o. b. cars."
'This is the first time 14 pounds"appeared in the correspondence between the parties. What did it mean? On the trial it was shown that

BOISE CITY, IDAHO, v. BOISE ARTESIAN HOT & COLD WATER CO.,
Limited.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Nintb Circuit.
NO.1,875.

1.

FaANcrnsEs (§ 2*)-SPECIAI, PRII'ILEGEs-GRAKT.

jfranchises and special privileges must be construed most strongly
against tbe grantee Hnd in fa YOl" of tbe governlDe!lt.
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases, see Francbises, Cent. Dig. § 2; Dec. Dig.

§

2.

2."l

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 5S*)-DELEGATION OF PO\YEU-CONSTRUCTTON.

Legislative grants of power to municipal corporations must be strictly
construed to operate as a surrender of the so,ereigntr of the state no
further tban is expressl,' declared by the language thereof.
[Eel. Note.-For otl!er cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§
145-147; Dec. Dig. § 5S.*]

3.

(§ GS2')-CnARTER-FRAXCI1ISE-GRAXT-ExTENT.
Where the charter of a cityautllorized it to graut the use of itR streets
for the laying or water mains to snpply its inbabitants, the cit)" waH
only autllOrized to gn.nt snch use for a reasonable time and could not
grant a perpetual franchise under the rule thilt a municipal corporati,)f\
may not irrevocably surrender aDr part of its power to control its pub.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

·For other cases see same topic & §

186F.-45
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"Sec. 3. Tbis ordinance shall tal;e effect aud be in force from and after its
passage." Appron'd July 10, 1890.
lnulleclintely after the enactment of tbe ordinance in their fa'>or, E.1stman
Bros. proceeded to construct a system of waterworks, consisting of artesian
wells and reservoirs, and laid mains aud pipes under and along the streets
and alleys of Boise Oity, and to supply tbe city and its inbabitants with pure
mountain water, in accordance with tbat ordinance, expending in such constructiou over $20.000 to tbe time tbey sold their interest tberein to an Idaho
corporation called tbe Artesian Hot & Cold Water Oompany, Limited, here-inafter mentioned.
.
Immediately after the enactment of the ordinance in fayor of tbe Artesian
Water & Land Impro'>ement Oompany. it proceeded to sink artesian .,-ells,
con·truct resen·oirs. and lay pipes under and along tbe streets of the city
and to supply tbe city and its inbabitants with pure, fresb water for municipal, domestic. and irrigation purposes, under and pursuant to tbe aforesaid

lie streets by contract or otberwise witbout tbe express consent or the
Legislature.
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases, see Municipal Oorporations, Oent. Dig. §
14U9; Dec. Dig. § 682. oJ
4.

MUNICIPAL OORPORATIONS (§ 68Z*)-WATERWORKS COMPANY-FRA.NCHISECO" STRUCTIO N-TERM-LICE!': SE FEE-STATUTES.

Hey. St. Idabo 1887, § 2710, provides tbat no corporation formed to
stlPply a city witb 'Yflter mny do so unless prey;ously aut.horized by ordinnnee or unless done iu conformity with a contract between tbe corporation and tbe city or town. and that such contmct sball not deprive tbe
city or to\\'n of tbe right to re!:;ulate rates, nor sball any exclusire right
be grnnted or contract or grant made for a term exceeding 50 sears.
Held that wbere a city granted a franchise to defendant's predecessors
to use tbe streets for tbe construction of a water system without specifying uny term for tbe continuance of tbe grant, it was not a grant for
5Q years, but a mere license revocable by the city at wlll, and bence dill
not depriYe tbe city of the right thereafter to impose on defendant paynlent of a montbly license (ee for tbe use of tbe streets.
[Jiid. Note.-For otber cases, see Municipal Corporations,'Cent. DIg. §
1470; Dec. Dig. § 682.*]

ordinance in its (avor, expending in the construction, extensiOIl, and iWIJroVe-

In Error to the Circuit Court of the Unit, . States for the Central
Didsion of the District of Idaho.
Action by Boise City, Idaho, against the Boise Artesian Hot & Cold
\Vater Company, Limited. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff
brings error. Reversed, with directions.
The plaintiff in error was plaintiff in tbe conrt below, where It hrought tlle
action to recover from tbe defendant certain license fees imposed by one of
its ordinances, enacted in ~906. Tbe facts of tbe case are undisputed. 'fbey
sbow, among otber tbings. that tbe plaintiff in error is a municipal corporation operating under a special cbarter granted by tbe Legislature of tbe territory of Idaho during the year 1863. and subsequent amenflllleuts tbereto;'
tbat on the 3d dao' of October, 1889, tbe city enacted an ordinance entitled
"An ordinance granting Eustman Brotbers the right to lay water pipes ill
Boise City," tbe only two sections of wbicb ordinance are as follows:
"Section 1. H. B. Eastman and B. M. Eastman. and their successors in interest in tbeir watenyorks for tbe supplying of mountain water to the residents of Boise City, are hereby autborized to lay and repair tbeir water pipes
in, through, and along ancl across the streets and alleys of Boise City, under
tbe surface tbereof; but tbey sball at all times restore and leave all streets
and alleys in. tbrougb. along, and across which they may lay sucb pipes, in
as good condition as tbey sball find the same, antI shall at all times promptly
repair all dumage done by them or their pipes, or by w'lter escaping tbere·
from.
"Sec. 2. Tbis ordinance sball take effect from and after its passage and
approyal." Approyed October 3, 1889.
Tbe Artesian Water & Land Improvement Company baving become organized as a corporation under the laws of tbe state of Idabo for tbe pnrpose of
snpplying Boise City and its inhabitants witb wa tel' for public and family
use, the city, on tbe lOtb day of July, 1890, enacted an ordinance entitled "An
ordinance granting to tbe Artesian WaleI' & Land Improvement Compauy the
rigbt to lay water pipes in Boise City," the three sections of wbicb are as
£ollo,,"s:
"Se<,tion 1. The privilege of laying down and maintaining water pipes in
the streets and alleys now laid out or bereafter to be laid out and dedicated
in Boise City. Idabo, is berel,y granted to tbe ArteSian Water & Land Illprovement Company, its successors or assigns.
"8ec. 2. All water pipes placed in said streets and allcys sball be laid
down in a "'orkmanlil<e manner, and all excayations made for pipes sball be
properly filled. aud with all convenient speed.
-For other cases see same topic & §
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ment of its waterworks more tban $50.000 up to tbe time of its sale thereof
to tbe aforesaid Artesian Hot & Oold Water Company, Limited, as bereinafter
mentioned.
Tbe Artesian Hot & Cold Water Company, Limited, was organized under
the laws of the state of Idabo. and was autborized by its articles cof incorporation to supply the plaintiff in error and its inhabitants witb ,,'ater for
mnnicipal and domestic uses, and to purcbase and acquire the "aterworks,
wells, reservoirs, pipe lines, properties, rights, and francbises of both tbe
Eastman Bros., and the Artesian Water & Land Impro'>ement Companr, wbich
purchase was effected on tbe 28tb day of March, 1891.
Tbe defendant in error is a corpora tion organized and existing under the
laws of tbe state of West Virginia, witb its principal place of business at
Boise City, Ada county, Idaho. Its articles of incorporation autborize it to
carryon "a waterworl's system, and to sell and rent \yater to tbe inhabitants
of tbe said Boise City and t.o taIte, purcbase, acquire, hold. operate. and
maintain rights and privileges of water companies, associations. or corporations. and to acquire, use, own. and operat.e all properties, franchises, rights,
claims, privileges, and everytbing belongiug to tbat certain corporation kno>,n
as the Artesian Hot"" Cold Water Company, Limited, and to be the successor in every respect of said corporation."
On the 28th day of August, 1901, the defendant in error acquired by purcbase from tbe Artesian Hot & Cold Water Compnny. Limited, all of its
rights in and to both of tbe \\'ater systems mentioned, and all of its said waters, as well as all of the rigbts and prh'i!eges granted by tbe aforesaid ordinances.
Tbe record furtber shows: Tbat between tbe 28tb dar of Marc-b, 1891,
and tbe 28tb day of August, 1901. the Artesian Hot & CQld Water Oom!Jany,
Limited, supplied the city and its inbabitnnts with pure, fresb water for
municipal, domestic. and other useful purposes, and tbat during tbnt period
the population of tbe city increased from about 3,000 to about 6,000 people,
the nrea of the city being enlarged by the laying out arid platting of additions
tbp.reto, wbich were settled upon and occupied. llnd during wbicb period tbe
Artesian Hot & Cold Water Company. witb tbe city's knowledge and consent. extcnrled its pipe lines nnder tbe streets and alleys of the clty from
time to time. and snpplied sucb additions with water to meet the demands
upon it, and laid about 15 miles of additional pipe, constructed two wells
and one reservoir for cold water, and erected a lar!,(e steam pumping plant
witb a capacity of 3,000,000 gallons a day. ag:o;re:o;ating in cost more than
$192.000. 'l'bat at all times since tbe 28tb day of August, 1901, tbe defendant
in error bas supplied tbe city and its inhabitants "by ,-irtue of said ordinance
and la IVS, and witb plaintiffs Imowledge, acquiescence, and consent, pure
fresh wa ter for municipal, domestic, and otber useful purposes, in accordance
with said ordinances, and in full compliance tberewitb. aud with said la ,,'s
of Idaho. Tbat since said last-named date tbe population of Boise City bas
increased from about 6.000 to over 25,QOO inbabitants. and tbis defendant.
\vith plaintiff's knowledge. acquiescence. and consent, has extended its eold
water system to meet tbe growth of said city, and bas laid over 30 mile, ot
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additional mains under tbe streets and alleys or said city, constructed numerous ,<eIls and galleries, acquired by condemnation proceedings additional
land ior the development of an increased water supply, installed fonr electric
pumps of an aggregate capacity of six and one-half million gallons of wuter
pcr day, and bas expended in the improvement and extension of said cold
water system an additional S11m of mofe tban $140,000. That tbe defelluant
and its predecessors in interest in and to its waterworks system are now and
ever since tbe 3d day of October, 1889, have been using the streets and alleys of said Boise City in the sale and delil'ery of water to tbe plaintiff, and
residents and inhabitants of Boise City, tbrough tbe water mains of said
waterworks systems, and in the laying and repairing of said water pipes ~on
nee ted with said waterworks systems."
On tbe 7tl1 day of June, 1906, tbe plaintiff in error enacted an ordinance,
tbe first and fourtb sections of IYhi~h are as follows:
"Section 1. That the said Boise .'l.rtesian Hot & Cold Water Company. a
private corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the state of west Virginia, tbe successors in interest of the said H. B.
Eastman anel B. 1\1. Eastman in and to said waterworks now being operated

under said license granted by snid ordinance of October 3d, 18SD, in said
Boise City, are herehy required to bereafter pay to said Boise City on the
firH day of eacb and el'ery month, a nWllthly license fee of $300.00, for the
pridlege granted by said ordinance of October 3d, 188!l, to lay and repair
water pipes in tbe streets nnd alleys of snid city tbrough whicb waler Is being furnished to the inbabitants of said Boise City by said company. • • *
"Sec. 4. Tbat nothing in this ordinance sha1I be construed or understood
as granting any privilcp:e or authority for any other term than tbat provided
for in tbe aforesaid ordinance of October 3d, 1889."
Tbe action was brougbt to recover tbe aggregate amount of tbree years'
license fees so imposed, and whieb the defendant refused to pay after demand made.
The court below beld tbat tbe ordinance of July 10, 1890, to tbe Artesian
,Vater & Land Improvement Company. its Sl1ccessors and assigns, having
been accepted and acted upon by tile grnntee and its successors, created a
fr:lI1cbise for 50 years, anc1 tbat tbe imposition of tbe license tax provicled
for by tbe ordiuance of June 7, 190G, was an impairment of such franchise
and tberefore void. Judgment followed accordingly, and the city brougbt
this IHit of error.
Frank B. Kinyon and Cm'anah & Blake, for plaintiff in error.
Richard H. Johnson, for defendant in error.
Before ROSS and MORROW, Circuit Judges, and HANFORD,
District Judge.

N
C
"
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ROSS, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above), It will be
seen from the foregoing statement that the trial court held in effect
that the ordinance of July 10, 1890, granted to the Artesian \,yater &
Land Improvement Company. one of the predecessors in interest of
tl;e defendant in error, a franchise to use the streets and alleys of the
clty for the purpose of supplying it and its inhabitants with water for
the period of 50 years. If that be so, then manifestly the. attempted
imposition by the ordinance of Tune 7, 1906, of the license fees in
question was of no effect. The court below held that the fact that the
plaintiff in error was incorporated and exists under a special charter
does not render inapplicable to it the provisions of section 2710 of the
Revised Statutes of Idaho of 188'1, and tbat the provisions of that section should be read into the ordinance of July 10, 1890, as a part
thereof, and thereby fixed the life of the franchise or privilege granted
by that ordinance at 50 years.
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Section 2710 of the state statutes so referred to reads as follows:
"No corporation formed to supply any city or town with water must do so
unless previously autborized by an ordinance of the authoritles tbereof, or
unless it is done in couformity wit.h a contract entered into betn'cen the cil,.
or town nnd the corporation. Contracts so made are valid and binding in
law, but do not take from the city or town tbe right to regulate ttle raLes for
water. llor must any exC'lusive

ri~ht

be granted.

be made for a term exceeding fifty years."

No contract or grunt must

We are unable to give to this statute the effect attributed to it by
the court below'. Its terms and purposes, we think, seem quite plain.
Every corporation formed to supply any city or town of the state with
water is thereby prohibited from doing so unless previously authorized
by an ordinance of the authorities thereof, or unless done in conformity with a contract entered into between snch city or town and
the corporation. Such contracts are authorized by the statute, subject
to the express provision that they shall not take fro111 the city or town
the right to regulate the rates for water, nor, further expressly declares tbe statute, shall any exclusive right be granted, nor shall any
such contract or grant be made for a term exceeding 50 years,
This is very far from saying that no such contract or grant shal1
be made for a shorter period than 50 years. It fixes a maximum beyond which no contract or grant is permitted to extend, but leaves the
matter of time, within that limit, to be fixed by contract or by grant of
the municipality.
In the case of 'Water Co. v, Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22, 33, 26 Sup. Ct.
224, 227 (50 L. Ed. 353), the Supreme Court said:
"'Grants of franchises and special privileges are always to be construed
most strongly against tbe dOhet', and in fa 1'01' of tbe pulllic.' Such were the
words of this court in Turnpike Co, \-. Illinois, 96 U, S, 63, 68 (24 L. Ed. 651J,
'l'he universal rule in doubtful cases-this court said in Oregon Itailway Co.
v. Oregoniun Ry. Co .. 130 U. S. 1. 26 If) Sup. Ot. 409, 32 L. Ed. S3i]-is tbat
't.he constructlon !;hall be against the grantee and in fal'or of tbe go,ernment.' As late as Ooosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 D, 8. 550, 562
[12 Sup, Qt. (;89, 36 L, Ed. 537), this court said: 'The doctrine is firmly established that only that which is granted in clear and explicit terms passes
hy a grant of property, franChises. or pridleges in whicb the gOl'ermnent or
tue public has an interest. Statuto1', grants of tbat character are to be construed strictly in favor of tbe public, and Whatever is not unequil'ocally
granted is withbeld; nothing passes b, mere implication. This principle, it
hus been said, is a \vise one.

flS

it

scn'e~

to defl?nt any purpose concealed by

the skillful use of terms to accomplish somethil1.g not apparent on tue face
of the act, and thus sanctions onl"' open dealing with legislntil'e bodies.' Slidell v. Grandjean, 111 D. S. 412, 438 (4 Sup. Ct. 475,.28 L. Ed. 321], We bHe
never departed from or modified tbese principles, but bave reaffirmed tbem
in many cases. It is true tbat tbe cases to n'hich we have referred involved
in tbe main tbe construction of legislative enactments, But tbe principles
tbey annoullce apply with full force to ordil1tlnCes and contracts by mnnicipal
corporations in respect of matters tbat concern tbe public. Tbe authorities
are all agreed tbat a mUlliciJ1~1 corporation, when exerting it;; functions for
tile general good, is not to bp shorn of its powers by mere implication. If by
contract or otherwise it may. in particular circumstances. restriet tbe exercise of its public pon·ers. the intention to do so 111ust be manife,l ed by words
so clear as not to admit of two different or inconsistent meanings."
Turning to the ordinance of July 10, 1890, it is seen that it only
granted to the Arte!'ian iVater & Land Improvement Company, one
of the predecessors in interest of the defendant in error, the privilege
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of laying down and maintammg water pipes in the streets and alley_
then laid out in Boise City or thereafter to be laid out and dedicated'
with provisions for the proper performance of the work with rca.'
sonable diligence. In effect the provisions of that ordinance were pre.
cisely similar to those of the previous ordinance of October 3, 1889
granting to the Eastman Bros., also predecessors in interest of the de~
fend ant in error, similar rights, which were held by this court in the
case of Boise City Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 123
Fed. 232, 59 C. C. A. 236, to have conferred on the Ea.stmans a license
merely, revocable at the pleasure of the city; we there saying:
"The ordinance of October. 1889. granted permission to the Eastmans and
to their successor~ in interest to lay and repair their pipes in tbe streets of
the city. and to furnish water to tbe inbabitants thereof. No term "'as fixed
for the duration of the prh"Uegc, and no contract was in terms ronae between

tbe city and the grantees of the privilege. It is plnin tbat the ordinance was
eitber the grant of a license rel"ocable at tbe will of the grantor. or. by its
acceptance on tbe part of the grantee, it became an irrevocable and perpetual
contract. No middle gronnd is tenable between these two constructions. In
tbe Constitutions of nearly all the states it is provided that no eXclusive or
perpetual francbises shall be granted, and. irrespecth'e of sncb constitutional
limitation. it is clear. botb npon reason and authority. that no municipal corporation, in the ahsence of express legislatiye autbority, bas power to grant
a perpetual francbise for tbe nse of its streets. The ('ity of Boise was incorporated by tbe territori,,1 Legislo\ure of Idnho on .January 11. 18SB. It was
given power 'to provlc1e tbe city with good and wholesome water: and to
erect or construct 'such wa terworks and reservoirs within the established

limits of the city as may be necessary or com'enient therefor: Tbere cnn
be no doubt that under this provision of its charter the city bad the power
to grant the use of its streets for a fixed reasonahle period of time. eitber to
an indl,idufl.1 or to a corporation. for the purpo"" of furnishine: a water sur>ply to tbe inbabitants. It bad no autbority. how<'ver. to make a perpetual
contract. A municipal corporation intrusted with the power of control over
its public streets cannot. D)" contract or otherwise. irrevocably surrender [lny
part of sucb power without the explicit consent of tbe Le"islature. Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations (2d E,1.) 205. 210; Dillon on Municipal Corpora·
tions. §~ 715. 716: Barnett v. Denison. 145 U. S. 135. 13!1. 12 Sup. ct. 819. 36
L. Ed. '652. And lep:islatiye grants of powers to municipal corporations are
to be so strictly construed as to operate as a surrender of the soverei"nty of
tbe state no further than is expressly declared by the lanq;l1age thereof.
Cbarles River Bridge Co. "1". Warren Bridge. 11 Pet. 426. !l L. Ed. 773. 938:
Syracuse Water Co. "1'. City of ~)'mcl1se. 116 N. Y. J137. 22 N. E. :181. 5 L. R.
A. 54G; Lone: Islanll ,Vater 811nniy Co. v. Brookiyn. 1Gr, U. S. 68::;. 6913. 17
Sup. Ct. 718. '41 L. E,~. J 1R~: ~tein v. Rien,ilie '.Yater Supply Co .. 141 U. S.
67. 11 Sl1D. Ct. S!l2. :\!'\ L. Eel. 622. From the"p principles and authoritie~ it
follow. that the Ea"tman" were given no exciusi"l'e or perpetnal right. and
tbat the ordinance operntc'll to grant them n license oni,. and left the city
free at any time to re"l'o];e the priyilege granted. or to nut in its own waterworl<s. or to p:rnnt a franchise to another company. The most tbat tbe Ilcensees could claim under it was that it legn1i7,eo (heir use of the ~treets for
SUpplying water. nnll gnye them permission to occupy the same until sucb
time as 'the city might see fit to terminate tbe prh'i1ege."

If a revocable license only, it does not seem to be questioned that
the. city might either terminate the license, or impose a license fee as
a condition of its continued enjoyment.
It results from what has been said that the j\1dgment must be and
is reversed. with directions for further proceedings in accordance
with the views here expressed.

'111

HANLEY V. UNITED STATES

HANLEY v. UNITED STATES. t
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. February 6, 1911.)
No.l.814.
1.

PUBLIC LANDS .§ :9')-UNLAWFUL INCLOSURE-PROSECUTION.

Whether defell(bnt. wbo was general manager of a large stocl, ranch
owned by a corpol'ation. on "'hieb there was a fence' wbieb. together
with natural barrier., inclosed a large quantity of government lund.
was pers0ually ehargeuule with the offense of maintainiDg such inclosure
in violation of Act J<'eb. 188,>, c. 149. § 1. 23 Stat. 321 (U. S. Compo st.
1901, p. 1524), hel.d. under tbe e,idence, a question for the jury.
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases. see Public Lands, Dec. Dig. § 19.*]
2. PUBLIC LANDS (§ 100)-PROSECUTION FOR UNLAWFUL INCLOSURE-INSTRUC'
TIONS.

The charge of the court in a prosecution for maintaining un unlawful

inClosure of public lanus in relation to e,-idenee of tbe intention and pur·
pose with which the fences complained of "'ere built and maintained con·
sidered. and lIeld. witbout error.
[Ed. Note.-For otber cases. see Public Lands. Dec. Dig. § 19. oJ
3.

PUBLIC LANDS (§ l!l*)-PnoSECUTlON FOR UNLAWFUL INCLOSURE-INSTRUCTIONS.

Act Feb. 25. 1885. e. 14(). § 1, 23 Stat. 321 (D. S. C<lmp. St. 1901, p.
1524). probibits the construction or maintenance of any inciosure of pub·
lic land by one bavin/Z no clnim or color of title tbereto. Section 4 provides tbat any person viobting the act "whether as owner. part OW11er.
agent. or who ~btln aid. ahet. counsel. advise or assist in any violation
tbereaL" shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Held that. under an
indictment cbarging only tl"!e maintenance of such an inclosure. tIle de-

fendant could not he conyicted of bn"ing aided. abetted. counseled. ad·
vised, or assisted in its maintenance.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases. see PubUc Lands. Dec. Dig. § 19.']

In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District
of Oregon.
William Hanley was cO!1\'icted of a criminal offense, and brings error. Reversed.
C. E. S. Wood and John TIL Gearin, for plaintiff in error.
John McCourt, U. S. Atty.
Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and HANFORD, District Judge.
ROSS. Circuit Judge. The plaintiff in error was defendant in the
court below to an indictment containing two counts, the first of which
charged him with unlawfully maintaining and controlling certain
fences, which, together with natural barriers and cross-fences, inclosed
a large body of public land of the United States situated in Harney
county, state of Oregon, and the second of which counts charged him
with unlawfully preventing and obstructing persons from peaceably
entering upon or establishing a settlement or residence on the tracts of
public land within the inclosure, and preventing and obstructing their
passage over and through the public lands so inclosed by means of the
fences described in the first count, contrary to the provisions of Act
-For other cases see same topic &: § NUMBER In vee. &; Am. Digs. 1901 to date.
t Rehearing denied March 10. 1911.
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N.J. 127, 132-33,405 A.2d 381 (1979) (citing
40:550--4). Second, the legislative history
of "interested party" indicates that a potential plaintiff must show merely that he has
been denied the reciprocal benefits of a
common zoning plan.
[14] The current definition of "interested party" first appeared in N.J.S.A. 40:5547.1 of the prior municipal land use statute.
The Legislature intended that section to
give individuals the same right to an injunction afforded municipalities under N.J.
S.A. 40:55--47. See Assembly Bill 536 of
1969; see, also, Alpine Borough v. Brewster, 7 N.J. 42, 80 A.2d 297 (1951). Accordingly, an interested party, at most, must
show the equivalent of what was traditionaIly described as "special damages," that is,
damages "distinct from [those] suffered ...
in common with the community at large."
Morris v. Haledon, 24 N.J. Super. 171, 17980, 93 A.2d 781 (App.Div.1952). See, also,
Governor's Message re Assembly Bill 536,
Dec. I, 1969; Alpine Borough v. Brewster,
supra 7 N.J. at 52, 80 A.2d 297; Stokes v.
Jenkins, 107 N.J.Eq. 318, 321, 152 A. 383
(Ch.1930).

[15J Plaintiffs have clearly suffered special damages. Their proximity to the windmill denies them the equal benefit of enjoyment of their property, and causes them
injury greater than that suffered by the
general pUblic. See Stokes v. Jenkins, supra at 322, 152 A. 383. Accordingly, plaintiffs are "interested parties" within the
meaning of N.J.S.A. 40:550-4 and are entitled to an injunction under N.J.S.A.
40:55D-18.
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[16J Defendants nevertheless contend
that the windmill ordinance is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That position is unpersuasive. Defendants argue that the ordinance
violates equal protection guarantees by arbitrarily singling out windmills for noise
control, and due process because it unreasonably limits windmill noise to 50 dBA
while other ambient sounds often rise above
that level. The ordinance, however, is a
zoning regulation and was promulgated under the police power. Since it is "social"
legislation it need be justified only by a
showing that, in any state of facts, it rea-

sonably advances a legitimate state purpose. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491
(1970). This same minimal standard satisfies the principle of substantive due process.
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54
S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934); Hutton Park
Gardens v. West Orange, 68 N.J. 543, 56061,350 A.2d 1 (1975). Thus, a showing that
the ordinance reasonably advances a legitimate state purpose would defeat both
claims.
Pursuant to a police power statute, the
Brigantine ordinance legitimately protects
public health and welfare by proscribing
excessive noise. Limiting noise from windmiIls indisputably advances that legitimate
purpose and does so in a reasonable way.
The claim that "other ambient sounds" may
exist above 50 dBA ignores the distinction
between noise (unwanted sound) and natural ambient sounds. It is not unreasonable
for Brigantine to classify a windmill's sound
"noise" and thus limit it. Nor is it unreasonable for the city to attack the noise
problem "one step at a time," beginning
with windmills, "addressing itself to the
phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind." Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75
S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). Defendant's constitutional claims are thus without
merit. It must also be r~membered that
this ordinance is entitled to a presumption
of validity. That presumption "may be
overcome by a clear showing that the local
ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable."
Quick Chek Food Stores v. Springfield Tp.,
83 N.J. 438, 447, 416 A.2d 840 (1980). There
has been no such showing here.
In conclusion, it is the view of this court
that, for a variety of reasons, defendants'
windmill constitutes an actionable nuisance.
Under the same analysis plaintiffs' heat
pump does not. An alternative basis for
granting injunctive relief is defendants' violation of the municipal zoning ordinance.
An order should be entered accordingly.
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Peter CARLINO and Elizabeth Carlino,
His Wife, Appellants,
v.

WHITPAIN
INVESTORS,
Whitpain
Township, Whitpain Township Board of
Supervisors and Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Oct. 19, 1982.
Decided Dec. 23, 1982.

2. Highways ~85
Although complaint alleging that Commonwealth Department of Transportation
should not have issued driveway permit authorizing construction of access road without adequate preliminary studies and that
deficiencies existed in the access road which
would endanger public health, safety and
welfare contained broad assertion that deficiencies would have unique impact on plaintiff, there was failure to specify any individual injury attributable to deficiencies in
roadway itself and in preparatory studies,
and thus plaintiffs lacked standing to raise
such objection to DOT's action.

In an equity action, landowner sought
preliminary injunctive relief with respect to
an access road. Complaint was dismissed
by the Commonwealth Court, 52 Pa.
Cmwlth. 145, 415 A.2d 461, on preliminary
objections, and the landowners appealed.
The Supreme Court, Eastern District, Flaherty, J., held that: (1) landowners lacked
standing to complain of endangering of the
public health, safety and welfare; (2) allegations asserting nonexistent right to maintain existing traffic conditions on avenue
failed to state cause of action; (3) if defending developer's predecessor in title procured rezoning of subject land in exchange
for covenanted use restrictions applicable to
that land, such restrictions would be unenforceable; and (4) any amendment of complaint would be futile.

3. Highways ~85
Allegations that grant of driveway permit by Commonwealth Department of
Transportation would result in inconvenience and annoyance because of presence of
access road immediately adjacent to plaintiff's property, thereby impairing value of
the property in manner not compensable in
damages, were an assertion of nonexistent
right to maintain existing traffic conditions
on avenue and therefore failed to state
cause of action.

Affirmed.
Larsen, J., dissented and filed opinion
in which McDermott, J., joined.

1. Action ~ 13
Rule respecting standing is not intended to bar from relief persons injured by
breach of public duty merely because many
others have incurred similar injuries as consequences of that breach, but rather, the
concern is to distinguish those who have
suffered some individual injury from those
asserting only common right of entire public that the law be obeyed.

4. Contracts ~108(1)
Individuals cannot, by contract, abridgf
police powers which protect general welfare
and public interest but, rather, the otherwise valid contractual rights of individuals
must give way to general welfare.
5. Zoning and Planning ~3, 160
Police power of municipalities cannot
be subjected to agreements which restrict
or condition zoning district classifications as
to particular properties, and agreement and
concomitant presentations or stipulations
which induce changes in zoning district classifications do not limit effect of those
changes once enacted.
6. Pleading ~233
Pretrial Procedure ~695
Right to amend pleadings should not be
withheld where there i~ ~omp rp".on"h]p
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possibility that amendment can be accomplished successfully, but where allowance of
amendment would be futile exercise, complaint may properly be dismissed without
allowance for amendment.
Edward J. Hughes, Norristown, for appellants.
Howard Gershman, Blue Bell, for Whitpain Tp. and Bd. of Sup'rs.
J. Peirce Anderson, Norristown, John M.
Hrubovcak, Asst. Atty. Gen. for Dept. of
Transp.
Before O'BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS,
NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT and HUTCHINSON, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Justice.
This equity action was commenced in the
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery
County by the appellants, Peter Carlino and
Elizabeth Carlino, seeking a preliminary injunction against the appellees, Whitpain Investors (hereinafter Developer), Whitpain
Township (hereinafter Township), and
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (hereinafter PennDOT). Upon motion
of Penn DOT, the action was transferred to
Commonwealth Court, and, sustaining appellees' preliminary objections, Commonwealth Court dismissed the complaint.'
The instant appeal ensued.
Since review is sought of the sustainment
of preliminary objections in the nature of
demurrers, the well pleaded factual allegations set forth in the complaint are to be
regarded as true for purposes of review.
Papieves v. Kelly, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118
(1970). The facts as alleged by appellants'
complaint establish the following. Developer is constructing an apartment complex in
the Township on a 47 acre tract of land
situated between three roads, one of which,
Stenton Avenue, is a state highway. Appellants' residence lies directly across Stenton Avenue from the construction site. De-

veloper's predecessor in title sought to have
the 47 acre tract rezoned from an R-l
(single-family) classification to an R-3
(multi-family) classification to permit construction of residential rental units. At the
hearing on rezoning of the tract, the then
owner stipulated that a 300 foot buffer
would be provided from the right-of-way
line of Stenton Avenue, and further specified that no access road from the apartment
complex to Stenton Avenue would be built.
In 1973, the requested zoning change was
adopted by the Township. In 1979, however, construction of an access road from
the apartment complex to Stenton Avenue
commenced, and appellants became aware
that the land development plan finally approved by the Township had, at the insistence of the Township, included a provision
for access to Stenton Avenue, and that in
1978, a driveway permit authorizing construction of the access road to Stenton A venue had been issued by Penn DOT.

[1, 2] Alleging that the driveway permit
issued by PennDOT to Developer was
granted without adequate preliminary studies, and asserting the existence of deficiencies in the access road that endanger the
public health, safety, and welfare, appellants seek an injunction requiring revocation of the perInit. Established principles
governing standing to raise issues in the
public interest, however, bar appelIants' assertion of these claims. In Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464
Pa. 168, 192, 346 A.2d 269, 280-281 (1975),
our cases dealing with standing were summarized as follows:
The core concept, of course, is that a
person who is not adversely affected in
any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not "aggrieved" thereby and has
no standing to obtain a judicial resolution
of his challenge. In particular, it is not
sufficient for the person claiming to be
"aggrieved" to assert the common interest of all citizens in procuring obedience
to the law.
r .................. ,....

1AC::

Ale:>:

h,.,,,,

dt:l

(IQQ()\

(footnotes omitted). This rule respecting
standing is not intended to bar from relief
persons injured by breach of a public duty
merely because many others have incurred
similar injuries as a consequence of that
br:ach; rather, the "concern is to di~tin.g~llsh t?~se who have suffere~ some lndlVidual lnJU1Y from those assertmg only the
common right of the entire public that the
law be obeyed." Id. at 203, 346 A.2d at 287
· a dd ed). S·IUce th'
( emp h aSls
e IUS t an t complaint, although containing a broad assertion that deficiencies in the access road wiIl
"have a unique impact" on appellants, fails
to specify any individual injury attributable
to deficiencies in the roadway itself and in
preparatory studies, appellants must be regarded as lacking standing to raise such
objections to PennDOT's action.
[3] Appellants further challenge PennDOT's grant of the driveway permit on
grounds that presence of the access road
immediately adjacent to their property will
cause inconvenience and annoyance, thereby impairing the value of their property in
a manner not compensable in damages. We
regard this assertion as inadequate to state
a cause of action. In Wolf v. Department
of Highways, 422 Pa. 34, 220 A.2d 868
(1966), an eminent domain case, an owner
of business property abutting a state highway alleged that highway improvements
had diminished the property's value by necessitating a circuitous route of ingress,
thereby reducing the number of business
customers willing to enter the premises.
Denying the owner's claim for damages insofar as property value diminution occasioned by such a diversion of traffic, this
Court held that owners of properties abutting state roads have no cognizable legal
interest in preserving a particular flow of
traffic on those roads. Thus, in Wolf, 422
Pa. at 47, 220 A.2d at 875, quoting State of
Missouri ex reI, State Highway Comm. v.
Meier, 388 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Mo.1965), the
rights of an abutting owner were stated as
folIows:
2. In Gladwyne Colony, Inc. v. Lower Merion
Township, 409 Pa. 441, 187 A.2d 549 (1963), it
was alleged that a landowner gave consideration (parkland) to a municipality in exchange
E....... ............ ,. .............. t

""f ........... _ .... _:_ ....... _..Jl_____

Tt.._

"Respondent, as an abutting property
owner on a public highway, does not now
have and has never had any other property interest in the public highway other
than a reasonable right of ingress and
egress, as stated. Respondent has never
had a property right in the traffic, great
or small on the highway nor a right to
'
'.
recover da~ages for a decrease I~ va~ue
of her premIses
by reason of the dIversIOn
.
of traffiC away from he.r property, no

has she had a property right to have th

same amount of traf~ic pass ~er property
as before or to have It move m the same
direction."
(emphasis added). Since appellants' contention that the access road in question will
cause inconvenience and annoyance is, in
essence, an assertion of right to maintain
the existing traffic conditions on Stenton
Avenue, and since the existence of such a
right has been negated by our holding in
Wolf, appellants' claim against PennDOT
fails to state a cause of action.
With respect to Township and Developer,
appellants seek an injunction requiring the
former to refrain from conditioning Developer's construction permit upon provision of
the access road in question, and requiring
the latter to eliminate that road and restore
the 300 foot buffer zone along Stenton A v
nue. The complaint alIeges that
er's predecessor in title, pursuant an
ment with the Township, stipulated as to
plans to preserve the buffer area and forego an access road to Stenton A venue, thereby rendering the 1973 rezoning contractually conditioned upon there being no access
route traversing the buffer zone.
[4, 5] The concept of contractually conditioned zoning advanced by appellants
lacks precedent in this Commonwealth,2 and
authorities elsewhere differ with respect to
whether to accord the concept validity. See
generalIy Nicholson v. TourtelIotte, 110 R.I.
case did not involve contractually conditioned
rezoning, however, since no special land use
limitations or conditions were accepted by the
property owner in order to secure the rezoning.
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411, 293 A.2d 909 (1972); State ex rel. Zutrolled by the considerations which enter
pancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis.2d 22, 174
into the law of contracts. The use reN.W.2d 533 (1970); 70 ALR 3d 125. The
striction must needs have general applicaproposition has long been recognized in this
tion. The power may not be exerted to
Commonwealth that individuals cannot, by
serve private interests merely, nor may
contract, abridge police powers which prothe principle be subverted to that end.
tect the general welfare and public interest. Accordingly, we reject the view that agreeAs stated in Leiper v. Baltimore & Philadel- ments, and concomitant representations or
phia Railroad Co., 262 Pa. 328, 332, 105 A. stipulations, which induce changes in zoning
551, 553 (1918), "Where the rights of indi- district classifications limit the effect of
viduals under a contract which would other- those changes once enacted. Thus, if it
wise be perfectly valid are in conflict with were proven, as alleged in the complaint,
the 'general well-being of the State: the
that Developer's predecessor in title prorights of the individuals must give way to
cured rezoning of the subject land in exthe general welfare." See also, Municipal
change for covenanted use restrictions apAuthority of Blythe v. Pennsylvania Public
plicable to that land, such restrictions would
Utility Commission, 199 Pa.Super. 334, 185
A.2d 628 (1962). The police power of mu- be unenforceable; hence, proceedings to enproperly disnicipalities cannot be subjected to agree- force the restrictions were
3
ments which restrict or condition zoning missed by the court below.
[6] Finally, appellants contend that the
district classifications as to particular properties. We are in accord with the position court below abused its discretion by dismissadopted by the Supreme Court of New Jer- ing their complaint, while sustaining presey, in Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automo- liminary objections, without granting leave
tive Products Credit Association, Inc., 9 N.J. to amend the pleadings in an effort to avoid
122, 87 A.2d 319, 322 (1952), wherein the dismissal. As stated in Otto v. American
Court stated: "Contracts thus have no Mutual Insurance Co., 482 Pa. 202, 205, 393
place in a zoning plan and a contract be- A.2d 450, 451 (1978), "The right to amend
tween a municipality and a property owner should not be withheld where therc is some
should not enter into the enactment or en- reasonable possibility that amendment can
forcement of zoning regulations." In Hous- be accomplished successfully." Where alton, covenants and restrictions agreed to by lowance of an amendment would, however,
a landowner as a means of effecting a be a futile exercise, the complaint may
zoning change were held invalid on grounds properly be dismissed without allowance for
that the purported contract thereby made, amendment. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
was, with regard to the municipality, ultra Co. v. Barbera, 443 Pa. 93, 277 A.2d 821
vires and contrary to public policy. In so (1971). Appellants submit only that, if
holding, the Court relied upon its decision in granted the opportunity to amend their
V.F. Zahodiakin Engineering Corp. v. Zon- complaint, they "would plead ... a suffiing Board of Adjustment, 8 N.J. 386, 394- cient interest to confer standing .. , and
395, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (1952), setting forth would assert third party beneficiary rights
the following principle, with which we .. , arising out of the stipulation and
agree, governing exercise of municipal zon- agreement between the Township and the
ing power:
Developer and the conditional rezoning of
Zoning is an exercise of the police pow- the tract." Since the principle of contracer to serve the common good and general tually conditioned rezoning lacks viability,
welfare. It is elementary that the legis- and in view of appellants' failure to allege
lative function may not be surrendered or what new interest would be asserted as a
curtailed by bargain or its exercise con- basis for standing, there appears no reason3. Since rezoning of the subject tract is held not

to be validly conditioned upon there being no
access road to Stenton Avenue. there is no

need to address PennDOTs claim that munici·
palities lack authority to deny access to state
highways.

able possibility that amendment could successfully be accomplished. Accordingly, an
opportunity to amend the complaint was
properly denied.
Order affirmed.
LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion in
which McDERMOTT, J., joins.

rights, should not be left without a remedy
when they discover that they were deceived.
Under these circumstances, it may be said
that the rezoning application with accompanying plan and representations were detrimentaly misleading as to the Carlinos. In
such instances, our courts have said that
negligent or wrongful official conduct
which misleads an aggrieved party to his
detriment can be equated to fraud. See:
Appeal of Girolamo, 49 Pa.Commw. 159, 410
A.2d 940 (1980); See also: Visual-EducE
tion Devices, Inc. v. Springettsbury Town
ship, 54 Pa.Commw. 529, 422 A.2d 235
(1980). Although the facts and specific issues in Girolamo and Springettsbury are
dissimilar to those in the present case, the
judicial disapproval of deceit and misleading conduct as a viable principle is applicable to the Carlinos' situation.
Accordingly, I would hold that the appellants' right to be heard, a right which they
were wrongfully induced to forego in 1973,
should be recognized under the facts in this
case and would, therefore, reverse.

LARSEN, Justice dissenting.
I dissent to the majority's conclusion that
the appellants have no enforceable rights
against the township and developer. The
Carlinos apparently were prepared to oppose the application for rezoning and, if
necessary, challenge by appeal any approval
of a new zoning classification. However,
the appellants were misled to inaction by
conduct of the township and the developer's
predecessor when the property was rezoned.
The potential flames of opposition were
doused quickly and efficiently by the soothing nectar of promises, stipulations and representations publicly and officially made by
township officials and the then owner of
the premises. There is nothing before us to
suggest that the Carlinos were other than
completely assured that the threats to the
public health and safety, which they perMcDERMOTT, J., joins in this dissenting
ceived, were effectively minimized by the
opinion.
establishment of a 300 feet buffer zone and
the committment that no access road to
Stenton Avenue would be built. The appellants' good faith beliefs in this regard were
derived directly from the pacifying actions
of the township and the former property
owner. The Carlinos, who were cajoled into
giving up valuable and legally protected
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Wen Y. CHUNG, as Trustee U/AfD
June 5, 1986, Appellant,

ments for rezoning. U.S.CA Const.Amend.
14; West's F.SA § 163.3215(7).

v.

SARASOTA COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, and The
Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County, Florida, and its Commissioners, Wayne L. Derr, Charley Richards, Robert L. Anderson, David R.
Mills, and Eugene A. Matthews, in their
official capacities, Appell ees,
and
Elling O. Eide and Holiday Harbor
Homeowners Association, Inc.,
Intervenors/Appellees.
Nos. 95-04581, 95-04911.

2. Zoning and Planning <1:=>160

"Contract zoning" refers to agreement
between property owner and local government where owner agrees to certain conditions in return for government's rezoning or
enforceable promise to rezone.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and def-

initions.
3. Zoning and Planning <1:=>160, 762
Contracts have no place in zoning plan
and contract between municipality and property owner should not enter into enactment
or enforcement of zoning regulations; purported contract so made is ultra vires and all
proceedings to effectuate it are coram non
judice and utterly void.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Second District.
Dec. 27, 1996.

Trustee brought action against county to
challenge county's denial of his rezoning petition. The Circuit Court, Sarasota County,
Peter A. Dubensky, J., vacated stipulated
final judgment which had obligated county to
rezone trustee's property subject to numerous stipulations and conditions. Trustee appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Blue,
J., held that county's purported settlement
agreement with trustee constituted invalid
contract zoning.

Stephen D. Rees and Julie Ginsburg Eller
of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen &
Ginsburg, P A, Sarasota. for Appellant.
Elizabeth M. Woodford, Assistant County
Attorney, Sarasota, for Appellee Sarasota
County and its Commissioners.
Donald E. Hernke of Carlton, Fields.
Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A..
Tampa, for Appellee/Intervenor Eide.
Daniel J. Lobeck of The Law Offices of
Lobeck & Hanson, PA, Sarasota, for Appellee/Intervenor Holiday Harbor_

Mfirrned.
BLUE, Judge.
In these consolidated cases, Wen Y.
Chung, as trustee, appeals two orders by the
County's purported settlement agree- circuit court. The first order allowed the
ment in zoning litigation, under which county Holiday Harbor Homeowners Association to
agreed to rezone disputed property subject intervene_ Because Holiday Harbor'S subto numerous stipulations and conditions, con- stantial interests were affected and because
stituted invalid contract zoning, though coun- it moved to intervene while a rehearing was
ty commission had approved settlement at its pending, we affirm this order without further
regular meetings, as settlement bypassed discussion. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clm'le, 414
more stringent notice and hearing require- So.2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) ("Finality

1. Zoning and Planning <1:=>160

.)

)

J

II

CHUNG v. SARASOTA COUNTY
Cite as 686 So.2d \358 (Fla.App.2 DiS!. 1996)

of a determination does not '" occur until
time expires to file a rehearing petition and
disposition thereof if filed .... "); Friedland
v. City of Hollywood, 130 So.2d 306 (Fla. 2d
11
DCA 1961) (holding that adjacent property
I owners had standing to challenge rezoning).
, The second order on appeal vacated a stipulated fipal judgment entered in a zoning dispute between Chung and Sarasota County.
Based on the following analysis, we have
concluded that Sarasota County's purported
settlement agreement constituted improper
contract zoning. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court order that vacated the fmal judgment.

!

Briefly stated. the facts are these. In
1990. Chung filed a petition with Sarasota
County to rezone approximately eleven acres
of land. After the rezoning petition was
denied by the Sarasota County Commission,
Chung filed legal actions in the circuit court.
Subsequently, Chung and the County entered into a settlement agreement, which
obligated the County to rezone Chung's
property subject to numerous stipulations
and conditions. Based on the settlement, the
trial court entered a stipulated final judgment and retained jurisdiction over its enforcement. An adjacent property owner, Elling O. Eide, filed a motion to intervene that
the trial court granted for the limited purpose of a rehearing. The Holiday Harbor
Homeowners Association also intervened.
After a healing, the trial court vacated the
stipUlated final judgment and Chung appeals.
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Bank, 252 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1971). For the
following reasons. however, we have reached
the conclusion that this zoning dispute was
not a matter upon which it was appropriate
to stipulate.
[2, 3] "Contract zoning" refers to an
agreement between a property owner and a
local government where the owner agrees to
certain conditions in return for the government's rezoning or enforceable promise to
rezone. James D. Lawlor. Annotation, Validity. Construction, & Effect of Agreenwnt
to Rezone, or Amendment to Zoning Ordinance, Creating Special Restrictions or Conditions Not Applicable to Other P?-operly
Similady Zoned, 70 A.L_R.3d 125, 131
(1976).

Contracts have no place in a zoning plan
and a contract between a municipality and
a property owner should not enter into the
enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations. . . . [A] purported contract so
made is ultra vires and all proceedings to
effectuate ,it are coram non judice and
utterly void.

E.C. Yokley. 4 Zoning Law & Practice § 2511, at 321 (4th ed. 1979) (footnote omitted).
In P.C.B. Partnm-ship v. Cit.y of Largo, 549
So_2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), this court held
that a contract was ultra vires and unenforceable because it purported to restrict the
City's decision-making authority on development issues. "The City does not have the
authori!:'! to enter into such a contract, which
effectively contracts away the exercise of its
[1] Chung argues that the trial court police powers." 549 So.2d at 740 (citations
erred in vacating the stipulated final judg- omitted).
ment because counties have the authority to
One of the reasons contract zoning is genenter into contracts and to settle litigation.
erally
rejected is because "[t]he legislative
Eide and the Homeowners Association argue
power
to
enact and amend zoning regulations
that the settlement agreement and final
judgment were invalid as contract zoning and requires due process. notice. and hearings."
as violative of due process and various stat- Terry Lewis et aI., Spot Zoning, Contract
utes and ordinances related to zoning_ We Zoning, & Conditional Zoning, in 2 Florida
Envi?'onmental & Land Use Law 9-1, 9-13
accept the general rule that uta] stipulation
(James J. Brown, ed., 2d ed. 1994).
properly entered into and relating to a matter upon which it is appropriate to stipulate
Assuming that the developer and municiis binding upon the parties and upon the
pality bargain for a rezoning ordinance
Court" r""J'rJ'YJ Pl","l'V>J..';"",.. r.M_

'-';"t
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tory, contract zoning is nevertheless illegal
when they enter into a bilateral agreement
involving reciprocal obligations. By binding itself to enact the requested ordinance
(or not to amend the existing ordinance),
the municipality bypasses the hearing
phase of the legislative process.
Roy P. Cookston & Burt Bruton, Zoning
Law, 35 U.Miami L.Rev. 581, 589 n. 34
(1981). In Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86
(Fla.1956), the Florida Supreme Court declared a zoning ordinance invalid because it
was conditioned upon separate collateral
agreements with the developer. The court
also noted:
If each parcel of property were zoned on

the basis of variables that could enter into
private contracts then the whole scheme
and objective of community planning and
zoning would collapse. The residential
owner would never !mow when he was
protected against commercial encroachment. . .. The adoption of an ordinance is
the exercise of municipal legislative power.
In the exercise of this governmental function a city cannot legislate by contract. If
it could, then each citizen would be governed by an individual rule based upon the
best deal that he could make with the
goverrii.rig body.
93 So.2d at 89. We conclude that the County's settlement agreement here presents a
case of improper contract zoning. Although
the County Commission approved the settlement at its regular meetings, it bypassed the
more stringent notice and hearing requirements for a rezoning. When it entered into
the settlement agreement that obligated it to
rezone Chung's property, the County contracted away the exercise of its police power,
which constituted an ultra vires act.

N
C
~:::x::>

Chung argues that the County must still
follow the formal requirements to enact the
zoning amendments and that this process will
provide the necessary due process opportunities for notice and a hearing. We reject this
argument because the hearings that follow
would be a pro forma exercise since the
County has already obligated itself to a deci-

GANYARD v. STATE
Clle as 686 So.2d 1361 (Fla.App. 1 Disl. 1996)

sion. See Zoning Board of Monroe County
v. Hood, 484 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
(binding County to stipulated final judgment,
where the County had agreed to approve a
development plan and rezone the site; no
reference to contract zoning but discussing
potential collateral attacks on the stipulated
judgment by non-parties). In Molina v.
Tradewinds Development C0111., 526 So.2d
695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), the Fourth District
approved a settlement agreement similar to
the one between Chung and Sarasota County
and affirmed an order compelling the City to
comply by rezoning in conformity with the
agreement. Without discussing the issue of
contract zoning, the court held that the orders did not abrogate or modify the City's
obligation to follow applicable zoning laws,
including requirements for public hearings.
On this point, we disagree with the Fourth
District because the County has already
made its rezoning decision. Its obligation to
follow applicable zoning laws, including requirements for public hearings, is an obligation that must be exercised prior to the
decision-making, not afterwards.
We are concerned about impairing a local
government's ability to settle litigation. On
the other hand, we can envision developers
filing an unacceptable plan for rezoning, appealing its denial, and then obtaining approval of a modified plan by settlement agreement before satisfying the public notice and
hearing requirements. While we do not suggest that this happened in the present case,
the fact remains that the County bound itself
to enact the requested rezoning before the
matter was noticed or scheduled for the required hearings. As a final note, we point
out an interesting provision in chapter 163,
Florida Statutes (1995). Aggrieved parties
are entitled to bring suit to prevent local
government action that would be inconsistent
with the comprehensive plan. § 163.3215(1).
"In any action under this section, no settlement shall be entered into by the local government unless the terms of the settlement
have been the subject of a public hearing
after notice as required by this part."
§ 163.3215(7). In the zoning and land use
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arena, we find reassuring this legislative recognition of the need to afford due process,
notice and hearing before settlement terms
are approved. By prohibiting contract zoning, the same due process rights have been
protected in the local exercise of zoning pow-

and he appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Allen, J., held that: (1) defendant has no
right to be physically present whenever peremptory challenges might be exercised and
has only the right to be present when peremptory challenges "are exercised," and (2)

er.

defendant was not prejudiced by his absence
from bench conference when peremptory
challenges were exercised by prosecutor, despite claim that he was prejudiced because
his attorney might have exercised challenges
at the conference.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
order in this case, which vacated the stipulated final judgment between Chung and
Sarasota County. Further, we certify the
following question of great public importance:
WHETHER A COUNTY OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CAN ENTER INTO A
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN ZONING LITIGATION WITHOUT FIRST
ADHERING TO THE DUE PROCESS
AND STATUTORY/ORDINANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ENACTING THE
ZONING CHANGES CONTEMPLATED
BY THE AGREEMENT?
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and FULMER,

J., concur.

Affirmed and question certified.
Lawrence, J., filed a specially conCurring
opinion.
Webster, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Mickle, J., joined.

1. Criminal Law e:>636(3)

It was error not to have defendant physically present at bench conference during
which jury challenges were exercised where
he never waived his presence or ratified the
strikes made outside his presence. (Per Allen, J., with one Judge concurring and one
Judge concurring specially.)
2. Criminal Law e=>U66.14

James D. GANYARD, Appellant,
v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 95-1536.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.
Dec. 30, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1997.

Defendant was convicted in the Circuit
, Court, Leon County, J. Lewis Hall, Jr., J.,

Defendant was not prejudiced by his
absence from bench conference when peremptory challenges were exercised by prosecutor because challenges were within the discretion of the prosecutor, despite claim that
defendant was prejudiced because his attorney might have exercised challenges at the
conference. (Per Allen, J., with one Judge
conCurring and one Judge conCurring specially.)
3. Criminal Law e=>636(3)
Defendant has no right to be physically
present whenever peremptory challenges
might be exercised; he has only the right to
be present when peremptory challenges "are
exercised." (Per Allen, J., with one Judge
concurring and one Judge conCurring specially.)
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A.
The Association in Count I of their
underlying Amended Complaint alleged
that the County willfully violated the
FLSA. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
Co., 896 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir.1990), the
court interpreted a similar errors or omissions policy to not cover intentional acts.
The Fireman's Fund policy did not specifically exclude intentional acts of the insured. The exclusions in that policy, like
the exclusions here, were for dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts. The
court concluded that the only reasonable
construction was that the insurance company "contracted to provide coverage for negligent-not intentional acts • • • ." Id.
A willful violation of the FLSA does not
constitute a "negligent act or omission."
Cj City of Fort Pierre v. United Fire &
Casualty Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 848 (S.D.
1990) (holding negligent act, error or omissions policy did not cover city's intentional
decision to ignore federal government permit requirements).
[8]

Also, the FLSA is a federal statute that
prescribes criminal penalties for its violation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a). Thus, a willful
violation of the FLSA is a criminal act that
is excluded under the policy.
B.

'0

......,
~

~

[9,101 Count II of the Association's
Amended Complaint alleged that the County breached its members' contract of employment and breached the County Rules
and Regulations incorporated in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Exclusionary
provisions in insurance policies will be enforced if they are clear and do not violate
public policy. Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 322, 324, 757 P.2d
792, 794 (1988). As previously noted, the
exclusions applicable to the Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance portion of the
policy were also applicable to the errors or
omissions section. The Comprehensive
General Liability Insuranc1 exclusions include inter alia:
:

This insurance does not apply:
(a) to liability assumed by the insured
under any contract or agreement eXcept
a defined contract: but this exclusion
does not apply to a warranty of fitness
or quality of the named insured's product
if a warranty that work performed by or
on behalf of the named insured will be
done in a workmanlike manner; '"
As defined in the policy, contract means
"any written agreement, except one per.
taining to aircraft, under which a named
insured assumes the liability of others for
bodily injury or property damage." In
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Ba.
sic American Medical, Inc., 703 F.Supp.
629, 632-33 (E.D.Mich.1989), the court in.
terpreted the following exclusionary Ian.
guage in a general liability policy: "This
insurance does not apply: a. to liability
assumed by the insured under any contract
or agreement except an incidental contract
• • • ." The Commercial Union Court
found that "employment contracts do not
constitute the type of liability assumed by
defendants under a contract which would
bring these contracts within the policy's
coverage." Id. at 633. In its analysis of
the issue, the court referred to the following discussion of contractual exclusions
clauses in liability insurance policies con·
tained in 12 George J. Couch, Couch on
Insurance § 44A:35, at 55-57 (2d ed. 1981):
"Such provisions • • • deny the coverage generally assumed by a liability polio
cy in cases in which the insured in a
contract with a third party agrees to
save harmless or indemnify such third
party." (citations omitted).
The purpose of these contractual exclusion clauses is not to make the insurer
underwrite its insureds' contracts, but to
limit coverage to the insured's tort liability.
Commercial Union, 703 F.Supp. at 633.
We agree with the court in Commercial
Union, and interpret the similar, clear language here to exclude coverage for employment contracts. The Colonial Penn
policy does not afford coverage for breach
of contract or breach of the Collective Bar·
gaining Agreement.

C.
(111 Count III of the Association's

417, 426 (4th Cir.1947), cert. denied, 333
U.S. 854, 68 S.Ct. 729, 92 L.Ed. 1135 (1948).

Amended Complaint alleged that the CounThe claims of the Association were propty failed to negotiate changes in County erly viewed as existing only in contract,
Rules and failed to pay stand-by time, and the Colonial Penn policy excluded
therefore breaching its contract of employ- claims for breach of contract. The County
ment with members of the Association and made no showing that the essential facts of
willfully violating County Rule 312.2. In the complaint alleged any "negligent act,
the alternative, it is alleged that the Coun- error or omission." See Wylie, 105 N.M. at
ty negligently breached the Collective Bar- 409, 733 P.2d at 857. Therefore, Colonial
gaining Agreement. The County contends Penn had no duty to defend or indemnify
that acting upon the advice of its attorney under the policy.
and his interpretation of the FLSA, employ·
The judgment of the district court is
ees were not paid for on-call lunch periods.
The County argues "that a misapprehen- affirmed.
sion of what the law allows is sufficient to
IT IS SO ORDERED.
constitute an error under the policy."
Thus, the County contends, the breach of
MONTGOMERY and FROST, JJ.,
contract occurred as a result of a "negligent act, error or omission," and the key to concur.
determining coverage is not the form of the
pleading, but the nature of the insured's
conduct. See Touchette Corp. v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 76 A.D.2d 7, 9, 429
N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (1980).
Under some circumstances, breach of a
contractual duty may give rise to an inde114 N.M. 699
pendent action in tort. Preferred Mktg. v.
Hawkeye Nat'/ Life Ins. Co., 452 N.W.2d
Wayne DACY and Sandra Dacy, his
389, 397 (Iowa 1990). "Only where a duty
wife, Petitioners-Appellants,
recognized by the law of torts exists between the plaintiff and defendant distinct
V.
from a duty imposed by the contract will a
VILLAGE
OF
RUIDOSO,
tort action lie for conduct in breach of the
Respondent-Appellee.
contract." Id.; see Cottonwood Enters. v.
McAlpin, 111 N.M. 793, 795-96, 810 P.2d
No. 20143.
812, 814-15 (1991) (holding tort of negli·
gence must be based upon duty other that
Supreme Court of New Mexico.
one imposed by contract); W. Page Keeton
Nov. 19, 1992.
et aI., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 92 (5th ed. 1984) (describing requirement for separate duty apart from
contractual duty to give rise to tort action).
Landowners sued village for breach of
There is no relationship between the Coun- contract after village failed to rezone landty and its employees that gives rise to a owner's property. The District Court of
legal duty to pay overtime which is inde- Lincoln County, Sandra A. Grisham, J.,
pendent of the Collective Bargaining found for village. Landowners appealed.
Agreement. Even the violation of the The Supreme Court, Montgomery, J., held
FLSA evolves from the contract of employ- that: (1) contract zoning between landownment. The FLSA provisions "are read into ers and village was unenforceable, and (2)
and become a part of every employment landowners were not entitled to restitution.
contract that is subject to the terms of the
Affirmed.
Act." Roland Elec. Co. v. Black, 163 F.2d
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ming and Planning ¢:>160
'Contract zoning," properly used, dees agreement between municipality
another party in which municipality's
deration consists of either promise to
property in requested manner or actut of zoning property in that manner.
See publication Words and Phrases
)f
other judicial constructions and
efinitions.
ming and Planning ¢:>160
:;ontract zoning is illegal whenever it
s from promise by municipality to zone
~rty in certain manner, such as in bilatcontract to zone or in unilateral conin which municipality promises to rein return for some action or forbearby other party; in making such promnunicipality preempts power of zoning
Jrity to zone property according to
ribed legislative procedures.
,ning and Planning ¢:>160
~ontract zoning in form of unilateral
act in which party makes promise in
n for municipality's act of rezoning is
as municipality makes no promise
;here is no enforceable contract until
~ipality acts to rezone property; be! municipality does not commit itself
y specified action before zoning heart does not circumvent statutory proce, or compromise rights of affected perning and Planning ¢:>160
Tillage's agreement to rezone landrs' property in return for landowners'
'yance of property needed for right-ofwas unenforceable unilateral contract
g as village's agreement was an at; to commit itself to specific zoning
I without following required statutory
dures. NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6, subd.
ntracts ¢:>136
'amages are unavailable as relief to
to illegal contract.
'unction ¢:>57
ecific Performance ¢:>55
leither specific performance nor inon wiJI be granted to party to illegal
lct.

Sam A. Westergren, Santa Fe, for peti.
tioners-appellants.
David A. Thomsen, Ruidoso, for respon.
dent-appellee.

OPINION
MONTGOMERY, Justice.
In this case we deal with an instance of
so-called "contract zoning." The trial court
found that the Village of Ruidoso ("the
Village") had contracted with the appel·
lants, Wayne and Sandra Dacy, to rezone a
tract of land conveyed to them in exchange
for another tract and held that the contract
was void for illegality. In the Dacys' suit
against the Village for damages for breach
of contract, the court after a bench trial
entered judgment for the Village. The Dacys appeal and we affirm, discussing the
enforceability of a contract to zone property and the consequences of a ruling that
the contract is unenforceable.

\

the Village in the 1983 agreement to rezone
Tract A-A as R-2.

1. FACTS AND ISSUES
In 1983, the Village desired to acquire
property owned by the Dacys for use as
part of a highway right of way. Because
the Village had neither the time nor the
money to condemn the Dacys' property, it
proposed a trade under which the ViJ\age
would convey certain property, described
as "Tract A-A," to the Dacys in exchange
for the property it needed for the right of
way. The Dacys agreed to this exchange,
and in October 1983 the parties drafted a
written agreement for the trade of these

The court hel~ a hearing in February
1986 and determmed that, for reasons not
material here, Tract A-A had no zoning
classification. Accordingly, upon agreement of the parties, the court remanded the
matter to the Planning and Zoning Com mission to properly zone Tract A-A. The
court deferred resolution of the breach of
contract and misrepresentation claims
pending the Village's reconsideration of the
zoning issue.
In April 1986, the Village zoned Tract AA as R-2. By that time, however, the
market in Ruidoso for R-2 property had
collapsed. Thus, when the Dacys sold
Tract A-A in June 1986, they received only
$150,000 for the property, compared with
the $405,173 that the court found would
After the parties exchanged their deeds, have been its fair market value in 1984 had
it been zoned R-2 at that time.
the Dacys applied to the Village for rezonThe Dacys therefore pursued their
ing of Tract A-A. They requested a
change in zoning from R-1 (residential sin- breach of contract claim against the Vil2
gle-family housing) to R-2 (multi-family lage. The court held a hearing on the
housing) so that they could build condomin- issue in April 1989 and afterwards entered
iums on the property. After review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. It
application, the Planning and Zoning Com- determined that "[a] fair reading of [the
1983 agreement and the deed from the
mission, an advisory body to the Village
ViJlage to the Dacys] would support a conCouncil, recommended rezoning Tract A-A
clusion that was intended to allow the [Daas R-2. The ViJlage Council then considcys] to build condominiums." It also found
ered the matter in October 1984 and, declinthat the 1983 agreement "implied the duty
ing to follow the Commission's recommenof the Village to zone the property R-2."
dation, denied the Dacys' rezoning request. The court apparently reasoned that, by omIn November 1984, the Dacys filed suit itting paragraphs A(2) and A(ll) of the
against the Village, seeking reversal of the restrictive covenants from the agreement
Council's denial of their request and dam- and deed and thereby allowing subdivision
ages for breach of contract and misrepre- of the property, the Village impliedly
sentation. The Dacys based their breach agreed to zone Tract A-A as R-2 so as to
3
of contract claim on an alleged promise by permit multi-family housing.

lands. The parties executed the agreement
. January 1984 by exchanging quitclaim
: ds to their respective parcels.
ee
The Village conveyed Tract A-A to the
Dacys subject to the restrictive covenants
contained in a document entitled "Restrictive Covenants of Gavilan Subdivision,"
which was incorporated by reference into
both the agreement and the Village's deed. 1
Both the agreement and the deed, however,
specifically excepted paragraphs A(2) and
A(ll) of the Gavilan subdivision restrictive
covenants. These omitted paragraphs, had
they been included, would have prohibited
subdivision and multi-family use of Tract
A-A and restricted removal of trees and
earth.

7. Municipal Corporations ¢:>249
Landowners who entered into unen.
forceable contract for zoning with Village
were not entitled to restitution; landown.
ers would not suffer disproportionate for.
feiture absent restitutionary relief, as it
was questionable whether village had made
promise to rezone, landowners failed to
protect themselves against risk of decline
in value of property and reasonableness of
landowners' reliance on alleged promise to
rezone was questionable.

I.

Tract A-A was located adjacent to the Gavilan
subdivision but was not a part of that subdivi·
sion.

I
1

•
1
1

2. The Dacys apparently dropped their misrepre.

sentation claim, because the breach of contract
claim was the only issue bef6re the court at the
April 1989 hearing.
3. The court's reasoning is not apparent from its

findings of fact or conclusions of law. However, in its letter decision to the parties, the court
stated:
I understand [the Village's] argument that all
the deed purported to do was to allow Dacv to

In its findings, the court stated that the
Dacys had incurred damages of $255,173,
subdivide the parcel, and did not speak to the
issue of multi.family use, but I am assuming
for the moment that the Village did, by impli·
cation, contract to zone the Tract A-A. R-2,
and the court would find that the omission of
the zoning provision from the contract was
necessarily implied.
Additionally, at oral argument before this Court,
counsel for the Dacys stated that the only evi·
dence supporting an implied promise to zone
Tract A-A as R-2 was the deletion of paragraphs
A(2) and A(ll) from the agreement and deed.
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representing the difference in market value
of Tract A-A as R-2 property in 1984,
when the Dacys applied for and were denied rezoning, and June 1986, when the
Dacys sold the property as R-2 for $150,000. However, the court concluded that
there was no legal basis upon which the
Dacys could recover those damages, because the implied contract to zone between
the Dacys and the Village was unenforceable. It stated that "[aJ contract to zone
property between a zoning authority and
an individual is illegal and an ultra vires
bargaining away of the police power of the
municipality" and that "[iJllegal contracts
are void ab initio and the court must leave
the parties as it finds them." Accordingly,
the court awarded the Dacys no damages.
On appeal, the Dacys assert that the trial
court erred in holding that the contract was
illegal and unenforceable; they also assert
that the Village should be estopped to
claim that the contract was illegal. They
urge us to reverse the trial court's holding
of illegality and award them damages in
the amount the court determined.
II. LEGALITY OF CONTRACT
ZONING
This case presents this Court with our
first opportunity to discuss in some detail
the legality of "contract zoning." While a
few of our previous opinions relate to contract zoning, none provides clear guidance
on the subject. See Westgate Families v.
County Clerk, 100 N.M. 146, 148, 667 P.2d
453, 455 (1983) (because the New Mexico
Zoning Enabling Act expressly provides for
zoning by representative bodies, it denies
an exercise of zoning power by referendum); Mechem v. City of Santa Fe, 96
N.M. 668, 672, 634 P.2d 690, 694 (1981)
(dictum) (endorsing validity of contract zoning under certain circumstances); Spray v.
City of Albuquerque, 94 N .M. 199, 201, 608
P.2d 511, 513 (1980) (contracts attempting
to curtail or prohibit a municipality's legislative or administrative authority are uniformly invalid).

A. Definition of Contract Zoning
At the outset, it is important to explain

tract zoning has been variously defined by
courts and commentators and has sometimes been used interchangeably with the
term "conditional zoning." See, e.g., 2
Robert M. Anderson, American Law of
Zoning 3d § 9.21 (1986); 1 Norman
Williams, Jr. & John M. Taylor, American
Planning Law §§ 29.01-.04 (rev. ed. 1988).
Contract and conditional zoning are distinct, however, and an appreciation of the
distinction is important to understanding
our holding today.
[1J "Contract zoning," properly used,
describes an agreement between a municipality and another party in which the municipality's consideration consists .of either
a promise to zone property in a requested
manner or the actual act of zoning the
property in that manner. Cj Nolan M.
Kennedy, Jr., Note, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility, 23 Hastings L.J. 825, 831 (1972) (defining contract zoning in slightly different
terms). A contract to zone may be in the
form of either a unilateral contract or a
bilateral contract. See id. at 837-38. A
bilateral contract involves reciprocal promises in which the municipality promises to
zone property in a certain manner in return
for some promise from the other party to
the contract. See id. at 838. A unilateral
contract, on the other hand, consists of a
promise by only one of the contracting
parties; the other party's consideration is
action or forbearance rather than a promise. 1 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 21 (1963). Thus, in the context of
contract zoning, a unilateral contract describes two possible situations: Either a
municipality promises to rezone in return
for some action or forbearance by the other
contracting party, or the other contracting
party makes a promise in return for the
municipality's act of rezoning. Cf Kennedy, supra, at 837 (describing unilateral contract zoning only in terms of a promise by
the other contracting party in return for
the municipality's action of rezoning; not
describing the converse situation).

In comparison, conditional zoning is not

involve a promise by either party. Rather,
conditional zoning describes the situation in
which a municipality rezones on condition
that a landowner perform a certain act
prior to, simultaneously with, or after the
rezoning. Id. at .831. T~e absence ~f ~n
enforceable promise by either party dlStmguishes condi~ional zoning from contract
zoning. See 2d. In .t~e present case, we
address only the vali?lty of contra~t zoning; . ,,:e do no~ conSider the proprIety of
condItional zonmg.

party to a bilateral contract to zone or
when a municipality is a party to a unilateral contract in which the municipality promises to rezone in return for some action or
forbearance by the other contracting party.
A contract in which a municipality promises to zone property in a specified manner
is illegal because, in making such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of
the zoning authority to zone the property
according to prescribed legislative procedures. Our statutes require notice and a
public hearing prior to passage, amendB. Illegal Contract Zoning
ment, supplement, or repeal of any zoning
Numerous courts have criticized contract regulation.
NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6(B)
zoning, declaring it invalid per se. See (RepI.Pamp.1985). The statutes also grant
Judith W. Wegner, Moving Toward the to citizens and parties in interest the opporBargaining Table: Contract Zoning, De- tunity to be heard at the hearing. Id. By
velopment Agreements, and the Theoreti- making a promise to zone before a zoning
cal Foundations of Government Land hearing occurs, a municipality denigrates
Use Deals, 65 N.C.L.Rev. 976, 982-83 the statutory process because it purports
(1987). While these courts have advanced to commit itself to certain action before
several grounds for disapproving contract listening to the public's comments on that
zoning, the most common rationale is that action. Enforcement of such a promise
contract zoning is inherently flawed as a allows a municipality to circumvent estab"problematic blend of contract and police lished statutory requirements to the possipowers." Id. at 982. Their opinions typi- ble detriment of affected landowners and
cally condemn contract zoning as an illegal the community as a whole. See County of
bargaining away or abrogation of the po- Ada v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630, 533 P.2d
lice power. See, e.g., Hartman v. Buck- 1199, 1201 (1975) (oral agreement to allow
son, 467 A.2d 694, 699-700 (DeI.Ch.1983); mobile homes on property was invalid beHartnett v. Austin, 93 So.2d 86, 89 (Fla. cause it did not comply with county
1956) (en banc). As one commonly cited ordinance); Midtown Properties, Inc.
case states, "Zoning is an exercise of the Township of Madison, 68 N.J.Super. 197,
police power to serve the common good and 172 A.2d 40, 45-46 (Ct.Law Div.1961) (congeneral welfare. It is elementary that the tract to zone illegal because it circumventlegislative function may not be surrendered ed mandatory zoning procedures), afFd, 78
or curtailed by bargain or its exercise con- N.J.Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (Ct.App.Div.
trolled by the considerations which enter 1963) (per curiam).
into the law of contracts." V.F. Zahodiakin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust- C. Legal Contract Zoning
ment, 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (1952).
[3] The foregoing analysis implies that
[2] We agree that in most situations one form of contract zoning is legal: a
contract zoning is illegal. However, we do unilateral contract in which a party makes
not subscribe to a per se rule against all a promise in return for a municipality's act
forms of contract zoning, nor does our ra- of rezoning. In this situation, the municitionale rest on the "bargaining away" or pality makes no promise and there is no
abrogation of the police power. Rather, enforceable contract until the municipality
we believe that contract zoning is illegal acts to rezone the property. See 1 Corbin,
whenever it arises from a promise by a supra, § 21, at 54. Because the municipalrnnnll'ltn<'llittt tn .... ,.. ........ ..... _ ......... _ .... oi..~
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not circumvent statutory procedures or
compromise the rights of affected persons.
Cj Kennedy, supra, at 837 (in a unilateral
contract to zone, municipality makes no
binding promise and there is no abrogation
of the police power). Some courts have
nonetheless condemned this form of contract zoning on the ground that the contracting party's promise provides improper
motivation for the municipality's rezoning
action. See, e.g., City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528, 530
(1953); see also Wegner, supra, at 979 n.
122 ("The distinction between bilateral and
unilateral agreements seems problematic
on policy grounds, however, because even
unilateral agreements can serve as an incentive to government action."). We do
not find this reasoning persuasive. Private
interests are inherent in any zoning matter;
therefore, it is disingenuous to condemn a
method of zoning because it benefits private interests in some way. Moreover, any
potential misconduct that might occur
through unilateral contract zoning may be
corrected through judicial review if the action of the zoning authority is improper.
See Singleterry v. City of Albuquerque, 96
N.M. 468, 472, 632 P.2d 345, 349 (1981)
(reviewing court upholds decision of zoning
authority if not fraudulent, arbitrary, or
capricious); see also Kennedy, supra, at
834.

,)
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the proceeds of Tract A-A when they sold to support such a promise was the omission
it in 1986.4 (The court could not order the of paragraphs A(2) and A(ll) of the restricVillage to return the land to the Dacys tive covenants from the agreement and the
since it presumably has already been used deed. The omission of these paragraphs
by the Village for the highway right of allowed subdivision and possible multi-family use of Tract A-A and unlimited removal
way.)
The circumstances in which restitution of trees and earth on the land. We see
will be awarded to a party to an illegal nothing in the deletion of these covenants
contract cannot be easily defined or catego- that gave rise to an implied promise by the
rized. [d. § 1534, at 818-19. The Restate- Village to rezone the property. In deleting
ment says that restitution is generally un- these covenants from the agreement and
available to a party who has rendered per- deed, the Village authorized the present
formance in return for a promise that is resubdivision of Tract A-A and possible
unenforceable "unless denial of restitution future use of the property for multi-family
would cause disproportionate forfeiture." housing, but we cannot see that it promised
Restatement, supra, § 197. Whether the to rezone the property.s
forfeiture is "disproportionate" depends on
A second factor influencing our decision
the extent of the denial of compensation is our belief that the Dacys bear some
compared to the gravity of the public inter- responsibility for their loss because they
est involved and the extent to which the failed to protect themselves against the
contract contravenes public policy. [d. risk of a decline in the market for R-2
comment b. Additionally, Corbin identifies property. By entering into the agreement
the following factors (which we assume to with the Village without demanding a time
be a nonexclusive list) as influencing deadline for the rezoning, the Dacys aswhether a court will grant restitution: The sumed the risk that the Village would not
degree of criminality involved in the illegal promptly rezone and that the market in
contract, the comparative innocence or Ruidoso for R-2 property would drop. The
guilt of the parties, the extent of public Dacys could have expressly provided in the
harm involved, the moral quality of the agreement that their transfer of land to the
parties' conduct and the severity of the Village would not be effective unless and
penalty or forfeiture that will result from until the Village rezoned Tract A-A or
denial of relief. 6A Corbin, supra, § 1534, unless the Village rezoned Tract A-A by a
at 818.
specified date. In that way, had the VilWe do not believe that denying restitu- lage failed to comply with those terms, the
tion in this case will cause a disproportion- Dacys would not have suffered any harm.
ate forfeiture. Several factors support this By failing so to protect themselves, the
conclusion. First, we have serious doubts Dacys undertook the risk that the market
that the Village even made a promise to for R-2 property would collapse and that
rezone. As stated above, the only evidence they would lose money on the deal.

void ab initio and the court must leave the
parties as it finds them." It therefore con.
cluded that it could award no damages to
the Dacys. In its letter decision to the
parties, the court stated that "any remedy
whether equitable or legal, is foreclosed a~
to an illegal contract." While we affirm
the trial court's denial of relief to the Dacys, we explain our reasoning in some detail so as to clarify the legal rules regarding the availability of relief to a party to an
illegal contract.

[5,6] The trial court was correct in stat·
ing that damages are unavailable as relief
to a party to an illegal contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 346(1)
(1979) [hereinafter Restatement] ("The injured party has a right to damages for any
breach by a party against whom the contract is enforceable .,. _") (emphasis added). Additionally, neither specific performance nor an injunction will be granted to
a party to an illegal contract. See id.
§ 365 (specific performance and injunction
are unavailable if act that would be compelled is contrary to public policy). Although the foregoing remedies are unavail·
able, it is not accurate to say that "any
remedy ... is foreclosed as to an illegal
contract." As Corbin states, "A party who
has rendered part or all of the bargainedfor-exchange, or has otherwise materially
changed his position in reliance on the return promise in an 'illegal' bargain, has
III. CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL
often seemed to deserve and has often been
CONTRACT ZONING
given a restitutionary remedy." 6A Cor14] If we assume the correctness of the bin, supra, § 1534, at 818.
trial court's finding of fact that the Village
[7] Restitution, in the context of conagreed in the 1983 Agreement to rezone tract law, is a remedy that restores to a
the Dacys' property, this case involves a contracting party any benefit that he or
form of unilateral contract zoning: The she has conferred on the other party
Village promised to rezone Tract A-A in through part performance or reliance. Re·
return for the Dacys' conveyance of prop- statement, supra, §§ 344(c), 370. Restitu·
erty that the Village needed for the high- tion may be in the form of the specific
way right of way. Under the principles set restoration of land or chattels, the repayout above, this contract is unenforceable ment of money, or the payment of the
because the Village attempted to commit reasonable value in money of services renitself to specific zoning action without fol- dered. 6A Corbin, supra, § 1535, at 821 .
lowing the required statutory procedures. In the present case, restitution to the Da·
The trial court concluded that the con- cys, if granted, would probably take the
tract between the Village and the Dacys form of a payment to them of the value of
was illegal and that "[i)llegal contracts are the land they conveyed to the Village, less
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4. The Dacys did not seek restitution in their
complaint against the Village asserting breach
of contract. Even had they requested such relief as an alternative to their claim for damages.
and even if (contrary to the reasoning in the
text infra) a court were to find a disproportionate forfeiture absent restitutionary relief. they
still would have faced Significant problems in
securing this type of relief. See NMSA 1978.
§ 37-1-23(A) (RepI.Pamp.1990) (granting gov·
ernmental entities immunity from actions based
on contract. except actions based on valid writ·
ten contract) (emphasis added); Hydro Conduit
Corp. v. Kemble. 110 N.M. 173. 793 P.2d 855
(1990) (subcontractor's claim against state for
restitution. on account of materials furnished to
general contractor for construction of public-

works projects. was "based on contract" and
hence barred by § 37-1-23).
5. The district court seems to have shared our
doubts about the existence of a promise to rezone. Although the court stated in its findings
that "a fair reading" of the parties' agreement
"would support a conclusion that [it) was intended to allow the [Dacys] to build condominiums" and that the agreement "implied the duty
of the Village to zone the property R-2." the
court said in its letter to the parties that it was
"assuming for the moment" that the Village had
by implication contracted to zone Tract A-A as
R-2.
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A final factor causing us to believe that
the Dacys have not suffered a disproportionate forfeiture lies in the at least arguable unreasonableness of their reliance on
the Village's purported promise to rezone
Tract A-A. As mentioned previously, the
Dacys have argued on appeal that the Village should be estopped to assert the invalidity of the claimed agreement to rezone.
The estoppel asserted is "equitable estoppel," based on cases such as Albuquerque
Nat'l Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., 99 N.M. 95, 101, 654 P.2d 548,
554 (1982). It is clear, however, that this
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Susan KIRKPATRICK, d/b/a
Kirkpatrick & Associates,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

INTROSPECT HEALTHCARE CORPO.
RATION, a New Mexico corporation.
d/b/a Introspect HeaIthcare of New
Mexico and Daniel Lopez, Defendants_
Appellees.
No. 19944.
Supreme Court of New Mexico.

form of estoppel, like other forms," re-

Dec. 29, 1992.

quires the party asserting it to have reasonably relied on the other party's promise
or representation. See, e.g., id. The reasonableness of the Dacys' reliance on the
Village's "implied" promise to rezone-in a
contract covering in considerable detail other aspects of the parties' transaction-is
questionable to say the least.

Interior designer brought suit against
corporation, alleging breach of contract
and several related counts. The District
Court, Bernalillo County, Burt Cosgrove,
D.J., dismissed complaint for failure to
state claim upon which relief can be grant·
We do not hold that the Dacys' reliance ed. Designer appealed. The Supreme
on the Village's putative promise to rezone Court, Baca, J., held that: (1) written con·
was unreasonable as a matter of law; nor tract between designer and corporation
do we hold, as a matter of law, that the was not contract for sale of goods under
Village did not in fact make such a prom- Article 2 of Uniform Commercial eode
ise; nor do we hold-again, as a matter of (UCC); (2) contract between designer and
law-that the Dacys assumed the risk that corporation unambiguously required corpothe real estate market in Ruidoso would ration to purchase furnishings from designcollapse during 1985. We hold only that, er; (3) dismissal of designer's entire com·
as a matter of law, the Village's promise to plaint, without addressing all counts raised
rezone, if made, was unenforceable and in her complaint, was error; and (4) trial
that in the circumstances of this case deny- court misapplied rule governing judgment
ing restitution to the Dacys does not result upon multiple claims by entering final judg·
in a disproportionate forfeiture.
ment as to all designer'S claims.
The trial court's judgment is therefore
Reversed and remanded.
affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
1. Sales e=>3.1
RANSOM, C.J., and BACA, J., concur.
Written contract between interior de·
signer and corporation, which provided that
fee for design services would be generated
through markups on furnishings that de·
signer purchased and resold to corporation,
was not contract for sale of goods under
6.

For example, promissory estoppel. See Re·

statement, supra, § 90 (promissory estoppel

~
~

'..N

may be available if promisor should reasonably
have expected promise to induce action or for·
bearance by promisee); Eavenson v. Lewis

Means, Inc., lOS N.M. 161, 162, 730 p.2d 464,

(promissory estoppel requires that
promisee act reasonably in justifiable reliance
on promise as made).

465 (1986)

N. M.
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Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code
(vec); ?ontr.act's p:rimary ~urpose :vas to
provide mten.or deSIgn ~ervices and ~nclud.
ed itemized lIst of 23 dIfferent servIces to
be performed. NMSA 1978, §§ 55-2-101
to 55-2-725.

7. Contracts <S=>143.5
When determining whether contract is
ambiguous, court must consider contract as
whole.

2. Sales e=>3.1

Under "primary purpose" test, Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
which applies to contracts for sale of
goods, applies to "mixed contracts" only if
primary purpose of contract is to sell goods
rather than to provide services. NMSA
1978, §§ 55-2-101 to 55-2-725.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Licenses e=>8(1)
Professional and occupational licensing
statutes for interior designers are intended
to set standards and requirements for prac·
tice of and entrance into profession of inte·
rior design and do not represent legislative
proclamation that interior design contracts
are solely service contracts exempt from
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). NMSA
1978, §§ 61-24C-1 to 61-24C-16.
4. Sales e=>3.1

Supreme Court determines whether
Article 2 of Uniform Commercial Code
(UeC), which applies to contracts for sale
of goods, applies to given mixed contract
on case·by·case basis by scrutinizing contract itself to determine whether primary
purpose of contract is for sales or services.
NMSA 1978, §§ 55-2-101 to 55-2-725.
5. Contracts e=>198(2)

Contract between interior designer and
corporation, which provided for design ser·
vices to be rendered to corporation by de·
signer, unambiguously required corporation to purchase furnishings from designer;
contract explicitly stated that fee for designer's interior design services would be
included in furnishings that would be purchased for facility being built by corporation.
6. Contracts e=>176(2)
Whether or not contract is ambiguous
is question of law for court.

8. Contracts e=>143(2)
Contract is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible to different construc·
tions.
9. Contracts e=>147(2)
When language of contract clearly and
unambiguously expresses agreed-upon intent of parties, SUpreme Court will give
effect to such intent.
10. Appeal and Error e=>842(8)
For purpose of interpreting contract,
when resolution of issue depends upon interpretation of documentary evidence, Suo
preme Court is in as good a position as trial
court to interpret the evidence.
11. Contracts e=>I43.5
To make reasonable interpretation of
contract, language of entire contract must
be considered, and selected portions cannot
support claim of ambiguity.
12. Appeal and Error e=>842(1)
Appellate court will not determine
questions of fact on appeal.
13. Appeal and Error e=>1178(6)
Remand to trial court for trial on mer·
its would be required to determine whether
corporation breached contract with interior
designer and to determine resulting dam·
ages to interior designer in event that corporation was found to have breached contract.
14. Pretrial Procedure e=>643
Dismissal by trial court of plaintiff's
entire complaint for failure to state claim
upon which relief can be granted, without
addressing all counts raised in plaintiff's
complaint, was error; it could not be said
that plaintiff failed to state claim upon
which relief can be granted as to alternative counts without trial court conducting
separate assessment of each distinct claim.
SCRA 1986, Rule 1-012, subd. B(6).
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FORD LEASING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF the COUNTY OF JEFFERSON, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 26445.

'Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
Nov. 11, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1974.

Developer's predecessor in title filed
application for rezoning from agricultural
district to planned development district.
The board of county commissioners denied
rezoning. The District Court, Jefferson
County, Roscoe Pile, J., upheld board's decision and held existing zoning ordinance
constitutional, and developer, who was substituted as plaintiff after acquiring title to
the property, appealed.
The Supreme
Court, Day, J., held that board was not estopped to deny the application for rezoning, that board's decision was supported by
some competent evidence and was thus not
an abuse of discretion, and that upon finding that developer was not deprived of any
reasonable use of its property by zoning
ordinance, district court properly held that
the ordinance as applied to the property in
question was constitutional.
Judgment affirmed.
I. Zoning e::>192

Planned development application must
meet all standards, procedures, and conditions of a planned development ordinance.
2. Zoning e::>192

Where planned development application stated that one developer would handle
proposed auto dealership and another developer would develop and sell townhouses;
the application did not comply with county
ordinance, which provided that a planned
development must be under unified control.

hood a use which would otherwise not be
allowed.
4. Zoning <??151

Planned development should not usurp
discretionary function of board of county
commissioners to deny or grant applications for rezoning.
5. Zoning <??194

Where developer's application for rezoning of property from agricultural district to planned development district was
denied by board of county commissioners,
it was not necessary for the board to impose any final regulations.
6. Zoning <??151

Board of county commissioners properly refused to engage in contract zoning,
which is illegal, when it refused to inform
developer of whatever additional requirements and regulations were necessary in
order to approve his applications for rezoning of property from agricultural district to planned development district.
7. Zoning e::>21

Contract zoning is illegal as an ultra
vires bargaining away of police power.
8. Zoning e::>161

Where county planning commISSIOn
approved proposed planned development
subject to 17 restrictive recommendations,
developer complied with only five of such
recommendations, and developer did not
strictly comply with county ordinance requiring that planned development must be
under unified control, board of county
commissioners was not estopped to deny
developer its application for rezoning from
agricultural district to planned development
district.
9. Administrative Law and Procedure <??788

In order for a court to set aside decision of administrative body on certiorari
review, there must be no competent evidence to support the decision. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 106, 106(a)(4).
~676

3. Zoning e::>151

10. Administrative Law and Procedure

Planned development is not a catchall;
it is not supposed to inject into a neighbor-

On certiorari review of a decision of
an administrative body, reviewing court is
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limited to what appears in the record.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 106,
l06(a) (4).

prove that it is not possible to use and develop the property for any other use enumerated in the existing zoning.

II. Zoning e:>741

18. Zoning e:>648

Supreme Court will not sit as a "super-zoning commission."

Where record was replete with contrasts and contradictions on issue of
whether developer could use and develop
property for any use enumerated in existing zoning, which was for agriculture, developer, who sought rezoning to planned
development district, did not meet its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt that
zoning ordinance as applied to it was unconsti tutional.

12. Zoning e:>702

Where question of whether proposed
planned development was compatible with
surrounding development was fairly debatable, board of county commissioners' denial
of application for rezoning £r'om agricultural district to planned development district was supported by some competent evidence, and thus the denial was not an
abuse of discretion.
13. Zoning e:>648, 672

Zoning ordinances, like other legislative enactments, are presumed valid, and
one who challenges them has burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt that they
are invalid.
14. Zoning e:>27

Zoning ordinance is unconstitutional if
it is not substantially related to public
health, safety, or welfare.
15. Zoning e:>672

19. Zoning e:>684

Where present zoning of property was
for agricultural use and developer sought
rezoning to planned development district,
developer failed to meet its high burden of
proof in attempting to show that existing
ordinance was unconstitutional as applied
to it, where developer presented no eVldence that there were no reasonable uses
in the eight intervening zones.
20. Zoning e:>164

Proof that it is not possible to use and
develop land for any uses permitted in
zones which are in between zone sought
and existing zone is prerequisite to showing that property has been unconstitutionally confiscated under existing zoning.

Developer did not meet its burden of
proof in his assertion that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional, where ordinance zoned area in question for agricultural use and application for rezoning to
planned development district was denied by
board of county commissioners upon specific finding, based on fairly debatable evidence, that proposed rezoning was not in
best interests of health, safety, welfare,
and morals of citizens of county.

Where developer was not deprived of
any reasonable use of property by zoning
ordinance, ordinance as applied to property
in question was constitutional. Rules of
Civil Procedure, rules 106, 106(a) (4).

16. Constitutional Law e:>278(1)

22. Zoning e:>164

Zoning ordinance is unconstitutional
as applied to landowner's property if it
precludes the use of the property for any
reasonable purpose and thus constitutes a
confiscatory taking of property without
due process of law.

Where application for rezoning of
property from agricultural district to
planned development district had been denied by Doard of county commissioners, developer who thereafter purchased the property and began process of appeals, had full
and complete notice and knowledge of zoning restrictions on its property, and any
hardship was self-inflicted.

17. Zoning e:>684

In order to obtain rezoning to permit
a use which a landowner seeks, he must

21. Zoning e:>38
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DA Y, Justice.
We will refer to plaintiff-appellant as
Ford and the Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County as the Board.
The latter denied Ford's application for rezoning. The district court upheld that decision. This appeal is from that jUdgment.
We affirm.
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1.
Ford's predecessor in title filed an application for rezoning from A-2 (Agricultural Two District) to P-D (Planned Development District) for approximately 23
acres located at the southwest corner of
West Hampden Avenue and South Wadsworth Boulevard in Jefferson County.
Ford was to develop and occupy the land.
The plan was submitted first to the J efferson County (J effco) planning commission.
It approved the proposed planned development, subject to 17 restrictive recommendations of which, according to the record,
Ford complied with only five. The Board
denied the change.
Pursuant to c.R.c.P. 106(a)(4), review
was sought in district court. While the
matter was still pending, Ford acquired title to the property and was substituted as
plaintiff.
A two-pronged challenge to the Board's
action was launched in the district court.
In the Rule 106 certiorari proceeding, it
was claimed that the Board was estopped
to deny the application because Ford had
complied with recommendations of the
planning commission on which its approval
was predicated. As a second string to this
bow Ford claimed that the Board was arbitrary, capricious and showed an abuse of
discretion. A second claim sought a declaratory judgment that the existing zon-

ing as applied to the property was an unconstitutional confiscation.
Trial was held in two phases. On certiorari the lower court reviewed only the
record at the hearing before the Board.
The constitutional question was accorded a
complete trial de novo. At its conclusion,
the district court affirmed the Board and
held the zoning ordinance constitutional.

II.
The subject property is zoned A-2 (agricultural). The area at the time of the
original zoning was generally undeveloped.
Medium and high density residences have
since been built, as have restricted commercial businesses.
The most extensive land use in the area
is the 300 acre Academy Office Park, a
multi-complex commercial use. However,
that entire area is protected by extremely
strict covenants, voluntarily imposed by the
builder, which last until the year 2000.
They are designed specifically to preserve
an open green space motif. The Jefferson
County Comprehensive Future Land Use
Plan recommends low density residential
and light restricted commercial uses for
the area.
The planned development submitted by
the Ford application would be a concentrated commercial and medium to high
density residential use. An auto dealership
would cover about eight acres. It would
be buffered from the surrounding community by townhouses, which would cover approximately 13.5 acres. The entire combination development would be artfully landscaped. Ford argued that a heavy commercial use, planned as it is to blend with
the area, would not be out of place. The
Board came to a different conclusion.

III.
[1] We take up first the question of
whether the Board is bound to grant the
change. Ford cites Dillon Companies, Inc.
v. Boulder, Colo., 515 P.2d 627 (1973), for
the proposition that the Board is estopped

v
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to deny its application for rezoning. We
do not read Dillon as being that broad. In
Dillon there were no findings of fact to
support the city council's decision. Dillon
also pointed out that a planned developwent application must meet all standards,
procedures and conditions of a planned development ordinance.

[2J In addition to not implementing 12
of the planning commission's recommendations, Ford did not strictly comply with the
Jeffco ordinance. Section 39-B and section 39-C-l state in part that a planned development must be under unified control.
The record reveals that F o1'd would handle
the auto dealership and Broker House,
which had a contract to purchase the residential site, would develop and sell the
townhouses. That is separate, not unified,
control.
Moreover, section 39-C-2 states in part
that P-D parking, height, setback and area
regulations shall be compatible with the
su'rrounding development.
The Board
made a specific finding that the Ford proposal was "incompatible with the surrounding land uses at the present time." See
Moore v. City of Boulder, 29 Colo.App.
248,484 P.2d 134 (1971).
Ford argues additionally that the Jeffco
ordinance mandates final compliance regulations and contends that the Board having
failed to impose any final regulations,
there was nothing remaining to satisfy.
The resulting conclusion advanced is that
Ford has met the county conditions by default and under the Dillon rule became entitled to the rezoning.
[3-5] Ford's thesis would require that
any planned development proposal must automatically be granted by the Board, leaving to it only the power to issue final regulations. Then-merely by compliancethe plan would pass, regardless of whether
the Board wants the design. Such bootstrapping is clearly obnoxious to the essence
of planned development zoning. Planned
development is not a catch-all. It is not
supposed to inject in a neighborhood a use
which would otherwise not be allowed. It

should not usurp the discretionary function
of the Board. Since Ford's application
was denied no final regulations were necessary. This would be meaningless rhetoric, for there was nothing to comply with.
[6,7] At the conclusion of extensive
hearings, Ford requested the Board to inform it of whatever additional requirements and regulations were necessary in
order to approve the application. This the
Board refused to do. To act otherwise
would be patent contract zoning, a concept
held illegal in most states as an ultra vires
bargaining away of the police power. 1 R.
Anderson, American Law of Zoning §§ 8 e
20-1.
[8] Thus, looking at the Jeffco statute
as a whole, we cannot say that the rationale of Dillon applies in this case. The
Board was not estopped to deny Ford its
application for rezoning.
On the other phase of the certiorari review, Ford asserts that the district court
erred in upholding the Board's arbitrary
and capriciot!s denial of the requested rezomng.
[9, 10] In order for a court to set aside
a decision of an administrative body on
certiorari review, there must be no competent evidence to support the decision.
Board of County Commissioners v. Simmons, 177 Colo. 347, 494 P.2d 85 (1972);
Marker v. Colorado Springs, 138 Colo. 485,
336 P.2d 305 (1959). The reviewing court
is limited to what appeared of record,
which in this case was substantial. It is
obvious from the record that Ford has
tried to propose an innovative planned development design. It is equally obvious
that many others contest the feasibility of
such a plan.
[11,12] This Court will nDt sit- as a
"super-zoning commission;"
Garrett v.
City of Littleton, 177 Colo. 167, 493 P.2d
370 (1972); Baum v. Denver, 147 Colo.
104, 363 P.2d 688 (1961). The question
whether the proposed planned development
was compatible with the surrounding development was fairly debatable. Radice v.
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New York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 S.Ct. 325, 68
L.Ed. 690 (1923); Simmons, supra. Consequently, we cannot say that the zoning
decision of the Board was supported by no
competent evidence. In such a state of the
record, it cannot be said there was a clear
abuse of discretion.
IV.
Ford also asked for a declaratory judgment that the zoning ordinance as applied
to its property is unconstitutional.
(13] Zoning ordinances-like other legislative enactments-are presumed valid.
Ford has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that it is invalid. Simmons, supra; Bamn, s1~pra.

[14,15] There are two methods to establish that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional. First, it may be shown it is not
substantially related to the public health,
safety, or welfare. Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct.
114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146
Colo. 374, 362 P.2d 172 (1961). Relating
to this, the Board made a speci fic finding
that the "rezoning [was] not in the best
interest of the health, safety, welfare and
morals of the citizens of Jefferson County." As noted above, contentions regarding the Board's actions were fairly debatable. Thus, Ford has not met its burden of
proof here.
[16-18] The second method is to show
that the zoning ordinance precludes the use
of Ford's property for any reasonable purpose. Village of Euclid, supra; Madis v.
Higginson, 164 Colo. 320, 434 P.2d 705
(1967); Baum, supra. A trial de novo
was held on this point. Considerable evidence and many witnesses were produced
for both sides. The answers were far
from uniform. Still, we do not feel that
528 P.2d-lb

there has been a confiscatory taking of
property from Ford without due process of
law. True, whatever use is available is
perhaps not the highest and best use. But
that has never been the test. Madis, supra.
We have held that in order to obtain rezoning to permit a use which the applicant
seeks, he must prove that it is not possible
to use and develop the property for any
other use enumerated in the existing zoning. Garrett, supra; Wright v. Littleton,
174 Colo. 318, 483 P.2d 953 (1971); Baum,
supra. The record is replete with contrasts and contradictions on this point.
We cannot say as a matter of law that
Ford met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

[19,20] Similarly, just because the land
is unsuited for agricultural use does not
mean the applicants can skip other intermediate zones up to planned development
-the most advantageous for its purpose.
Ford presented no evidence that there were
no reasonable uses in approximately 8 'intervening zones. Such proof is of crucial
importance as a prerequisite that property
is unconstitutionally confiscated. Simmons,
supra; Garrett, supra. Without it, Ford
failed to meet its high burden of proof.
[21] Upon finding that the landowners
were not deprived of any reasonable use of
their property by the zoning ordinance, the
district court was perfectly justified in
holding that the ordinance as applied to the
property in question was constitutional.
[22] We note if there is hardship here
it is self-inflicted. The application had
been denied by the Board when Ford
thereafter purchased the property and took
up the burden of appeal through the
courts. Thus, it had full and complete notice and knowledge. Accord Nopro Co. v.
Cherry Hills Village, 180 Colo. 217, 504 P.
2d 344 (1972); Madis, supm.
Judgment affirmed.
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Henry duPont Ridgely of Ridgely &
Ridgely, Dover, for defendant Town of
Camden.
William S. Hudson of Hudson, Jones, Jaywork & Williams, Dover, for defendant
Frank A. Robino, Inc.
LONGOBARDI, Vice Chancellor.
On November 6, 1979, David P. Buckson
and Frank A. Robino, Inc. made an application to the Town Council of Camden to
construct a subdivision of 88 townhouses on
9.671 acres of land. By letter dated December 26, 1979, the parties were advised by
the Camden Town attorney that the application was subject to compliance with the
town's zoning ordinance. On January 7,
1980, Buckson and Robino appeared at a
Town Council meeting again offering the
plan without having complied with applicable zoning regulations. The Council rejected the plan.
Through the winter and spring of 1980,
the developers altered their plan and on
June 23, 1980, a plan providing for 53 twostory townhouses was reviewed by the
Planning Commission. One problem remained.
The Camden zoning ordinance required
the developers to provide a minimum average of 7,500 square feet of open space per
residential lot. The revised plan provided
such an open space area but Buckson reserved the right to future use of that area
rather than an outright, unencumbered dedication to its existence as "open space."
The Planning Commission recommended
guarantees that the open space remain
open. Buckson appealed this decision to the
Town Council. Council upheld the Commission after a public hearing on August 18,
1980.
Buckson subsequently took the position
that the Camden zoning ordinance, originally passed by the Town Council in December
of 1975, was void because it was not passed
in compliance with the requirements of 22
Del.C. § 304. That statute provides as follows:
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. .. no such regulations, restrictions or
boundary shall become effective until after a public hearing in relation thereto, at
which parties in interest and citizens shaH
have an opportunity to be heard. At
least 15 days notice of the time and place
of such hearing shall be published in an
official paper or a paper of general circulation in such municipality.
In support of his argument, Buckson contends that an examination of the Council
minutes for the relevant period indicates
that Camden did not provide for a public
hearing or for the necessary publication of
the notice of the hearing. The Council
countered that the ordinance was enacted
pursuant to the provisions of the Camden
Town Charter which only requires the posting of such ordinances in two public places.
Unfortunately, no one can demonstrate
compliance even with the Charter provisions.
Buckson then countered that he was prepared to litigate the invalidity of the zoning
ordinance. Council, apparently alarmed at
the prospects of litigation and the incidental expenses associated with it, entered into
a "compromise" agreement with Buckson.
The "compromise" allows the developers
to place 68 houses on 8.193 acres. Obviously, this is substantially different from the
plan approved by Council in August of 1980.
That plan would have allowed only 53 houses on 10.919 acres.
Subsequent to the "compromise" agreement, the Plaintiffs brought this action
against the Defendants seeking an injunction against any compliance with the October 20th agreement. Defendant Buckson
has moved for summary judgment asking
this Court to determine, as a matter of law,
that the Camden ordinance is, in fact, invalid and that the agreement between Camden
and Buckson is valid. Plaintiffs have
moved for summary judgment requesting
that the Camden ordinance be deemed validly enacted, that the agreement between
Buckson and Camden be deemed invalid
and asking that Buckson be enjoined from
building on the property in question until

proper approval has been determined and ordinance at the time he attempted to comprocedures followed.
ply with it.
The Plaintiffs have argued that Buckson
Under the provisions of Article II, Secshould be estopped or barred by the doc- tion 25 of the Delaware Constitution, the
trine of laches from challenging the validity State Legislature clearly is empowered to
of the Camden zoning ordinances. They delegate zoning authority to any political
insist that his initial compliance with the subdivision of the State. Section 25 proprocedure established by the ordinance, i.e., vides:
applying for building permits, going before
The General Assembly may enact laws
the planning commission, demonstrated
under which municipalities and the Counthat he recognized the validity of the ordity of Sussex and the County of Kent and
nance and only challenged it when it did
the County of New Castle may adop'
not provide him with what he wanted.
zoning ordinances, laws or rules Iimitinl
and restricting to specified districts and
[1,2J An estoppel arises when a party,
regUlating therein buildings and strucby his conduct or words, intentionally or
tures according to their construction and
unintentionally leads another, in reliance on
the nature and extent of their use, as
such words or conduct, to change his posiwell as the use to be made of land in such
tion to his detriment. Wilson v. American
districts for other than agricultural purInsurance Company, DeI.Supr., 209 A.2d 902
poses; and the exercise of such authority
(1965); see Wolf v. Globe Liquor Co., Del.
shall be deemed to be within the police
power of the State.
Supr., 103 A.2d 774 (1954). There is no
basis on this record for finding that the
This constitutional provision is the source
Town of Camden in any way altered its of any authority to zone which is possessed
position to its detriment due to Buckson's by the Town of Camden. Such authority
initial compliance with the procedure of ob- was delegated to Camden under the terms
taining approval of his plan.
of the statute which established the town
charter in May, 1941. 43 Del.Laws Ch. 159.
[3, 4J The doctrine of laches is applicaUnder the terms of this charter, section 28,
ble when an individual's delay in making a
it was provided that the Camden Town
claim works a disadvantage to another, as
Council:
when an individual alters his position due to
... may adopt zoning ordinances limit·
the delay. McGinnes v. Department of Fiing and specifying districts and regulat
nance, DeI.Ch., 377 A.2d 16 (1977); Bovay v.
ing thereon buildings and structures acH.M. By/Iesby & CQ., DeI.Ch., 12 A.2d 178
cording to their construction and accord(1940). Additionally, it has been suggested
ing to the nature and extent of the busithat the individual who delays in asserting
ness to be carried on therein.
a claim must possess knOWledge that his
The powers to be exercised under and
rights have in some way been affected.
by virtue of this provision shall be
Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises, Inc." Del.
deemed to have been exercised under the
Ch., 386 A.2d 674 (1978); Elster v. Ameripolice power and for the general welfare
can Airlines, DeI.Ch., 128 A.2d 801 (1957).
of the inhabitants.
In this case, there is no indication that
[5J The exercise of zoning authority unBuckson was aware of any defects in the
manner in which the Camden ordinance was der the terms of both the charter and the
adopted at the time he proceeded under the provisions of Article II, Section 25 of the
ordinance. There has been no demonstra- Constitution of the State of Delaware is
tion, therefore, that there was a delay suffi- designed for the protection of the general
cient to establish laches by the Defendant welfare and benefit of the entire public.
Buckson because there is no showing that
Buckson knew about the problems with the

The Town of Camden is empowered by
section 32 of its charter to enact ordinances
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r resolutions on any subject within its
owers. This would include zoning ordiances. Under paragraph 2 of section 32,
owever, it is provided that" All ordinances
r resolutions of general character relating
) the government of the Town shall not be
f force and effect until the same shall have
een posted in at least two public places in
'own." In 1975, the Town Council purportd to enact a zoning ordinance under secion 28 of its charter. Under this ordiance, the minimum average open space per
esidential unit was established as 7,500
iuare feet. Apparently, the Council pubcly posted the proposed ordinance for thirVdays prior to the adoption in at least one
ublic place then adopted the ordinance on
lecember 1, 1975. Under these circumlances, there are questions concerning the
fficacy of that statute.
Plaintiffs, who argue for the validity of
he zoning ordinance, admit that there is no
lear demonstration that the Council in fact
osted the ordinance in two public places.
Inly one public posting can be verified.
'lain tiffs insist that this defect is not necssarily fatal.
[6, 7] The question of invalidity really
Jrings from the failure of the Camden
ouncil to follow the procedures provided
y 22 Del.C. Ch. 3. This is so because the
own charter is merely the font of delegatj legislative authority to zone while Title
~, Chapter 3 specifies the proced ures and
rerequisites which must be followed under
:ate law to make the exercise of that aulOrity effective. Admittedly, the Town
larter was promulgated subsequent to the
litial enactment of 22 Del.C. Ch. 3. Howfer, the charter provision on zoning is the
egislative grant to zone while 22 De/.C.
h. 3 provides the specific prerequisites for
aplementing that power. The charter prosion relative to the enactment of any or
I ordinances is not inconsistent in this
!slJ.ect with section 302 but only suppleiWtaI. Under 22 Del.C. Ch. 3, if the mui~ality does zone by district, section 304
l!DJires "at least 15 days notice" prior to
Ie holding of a public hearing on the plan

and provides for publication of this notice in
a local paper before the ordinance can take
effect. Clearly, this requirement was never
satisfied by the Town of Camden. Just as
clearly, Camden did not comply with its
charter provision requiring the posting of
proposed ordinances in two public places.
The fact that the Town charter was enacted after the initial enactment of 22
Del.C. Ch. 3 is not evidence of a legislative
intent to excuse Camden from complying
with the purpose or prerequisites of Chapter 3. Nothing in the charter concerning
the implementation of zoning ordinances is
inconsistent with Chapter 3. It is only that
Chapter 3 provides additional protection for
the public in the form of notice and opportunity to be heard.
[8] The two statutes, therefore, should
be construed together so that effect is given
to every provision because there is no irreconcilable difference between them. Green
v. County Council of Sussex Cty., DeI.Ch.,
415 A.2d 481, 484 (1980), afl'd., DeI.Supr.,
447 A.2d 1179 (1982); Sands: Sutherland
Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., § 5102.
Camden could have complied with the notice requirements of 22 Del.C. § 304 and
with the public posting requirements of section 38(2) of its charter.
[9, 10] Plaintiffs suggest that there is a
conclusive presumption that the ordinance
was properly enacted and that the ordinance cannot be chalIenged as defective
years after it has been accepted and relied
on by the public. The authorities they cite
for this proposition, however, deal with situations in which (1) the party chalIenging
the statute has not in fact demonstrated the
defect in enactment, or (2) where there has
been such a delay, generalIy between ten to
twenty years, in chalIenging the statute,
that the Court felt it inequitable to undermine the reliance placed on the statute by
the public. See Taylor v. Schlemmer, Mo.
Supr., 353 Mo. 687, 183 S.W.2d 913 (1944);
Struyk v. Samuel Braen's Sons, N.J.Supel'.,
17 N.J. Super. 1, 85 A.2d 279 (1951); Northville Area N.-P.H. Corp. v. City of Walled

\

Lake, Mich.Ct.App., 43 Mich.App. 424, 204 the division of a community into zones or
N.W.2d 274 (1972); Edel v. Filer Township, districts. See 82 Am.Jur.2d Zoning & PlanManistee County, Mich.Ct.App., 49 Mich. ning § 79; Anderson, American Law of
App. 210, 211 N.W.2d 547 (1973). In the Zoning § 9.01 (2nd Ed.); see also Santpresent case, there is no doubt that the myers v. Town of Oyster Bay, N.Y.Supr., 10
Town of Camden failed to comply with 22 Misc.2d 614, 169 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1957). This
Del.C. Ch. 3. Moreover, the five years that agreement, in fact, creates a cognizable dispassed before this chalIenge was made to trict in which the erection "construction
the ordinance is not a sufficient period to ... or use of buildings, structures or land"
bar chalIenge to the statute under the total- is determined. See 22 Del.C. § 303. The
ity of circumstances in this case. This is fact that only one district was created does
particularly so since there is no question not make it any less an exercise of zoning
that the statutory prerequisites were not authority. The Town Council "may divide
satisfied and, therefore, the presumption of the municipality into districts of such numvalidity has been effectively countered. Cf. ber, shape and area as may deemed
82 C.J.S. Statutes §§ 82-83. Council may best. ... " Id. Here, it chose to create
not ignore statutorily mandated procedures. only one.
Green v. C~U?ty Council of Sussex Cty., 415
[12,13] While there is no doubt about
A.2d 481, cltmg WelIdon v. Capano Realty, the Town's ability to compromise claims,
Inc., DeI.Ch., 225. A.2d 486 (1966~ and Green there is no question that the Town can only
v. County P/annmg & Zon. Com n of Suss,ex compromise particular types of claims like
Cty., DeI.Ch., 340 A.2d 852 (1974), aff'd., those "claims which exist in its favor or
without opinion, DeI.Supr., 344 A.2d· 386 against it and which arise out of a subject
(1975).
matter concerning which the municipality
[1I] The Defendants have argued that has the general power to contract." Annothe Town of Camden was acting properly in Municipal Claims-Power to Compromise,
entering into a contract with Buckson. The 15 A.L.R.2d 1359. It may not, under the
"compromise", they contend, was an appro- guise of compromise, impair a public duty
priate exercise of Camden's inherent au- owed by it. 56 Am.Jur.2d Municipal Corpothority to compromise claims against it. ration, Etc. § 806. By entering into the
See 17 McQuillen, Municipal Corporation, contract in question, Camden bargained
3rd Ed., § 48.17. The Court cannot agree, away part of its zoning power to a private
however, that the contract between these citizen. It simply does not possess the auparties is anything but a private agreement thority to normally contract such authority
to create a particular zoning district for the and the fact that this agreement was in
benefit of Buckson. The agreement itself furtherance of a compromise, an attempt to
refers to the plot plan submitted in Novem- avoid Buckson's threats to sue, does not
ber, 1979, as the basis for the street plan make it any more valid. See 82 Am.Jur.2d
and layout; to Town subdivision regula- Zoning & Planning § 17; see Andgar Assotions which were deemed applicable; to the ciates, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
developer's responsibility for on-site im- N.Y.Supr., 30 A.D.2d 672,291 N.Y.S.2d 991
provements in particular areas; to the (1968). As aptly put in one case concerning
agreement between the parties that the "contract zoning", that is, the contracting
Camden Commons plot plan attached to the by a zoning authority to zone for the beneagreement is to be the plan accepted except fit of a private landowner:
for "minor or insignificant adjustments in
Zoning is an exercise of the police powproperty lines and street locations" as reer to serve the common good and general
welfare. It is elementary that the legisquired. (See' 18 of the agreement.) OveralI, the agreement meets, in this Court's
lative function may not be surrendered or
view, the legal definition of zoning, that is,
curtailed by bargain or its exercise con-
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trolled by the considerations which enter
into the law of contracts. The use restriction must needs have general application. The power may not be exerted to
serve private interests merely, nor may
the principle be subverted to that end.
V.F. Zahodiakin Eng. Corp. v. Zoning Board
of Adjust., N.J.Supr., 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d
127, 131 (1952).
[14,15] When possible, cases should be
disposed of by summary judgment for the
result is a prompt and economical way of
disposing of litigation. Dat7s v. University
of Delaware, DeI.Supr., 240 A.2d 583 (1968).
Summary judgment will be granted when
there is no reasonable indication that a material issue of fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Tew v. Sun Oil Co., DeI.Super.,
407 A.2d 240 (1979); see also, Vanaman v.
Milford Memorial Hospital, Inc., DeI.Supr.,
272 A.2d 718 (1970). In this case, the parties have stipulated at oral argument that
there are no additional facts that could be
produced on the issue of how the zoning
statute was enacted. As a matter of fact,
the parties have agreed that there is no
factual dispute on the evidence relative to
that issue. On that basis, the exercise of
deciding the motion for summary judgment
was commenced.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is
granted to the extent that the Camden
zoning ordinance is determined to have
been invalidly enacted but denied to the
extent that it requests a determination that
the contractual agreement between Camden and Buckson is valid. Plaintiffs' motion is granted in that the contractual
agreement is deemed an invalid ultra vires
exercise of municipal authority.

..)

""

-"
~

[16,17] The Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief has been placed before the Court
in the context of a motion for summary
judgment. The question can be decided as
a matter of law since no genuine issues of
fact have been found and nothing more is
to be submitted in support of the motion.
To demonstrate a right to injunctive relief,

the moving party must show (1) irreparable
harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the
merits, and (3) that the injury Plaintiffs
will incur if the injunction is denied outweighs any injury to the non movant if the
injunction is granted. Gimbel v. Signal
Companies, Inc., DeI.Ch., 316 A.2d 599, 602
(1974), afl'd., DeI.Supr., 316 A.2d 619 (1974).
Based on the entire analysis above, the
Plaintiffs have demonstrated more than a
likelihood of success on the merits of their
case. They have, in fact, prevailed.
Due to the imminent injury to both (1)
the policies for zoning underlying 22 Del.e.
Ch. 3 and the Camden charter, and (2) the
interests of adjoining landowners, irrepara_
ble injury has been shown. A balancing of
the equities shows that Buckson is not seriously injured since he has recourse to the
Camden authorities like anybody else for
approval of a new plan. Buckson is, there-'
fore, currently enjoined from building on
his property. The injunction will be effective until such time as he receives a proper
approval of a plan submitted and reviewed
under a validly enacted zoning ordinance.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Alan G. EMSLEY, Petitioner,

v.
Patricia G. EMSLEY (Bellezza-Aures),
Respondent.
Family Court of Delaware,
New Castle County.
Submitted: April 29, 1983.
Decided: July 21, 1983.
Mother petitioned for child support
from father. The Family Court, Newcastle
County, Poppiti, J., held that: (1) amount

paid for premiums on life insurance policies
naming children as beneficiaries, required
by court order, could be deducted from income used to compute amount of child support to be paid; (2) travel expenses of children relating to visitation, expenses which
were paid for by father, could not be deducted from his income for purposes of
determining child support; (3) business losses which involved no out-of-pocket expenditures could not be deducted from computation of income used to determine amount of
child support; and (4) mother was entitled
to attorney fees.
So ordered.
1. Parent and Child cg:,3.1(8)
Although in certain cases inclusion of
capital gains or losses may be appropriate
in computation of income for purposes of
determining amount of child support to be
paid, family court recognizes agreements of
parties to exclude them from calculations.
2. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(7)
Amounts paid by spouses for premiums
on life insurance policies required to be
maintained for children should be deducted
from income for purposes of determining
amount of child support to be paid.

father, could not be deducted from father's
income for purposes of determining amount
of child support to be paid.
.
6. Parent and ChIld cg:,3.1(l)
An individual's child support obligation
comes first and may reduce one's ability to
acquire and hold marketable assets, not the
other way around.
7. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(7)
Family court is not restricted to tax
law determinations as to what necessary
and proper business expenses are deducted
from income for purposes of determir·
amount of child support to be paid, ~
purposes and policies of Internal
Code are far different from those of statutes pertaining to child support. 13 DeLC.
§ 501 et seq.
8. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(9)
Order entered regarding arrears in
child support payments may be in form of
judgment recordable and enforceable
through the Superior Court.

9. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7)
Since mother's application for award of
attorney fees was for fees incurred in petitioning for child support, court did not have
to find that mother lacked available funds
to engage and pay counsel but, rather, sup3. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7)
While, ordinarily, the only allowable port obligor could be ordered to pay fees in
deductions from gross income for child sup- order that neither estate of children nor
port purposes are taxes, FICA, and other estate of mother would be depleted by
required or necessary expenses or pay- of legal action.
ments, if the deductions claimed are re- 10. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7)
quired by law or by employer or directly
In proceeding on petition for child supbenefit the children, they may be conport, attorney fees for representation besidered.
fore master and court, as well as costs,
could be awarded to mother, since positions
4. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7)
Key to whether payments by party taken by father regarding business losses
may be deducted from gross income for and visitation expenses were previously adpurposes of determining child support is dressed by family court, and mother was
whether claimed expenditures reasonably substantially successful before master and
before court regarding business loss issue.
and directly benefit the children.
5. Parent and Child cg:, 3.3(7)
Travel expenses of children relating to
visitation, expenses which were paid for by

11. Parent and Child cg:,3.3(7)
Order entered regarding attorney fees
in child support proceeding may be in form
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of the Fu\I Commission is quashed with
paint spray; Hardin's Bakeries, Inc., v.
directions to remand the cause to the
Ranager, 1953, 217 Miss. 463, 64 So.2d 70S,
Deputy Commissioner for the entry of
holding that a baker's disability, caused
such an award upon an appropriate findby an allergy resulting from his contact
ing of fact.
with a mitten he was required to use in
handling hot pans of bread as they came
It is so ordered.
from the oven, resulted from "accidental
injury", and cases therein cited; SchneiTERRELL, C. J., and DREW and
der, Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 4,
THORNAL, JJ.. concur.
Sec. 1.328; Larson, Workmen's Compensation, Vol. 1, Sec. 12.20.
Under the facts, as found by both the
Deputy Commissioner and the Full Commission, claimant's pre-existing tubercular
condition was accelerated or aggravated
by his continued work and failure to have
care and rest, togetltel· with his inhalation of
dltst and fumes to which the publiC ge1;erally is 1I0t Ol·dinarily exposed. There
was thus found to be a direct causal connection between claimant's injury and the
exposure to a danger not ordinarily risked
by the public (the inhalation of dust and
fumes) even though this was not found
to be the sole cause of his disability.

87

2. Municipal Corporations tS=>111(1)

9. Municipal Corporations tS=>I06(1)

An ordinance which is so vague that
its precise meaning cannot be ascertained
is invalid, even though it may otherwise
be constitutional.

Adoption of an ordinance is the exercise of municipal legislative power, and in
the exercise of such a function city can·
not legislate by contract.

3. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>601(7)

10. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>645

Although authority to exercise power
to enact zoning ordinances, when delegated by the state, is generally recognized,
nevertheless, the restriction on property
rights must be declared as a rule of law in
the ordinance and not left to the uncertainty of proof by extrinsic evidence
whether parol or written.

Plaintiffs, who occupied homes immediately across street from proposed
parking lot authorized by change in zoning ordinance approving such commercial
development, and who relied on existing
zoning conditions when they bought their
homes, had a right to continuation of
those conditions and could maintain suit to
enforce them.

4. Municipal Corporations e=>601(15)
Fred HARTNETT, as Mayor and Commissioner of the City of Coral Gables, Florida,
W. Keith Phillips, Lucille Neher, Robert L.
Searle and John M. Montgomery, Members
of the City Commission in and for the City
of Coral Gabies, Florida, Appellants,

v.
W. P. AUSTIN and Wilmeth F. Austin,
his wife, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida, en Bane.
(2) We re-affirm the rule of Alexander
Dec. 5, 1950.
Orr, Jr., Inc., v. Florida Industrial Commission, supra, 176 So. 172, that "excessive exposure may be found to have been
Action attacking validity of zoning orthe direct cause cif the injury, though opdinance. The Circuit Court for Dade
erating upon other conditions of common County, Grady L. Crawford, J., determined
exposure", and we agree with the deci- that the ordinance was invalid. Defendsions from other jurisdictions, cited above,
ants appealed. The Supreme Court, Thorholding in effect that the fundamentally
nal, J., held tha,t where effectiveness of
accidental nature of the injury is not alprovisions of municipal zoning ordinance
tered by the fact that, instead of a single
was conditioned upon necessity for subseoccurrence, it is the cumulative effect of
quent execution of contract by municipalthe inhalation of dust and fumes to which
ity with private parties, such ordinance
a claimant is peculiarly susceptible that was invalid, because of absence of reaccelerates a claimant's pre-existing disquired degree of clarity and certainty.
ability.
Affirmed.
The claimant in the instant case is enRoberts, J., dissented.
I\,.)titled to an award of compensation for
:.V that proportion of the acceleration or aggravation of his tubercular condition that
,
I. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>III(I)
is reasonably attributable to his inhalaA municipal ordinance should be clear,
tion of dust and fumes in the course of
definite, and certain in its terms.
his employment. Accordingly, the order

N
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Cite as. Fla., 93 So.2d 86

A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract with a property
owner for the amendment of a zoning
ordinance subject to various covenants and
restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city and
property owner.
5. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>589

A municipality cannot contract away
the exercise of its police powers.
6. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>601(15)

When a zoning ordinance is amended
by changing the classification of particular property, such amendment must be
justified by change in the use value of the
property involved.
7. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>III(I)

\Vhere effectiveness of municipal zoning ordinance was conditioned upon necessity for subsequent execution of a contract by municipality with private parties,
such ordinance lacked degree of clarity
and certainty required of municipal legislation and was invalid.
8. Municipal Corporations ¢:::>601(5)

In exercising zoning powers a municipality must deal with weB-defined classes
of uses.

Edward L. Semple, Miami, for appellants.
Gustafson, Persandi & Vernis, Coral Gables, and Anderson & Nadeau, Miami, for
appellees.
M. L. Mershon and W. O. Mehrtens
and Evans, Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston &
Simmons, Miami, amici curiae.

THORNAL, Justice.
Appellants, Hartnett and others, who
were defendants below, seek reversal of a
final decree holding a zoning ordinance of
the City of Coral Gables to be invalid.
Several points are assigned for reversal.
The determining question, however, is the
validity of a zoning ordinance which is
made contingent upon the subsequent execution of a contract between the city and
private parties.
BUl·dines, Inc., alleging itself to be the
holder of an option to purchase the property in question, requested the City Commission to change the zoning classification
of the property from single-family residential use to commercial use. The change
was necessary in order to enable Burdines
to construct a large shopping center with an
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adjoining parking lot. The City Commission, after hearing, adopted Ordinance No.
g:;l7 undertaking to amend its original zoning ordinance which was numbered 271.

Cit. as. Fla., 93 So.2d 86

showing as to invalidity, the ordinance
should be upheld; that at most, need for the
change in the zoning is "fairly debatable"
and that therefore the decision of the City
Commission should not be disturbed.

Ordinance 897, which is here under attack, provided that the requested change
should be made. However, the ordinance
expressly provided that "all of the re-zoning is subject to and dependent upon the
full and complete observance of the limitations, restrictions and other requirements

imposed as hereinafter set forth". Following this provision a number of contingencies were prescribed as conditions to the
effectiveness of the amendatory ordinance.
In summary these conditions were: (1) a
"Bay Point type wall" shall be placed around
the perimeter of the property not less than
40 feet inside the property line abutting
certain streets; (2) the 40-foot strip shall
at all times be kept and maintained in a
condition prescribed by the City Commission at the expense of the property owner;
(3) suitable contracts shall be entered in. to between the city and the property owner
covering the above requirements and also
providing for control of lights on the premises in order to bring about "as little glare
'l.nd disturbance" as possible to the people
in the neighborhood (this expense was to
be borne by the property owner); (4) the
property owner should furnish and pay for
adequate police protection within the rezoned area; (5) to submit to the City Commission for approvel plans and specifications of any proposed building; and (6)
the property owner shall not open access
to certain abutting streets.

Appellees contend that the ordinance is
clearly invalid; that they purchased their
property in reliance upon the then-existing
zoning ordinance; that they have a right
to a continuance of the then-existing regulations in the absence of a showing of a
change in the area that justifies the amendment; that there has been no such showing,
and that further, the ordinance by its very
terms is made contingent upon the subsequent execution of a contract with private
parties and this results in a degree of indefiniteness and uncertainty that destroys
the ordinance as a valid municipal enactment.

The appellees, Austin, who owned and
occupied a home across the street from the
area proposed to be re-zoned, filed a complaint seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance. The Chancellor agreed that the ordinance was invalid
and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
~eversal of this decree is now sought.
:; Appellants contend that the ordinance
Jwas a valid exercise of the zoning powers
of the citv;
. that in the absence bf
, a clear

I
f

I

By very able briefs, the parties have
raised for our consideration numerous
questions. The point which we consider
fatal to the ordinance disposes of the necessity to discuss all of the incidental questions.
[1,2] It is a rule long recognized by the
precedents that a municipal ordinance
should be clear, definite and certain in its
terms. An ordinance which is so vague
that its precise meaning cannot be ascertained is invalid, even though it may otherwise be constitutional. The reason for
the rule is the necessity for notice to those
affected by the operation and effect of the
ordinance. The provisions of a municipal
ordinance which conditions its effectivenessupon the necessity for the subsequent execution of a contract with private parties
such as was done in the case at bar cannot
be held to provide the degree of clarity and
certainty that is required of municipal legislation. See McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., Vol. 5, Sec. 15.24.
The above announced rule is particularly
applicable to the exercise of the zoning
power which is an aspect of the policepower.

'I

I

I
\

I

[3] The above announced rule is particularly applicable to the exercise of the
zoning power which is an aspect of the
police power. While the authority to exercise this power, when delegated by the
State, is generally recognized, nevertheless, the restriction on property rights must
be declared as a rule of law in the ordinance and not left to the uncertainty of
proof by extrinsic evidence whether parol
or written. Johnson v. City of Huntsville. 1947,249 Ala. 36. 29 So.2d 342.
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glare and disturbance; and (5) if the property owner paid for police protection. All
of these "ifs" were to be included in a
proposed collateral private contract to be
executed in the future. If the City Commission, after appropriate hearing, had determined that the highest and best use value
of the land had changed from residential
to commercial, then the "fairly debatable"
rule might have a sphere of applicability.
This was not done.

[4-6] A municipality has no authority
to enter into a private contract with a
property owner for the amendment of a
zoning ordinance subject to various covenants and restrictions in a collateral deed
or agreement to be executed between the
city and the property owner. Such collateral agreements have been held void
in all of the cases to which we have been
referred. Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass.
477, 197 N.E. 224; V. F. Zahodiakin Eng.
Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjust., 8 N.J.
386, 86 A.2d 127; Houston Petroleum Co.
v. Automotive Prod. C. Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122,
87 A.2d 319; Rathkopf on The Law of
Zoning and Planning, 3d Ed., Vol. 2, p.
392. Any contrary rule would condone a
violation of the long established principle
that a municipality cannot contract away
the exercise of its police powers. When a
zoning ordinance is amended by changing
the classification of particular property,
such amendment must be justified by a
change in the use value of the property involved.
[7] We are not here receding in any
fashion from our established rule that if
the need for a change in a zoning ordinance is "fairly debatable" the decision of
the governing authority will be given the
benefit of the doubt. Here the ordinance
expressly recognized that the change was
justifiable only: (1) if the Bay Point Wall
was built; (2) if there was a 40-foot setback; (3) if the sct-back area was landscaped and maintained; (4) if surrounding
property owners were protected against
93 So.2d-G'h

Fla.

[8] In exercising its zoning powers the
municipality must deal with well-defined
classes of uses. If each parcel of property
were zoned on the basis of variables that
could enter into private contracts then the
whole scheme and objective of community
planning and zoning would collapse. The
residential owner would never know when
he was protected against commercial encroachment. The commercial establishments on "Main Street" would never know
when they had protection against inroads
by smoke and noise producing industries.
This is so because all genuine standards
would have been eliminated from the zoning ordinance. The zoning classifications
of each parcel would then be bottomed on
individual agreements and private arrangements that would totally destroy uniformity.
Both the benefits of and reasons for a
well-ordered comprehensive zoning scheme
would be eliminated.
[9] The adoption of an ordinance is
the exercise of municipal legislative power.
I n the exercise of th is governmental function a city cannot legislate by contract.
If it could, then each citizen would be
governed by an individual rule based upon
the best deal that he could make with the
governing body. Such is certainly not
consonant with our notion of government
by rule of law that affects alike all similarly conditioned.
This opinion is not to be construed as
being adversely critical of the policy adopted by appellants in this instance. Conceivably, if effectuated. the plan might re-
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dound to the economic benefit of the community. We have dealt here solely with
a question of municipal power, not policy.
'\lVhen the nub of the problem is isolated
and subjected to the criterion of municipal
power to act in the manner here revealed,
we are compelled to reach the conclusion
which we here announce. We find no authorities to the contrary.

As poihted out above, our solution to the
vital question discussed disposes of the
controversy. We deem it unnecessary to
prolong our discussion by delving into the
other points raised.
The Chancellor ruled correctly in holding the ordinance invalid and his decree
isAffirmed.

f'0
I'.,;
.~

[10] We encounter no difficulty in concluding that the appellees were entitled to
DREW, C. J., TERRELL and O'CONbring the suit. They occupied their homes NELL, JJ., and WALKER, Associate Jusimmediately across the street from the pro- tice, concur.
posed parking area. They relied on the
exlst1l1g zoning conditions when they
ROBERTS, J., dissents.
bought their homes. They had a right to
a continuation of those conditions in the
absence of a showing that the change
requisite to an amendment had taken place.
They allege that the contemplated change
would damage them and that it was contrary to the general welfare and totally
unjustified by existing conditions. This
gave them a status as parties entitled to
Edlse M. THOMPSON, Appellant,
come into court to seek relief. True their
v.
rights were subject to the power of the
Edmund B. THOMPSON, Appellee.
city to amend the ordinance on the basis
of a proper showing. Nonetheless, they
Supreme Court of Florida,
have a right to insist that the showing be
Special Division A.
made.
Feb. 27, 1957.
We point out in passing that the applicant Burdines was not appealing to a
Board of Adjustment for a variance on the
Proceedings under Uniform Reciprocal
basis of any hardship. They were seek- Enforcement of Support Law Act by wife,
ing an outright change in the zoning ordi- who had been awarded $20 per week for
nance by amendment. In this regard they alimony and support of her minor child by
were mere optionees of the property. Not divorce decree of the Circuit Court of
being owners thereof, they would hardly Volusia County, but who was a resident of
have any standing before a Board of Ad- Connecticut at the time of proceedings.
justment on the basis of an alleged hard- The Circuit Court, Duval County, Claude
ship. What we have here held might not Ogilvie, j., entered order of dismissal and
be applicable to a proper application for wife appealed. The Supreme Court,
a variance by an owner based on hardship. Roberts, J., held that since the Act was
This is a point which we are not called designed to provide a remedy enti rely sepupon to decide. For limitations on the au- arate from and independent of any remedy
thority to "amend" under the guise of a existing under other applicable provisions
"variance" see Yolkey on Zoning Law and of law, the Circuit Court of Duval County,
Practice, 2d Ed., Sec. 140, and many cases the place of ex-husband's residence had
jurisdiction of the proceedings and could
there cited.

enforce the duty of support decreed by a
sister county.
Reversed and remanded.

FIe..
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place of ex-husband's residence had jurisdiction of the proceedings and could enforce the duty of support decreed in the
divorce proceedings by a sister county.
F.S.A. §§ 88.oI 1 et seq., 88.041, 88.281.

I. Judgment €=>585(5)

Res judicata is not a defense in a
subsequent action where the law under
which the first judgment was obtained is
di fferent from that applicable to the second
action.
.2. Husband and

Wife e=>303, 315

Richard '\IV. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and
Reeves Bowen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Joseph C. Black, Jacksonville, for appellee.

Parent and Child €=>3(3)

While the purpose of the 1953 Florida
Uniform Support of Dependents Law was
to secure support for "dependent wives and
children" only, the 1955 Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Law applies to
any persons to whom a duty of support is
owed, and judgment of dismissal under
1953 Act was not res judicata on proceedings brought under 1955 Act. F.S.A. §§
88.011 et seq., 88.031 (6); Acts 1953, c.
27996, § 1 ct seq.
3. Husband and WIfe €=>303
Parent and Child €=>3(3)

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Law was intended to provide
a simplified two-state procedure by which
the obligor's duty to support an obligee
residing in another state may be enforced
expeditiously and with a minimum of expense to the obligee. F.S.A. §§ 88.011 et
seq., 88.041, 88.281
4. Husband and WIfe €=>308
Parent and Child 1$::>3(3)

Where wife had obtained divorce in
Volusia County, Florida, but later became a
resident of Connecticut and brought proceedings under Connecticut law and 1955
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, which by its terms was designed
to provide a remedy entirely separate from
and independent of any remedy existing
under other applicable provisions of law,
the Circuit Court of Duval County, the

ROBERTS, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order
in a proceeding brought under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law,
Ch. 29901, Acts of 1955, appearing as Ch.
88, Fla.stat.l955, F.s.A. (the "1955 Florida
Act" hereafter).
The facts are not controverted and are
as follows: the appellant and the appellee
were divorced in 1953 by a decree 6f the
Circuit Court of VoJusia County, Florida,
the decree providing for the payment to the
appellant wife of $20 per week for alimony
and support of the minor child of the
parties pursuant to an agreement of the
parties. The appellant is a resident of the
State of Connecticut and the appellee resides in Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida. Connecticut has a Uniform Reci'
Enforcement of Support Law, Ch. .
Conn.Gen.Stat., 1953 Supp. (referred
hereafter as "the Connecticut Law") substantially similar to the 1955 Florida Act,
supra.
In 1954 the appellant sought to utilize
the provisions of the Connecticut Law and
the Florida Uniform Support of Dependents Law, Ch. 27996, Acts of 1953 (then
in effect but since repealed by the 1955
Florida Act, supra), to enforce the appellee's duty of support decreed by the 1953
Volusia County divorce decree. Her petition was referred by the Connecticut court
to the Circuit Court of Duval County (the
place of appellee's residence) and was by
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e aggravated by an injuve consequences greater
IQuld be suffered by an
employee.
Swift &
ard, 186 Tenn. 584, 212

I·
defendants have not
{ that the conduct of the
ntional, willful or selfin.ct, the evidence raises a
Ie contrary. The judgIdge is affirmed.
I,

CHATTIN,
ustice, concur.

J.,

and

;ents.

ssent.
death was not the natu-

reached by the Court. None of these come
within the purview of the petition to rehear. Rule 32 provides in part:

md dismiss the suit.

:TITION TO REHEAR
ustice.
Glens Falls Insurance
:::ity of Oak Ridge, have
to rehear in accordance
he Tennessee Supreme
: of the petition is to
reconsider its analysis
•ented in the record and
lwn therefrom; to reh the Court studied in
in this case; and once
e equities of the result

Complainants, Appellants,
v.

"A rehearing will be refused where no
new argument is made, and no new authority adduced, and no material fact is
pointed out as overlooked."
As we observed in Sullivan v. Harpeth
Development Corporation, 218 Tenn. 107,
401 S. W.2d 195, 199 [1966J :
"Now, the office of petition to rehear
is to call to the attention of the Court matters overlooked; not to re-argue those
things which the losing party supposes
were improperly decided, after the Court
has given the same full consideration.
This Court has said, and says again, that
a petition for a rehearing should never
be used for the purpose of re-arguing
the case on the points already considered
and determined; unless some new and
decisive authority has been discovered,
which was overlooked by this Court."

f the work injury which

was the direct result of
tervening cause attribut:entional conduct, to-wit:
::> death.

Odfs F. HAYMON and Clark W. Taylor,

The burden of proof is of concern to the
appellants. They admit they had the burden of proving wilful intentional conduct
by the deceased under Section 50-910, T.
c.A. On the issue of whether the original
injury was the proximate cause of the subsequent death of plaintiff-appellee's husband, appellants insist the burden should
have been cast upon the plaintiff; however, as we held in our opinion, the evidence reveals that the death of the deceased directly resulted from his on-the-job
injury. Defendants argued that his conduct amounted to an "independent intervening cause", the burden of proof of
which was upon the appellants, but which
they failed to carry.
The petition to rehear is denied .
DYER, C. J., CHATTIN, J.,
LEECH, Special Justice, concur.
FONES, J., dissents.
513 S.W.2d-12'/z

CITY OF CHATTANOOGA et al.

.COUl·t of Appeals of Tennessee,
Eastern Section.
Nov. 23, 1973.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court
Feb. 4, 1974.

Owners of apartment building brought
an action against city, its mayor, and its
commissioners to enjoin the city from enforcing a stop-work order against the construction of more apartments being added
to the existing building. The Chancery
Court, Knox County, Herschel P. Franks,
c., dismissed the action and the apartment
owners appealed. The Court of Appeals,
McAmis, Special Judge, held that where
the owners' predecessors had entered into a
covenant with board of zoning appeals that
if board would rezone the land from R-2
to R-3, the owners would maintain a buffer zone of 200 feet between apartments
and the nearest property owner and the
owners, without knowledge of the covenant, obtained amendment to zoning ordinance, enacted pursuant to the covenant, reducing the buffer zone to 100 feet, the
covenant and the ordinance were void as
against public policy but that the owners
who had access to the recorded covenant
and who had expended $35,000 in planning
new apartments were not entitled to erect
the apartments on the basis of building
permit issued under authority of the ordinance or on the basis of equitable estoppel.
Affirmed.

f. Zoning @::>160

and

Where owners of land entered into a
covenant with board of zoning appeals that
if the board would rezone the land from
R-2 to R-3, the owners would maintain a
buffer zone of 200 feet between apart-
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ments on the land and the nearest property . building and the nearest property owner,
owner and subsequent owners, without where building inspector had indicated that
knowledge of the covenant, obtained there might be a covenant restricting the
amendment to zoning ordinance reducing erection of the apartments in space bethe buffer zone to 100 feet, the covenant, tween existing apartments and other propthe ordinance enacted in consideration erty, the owners had at least constructive
thereof, and the amending ordinance were notice of the covenant and city was not esvoid as against public policy as was build- topped from revoking the permit.
ing permit issued to the subsequent owners.
2. Contracts PI26

Contracts made for the purpose of unduly controlling or affecting the exercise
of legislative, administrative and judicial
functions, are opposed to public policy.
3. Municipal Corporations P621

A building permit is not a contract
and may be changed or entirely revoked
even though based upon valuable consideration if necessary in the exercise of the
police power.
4. Estoppel P54

As a general rule it is essential to the
application of the principle of equitable estoppel that the party claiming to have been
influenced by the conduct or declarations
of another to his injury, was himself not
only destitute of knowledge of the state of
facts, but was also destitute of any convenient and available means of acquiring the
knowledge, and that where the facts are
known to both parties, or both have the
same means of ascertaining the truth, there
can be no estoppel.
5. Estoppel P62.1

The doctrine of estoppel generally
does not appiy to acts of public authorities.
6. Estoppel <1P62.4

Even though landowners had expended
$35,000 in planning and laying foundations
of new apartment building in reliance on
building permit issued on the basis of ordinance amending prior ordinance, which
had been passed in consideration of previous owners' covenant of record to maintain a buffer zone between their apartment

Shattuck & Payne, Chattanooga, for appellants.
Eugene N. Collins City Attorney, and
Randall L. Nelson, Chattanooga, for appellees.
OPINION
McAMIS, Special Judge.
Odis F. Haymon and Clark W. Taylor,
owners of an apartment known as Chateau
Royale, brought this action in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County against the
City of Chattanooga, its Mayor and its
Commissioners to enjoin the City from enforcing a stop-work order against the construction of twenty-eight apartments which
complainants were in the process of adding
to the existing apartment.
Defendants answered the bill asserting
that at a time when the land in question
was zoned R-2 complainants' predecessors
in title appeared before the Board of Zoning Appeals and entered into an agreement
to execute a covenant, to run for a period
of 25 years, that, if the Board would rezone the property R-3, a buffer zone of
vacant property 200 feet in width would be
left between the apartment and the nearest
property owner; that this covenant was to
run with the land and bind subsequent
owners not to build apartments on the
buffer strip; that such a covenant was
duly executed and placed of record in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for Hamilton County and has ever since remained
of record and that in 1963, acting on this
covenant, the Board, over the objection of
neighboring property owners, after two
hearings, re-zoned the property R-3.
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Nothing further was done to develop
the property until after it was purchased
by complainants. Some time prior to 1971,
complainants constructed one hundred
apartments on the land, leaving intact and
unimproved the buffer strip 200 feet in
width.

attempting to enforce the Covenant, which
is in derogation of the City's Zoning Ordinance. The Court agrees with counsel for
the City that a Zoning Ordinance is not
controlled or changed by restrictive covenants running with the land, which may be
privately enforced; however, the City cannot maintain conflicting positions, i. e., on
On May 25, 1971, complainants had the
one hand, that it covenanted with the prititle searched professionally but t'he covevate individuals to maintain certain zoning
nant for some reason was not discovered.
on this property and, on the other, subseIgnoring and possibly being ignorant of
quently and within the time covenanted enthe covenant except that they were advised
act an Ordinance contrary to its Covenant.
by the building inspector that there might
The Court concludes that the Covenant and
be such a covenant in existence, complainthe Ordinance passed in consideration
ants made application to the Board to re. thereof are void, as a matter of law. See
duce the buffer strip to 100 feet to permit
Osborne v. Allen, 143 Tenn. 343, 226 S.W.
the construction of twenty-eight additional
221; City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196
apartments. A new Board in the meanTenn. 1,263 S.W.2d 528; Baylis v. City of
time having assumed office and being
Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429;
without knowledge of the covenant, passed
Hartnett v. Austin, Fla., 93 So.2d 86; State
an amendment to zoning ordinance reducex reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis.
ing the buffer zone from 200 feet to 100
2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533.
feet and the building inspector thereupon
"Ordinance 6302, which undertook to
issued a building permit to effectuate the
amend
the Ordinance held void, is likewise
amendment.
void.
Complainants then had plans drawn and
"The building permit issued to plaintiffs
entered into a contract for the construction
was
issued under authority of said Zoning
of the new apartments and claim to have
Ordinance
and is likewise void.
(See
expended in drawing plans and laying
Taylor
v.
Shetzen,
212
Ga.
WI,
90
S.E.2d
foundations for the apartments approxi572.) "
mately $35,000.00. At that juncture, apparently being advised of the covenant and its
then current violation, the City revoked the
building permit, precipitating the filing of
this action.

(1] The Chancellor in a well reasoned
opinion concluded that both the covenant
and the ordinance passed in consideration
thereof are void as a matter of law and
that neither can be enforced. On this subject the Chancellor reasoned:
"The City, by entering into the agreement with the covenantors to rezone in
consideration of the Covenant, should the
Court uphold the Covenant, has placed itself in an untenable position of, on the one
hand, finding through its Commi5sioners
that the property should be rezoned to allow further construction, and, on the other,

Weare in agreement with the Chancellor and affirm the decree.
We think the question at issue is ruled
by the two Tennessee cases cited by the
Chancellor. The principle underpinning
both is so well stated in Whitley v. White,
176 Tenn. 206, 140 S.W.2d 157, 159, cited by
the Court in Knoxville v. Ambrister that
we can do no better than quote the
pertinent portion of that opinion, which
affirmed the decision of this Court:
[2] "Contracts made for the purpose of
unduly controlling or affecting official
conduct of the exercise of legislative, administrative and judicial functions, are
plainly opposed to public policy. They
strike at the very foundations of government and intend to destroy that confidence
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in the integrity and discretion of public action which is essential to the preservation
of civilized society. The principle is universal and is applied without any reference
to the mere outward form and purpose of
the alleged transaction."
However, more directly controlling is the
holding of ollr Supreme Court in the Ambrister case.
In that case the Luttrell Estate made
certain agreements af fecting its property
for a period· of 50 years upon condition the
City of Knoxville would re-zone certain of
its property to permit the construction of
an apartment building in an area zoned
residential and, upon demand by the City,
to convey the land to it for park and recreational purposes.
Thereafter, the City
filed its bill for a decree declaring that the
land had been dedicated to the City in consideration for the re-zoning of the property.
After citing Osborne v. Allen, supra, and
citing and quoting the above portion of the
opinion in Whitley v. White, the Court, in
the concluding portion of the opinion said:
"In the instant case the offer was to
dedicate at a future date certain property
in the City to public park purposes, or to
convey it to the City for such purposes on
condition that the City amend its zoning
ordinance, a police measure, so as to meet
the wishes of the offerors. Upon receipt
of this offer the City Council did amend
its zoning ordinance so as to meet those
wishes. There seems to be no escape from
the conclusion that the case falls within
the facts of Osborne v. Allen, supra, and
within the facts stated in the rule there applied. Hence, this illegal agreement will
not be enforced at the instance of the City
of Knoxville, who was a party to it."

that case and this seems to us to be that
the covenant ran with the land, a principle
which we do not understand to be here seriously questioned.!
The same rule with respect to the validity of contracts to influence zoning seems
to prevail in numerous other jurisdictions,
the consensus being that contracts entered
into in consideration of concessions made or
to be made favoring the applicant are
frowned upon as being against public policy which dictates that zoning is an instrument of public authority to be used only
for the common welfare of all the people.
See generally Law of Zoning, Metzenbaum, Second Edition, pp. 967, 973, 1072, 3.

(3] It seems proper to note here that a
building permit is not a contract and may
be changed or entirely revoked even
though based upon a valuable consideration
if necessary in the exercise of the police
power. Howe Realty Co. v. City of Nashville, 176 Tenn. 405, 141 S.W.2d 904; Law
of Zoning, supra, p. 1158. See also Moore
v. Memphis Stone & Gravel Co., 47 Tenn.
App. 461, 339 S.W.2d 29.
It is strongly contended, however, that a
court of equity should hold the City estopped to revoke the building permit after
complainants have expended I~rge sums of
money relying upon the validity of the permit. While we are not unsympathetic with
the plight in which complainants find
themselves, we can not accede to this contention.

The principle is well established that
where both parties have the same means of
ascertaining the true facts there can be no
estoppel. Crabtree v. Bank, 108 Tenn. 483,
67 S.W. 797; Parkey v. Ramsey, 111 Tenn.
302,76 S.W. 812.

site. There the property owner only bound
himself to acts of a nature beneficial to
the general public, such as landscaping and
the like. The only principle common to

[4] "It is essential, as a general rule, to
the application of the principle of equitable
estoppel, that the party claiming to have
been influenced by the conduct or declarations of another to his injury, was himself
not only destitute of knowledge of the

I. Nothing in this opinion is to be construed as
holding that a planning commission, without

a covenant, can uot prescribe reasonable conditions for the benefit of the general public.

Hickerson v. Flannery 42 Tenn.App. 329,

302 S.W.2d 508, cited in the brief is inappo-
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state of the facts, but was also destitute of
any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge, and that where
the facts are known to both parties, or
both have the same means of ascertaining
the truth, there can be no estoppel." Crabtree v. Bank, supra; Hankins v. Waddell,
26 Tenn.App. 71, 167 S.W.2d 694.
(5) It is proper to add that, generally,
the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to
acts of public authorities. State v. Williams, 207 Tenn. 695, 343 S.W.2d 857.

[6] The record suggests, as above noted, that the building inspector said enough
to put complainants upon inquiry as to the
existence of the covenant. In any event
the instrument creating the covenant and
making it run with the land was of record
and complainants had constructive notice of
its existence. It seems to be unquestioned
that to narrow the buffer sttip would be to
the disadvantage of nearby owners of residential property. We fail to see why they
should suffer loss under all the circumstances of this case.
Affirmed and remanded for enforcement
of the decree. Complainants and sureties
will pay all costs.
PARROTT and SANDERS, ]J., concur.
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Appeals, Galbreath, J., held that testimony
of credible and corroborated witnesses was
sufficient to support conviction; that statute dealing with punishment for murder in
first degree which had been declared unconstitutional, had no bearing on case in
that defendant was convicted of second-degree murder; that there was no error in
instructing jury in accord with statute
which provided for jury fixing minimum
and maximum terms of convicted defendants; and that it was not error to deny
motion for mistrial on ground that arresting officer testified that he found a knife
on defendant, even though knife had not
been made available for inspection by defense counsel prior to trial as required by
statute, since all evidence on weapon causing death related to straight razor and fact
that defendant had small pocket knife
when arrested had no bearing on his guilt .
or innocence.
Affirmed.
Oliver,
paragraph.

J.,

concurred except to last

I. Homicide <e:::=>254

Testimony of credible and corroborated witnesses that they saw defendant
walk up behind victim, grab him by back
of head, and split his throat open with
straight razor, was sufficient to support
conviction of second-degree murder.
2. Homicide <e:::=>i46, 152

; welJ established that
have the same means of
le facts there can be no
v. Bank, 108 Tenn. 483,
!y v. Ramsey, 111 Tenn.

Gary SHARP, Plaintiff·ln.Error,

v.
STATE of Tennessee, Defendant·in·Error.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.
March 7, 1974.

ial, as a general rule, to
Ie principle of equitable
larty claiming to have
the conduct or declarahis injury, was himself
of knowledge of the
prescribe reasonable con·
fit of the general public.

Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court

.lune 17, 1974.
Uehearing Denied July 15, 1974.

Defendant was convicted in Circuit
Court, Sevier County, George R. Shepherd,
J., of murder in second degree, and he appealed in error. The Court of Criminal

All killings are presumed to be murder
in second degree, and jury may infer malice
from use of deadly weapon.
3. Constitutional Law <e:::=>49

Fact that statute dealing with punishment for murder in first degree had been
declared unconstitutional had no bearing
on case wherein defendant was convicted
of second-degree murder. Pub.Acts 1973,
c. 192.
4. Criminal Law <e:::=>796

Since it was valid function of legislature to provide various punishments which
f)f')()
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err in denying plaintiff's counsel the right
of summation?
The complaint seeks damages for the
anticipatory breach of an alleged oral contract made between the parties on May 5,
19-18, for the purchase of newsprint to be
delivercd in the futu-re, it being claimed that
the oral contract was confirmed by the
plaintiff on the following day. Immediately
on receipt of the letter of confirmation the
defendant, on May 7, advised plaintiff it
had not agreed to accept delivery on the
terms mentioned therein, that of billing it
on a basis of gross weight for net weight.
Plaintiff's source of supply in Holland
steadfastly refused the net weight type of
billing but plaintiff later agreed to reimburse the defendant for the difference.
'vVhile the question of gross for net billing
was still open the plaintiff kept seeking
and asking the defendant for the "specifications" for the paper. This went on for
several months, the negotiations between
the parties being open for further agreement, and were never furnished or agreed
upon. The necessity for such an agreement is amply evidenced by the cabled requests for the specifications sent from Holland to the defendant, by letters, and by
the fact that the newsprint was never completed or shipped.

,)

...J
)
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[3,4] There was a sharp conflict in the
testimony presented and the trial COurt
had the opportunity and advantage of observing the witnesses and was in a position
to evaluate their credibility to a greater
extent than can an appellate tribunal. His
findings of fact are entitled to great weight.
The credibility of witnesses is an important
consideration in the determination of factual issues. Gellert v. Livingston,S N.J.
65, i8, 73 A.2d 916 (1950). While an appellate court is not bound by a finding of
fact made by the trial court it is required to
give due regard to the opportunity of that
court to observe the demeanor of a witness
and to judge of his credibility. In re Perrone's Estate, 5 N.J. 514, 523, 76 A.2d 518
(1950).

(1,2] It is fundamental that the essential element to the valid consummation of a
contract is a meeting of the minds of the
contracting parties and that until there is
such a meeting of the minds either party
may withdraw and end all negotiations.
Water Commissioners of Jersey City v.
Brown, 32 N.J.L. 504 (E. & A.l866); Wilson v. Windo!ph, 103 N.J.Eq. 275, 143 A.
346 (E. & A.l928); P. Ballantine & Sons v.
Gulka, 117 N.J.L. 84, 186 A. 722 (Sup.Ct.
1936). "So long as negotiations are pending over matters relating to the contract,
and which the parties regard as material
to it, and until they are settled and their
minds meet u!'on them, it is not a contract,
aithough as to some matters they may be
agreed", Tansey v. Suckoneck, 98 N.J.Eq.
669, 671, 130 A. 528, 529 (E. & A.1925).
I f the defendant had furnished specifications which the plairtiff could not meet at
!he price fixed surely the plaintiff would not

[5] We are convinced there was ample
evidence to support the holding below that
no contract existed between the parties.
The point briefed and argued that the
plaintiff was denied his right of summation
merits little consideration under the facts
exhibited.
After the completion of testimony the
trial court reserved decision and directed
counsel to submit briefs, advising them
that oral argument would be permitted following the submission of briefs, if necessary or desirable, at such time as might
be suitable. Later plaintiff's counsel by
letter stated to the court that he requested
permission to file a reply brief or in thc
alternative that he be permitted to argue
the matter orally to which the court replied
that due to the pressure of time the matter
could not be argued orally but that counsel
might file a reply brief.
[6) It wiII thus be observed that plaintiff asked for oral argument only in tbe
alternative, i. e., in lieu of the opportunity
to file a reply brief. He was given this
opportunity and did so. No complaint that
opportunity was not given to argue orally
was made below and no objection made to
the course taken. It is only on appeal that
for the first time plaintiff complains that
he was denied the right of summation. Cf.
Roberts Electric Inc. v. Foundations &

Excavations, Inc., 5 N.J. 426, 75 A.2d 858
(1950). Whatever rights plaintiff's counsel
had were expressly waived by him.
Having reached the aforesaid .conclusions
we are not called upon to decide the defendant's point that the action was barred
by the statute of frauds, there not being a
sufficient memorandum in writing to meet
the requirements of that statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
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Superior Court, Chancery Division, reinstated and affirmed.
Vanderbilt, C. J., and Wachenfeld. J.,
dissented.
I. Municipal Corporations ~01(15)

Agreement between city and parties'
common grantor for the reclassification of
certain tracts so that they should <:ome
within and be subject to provisions of
light industrial district of zoning ordinance
For affirmance: Justices HEHER, OLI- of city and that when zoned as light industrial district premises should he subject to
PHANT and W ACHENFELD_3.
oCertain covenants and restrictions set forth

For reversal: Chief Justice V ANDER- in agreement constituted an abuse of zoning
power by city and therefore agreement was
BILT and Justice BURLING-2.
ultra vires, illegal and void.
2. MunicIpal Corporations ¢::>601(1, 7)

The zoning power may not be exerted
to serve private interests merely nor may
the principle be subvertcd to that end, and
a purported contract so made is ultra vires
and all proceedings to effectuate it are
coram non judice and utterly void.

9 N.J. 122
HOUSTON PETROLEUM CO. v. A.UTO-

MOTIVE PRODUCTS CREDIT
ASS'N, Inc.
No. A-80.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued Feb. 18, 1952.
Decided March 17, 1952.
Action by the Houston Petroleum Co., a
corporation of the State of New Jersey,
against Automotive Products Credit Associa.
tion, Inc., a corporation, for an injunction
and speeific performance of an agreement
creating covenants restricting use of realty.
The Superior Court, Chancery Division, en.
tered judgment dismissing the complaint,
11 NJ.Super. 357, 78 A.2d 310, and plaintiff appenled. The Superior Court, Appel.
late DiviSion, 15 N.J. Super. 215, 83 A.2d 239,
reversed and set aside the judgment, of the
Chancery Division, and defendant filed a petition for certification with the Supreme
Court which was granted, 8 N.J. 248, 84 A.2d
669. The ,Supreme Court, Burling, J., held
that under the circnmstances of the case
the restrictive Covenants were not enforceable by the plaintiff.
Judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, reversed, and the judgment of the

3. Municipal Corporations ¢::>601 (5)

A contract between a municipality and
a property owner should not enter into the
enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations.
4. MUnicipal Corporations ¢::>601(15)

\'lhere contract between city and parties' common grantor for rezoning of tract
as light industrial provided that when zoned
as light industrial district tract would be
subject to certain covenants and restrictions
and covenants were imposed not only for
purpose of obtaining rezoning of tract but
were themselves limited in duration to
period of time during which premises remained zoned for light industry and agreement provided for rel~ase or modification of
covenants at any time by agreement to
which city was made a necessary party,
covenants in themselves exhjbit~d a plan
in contravention of public policy incorporated in constitutional and statutory provisions relating to zoning, and restrictive
covenants, being violative of public policy
of State, were illegal, and, agreement establishing covenants being void, plaintiff
was not entitled to their enforcement.
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ported modification of agreement and to enforce restrictions against balance of tract
of
the
A contract in contravention
was a corruption of apparent purpOSe of
public 'Policy of the state will not be enrestriction and to that extent attempted enforced.
forcement was in restraint of competition
6. Municipal Corporations @:::>601(15)
and for such purpose plaintiff had no standAgreement entered into between par- ing to enforce the restrictive covenants.
ties' common grantor and city which pur12. Injunction @:::>62(1)
ported to modi fy previous contract between
Courts of equity do not aid one man to
common grantor and city under which
restrict another in use to which he may
common grantor agreed that tract should be
lawfully put his property unless right to
subject to certain covenants and restrictions when tract was zoned as light in- such aid is clear.

5. contracts @:::>I08(1)

dustrial district, by which modification common grantor agreed to ·bind his remaining
William C. Nowels, Maplewood, argued
lots; was in violation of public policy implicit in zoning laws and illegal and there- the cause for defendant-appellant (Stein
fore plaintiff's right against defendant & Stein, Jersey City, attorneys; Frederick
could not be enforced based on the modi- Z. Feldman, Jersey City, on the brief).
Samuel Koestler, Elizabeth, argued the
fication agreement.
cause for plaintiff-respondent (Koestler &
7. Covenants @:::>49
A restrictive covenant is a contl'act Koestler, Elizabeth, attorneys).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
dependent on reciprocal or mutual burdens
and benefits shared by each lot owner
brought within scheme thereof.

BURLING, J.
This is a civil action. The plaintiff in8. Covenants @:::>77
stituted the suit by -complaint against the
Any neighborhood scheme of restrictive defendant in the Superior Court, Chancery
covenants to be enforceable must apply to Division, seeking the remedy of injunction
all lots of like character brought within for the enforcement of certain restricti"~
scheme.
covenants relating to real property. After
trial, the Superior Court, Chancery Di9. covenants @:::>77
Where plaintiff's lot, which was re- vision, entered judgment dismissing the
leased from restrictive covenants applying complaint. 11 N.J.Super. 357, 78 A.2d 310
to other lots in tract, was of like character (Ch.Div.1951). The plaintiff pursued an
with remainder of tract, and attempted re- a-ppeal to the Superior Court, Appellate
lease of plaintiff's premises was effected for Division, 15 N.J.Super. 215, 83 A,2d 239
benefit of agent for plaintiff, restrictive (App.Div.1951) and that court reversed and
covenants would not be enforceable by set aside the judgment of the Chancery
Division. Thereupon the defendant filed
plaintiff against defendant.
a petition for certification with this court,
10. Injunction @:::>I09
A plaintiff who has by his own conduct which was granted. Houston Petroleum
Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Assodefeated the object and purpose of a restrictive covenant applying to a tract of ciation, Inc., 8 N.J. 248, 84 A,2d 669 (1951).
There is little controversy here as to the
realty is not entitled to injunctive relief
facts which became the -fonndation of this
for its enforcement.
suit. The plaintiff in its complaint claimed,
II. covenants @?77
and the defendant in the pretrial order
Where provision in original agreement
admitted, that one Lotta D. Byrn~ and
for application of restrictive covenants to
others, partners trading as Byrnes Realty
tract was applicable to entire tract and inCompany (hereinafter called Byrnes), being
cluded no permission for release of one
the owners of a tract of land (including the
portion or more of tract from those restricpremises in question) located in the City
tions, attempt to release one portion by pur-
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of Linden, County of Union and State of agreement. It was also daimed and adNew Jersey, on the northwesterly side of mitted that on March 29, 1948 Byrnes conNew Jersey State Highway No. 25 (also veyed ail the said tract, subject to the coveknown as Edgar Road) entered into a cer- nants and restrictions contained in the
tain agreement in writing with the City of aforesaid agreement, to Industrial Land
Linden dated April 15, 1947, recorded April Corporation, which in turn on the same
17, 1947 in Book 1620 of Deeds for Union date and likewise subject to said covenants
C<'ullty at page 434, etc., which included the and restrictions conveyed all land and
following pertinent language: "Whereas, premises to Clifford J. Colville and others
Byrnes Realty Company has applied to the trading as Macner Realty Company (hereMayor and Common Council of the City of inafter referred to as Macner). In the
Linden, in the County of Union, to reclassi- pretrial order it was stipulated that the
fy said premises so that the same shall come deeds for said conveyance contained the
within and be subject to the provisions of following language: "This conveyance is
Section 6--E (light industrial district) of the made subject to * '" * covenants and
zoning ordinance of the said City of Lin- restrictions imposed upon said premises by
den; and whereas, Byrnes Realty Company a certain agreement made between the
in connection with its said application has grantor and the City of Linden, dated
agreed that said lands and premises if and April 15, 1947, * * *."
when zoned as a light industrial district,
It was further claimed and admitted that
shall be subject to the covenants and re- on July 1, 1949 Macner, then being owners
strictions hereinafter set forth; * * *." of the entj re tract, entered into an agreeThe covenants and restrictions contained ment in writing with the City of Linden
in the aforesaid agreement included a set- modifying the agreement of April 15, 1947
back of 75 feet from the northerly line of as to a certain 300 feet of the frontage of
the right-of-way of State Highway No. 25 said tract 011 State Highway No. 25, so as
and a provision that the area between the to relieve that portion of the tract of the
northerly line of the right-of-way of said setback and seeding and planting covenants
highway and the setback line be "seeded and restrictions, and that this modification
and suitably planted, excepting, however, agreement was recorded on July 22, 1949.
such part of said area (not to exceed fifty
Macner thereafter, by deed dated August
(50%) per cent thereof) as shall be con1, 1949 and duly recorded, conveyed the
structed and used for driveways and parkaforesaid portion of said tract which had
ing space."
been released from the restrictions to one
It was further provided that said cove- Sand who subseql1ently conveyed the same
nants and restrictions should become effec- portion to Houston Petroleum Co., a New
tive on the rezoning of the area as re- Jersey corporation (hereinafter called the
quested by Byrnes and continue in effect plaintiff); Macner also conveyed an adso long as the premises remained so zoned joining portion of the tract, subject to reor until April 1, 1977, provided that they strictions and conditions of record, to the
might be released or modified at any time plaintiff on May 16, 1950. By deed dated
by agreement in writing between the City of June 12, 1950 and duly recorded, Macner
Linden and the owner or owners of all or conveyed, likewise subject to restrictions
all portions of said land and premises.
and conditions of record, to Automotive
The City of Linden, by ordinance adopted Products Credit Association, Inc., a New
on the same date (April 15, 1947) rezoned Jersey corporation (hereinafter called the
the Byrnes tract described' in the above defendant) a portion of the Byrnes tract
mentioned agreement to include said lands immediately adjoining the plaintiff's addiand premises in "Section 6-E (light indus- tional portion of the tract, aforesaid, and
trial district)." It is clear from the evi- also fronting on State Highway No. 25. It
dence introduced at the trial of this cause was further admitted in the pretrial order
that this rezoning was effected on con- that on July 11, 1950 the building inspector
Sideration of the making of the afnrpo,;ri .... £.l.t.._ r",
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power by the City, and was therefore
ultra vires, illegal and void. With this con-

a building permit for the construction upon
its portion of the tract a large gasoline
sen-ice station in conformity with plans and tention we agree.
..
specifications which showed that the defendant intended to seed and plant less
[2.J The latest expos~tlOn of the law
than 10 per cent of the land area, between appltcable. to the foregolJ1g conclusion is
the line of State Highway No. 25 and the contalJ1ed m V. F. Zah~dlaklJ1, etc., Corp. v.
7S-foot setback line, and to pave 90 per Zonll1g Board of Adjustment of_ City of
cent of the said land area with bituminous Sumnnt, 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 121 (1952).
pavement and concrete slabs, in clear vio- ~llls court there held, 8 N.J .. at pages 394lation of the covenants and restrictions ,,95,86 A.2d 127 that the zonmg power may
hereinabove quoted, and that the defendant not be exerted to ser~e private interests
commenced to place gasoline pumps on the merely nor may the pnnc.ple 'be subverted
premises in positions designated in the to that end, that a purported contract so
a fore said plans.
made was n!tm vtres and all proceedings to
TI
I"ff fil d .
I"
I'
effectuate It were coram non judice and
1e p awtl
_e Its c~mp alnt In t .115 utterly void.
cause on JIlly 11, 1950 In the Supenor
Court, Chancery Division seekino- to have
The same principle is implicit in the dethe defendant enjoined f~om violating the ds.ions of this court in Beckmann v. Towncovenants and restrictions imposed on its ship of Teaneck, 6 N.J. 530, at page 535, i9
said property 'by the aforesaid agreement of A.2d. 301 (1951) ,:~ere~n the asserted auApril 15, 1947 between Byrnes and the thonty of a mumclpahty to contract for
City of Linden, and by supplemental com- the. exercise of legislative powers was
plaint filed October 5, 1950 sought a judg- demed by the c,aurt and Anschelewitz v.
ment in the nature of a mandatory injunc- Borough of Belmar, 2 N.J. 178, 183, 6S
tion to require the defendant to remove such A.2d 825, 827 (1949) wherein the court
part of its construcl~on as was violative said: "A municipality cannot act as an inof said covenants and restrictions. An in- dividual does. It must 'Proceed in ;:onterlocutory injunction was denied by the formity with the statutes, or in the abtrial court on July 31, 1950. After trial sence of statute agreeably to the com~o!1
firal judgment was entered on January 29, l~w, by ordmance or resolutIOn or motlOll.
y
195 I in the Superior Court, Chancery Di- * * * .Especi'all is this so where real
vision, in favor of the defendant and dis- property IS concerned. * * *"
missing, the plaintiff's complaint: On the
[3-5) Contracts thus have no place in
plamtlff s appeal to the SuperIOr Court, a zoning pial} and a contract between a
Appellate Division, the judgment was re- municipality and a prope;ty owner should
versed and remanded, on August 30, 1951, not enter into the enactment or enforcement
with direction that a mandatory injunction of zoning regulations. See Bassett on Zonbe Issued dHectmg the removal of the Im- ing, p. 184 (1940). Compare Speakman v.
provcments vJOlatlng the covenant. The Mayor & Council of North Piainfield, 8
defenda~t filed ":ith this court its petition N.J. 250, 257, 84 A.2d i15 (1951); Lynch v.
for certificatIOn LO the Appellate DIVlslon Hillsdale, 136 N.J.L. 129, 134, 54 A.2d 723
to. revie;r. said judgment of re\:ers~l, and (Sup.Ct.l947), affirmed per curiam 137
saId petItIOn was granted resultmg m thIS N.J.L. 280, S9 A.2d 622 (E. & A.l948);
N. J. Good Humor, Inc., v. Borough of
lppeal as aforesaid.
[1] The defendant asserted below and Bradley Beach, 124 N·lL. 162, 164-165,
~serts here among its questions involved 168-169, II A.2d 113 (E. & A.l940);
111 appeal that the covenants and restric- Friedman v. Maines, 151 A. 472, 8 N.J.
ions sought by plaintiff to be enforced are Misc. 703 (Sup.Ct.l930), affirmed per
~1Vaiid and unenforceable for the reason, curiam, 110 N.J.L. 454, 166 A. 148 (E. & A·
inter alia, that the agreement of April 15, 1933). The covenants in question not only
1947, between Byrnes and the City of were imposed on the land for the purpose
Linden constituted an abuse of the zoning of obtaining rezoning of the Byrnes tract,
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but are themselves limited in duration to (the purported "modification agreement" of
the period of time during which the prem- July 1, 1949) to bind his remaining land, the
ises remain zoned for light industry. Thus plaintiff's rights should be enforced. And
they seem related not to the benefit of in- the second is whether there was created by
dividual portions of the tract but to zoning the common grantor a neighborhood plan
for the entire tract. In addition, the re- or scheme to the enforcement of which the
corded agreement provides for release or plaintiff is entitled. It was upon these
modification of the covenants at any time by propositions that the Superior Court, Apan agreement to zr.;hich the City of Linden pellate Division, principally rested its judgis made a necessary party. This again is ment. The common grantor's purported
referable to zoning, and is within the par- modi-fication agreement of July 1, 1949, apticular condemnation of the law as stated in proved by resolution of the Common Counthe Zahodiakin case, supra. Thus it may cil of the City of Linden on July 19, 1949,
be concluded that the covenants in them- is subject to the same condemnation as has
selves exhibit a plan in contravention of been hereinabove addressed to the original
the public policy incorporated in the con- agreement between Byrnes and the .city,
stitlltional and statutory provisions relating and is void as against public policy.
to zoning. The former Supreme Court of
[7-10] The principles upon which the
this State in Sharp v. Teese, 9 N.J.L. 352,
existence of a neighborhood scheme de354 (Sup.Ct.l828) held: "The attempt to
pen-ds are so firmly established that no
contravene the policy of a public statute is
repetition here is deemed necessary. Actillegal. Nor is it necessary to render it
ing upon the premise that a neighborhood
so that the statute should contain an exscheme was created by the common granpress prohibition of such attempt. It altors, independent of the illegal municipal
ways contains an implied prohibition; and
agreement, it is unenforceable by the plainto Stich attempt the principles of the comtiff. It is settled that a restri-ctive covenant
mon law are invariably and deadly hostile,
is a contract dependent upon reciprocal or
not always by an interference between the
mutual burdens and benefits shared by each
parties themselves, or by enabling the one
lot owner brought within the scheme thereto recall from the other, where in pari
of. Weinstein v. Swartz, 3 N.J. 80, 86, 68
deliclo, what may have been obtained; but
A.2d 865 (1949). The mutual and recipby at all times refusing the aid of the law
rocalburdens and benefits of the original
to carry into effect or enforce any contract
neighborhood plan (effected 'by the Byrnes
which may be the result of such intended
covenants) were so altered by the purported
contravention." And this court has reitermodification agreement as to render them
ated the rule that a contract in contravenunenforceable by the plaintiff for lack of
tion of the public policy of this State will
mutuality. Compare Weinstein v. Swartz,
not be enforced .. Lobek v. Gross, 2 N.J.
supra; Welitoff v. Kohl, lOS N.J.Eq. 181,
100, 102, 65 A.2d i44 (1949). We there147 A. 390, 66 A.L.R. 1317 (E. & A.1929).
fore conclude that the restrictive covenants
Upon the Byrnes conveyance to Macner the
in qUestion,being violative of the public
scheme established by Byrnes was und; spolicy of this State implicit in our zoning
turned, for the entire tract was the sublaws, are illegal. Compare Driscoll v.
ject of the conveyance. The plaintiff
Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., B N.5- 433,
argues to the effect that the neighborhood
86 A.2d 201 (1952); Stack v. P. G. Garage,
scheme that became established is not the
Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 121-122, 80 A.2d 545
result of the Byrnes agreement, but of the
(\951). The agreement establishing the
Macner modification agreement, and therecovenants being illegal and void, the plainfore the plaintiff is entitled to the protectiff is not entitled to their enforcement.
tion of the covenants, on the settled prin[6] Among the questions involved are ciples that the common grantor mayor may
two further propositions. The first of not bind himself by the restrictions, Clarke
these is whether upon the 'basis of the com- v. Kurtz, 123 N.J.Eq. 174, 177, 196 A. 777
mon grantor's express agreement in writinlT (P 1I. A 11'\""""
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formity 0 f the restdctions over the entire vent its appropriation to purposes which
tract subject to the scheme is not required, will impair the value or diminish the enjoy_
Weinstein v. Swartz, 3 N.r. 80, 86, 68 A.2d ment of the land which he retains. The
865 (1949). To this argument defendant only restriction on this right is, that it
interposes the established rule that any shall be exercised reasonably, with due reneighborhood scheme to Qe effective and en- gard to public policy , and without creating
forceable must apply to all lots of like any unlawful restraint of trade.' "
character brought within the scheme. Ibid.
[11] We find that restrictions were
There is no doubt, under the circumstances placed on the enti1'c tract and were not
of this case, that plaintiff's lot which was designed for the purpose now asserted.
released from the restrictions was "of like The provision for release or modification is
character" with the remainder of the tract. applicable to the entire tract and includes no
It is also settled that a plaintiff who has permission for release of one portion or
by his own conduct defeated the object and more of the tract from those restrictions.
purpose of a covenant of this nature is not This is evident from the text of the clause.
entitled to injunctive relic f for its en force- The attempt to release one portion by the
ment. Compare Dalstan v. Circle Amuse- purported "modification agreement" and to
ment Co., 130 N.J.Eq. 354, 356,22 A.2d 245 en force the restrictions aga inst the balance
(E. & A.l94l);
DeGray v. Monmouth of the tract is a corruption of the apparent
Beach Co., SO N .J .Eq. 329, 24 A. 388 (Ch. purpose of the restrictions. To this extent
1390), affirmed 67 N.J.Eq. 731, 63 A. 1118 th e attempted enforcement was admittedly
(E. & A.189.:!). The plaintiff in the present in restraint of competi tion. It is obvious
case has not proved its right to the applica- upon this view of the matter that for such
tion of the doctrine of the Clarke case, purpose the plaintiff has no standing. Comsupra. The record shows that the common pare Hrewer v. Marshall and Cheeseman,
grantor, Macner, accepted title subj ect to, 19 N.J .Eq. 537 (E. & A.IS68); Irving Inand was bound by, the covenants in the vestment Corp. v. Gordon, 3 N.;' 217, 221,
Byrnes agreement. Assuming -b ut not de- 69 A.2d 725 (1949).
ciding that Macner, being owner of the
[12] The defendant's fifth and final
entire tract, could alter the neighborhood
scheme previously established and eliminate question involved on this appeal presents
its own premises therefrom without destruc- the general argument that courts of equity
tion of the scheme, it does not. appear that do not aid one man to restrict another in
such was the course followed. The at- the uses to which he may lawfully put his
tempted release of the plaintiff's premises property unless the right to such aid is
was effected for the ,b enefit of Sand who clear. This is a recognized rule in this
was acting as agent for the plaintiff. We State. Howland v. Andrus, 81 N .J.Eq. 175,
find that under the circumstances of this 181, 86 A. 391 (E. & A.l913). Under the
case the restrictive covenants would not he circumstances of this case the plaintiff is
not entitled to enforcement of the restricenforceable by the plaintiff.
tive covenants against the defendant.
An additional question presented by the
For the reasons stated, the judgment of
defendant on this appeal is whether a plaintiff may enforce the covenants involved in the Superior Court, Appellate Division is
this litigation for the purpose of stifling reversed, and the j ucigment of the Superior
competition. The source of the defend- Court, Chancery Division, is reinstated and
ant's contention lies in the law approved affirmed.
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by the former court of Chancery in the
For reversal: Justices HEHER, OLIcase of Coudert v. Sayre, 46 N,J.Eq. 386, PHANT and BURLING---3.
389, 19 A. 190, 191, (Ch.1890) namely:
For affirmance: Chief Justice VAN" 'Every owner of real property has a right
to so deal with it, as to restrain its use by DERBILT and Justice WACHENFELD
his grantee, within stich limits as to pre- -2.
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THE LEAGUE OF RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD ADVOCATES, a California non-profit corporation; LARRY FAIGIN; THOMAS LARKIN; EDWARD C.
CAZIER; CYNTHIA CHV ATAL; J. LARSON JAENICKE; ELIZA LEWIS;
GARY J. HERMAN, SR.; MARGARET KUHNS; MADELINE WARREN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES; CONGREGATION ETZ CHAIM;
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No. 06-56211
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

498 F.3d 1052; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19824
July 10,2007, Argued and Submitted, Pasadena, California
August 21, 2007, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District ofCalifomia. D.C. No. CV-03-04890-CAS.
Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant city entered into a settlement agreement with defendant congregation allowing it to operate a synagogue in a residential-zoned area. Plaintiff neighbors sued alleging that the settlement agreement
was void because a conditional use permit was granted without providing notice and a hearing to the affected community. The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the action with prejUdice. The neighbors
appealed.
OVERVIEW: The court rejected the district court's analysis--a comparison between a traditional conditional use permit
(CUP) and the settlement agreement--because it ignored the plain language of Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code §
12.08. The congregation sought, and the settlement agreement granted, permission to operate a synagogue in a residential zone even though congregational worship was considered a conditional use under Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal
Code § 12.24, and required a permit. The court held the city impermissibly circumvented the procedural and substantive
limitations contained in Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24. Because the city did not satisfy those formalities
when it entered into the settlement agreement, the agreement was invalid and unenforceable under state law. The court
rejected any argument that the city could have circumvented its zoning procedures by referencing its general authority
to settle litigation under Los Angeles, Cal., City Charter § 273(c). Absent a fmding that federal law was violated or
would be violated, the district court could not approve the settlement agreement that authorized the city to disregard its
own zoning ordinances. '
OUTCOME: The dismissal of the neighbor's collateral attack on the settlement agreement was reversed and the case
was remanded for further proceedings.
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LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure> Pleading & Practice> Defenses, Demurrers, & Objections> Failures to State Claims
Civil Procedure> Appeals> Standards ofReview> De Novo Review
[RNl) A circuit court of appeals reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
All facts alleged in the complaint are assumed true.

Civil Procedure> Settlements> Settlement Agreements> General Overview
[HN2) A federal consent decree or settlement agreement cannot be a means for state officials to evade state law. State
officials can not agree to terms which would exceed their authority and supplant state law. Some rules oflaw are designed to limit the authority of public officeholders. They may chafe at these restraints and seek to evade them, but they
may not do so by agreeing to do something state law forbids.

Governments> Local Governments> Ordinances & Regulations
[HN3) In California, a duIy enacted local ordinance has the same binding force as a state statute.

Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> General Overview
[HN4) Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A) limits the use of buildings or structures in an Rl residential zone
primarily to one or two-family dwellings.

Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> General Overview
[HN5] See Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A).

Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances
[HN6] Among the conditional uses requiring approval under Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A) are the
operation ofChurcheslHouses of worship. Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24(T)(3)(b).

Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances
[HN7] The procedure for reviewing conditional use permit (CUP) applications requires an initial decision by the Zoning
Administrator, public notice, and a public hearing. Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24(C), (D). Furthermore,
the decision-maker must issue a series of factual findings before granting a CUP. § 12.24(E). Any aggrieved person may
administratively appeal the decision of the Zoning Administrator to the Planning Commission and, if still unsatisfied, to
the City Council. § 12.24(1).

Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> General Overview
[HN8) Municipalities may not waive or consent to a violation of their zoning laws, which are enacted for the benefit of
the public. Cal. Civ. Code § 3513. Any such agreement to circumvent applicable zoning laws is invalid and unenforceable.

Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Nonconforming Uses
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances
[HN9) Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.08(A) states that all conditional use is forbidden in an RI zone unless
approved pursuant to the provisions of Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code § 12.24.
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Governments> Local Governments> Police Power
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances
[HN1O] Land use regulations involve the exercise of the state's police power, and it is settled that the government may
not contract away its right to exercise the police power in the future.

Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances
[HNI I] Departures from standard zoning by law require administrative proceedings, including public hearings, followed by fmdings for which the instant density exemption might not qualifY. Both the substantive qualifications and the
procedural means for a variance discharge public interests. Circumvention of them by contract is impermissible.

Civil Procedure> Settlements> Settlement Agreements> Validity
Governments> Local Governments> Claims By & Against
[HNI2] Los Angeles, Cal., City Charter § 273(c) generally empowers the city council to approve or reject settlement of
litigation that does not involve only the payment or receipt of money. This provision does not purport to authorize contractual exemptions from zoning requirements. Such exemptions are illegal, and § 273(c) cannot grant the city more
authority than is permitted under California law.

Constitutional Law> Supremacy Clause> Federal Preemption
[HN13J Once a court has found a federal constitutional or statutory violation, a state law cannot prevent a necessary
remedy.

Civil Procedure> Settlements> Settlement Agreements> Validity
Constitutional Law> Supremacy Clause> Federal Preemption
[HNI4J Upon properly supported fmdings that such a remedy is necessary to rectifY a violation offederal law, a district
court can approve a consent decree which overrides state law provisions. Without such fmdings, however, parties can
only agree to that which they have the power to do outside oflitigation.
COUNSEL: Leslie M. WerIin, McGuire Woods, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Susan S. Azad, Latham & Watkins, Los Angeles, California, for defendant-appellee Congregation Etz Chaim.
Tayo A. Popoola, Los Angeles, California, for defendants-appellees City of Los Angeles, James K. Hahn, and Rocky
Delgadillo.
JUDGES: Before: Barry G. Silverman, William A. Fletcher, and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.
OPINION BY: Barry G. Silverman
OPINION
[*1053J
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:
An Orthodox Jewish congregation applied for a conditional use permit to operate a synagogue in an area zoned
solely for residential use. Neighbors of the proposed synagogue objected and, ultimately, the City of Los Angeles denied the application. The Congregation then filed a federal lawsuit alleging that the denial of the permit violated its federal and state constitutional rights. All these claims were later dismissed. However, while the lawsuit, was pending,
Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 u.s.c. § 2000cc. Concerned about the force [**2J of this new federal law and seeking to avoid further litigation, the City entered into a settlement agreement that allowed the Congregation to operate the synagogue under certain conditions.
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Neighbors of the synagogue brought the present action, alleging that the Settlement Agreement is void because, in
settling the lawsuit as it did, the City effectively granted the Congregation a conditional use permit without providing
notice and a hearing to the affected community. This, they say, violated state law and their right to due process.
We agree with the neighbors on their state law claim. To paraphrase Justice O'Connor in a different context, the
pendency of litigation is not a blank check for a city when it comes to the rights of its residents. In the Settlement
Agreement, the City granted a conditional use right without first giving affected persons notice and an opportunity to be
heard, thereby violating state law. A settlement agreement cannot override state law absent a specific determination that
federal law has been or will be violated. Since no such findings were made here, the Settlement Agreement is invalid
and unenforceable.
I. Background

Congregation Etz Chaim, an Orthodox Jewish [**3] congregation, acquired property on Highland Avenue in the
Hancock Park [*1054] neighborhood of Los Angeles. In light of the area's designation as an "RI" residential zone under Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.08, the Congregation sought from the City a conditional use permit ("CUP") to
allow for congregational religious worship and services on the property. In October 1996, the City's Zoning Administrator denied the application and the requested variances. This action was later upheld by the Board of Zoning Appeals and
the Los Angeles City Council.
Then, in 1997, the Congregation brought a federal action under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that the City's denial of
its CUP application violated state and federal law. In June 1998, while this federal action was pending, the Congregation petitioned for a writ of mandate in Los Angeles Superior Court, seeking to overturn the City's denial of the CUP.
The Superior Court upheld the denial and the California Court of Appeal affrrmed.
Shortly thereafter, the Congregation filed an amended complaint in the federal action to include an alleged violation
ofRLUlPA. RLUIPA's effective date was September 22,2000. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000). Citing [**4]
to the preclusive effect of the state court proceedings, the district court granted summary judgment to the City on all
issues raised by the Congregation in its original complaint. However, the court denied the City's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the newly added RLUIP A claim.
On September 27, 200 I, the City and the Congregation settled. The City denied any violation offederal law on its
part. However, the Settlement Agreement authorized the use of the Highland property for congregational worship, subject to several restrictions. It restricted the number of congregants and the number of cars at the property during services. Moreover, the Congregation could not hold weddings, funerals, banquets, fund-raising events, or offer day care
services. Finally, the Congregation had to maintain the property's residential exterior and could not post signs, posters,
or flyers on the premises.
Pursuant to the Agreement, the district court dismissed the Congregation's federal action with prejudice on February I, 2002, with the court retaining jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties for a period of five years. I The

League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates and individual [**5] Hancock Park homeowners (collectively, "the
League"), none of whom were parties to the first federal court action, filed a complaint under 42 U.SC § 1983 against
the City, Mayor James Hahn, City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo (collectively, "the City"), and the Congregation. 2 The
League argued that local zoning ordinances denied the City authority to enter into such an agreement. It also asserted
federal and state constitutional violations.
I The City and the Congregation have since been involved in litigation over the scope and enforcement of the
Settlement Agreement. See Congregation Etz Chaim v. City ofLos Angeles, 371 F.3d J J22 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, while the district court initially agreed to retain jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement and the
parties for five years, on September 6, 2006, the court entered a joint stipulation and order extending its jurisdiction until February 1,2012.
2 This action was originally assigned to the Honorable Harry L. Hupp. On February 2,2004, it was reassigned
to the Honorable Christina A. Snyder following the death of Judge Hupp.
On December 22, 2003, the district court granted the Congregation's motion to dismiss with prejudice. The [**6]
court found that the Settlement Agreement did not create a CUP, and that the privileges granted to the Congregation did
not run with the land and were created by contract against a threat oflitigation. Further, the court [* 1055] found, these
privileges would be enforced through contractual, and not criminal, sanctions. Therefore, the court held, the City did not
have to comply with the standards and procedures outlined in the local zoning ordinances for the granting of a CUP.
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The district court later granted the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, concluding
that "the law of the case established by the December 22,2003 order ... bar[red] any claim predicated on the theory
that the Settlement Agreement is a de facto CUP." The League thereafter amended its complaint against the City, which
the district court dismissed with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6}.
The League appealed. We remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of its ruling in light of Trancas
Property Owners Ass'n v. City 0/Malibu, 138 Cal. App. 4th 172, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200 (2006). In Trancas, the California
Court of Appeal invalidated a city's decision to settle a lawsuit by granting the functional [**7] equivalent of a zoning
variance without complying with statutory zoning procedures. Id. at 181-82. Having previously held that the Settlement
Agreement did not grant a de facto CUP, the district court found Trancas distinguishable and affirmed its earlier order.

n. Jurisdiction
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the League's constitutional claims under 28 U.s. C. § § 1331,
1343(a}, and over its state claims under 28
C. § 1367(a}. Furthermore, the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the Settlement Agreement for the purpose of issuing any order construing, modifYing, enforcing, terminating, or reinstating its terms. See Flanagan v. Arnaiz, 143 F.3d 540, 544-45 (9th Gir. 1998). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
§ 1291.

u.s.

u.s.c.

III. Standard ()f Review
[RN1] We review de novo the district court's dismissal of the League's claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6}._See
Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094,1097 (9th Cir. 2007). All facts alleged in the complaint are assumed true. Id.
IV. Discussion
[HN2] A federal consent decree or settlement agreement cannot be a means for state officials to evade state law.
See Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Gir. 1997) (holding [**8] that state officials "could not agree to terms
which would exceed their authority and supplant state law"); Perkins v. City 0/ Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212, 216 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("'Some rules oflaw are designed to limit the authority of public officeholders .... They may chafe at these
restraints and seek to evade them,' but they may not do so by agreeing to do something state law forbids. ") (internal citation and alteration omitted). [HN3] In California, a duly enacted local ordinance has the same binding force as a state
statute. See, e.g., Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bell, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1410, 1419, 1422, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749
(1997). We must therefore review the validity of the City's action under state law before examining any possible interaction with federal law.
A. The Settlement Agreement was not authorized by state law
[HN4J Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.08(A) limits the use of buildings or structures in an RI residential zone
primarily to one or two-family dwellings:
[HN5] A. Use. No building, structure or land shall be used and no building or structure shall be erected,
structurally altered, enlarged or maintained except for the following uses ....

[*1056] 6. Conditional uses enumerated in Sec. 12.24 when [**9] the location is approved pursuant to the provisions of said section.

[HN6] Among the conditional uses requiring approval are the operation of "ChurcheslHouses of worship." Los Angeles
Municipal Code § 12.24(T)(3)(b).
[HN7] The procedure for reviewing CUP applications requires an initial decision by the Zoning Administrator,
public notice, and a public hearing. Id. § 12.24(C), (D). Furthermore, the decision-maker must issue a series of factual
findings before granting a CUP. Id. § 12.24(E). Any aggrieved person may administratively appeal the decision of the
Zoning Administrator to the Planning Commission and, if stilI unsatisfied, to the City Council. Id. § 12.24(1).
[HN8) Municipalities may not waive or consent to a violation of their zoning laws, which are enacted for the benefit of the public. See Hansen Bros. Enters., Inc. v. Bd. o/Supervisors, 12 Cal. 4th 533, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 778,907 P.2d
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1324,1343 (Ca/. 1996); Trancas, 138 Cal. App. 4th at 181-82; see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3513. Any such agreement to
circumvent applicable zoning laws is invalid and unenforceable. See Smith v. City oJSan Francisco, 225 Cal. App. 3d
38,55,275 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1990).
The League contends that the Settlement Agreement did just that; it granted use permission to the Congregation
[**10] outside of the required statutory processes and, therefore, is void. The district court rejected this argument because it determined that the Settlement Agreement was not a CUP. It was created by agreement and its obligations did
not run with the land. Enforcement would not be accomplished through criminal law, but through contractual remedies.
Therefore, because the Settlement Agreement was something less than a traditional CUP, the procedures and standards
mandated by Los Angeles Municipal Code §§ 12.08, 12.24 were never triggered.
We disagree. The district court's analysis -- a comparison between a traditional CUP and the terms of the Settlement Agreement -- ignores the plain language of [HN9] Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.08: All "conditional use" is
forbidden in an Rl zone unless "approved pursuant to the provisions of [Section 12.24]." The question is not whether
the Congregation has been granted, in all respects, the de facto equivalent of a CUP. The question, rather, is whether,
within the framework ofthe City's zoning ordinance, the Congregation could engage in the uses permitted by the Settlement Agreement without first obtaining a CUP. Therefore, we need only ask whether the [** 1 1] Settlement Agreement grants the Congregation permission to engage in a "conditional use" as defined by the ordinance that is forbidden
in the absence of a valid CUP. If so, the statutory framework is triggered in full.
Here, the answer is evident. The Congregation sought, and the Settlement Agreement granted, permission to operate a synagogue on the Highland property. In an Rl zone, congregational worship is considered a "conditional use" under Section 12.24, and requires a permit. Before allowing such a use, the City was required to comply with the ordinance's procedural formalities. Because the City did not satisfy those formalities when it entered into the Settlement
Agreement, the Agreement is invalid and unenforceable under state law.
The California Court of Appeal's recent decision in Trancas confirms our conclusion. There, the City disapproved a
developer's tract maps and the developer filed suit. 138 Cal. App. 4th at 176-77. In order to settle the claims, the City
approved, in a closed session, a written agreement to rescind the disapproval [* 1057] and exempt the developer from
all present and future zoning density restrictions that would otherwise block the development. Id. at 178-79.
The [**12] Trancas court invalidated the agreement on two grounds.
First, it held the provision exempting the developer from all future density restrictions to be unlawfuI.ld. at 181.
[HNIO] "'Land use regulations ... involve the exercise of the state's police power, and it is settled that the government
may not contract away its right to exercise the police power in the future.''' Id. (quotingAvco Cmty. Developers, Inc. v.
S. Coast Reg'l Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 553 P.2d 546,556 (Cal. 1976)}.
Second, the court focused on another provision that exempted the developer from existing density limitations in the
zoning code. Id. at 181 (summarizing provision as an "agreement that the development need not comply with density
limitations different from the density set forth in the covenant"). The court held:
This contractual exemption from an element of the city's zoning is indistinguishable from the one condemned by Avco. Moreover, it functionally resembles a variance. Such [RNl 1] departures from standard
zoning, however, by law require administrative proceedings, including public hearings, followed by fmdings for which the instant density exemption might not qualify. Both the substantive qual(fications and
the procedural means [** 13] Jor a variance discharge public interests. Circumvention ojthem by contract is impermissible.

Id. at 182 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
Here, the Settlement Agreement violated both principles of Trancas. The City did bargain away its right to exercise
its police power over the Highland property so long as the Congregation is in existence. It is now contractually obligated to tolerate the conditional use approved in the Agreement and may not enforce Section 12.08 or any other zoning
ordinance to the extent that they deviate from the Agreement's provisions:
Moreover, in doing so, the City impermissibly circumvented the procedural and substantive limitations contained in
Los Angeles Municipal Code § 12.24. It granted the Congregation a right to use property in a residential neighborhood
for congregational worship without going through the necessary procedures and issuing the requisite factual findings.
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Finally, we reject any argument that the City may circumvent its zoning procedures by referencing its general authority to settle litigation under § 273(c) of the city charter. [HNI2] Section 273( c) generally empowers the city council
"to approve or reject settlement oflitigation that does [**14] not involve only the payment or receipt of money." This
provision does not purport to authorize contractual exemptions from zoning requirements. Trancas clearly holds that
such exemptions are illegal, and § 273(c) call11ot grant the City more authority than is permitted under California law.
See Elysian Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. City o/Los Angeles, 182 Cal. App. 3d 21, 40, 227 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1986)
("Local legislation in conflict with general law is void.") (citation and alteration omitted).
We hold that Settlement Agreement is invalid and unenforceable as a matter of California law.

B. There was no judicial determination that federal law had been or would be violated
Our inquiry is not yet complete. The City might not have to comply with the procedural and substantive limitations
set [*1058] forth in its zoning ordinances ifthere has been a violation offederal law or if compliance will result in
such a violation. Cj Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216 ("[RNI3] Once a court has found a federal constitutional or statutory violation, however, a state law cannot prevent a necessary remedy. ").
The district court validated the Settlement Agreement by referencing RLUlP A, 42 u.s. C. § 2000cc: "[The Settlement Agreement] was negotiated [**15] against the background not only of City zoning law, but federal law which
might or might not be held valid after long and expensive litigation." On this theory, the City had the right to settle the
Congregation's claim rather than litigate over RLUIPA's uncertain legal landscape.
This logic contains one critical flaw. By placing its imprimatur on the Settlement Agreement, the district court effectivelyauthorized the City to disregard its local ordinances in the name ofRLUIP A. Such judicial action is authorized
only when the federal law in question mandates the remedy contained in the settlement. See Keith, 118 F.3d at 1393
("Under the Constitution, the district court could not supersede California's law unless it conflicts with any federal
law. "). As summarized by the Seventh Circuit:
[HNI4] [U]pon properly supported findings that such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation 0/
/ederallaw, the district court can approve a consent decree which overrides state law provisions. Without
such fmdings, however, parties can only agree to that which they have the power to do outside of litigation.

Perkins, 47 F.3d at 216; see also Cleveland County Ass'n/or Gov't by the People v. Cleveland County Ed. o/Comm'rs,
330 U.S App. D.C 20, 142 F.3d 468, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Here, [** 16) the district court held that a potential violation of federal law allowed a settlement agreement authorizing the City to disregard its zoning regulations. This was incorrect. Before approving any settlement agreement that
authorizes a state or municipal entity to disregard its own statutes in the name of federal law, a district court must frod
that there has been or will be an actual violation of that federal law. 3
3 Even if such a finding is made, a district court would then have to consider the appropriateness of the agreedto remedy under federal law.
Such a fmding could not have been made in this case. While a district court would not be bound by the parties'
stipulation that a violation offederal law had occurred or would occur, the district court here was presented with a settlement agreement that specifically reiterated the City's denial of all of the allegations of the complaint, and disclaimed
any "admission ofliability ... under any federal, state, or local law, including [RLUIPA)."
Absent a finding that federal law was violated or would be violated, the district court could not approve a settlement agreement that authorized the City to disregard its own zoning ordinances. [** 17] Since no such finding was
made, the Settlement Agreement is invalid and unenforceable. 4
4 In light of this holding, we decline to reach any of the League's constitutional claims.

V. Conclusion

2 'f· 0'.
1l
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We reverse the district court's dismissal of the League's collateral attack on the Settlement Agreement and we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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Billboard company sought to hold county
in contempt and to enforce settlement agreement with county allowing billboard company
to maintain its existing billboards for ten
years. The Circuit Court, Montgomery
County, J. James McKenna, J., vacated settlement agreement. Appeal was taken. The
Court of Special Appeals reversed. After
writ of certiorari was granted, 101 Md.App.
731,101 Md.App. 734, the Court of Appeals,
Eldridge, J., held that: (1) order incorporating settlement agreement was final judgment
which ordinarily could not be revised in absence of fraud, mistake or irregularity; (2)
settlement agreement was not invalid attempt to obligate district council by advance
contract for particular zoning; (3) county
zoning regulations flatly prohibiting all billboards did not preclude enforcement of settlement agreement, absent compliance with
state statute requiring compensation for any
sign required to be removed by county; (4)
provisions of settlement agreement stating
that agreement would supersede conflicting
law and enlarging jurisdiction of sign review
board were unenforceable; and (5) county
could not rely on invalid provision of settlement agreement, which had been waived by
billboard company in order to excuse county's failure to perform its obligations under
agreement.
Judgment of Court of Special Appeals
vacated and remanded with directions.

irregularity, even if order did not provide
ruling on merits of underlying challenge to
validity of county's zoning regulations; settlement agreement ended case by granting
billboard company right to maintain its existing billboards for ten years after which county could fully implement its total ban against
billboards. Md.Rule 2-535(b).
2. Zoning and Planning <?;::::>131, 351
District council's zoning enactments under authority of Regional District Act are not
subject to approval or veto of county executive and, thus, do not constitute legislation
within meaning of State Constitution and
county charter; county council acts as administrative agency when it sits as district
council in zoning matters. Const. Art. ll-A,
§ 1 et seq.; Code 1957, Art. 28 § 8-101 et
seq.; Acts 1992, c. 643, § 1; Montgomery
County, Md., County Charter § 208.
3. Counties <?;::::>129
Municipal Corporations <?;::::>254
Counties and municipalities are normally
bound by their contracts to same extent as
private parties and, thus, are not afforded
defense of governmental immunity in contract actions against them.
4. Zoning and Planning <?;::::>4, 160
Local government.is generally prohibited from contracting away exercise of zoning
power or obligating itself by advance contract to provide particular zoning.
5. Zoning and Planning <?;::::>81
Settlement agreement between county
and billboard company, allowing billboard
company to maintain its existing billboards
for ten years after which county would be
able to fully implement total zoning ban
against billboards, was not invalid attempt to
obligate district council by advance contract
for particular zoning; agreement contemplated no action whatsoever by district council.

1. Judgment <?;::::>301

Order incorporating settlement agreement between county and billboard company
was final judgment which ordinarily could
not be revised in absence of fraud, mistake or

6. Public Contracts <?;::::>14
As general matter, executive discretion
in enforcement and execution of laws can be
limited by contract.
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7. Counties e=>126
County government executive branch's
entry into contract, in carrying out laws and
functions of government, is exercise of executive discretion and, thus, requirement that
government adhere to that exercise of discretion by being held to its contract ordinarily
does not constitute unlawful interference
with executive discretion.
8. Counties e=>124(I)
Settlement agreement with county allowing billboard company to maintain its existing billboards for ten years was not rendered unenforceable as illegal contract by
existence of county zoning ordinance flatly
prohibiting all billboards, in light of unenforceability of ordinance absent any offer by
county to compensate billboard company in
compliance with state statute expressly requiring payment of fair market value for any
outdoor advertising required to be removed
by county. Code 1957, Art. 25, § 122E(b);
Montgomery County, Md., Code § 59-F1.65.
9. Compromise and Settlement e=>9
Provision of settlement agreement between county and billboard company stating
that agreement would supersede conflicting
law was contrary to law and unenforceable.
10. Compromise and Settlement e::>9
Provision of settlement agreement between county and billboard company allowing
billboard company to appeal denial of billboard relocation request to county sign review board was invalid attempt to enlarge
subject matter jurisdiction of board by contract. Montgomery County, Md., Ordinance
§

~1l5.

11. Compromise and Settlement e::>20(1)
Billboard company waived any contractual entitlement under invalid provision of
settlement agreement between county and
billboard company, providing for appeal to
county sign review board for denial of request to relocate billboard, and thus, county
could not rely on invalid provision to excuse
county's failure to perform its obligations
under settlement agreement.

Frank E. Couper, Senior Assistant County
Attorney, (Marc P. Hansen, Acting County
Attorney; Alan M. Wright, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, on brief), Rockville, for
Petitioners.
Walter E. Diercks (Damn N. Sacks, Eric
M. Rubin, Rubin, Winston, Diercks, Harris &
Cooke, on brief), Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Argued before ELDRIDGE,
RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, KARWACKI,
BELL and RAKER, JJ.
ELDRIDGE, Judge.
The issue in this case is whether Montgomery County is bound by the provisions of
a settlement agreement incorporated in a
circuit court judgment. The agreement, ending sixteen years of litigation between the
County and the owner of a billboard company, granted to the owner the right to maintain its billboards within the County for a
period of ten years, despite a County zoning
regulation prohibiting all billboards. Montgomery County contends that the agreement
was void from its inception because it impermissibly undermined legislative and executive discretion in the enactment and enforcement of the County's zoning regulations.
1.
In 1968, the Montgomery County Council,
sitting as a district council, amended its zoning regulations concerning outdqor signs and
billboards. The new regulatory language
governed the placement, height and width of
billboards within the County. The 1968 regulations provided that any existing billboards
not conforming with the new standards were
required to be removed at the end of a
period of two years from the effective date of
the regulations or four years from the date
the billboards were erected, whichever occurred later. After the expirations of the
time periods provided for in the regulations,
controversies arose between Montgomery
County and Rollins Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., over billboards owned by Rollins.
Montgomery County contended that the billboards did not comply with the standards set
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E, Judge.
in this case is whether Montty is bound by the provisions of
agreement incorporated in a
.udgment. The agreement, endyears of litigation between the
:.he owner of a billboard compato the owner the right to mainlOards within the County for a
I years, despite a County zoning
rohibiting all billboards. Montnty contends that the agreement
m its inception because it imperjermined legislative and execu)n in the enactment and enforceCounty's zoning regulations.
1.
the Montgomery County Council,
district council, amended its zonons concerning outdoor signs and
The new reglllatory language
:e placement, height and width of
rithin the County. The 1968 regvided that any existing billboards
ing with the new standards were
be removed at the end of a
o years from the effective date of
ons or four years from the date
ds were erected, whichever ocMter the expirations of the
; provided for in the regulations,
s arose between Montgomery
I Rollins Outdoor Advertising,
billboards owned by Rollins.
r County contended that the billlot comply with the standards set

forth in the 1968 regulations and that they
should be removed.
In 1974, Rollins filed an action against
Montgomery County, the County Executive
and the Council,l in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, challenging the validity
of the 1968 billboard regulations and seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief.2 The bill of
complaint alleged that Rollins, which operated and maintained billboards in Montgomery
County, had been denied permission to erect
a new billboard and that the denial was
"based upon the discriminatory setback provisions" of the 1968 regulations.s The bill of
complaint also alleged that Rollins had been
ordered, without an offer of just compensation, to remove numerous existing billboards
which did not conform to the location specifications set forth in the 1968 regulations.
Rollins asserted that Montgomery County's enactment and enforcement of the 1968
regulations violated Articles 17 and 24 of the

Maryland Declaration of Rights,4 as well as
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Specifically, Rollins
maintained that the billboard regulations
constituted prohibited retrospective legislation, that they violated "substantive" due
process and equal protection principles, and
that they deprived Rollins of property without just compensation.
In 1986, while the above-described litigation was still pending, the district council
amended the zoning regulations to prohibit
all billboards within the County.a Neither
the 1986 amendment, nor the 1968 regulations, provided for compensation to the owners of billboards. Rollins amended its bill of
complaint, adding contentions that the County's ban on billboards violated state statutes
mandating just compensation when a governmental subdivision requires the removal of
billboards, as well as Article III, § 40, of the
Maryland Constitution.6 Rollins also mainAt the time Rollins's bill of complaint was filed in
1974. the present Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights had been numbered Article 23. We shall
use the current numbering.

I. Hereinafter. the defendants will be referred to
collectively as "Montgomery County." or simply
as "the County."
2. After the suit was filed in 1974. Rollins was
sold to Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc .. which
was later sold to Revere National Corporation.
Revere, the named party in the present proceeding. is the successor-in-interest to Rollins and
Reagan.

5.

"Commercial signs or structures that advertise
products or businesses not connected with the
site or building on which they are located are
prohibited. "

3. The setback provisions stated:
"No billboard shall be closer than one hundred
(IOO) feet to any property line nor located

closer than six hundred sixty (660) feet to the
right-of-way line of any highway which is part
of the interstate highway system, nor closer
than two hundred (200) feet to the right-of-way
line of any other street or road."
4. Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights states:
"That retrospective Laws. punishing acts
committed before the existence of such Laws,
and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty;
wherefore. no ex post facto Law ought to be
made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction
be imposed, or required.
Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights states:
"That no man ought to be taken 01' imprisoned or disseized of his freehold. liberties or
privileges, or outlawed, or exiled. or, in any
manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his
peers. or by the Law of the land."
II

Section 59-F-~_65 of the Montgomery County
code. as adopted by the district council in 1986.
stated:

6_

Rollins relied on Maryland Code (1957. 1994
RepLVoL), Art. 25. § 122E, which states as follows:
"§ 122E.

Compensation for removed outdoor advertising sign.
"(a)(1) In this section the following words
have the meanings indicated.
(2)0) 'Fair market value' means a value. determined by a schedule adopted by the Department of Transportation. that includes the value
of integral parts of an outdoor advertising sign.
less depreciation.
(ii) 'Fair market value' does not include a
value for loss of revenue.
(3)(i) 'Outdoor advertising sign' means an
off-premises outdoor sign:
1. Commercially owned and maintained;
and
2. Used to advertise goods or services for
sale in a location other than that on which the
sign is placed.
(ii) 'Outdoor advertising sign' includes signs
composed of painted bulletin or poster panel,
and usually referred to as billboards.
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tained that Montgomery County's regulations violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution by denying just compensation to Rollins
and violated the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution by restricting
Rollins's ability to disseminate speech.
In April 1990, sixteen years after the filing
of the original bill of complaint, Rollins's
successor-in-interest, Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., entered into a written settlement agreement with Montgomery County.
In addition to being signed by the county
attorney and county and Reagan officials, the
agreement was signed by the trial judge
below the words, "SO ORDERED." The
circuit court's docket entry for April 11, 1990,
reads as follows: "Stipulated Consent Agreement (McKenna, J.) Granted .... "

er party shall be entitled to seek an orde
the Court to enforce the Agreement.,

In March 1992, Revere National COrpl
tion, the successor-in-interest to Rea!
sought the County's permission to conso
a replacement billboard pursuant to the I
visions of the settlement agreement.
request was denied in May 1992 becaL
according to the County, the settlem
agreement entered into by the parties v
"void ab initio," and Revere was requesti
"to build a prohibited sign," whereas t
county regulations banned all billboards.

Upon the County's denial of its reque
Revere filed in the Circuit Court for MOl
gomery County a "Motion to Adjudicate D
fendants In Contempt of Court and For l
Order to Enforce Stipulated Consent Agre
ment." After setting forth the pertine
facts, Revere's Motion asserted that the d
fendants "have violated the April 11, 19
Order of this Court." Revere sought to ha
the defendants adjudicated in contemp
sought an order requiring the defendants
comply with the settlement agreeme
''which was entered as an order of the [c
cuit] Court," and requested compensato
damages.

The settlement agreement permitted Reagan to continue "maintain[ing) within the
County ... forty-seven [billboards)" for a
period of ten years. Reagan could replace
and relocate billboards to a new location if
either U(i) a lease for the premises on which a
sign is located is not to be continued, or (ii)
an outdoor advertising structure has been
destroyed or has deteriorated to the point
that it is no longer in a safe condition."
Relocation of billboards was limited to not
"more than five signs within any calendar
year," with Reagan having the sole discretion
as to which signs were to be relocated. The
agreement placed certain restrictions on
where billboards could be relocated but stated that "in no event shall the County utilize
procedures or fees to impair Reagan from
exercising its rights under this Agreement."
In the contract, the parties expressly agreed
upon the "dismissal of any and all pending
litigation between the County and Reagan .... " Finally, the agreement stated that
"[i]n the event either party fails to perform
its obligations under this Agreement the oth-

In response, the County filed a "Motion T
Vacate The Stipulated Consent Agreement
April 11, 1990," as embodied in the cour
order. The County asserted that the settl
ment agreement "is void ab initio because
purports to permit what the Montgome
County Zoning Ordinance prohibits, name
the existence of 47 billboards in Montgome
County." The County went on to state th
it "has no authority to make such an agre
ment or to consent to a court order whic
violates the Zoning Ordinance's prohibitio
on billboards .... " The County requeste
the court to find that the settlement agre
ment "is void ab initio and order that it h

(b) A county or municipality shall pay the
fair market value of an outdoor advertising
sign, removed or required to be removed by
the county or municipality, that was lawfully
erected and maintained under any State, county, or municipal law or ordinance."
Rollins also relied on Maryland Code (J 977,
1993 RepI.Vol.), § 8-737 of the Transportation
Article, which also prohibits a governmental subdivision from requiring the removal of a bill-

board contiguous to a federal aid primary hig
way without paying just compensation.
Article III, § 40, of the Maryland Constitutio
states:
"The General Assembly shall enact no La
authorizing private property, to be taken f
public use, without just compensation,
agreed upon between the parties, or award
by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to th
party entitled to such compensation."
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aty shall be entitled to seek an order of
Court to enforce the Agreement .... "

vacated." The County filed a separate answer to Revere's motion, also asserting, inter
alia, that the settlement agreement was void.

March 1992, Revere National Corporathe successor-in-interest to Reagan,
ht the County's permission to construct
Jlacement billboard pursuant to the prons of the settlement agreement. The
,est was denied in May 1992 because,
rding to the County, the settlement
!ement entered into by the parties was
d ab initio," and Revere was requesting
build a prohibited sign," whereas the
lty regulations banned all billboards.
"pon the County's denial of its request,
'ere filed in the Circuit Court for Montlery County a "Motion to Adjudicate Dejants In Contempt of Court and For An
ler to Enforce Stipulated Consent Agreent." After setting forth the pertinent
;;s, Revere's Motion asserted that the dedants "have violated the April 11, 1990
ier of this Court." Revere sought to have
, defendants adjudicated in contempt,
Ight an order requiring the defendants to
nply with the settlement agreement
hich was entered as an order of the [cirttl Court,"" and requested compensatory
mages.
In response, the County filed a "Motion To
Lcate The Stipulated Consent Agreement of
Jril 11, 1990," as embodied in the court's
der. The County asserted that the settleent agreement "is void ab initio because it
trports to permit what the Montgomery
IUnty Zoning iliainance prohibits, namely
E! existence of 47 billboards in Montgomery
mnty." The County went on to state that
"has no authority to make such an agreemt or to consent to a court order which
Ilates the Zoning Ordinance's prohibition
billboards .... " The County requested
~ court to find that the settlement agreemt "is void ab initio and order that it be
>oard contiguous to a federal aid primary high·
,ay without paying just compensation.
Article III, § 40, of the Maryland Constitution
tates:
"The General Assembly shall enact no Law
authorizing private property, to be taken for
public use, without just compensation, as
agreed upon between the parties, or awarded
by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the
party entitled to such compensation."
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The circuit court, after a hearing, denied
the County's motion to vacate the settlement
agreement and, without ruling on Revere's
motion, stated that the denial of the County's
motion to vacate the settlement agreement,
as embodied in the 1990 court order, was
final and appealable. Montgomery County
then noted an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals. In Apri11993, the Court of Special
Appeals, in an unreported opinion, dismissed
the appeal on the ground that the appeal was
premature because the trial court had not yet
ruled on the pending motions from Revere
and thus a final judgment did not exist. See
Maryland Rule 2-602(a).
After receiving additional memoranda and
holding another hearing, the circuit court on
November 18, 1993, entered an order granting the County's motion to vacate the settlement agreement and denying Revere's motion to enforce the agreement and to hold the
defendants in contempt. The circuit court
expressed the view that the April 11, 1990,
order approving the settlement agreement
was not a final judgment terminating the
action brought by Revere's predecessor in
1974, and that, therefore, the April 1990 order remained subject to revision at anytime
under Maryland Rule 2-602(a). 7 The circuit
court further held that the settlement agreement and April 1990 order should be vacated
because Montgomery County had no power
to enter into an agreement contrary to its
zoning regulations.
Revere appealed, and the Court of Special
Appeals reversed the circuit court's order in
another unreported opinion. The Court of
Special Appeals held that the settlement
a~e~ment, as embodied in the April 1990
Clrcmt court order, constituted a final judg7.

Rule 2-602(a) states as follows:
. "(a) GeneraJly.-Except as provided in sec·
~on. ~) of this Rule, an order or other form of
£ eCISIon, however designated, that adjudicates
ewer than all of the claims in an action
(whether raised by original claim, counter·
claIm, cross-claim or third-party claim) or that
ad~udicates less than an entire claim,' or that
adjudIcates the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties to the action:

ment terminating the action instituted by
Revere's predecessor in 1974. The intermediate appellate court further held that Montgomery County had not shown any valid
basis to set aside the 1990 judgment. The
Court of Special Appeals explained:
"[Montgomery County] maintains that it
had no ability to agree to the terms contained in the agreement because the County Executive and executive branch officials
who are obligated to enforce the Zoning
Ordinance cannot implement an agreement
that violates the Zoning Ordinance. We
shall not address that contention, however;
it is of no consequence in this case.
''When an agreement is incorporated
into an enrolled decree, an attack may not
be made upon the agreement without simultaneously challenging the validity of
the decree.... Inasmuch as the Stipulated Consent Agreement was incorporated into the court's judgment, appellee's
attack in the lower court was upon an
enrolled decree. To set aside an enrolled
decree, it is necessary to demonstrate
fraud, mistake or irregularity. Maryland
Rule 2-535.

*

*
*
*
"In summary, since the order vacated
was a final, enrolled judgment, the court
erred in vacating it, absent fraud, mistake,
or irregularity, on the grounds that the
agreement incorporated therein was void
ab initio because one of the parties had no
authority to enter into it." .

*

*

Montgomery County filed in this Court a
petition for a writ of certiorari which we
granted. Montgomery County v. Revere National Corp., 336 Md. 705, 650 A.2d 295
(1994). Montgomery County argues that the
Court of Special Appeals erred in holding
that the April 11, 1990, order constituted a
final judgment. The County asserts that the
(1) is not a final judgment;

(2) does not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or any of the parties; and
(3) is subject to revision at any time before
the entry of a judgment that adjudicates all
of the claims by and against all of the par
ties."
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April 1990 order did not dispose of all the
underlying issues in the case, was therefore
not fInal, and is subject to revision at any
time pursuant to Rille 2-{)02(a)(3). Alternatively, Montgomery County contends that if
the April 1990 order was a final judgment,
the judgment can still be set aside because
ultra vires acts of a county or municipality,
even if embodied in a final court judgment,
are "void." Finally, the County argues that
the settlement agreement, as incorporated in
the April 1990 order, exceeds the authority of
Montgomery County because it violates the
County's zoning regulation that prohibits all
billboards. Thus, according to the County,
the circuit court did not err in vacating the
1990 order.
Revere, on the other hand, asserts that the
Court of Special Appeals correctly held that
the April 1990 order was a final judgment.
Moreover, because the April 1990 order was
a final judgment, Revere contends that the
circuit court was prohibited from revising the
judgment absent fraud, mistake, or irregularity, and that there was no fraud, mistake or
irregularity in the present case. See Rille 2535. Finally, Revere argues that the County
did not exceed its authority in entering into
the settlement agreement.

II.
We shall fIrst address the issue of whether
the April 1990 order constituted a final judgment. If the April 1990 order was not a fInal
judgment, it "is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of a [fInal) judgment .... " Rille 2-{)02(a)(3). If the April
1990 order was a final judgment, however, it
would ordinarily be subject to revision only
during a thirty-day period after the entry of
8.

Maryland Rule 2-535 provides as follows:
"REVISORY POWER
(a) Generally.-On motion of any party
within 30 days after entry of judgment, the
court may exercise revisory power and control
over the judgment and, if the action was tried
before the court, may take any action that it
could have taken under Rule 2-534.
(b) Fraud. Mistake. Irregularity.-On motion of any party filed at any time, the court
may exercise revisory power and control over
the judgment in case of fraud, mistake or irregularity.
(c) Newly Discovered Evidence.-On motion
of any party filed within 30 days after entry of

the order on April 11, 1990. Rule 2-535(a).
After the thirty-day period, Rille 2-535(b)
authorizes revision of a judgment only "in
case of fraud, mistake or irregularity." S
The County maintains that the settlement
as incorporated in the April 1990
court order, "did not resolve any of the constitutional or statutory issues raised in the
Amended complaint" and "granted none of
the relief prayed for." (County's brief in this
Court at 33-34). For this reason, according
to the County, the April 1990 order was not
final. A similar argument was recently rejected by this Court in Horsey v. Horsey, 329
Md. 392, 401-402, 620 A.2d 305, 310 (1993),
where we stated:
agr~ement,

"Contrary to the view expressed by the
defendant ... in this case, a trial court's
order sometimes may constitute a fInal
appealable judgment even though the order fails to settle the underlying dispute
between the parties. Where a trial court's
order has 'the effect of putting the parties
out of court, [it] is a final appealable order.' Houghton v. County Comm'rs. of
Kent Co., 305 Md. 407,412,504 A,2d 1145,
1148 (1986), and cases there cited. See,
e.g., Wilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 85, 548
A.2d 837, 839 (1988) ('An order of a circuit
court ... [may bel a final judgment without any adjudication by the circuit court on
the merits'); Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md.
272, 275, 533 A,2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1987)
(trial court's order 'terminating the litigation in that court' was a fInal j~dgment);
Walbert v. Walbert, 310 Md. 657, 661, 531
A.2d 291, 293 (1987) (circuit court's unqualified order was a final judgment because it
'put Denise Walbert out of court, denying
judgment, the court may grant a new trial on
the ground of newly-discovered evidence that
could not have been discovered by due diligence in time to move for a new trial pursuant
to Rule 2-533.
(d) Clerical Mistakes.-Clerical mistakes in
judgments, orders, or other parts of the record
may be corrected by the court at any time on
its own initiative, or on motion of any party
after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be .so corrected before the appeal is
docketed by the appellate court, and thereafter
with leave of the appellate court."
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on April 11, 1990. Rule 2-535(a).
thirty-day period, Rule 2-535(b)
revision of a judgment only "in
ud, mistake or irregularity." 8
lllty maintains that the settlement
;, as incorporated in the April 1990
!r, "did not resolve any of the conor statutory issues raised in the
complaint" and "granted none of
prayed for." (County's brief in this
~4). For this reason, according
unty, the April 1990 order was not
similar argument was recently rethis Court in Horsey v. Horsey, 329
401-402, 620 A.2d 305, 310 (1993),
stated:

trary to the view expressed by the
mt .,. in this case, a trial court's
sometimes may constitute a final
tble judgment even though the orIs to settle the underlying dispute
n the parties. Where a trial court's
las 'the effect of putting the parties
court, [it] is a final appealable orHoughton v. County Comm'rs. of
'0., 305 Md. 407, 412, 504 A.2d 1145,
(986), and cases there cited. See,
ilde v. Swanson, 314 Md. 80, 85, 548
~7, 839 (1988) ('An order of a circuit
.. [may bel a final judgment with1 adjudication by the circuit court on
rits'); Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md.
75, 533 A.2d 1300, 1301-1302 (1987)
:ourt's order 'terminating the litigathat court' waS;: a final judgment);
t v. Walbert, 310 Md. 657, 661, 531
11,293 (1987) (circuit court's unqualder was a final judgment because it
mise Walbert out of court, denying
ent, the court may grant a new trial on
ound of newly-discovered evidence that
not have been discovered by due diliin time to move for a new trial pursuant
, 2-533.
:Ierical Mistakes.-Clerical mistakes in
,nts, orders, or other parts of the record
, corrected by the court at any time on
I initiative, or on motion of any party
lch notice, if any, as the court orders.
the pendency of an appeal, such mislay be so corrected before the appeal is
,d by the appellate court, and thereafter
Ive of the appellate court."

I

her the means of further prosecuting the a ten-year period. Although the County did
case at the triallevel'); Houghton v. Coun- not receive a judicial ruling on the validity of
ty Com'rs of Kent Co., 307 Md. 216, 221, the regulations, nevertheless tlJe County did
513 A.2d 291, 293 (1986); Concannon v. not have to pay compensation, was able to
State Roads Comm., 230 Md. 118, 125, 186 limit the billboard company to 47 billboards,
A.2d 220, 224-225 (1962), and cases there and could fully implement the ban on the
company's billboards after the ten-year pericited."
See also M oare v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 432, od. The settlement agreement was a typical
620 A2d 323, 325 (1993) (dismissal without compromise with respect to the claims, isprejudice, although not an "adjudication on sues, and positions of the parties. The billthe merits," was a final and appealable judg- board company gave up its claims for relief
against Montgomery County in return for
ment).
what
it received under tlJe agreement.
[1] Thus, an order entered on the docket
pursuant to Rule 2--601, and having the effect
Therefore, we agree with tlJe Court of
of terminating the case in the circuit court, is Special Appeals that the April 11, 1990, order
a final judgment. Montgomery County's po- was a final judgment. Moreover, we agree
sition, that all of the issues and claims in a witlJ the Court of Special Appeals that there
case must be resolved on the merits in order was no fraud, mistake or irregularity, within
that there be a final judgment, would under- tlJe meaning of Rule 2--535(b), so as to authomine the effectiveness of settlement agree- rize revision of the judgment under that rule.
ments as a mechanism for ending' litigation. See, e.g., Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md.
It is clear that, upon the entry of the 303, 315--318, 648 A.2d 439, 445-446 (1994);
settlement agreement as an order of the Autobahn Motors v. Mayor & City Council
court on April 11, 1990, the case begun by of Baltimore, 321 Md. 558, 583 A.2d 731
Revere's predecessor in 1974 was over. The (1991); Hamilos v. Hamilos, 297 Md. 99,465
settlement agreement, which comprises the A.2d 445 (1983); Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273
substance of the April 1990 order, discloses Md. 628, 331 A.2d 291 (1975); Schwartz v.
that the parties intended to terminate over Merchants Mort. Co., 272 Md. 305, 322 A.2d
sixteen years of litigation. There was noth- 544 (1974); Household Finance Corp. v. Taying further for the court to resolve after the lor, 254 Md. 349, 254 A.2d 687 (1969), and
agreement was executed and entered as an cases tlJere cited .
order. Section 4(a) of the agreement specifies that, "[iln consideration of the AgreeIII.
ment reached herein, Reagan and the County
Montgomery County contends tlJat, even if
hereby release each other from any claims or
the
April 11, 1990, order was a final judgobligations which arise from the complaint in
ment,
the County exceeded its legal authority
the above-captioned matter." Section 5(a) of
the agreement states tlJat agreement be- in entering into the settlement agreement
comes effective "upon execution ... and in- and tlJat this is a valid basis for vacating the
corporation of th[e] Agreement into a final judgment. The County argues that a final
judgment .... " The parties agreed to the judgment is not binding or preclusive, and is
"dismissal of any and all pending litigation subject to collateral challenge, when a county
or municipality exceeds its legal authority in
between the County and Reagan."
entering
into a settlement agreement that is
Moreover, in a real sense the agreement
did dispose of the claims and issues raised by incorporated in a final judgment.
the parties. In lieu of the relief which it
sought in the litigation, namely having the
challenged zoning regulations invalidated under state statutes and/or on constitutional
grounds and receiving compensation or dama?es, the billboard company received tlJe
nght to maintain its 47 existing billboards for

The cases have recognized certain unusual
and narrowly linIited situations when final
judgments based on consent of the parties,
altlJough not subject to revision under rules
like Maryland Rule 2-535, have been deemed
non-preclusive or subject to collateral attack.
See, e.g., Green v. Sollenberger, 338 Md. 118,
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131, 656 A.2d 773, 779 (1995) (final adoption
decree, not authorized by adoption statutes,
is subject to collateral attack and voidable);
Varsity Amusement Company v. Butters,
155 Colo. 330, 339, 394 P.2d 603, 607 (1964)
("a judgment entered by agreement or consent does not have a [res judicata] effect
where to give that effect would render impotent another important public policy"); Blazek v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 562, 565, 441
N.W.2d 205, 207 (1989) ("Except where an
important public policy would be violated,
judgments entered by agreement or consent
are generally given a conclusive effect and
are res judicata.")
The leading case in this area appears to be
Kelley v. Town of Milan, 127 U.S. 139, 8
S.Ct. 1101, 32 L.Ed. 77 (1888). There, earlier litigation between the Town and holders of
the Town's bonds had been-terminated when
the Town's officials consented to a decree
adjudging the bonds to be valid obligations of
the Town. In a subsequent lawsuit between
the Town and the bondholders, the Supreme
Court concluded that the Town was not
bound by the earlier judgment. The Court
held that, because the Town lacked authority
under the laws of Tennessee to issue the
bonds, the Town officials had no right to bind
the Town by a settlement agreement incorporated in a final judgment. The Supreme
Court explained (127 U.S. at 159, 8 S.Ct. at
1111, 32 L.Ed. at 85):
"The declaration of the validity of the
bonds, contained in the decree, was made
solely in pursuance of the consent to that
effect contained in the agreement signed
by the (parties]. The act of the Mayor in
signing that agreement could give no validity to the bonds, if they had none at the
time the agreement was made. The want
of authority to issue them extended to a
want of authority to declare them valid.
The Mayor had no such authority. The
decree of the court was based solely upon
the declaration of the Mayor, in the agreement, that the bonds were valid ....
"The adjudication in the decree cannot,
under the circumstances, be set up as a
judicial detennination of the validity of the
bonds. . . . This was not the case of a
submission to the court of a question for

its decision on the merits, but it was
consent in advance to a particular decisi4
... [which] gave life to invalid bonds ...
Consequently, under the KeUey principle, tl
act of placing a settlement agreement mac
by a local government in the fonn of a cOUl
judgment, in an effort to give it the force an
effect of a final judgment, will not cure th
lack of fundamental power in the governmen
tal entity to make the agreement.
The cases, in considering whether loca
governments are bound by final consen1
judgments reflecting agreements which thE
governments had no authority to make, hav
generally reached the same conclusion a
Kelley v. Terum of Milan, supra, although the
courts have used various approaches and rea
sons. Several cases rely on public policy
See, e.g., Blazek v. City of Omaha, supra, 232
Neb. at 565,441 N.W.2d at 207. One cour
has viewed a final judgment embodying a
governmental settlement agreement as "con
structive fraud" when the officials entering
into the agreement lack the authority to bind
the municipality as to matters contained
therein. See, Connor v. Morse, 303 Mass. 42
47-48, 20 N.E.2d 424, 426-427 (1939). An
other court has theorized that, since govern
mental officials are trustees of the municipa
entity, and thus represent the citizens of tha
entity, their lack of authority as to matters
agreed upon in a settlement agreement can
not be binding on their trustors, even i
incorporated in a final judgment. See, Union Bank v. Commissioners of Oxford, 119
N.C. 214, 226, 25 S.E. 966,969 (1896) ("when
parties act in a representative capacity, such
judgments do not bind the cestuis que trus
tent unless the trustees had authority to ac

... ").

A number of cases have simply stated tha
a municipality's lack of authority regarding
the matters stipulated in a settlement agree
ment incorporated in a final judgment is a
sufficient basis for either vacating a judg
ment or not applying the doctrine of res
judicata. See, e.g., State v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 134 Minn. 249,256, 158 N.W. 972
975 (1916) ("The parties could not accomplish
[pursuant to a consent judgment] what they
had absolutely no power to accomplish in any
manner ... "); Martin v. Territory, 5 Okla
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188 48 P. 106 (1897); Mellette County v.
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(1956) ("a consent judgment ill which offictals
rePresenting a county or other governmental
.
.
a ency assume obligations agamst It unau;orized by law is void"); Coolsaet v. City of
Veblen, 55 S.D. 485, 490, 226 N.W. 726, 729
(1929) ("consent decree was not beyond the
power of the city's officials and attorneys").
As explained by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in City of St. Paul V. Chicago, St.
P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 139 Minn. 322, 326, 166
NW. 335, 336-337 (1918),
"[a] judgment against a municipality, not
rendered as the judicial act of a court, but
entered pursuant to a stipulation of the
officers of the municipality, is of force and
effect only so far as such officers had
authority to bind the municipality. The
fact that by consent of the municipal officers an agreement or stipulation made by
them has been put in the form of a judgment, in an attempt to give it the force and
effect of a judgment does not cure a lack of
power in the officers to make it, and if
such power be lacking the judgment as
well as the stipulation is void."

A.

A~old, 76 S.D. 210, 214, 75 ~.W.~ 641, ~3

Regardless of the various theories employed, underlying these decisions is the recognition that the fundamental public policy of
a state may sometimes require that a final
consent judgment be vacated or not given
preclusive effect.
We need not in the present case, however,
explore or decide the scope and limits, under
Maryland law, of the principles discussed in
Kelley v. Town of Milan, supra, and the
other above-cited cases. We shall assume,
arguendo, that it would have been proper to
vacate the settlement agreement and judgment of April 11, 1990, if the agreement were
clearly ultra vires as contended by Montgomery County. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in Part IV below, we do not
agree that the substance of the agreement
was clearly ultra vires.
9.

Code (1957, 1995 RepI.Vol.), Art. 66B, relating
to zoning, is generally not applicable to chartered counties. See Art. 66B, § 7.03.

10. Legislation enacted by the County Council
pursuant to the Montgomery County Charter, the

Before addressing Montgomery Count;
argument that the April 1990 settleme
agreement exceeded the County's authori!
it would be useful to review certain gener
principles of Maryland law concerning zonir
in Montgomery County and contracts of loe:
governments.

Unlike most other home rule chartere
counties in Maryland which receive their ba
sic zoning authority from Article XI-A of th
Maryland Constitution, the Express Power
Act, Code (1957, 1994 Repl.Vol.), Art. 25A
§ 5(x), and their county charters, the exclu
sive source of Montgomery County's zonin
authority is the Regional District Act, Cod
(1957, 1993 Repl.Vol., 1995 Supp.), Art. 28
§ 8-101 et seq. See, e.g., Mossburg V. Mon
gomery County, Md., 329 Md. 494, 502-503
620 A.2d 886, 890 (1993); Chevy Chase Vie
v. Rothman, 323 Md. 674, 685, 594 A.2d 1131
1136 (1991). See also Narthampton v. Pr
George's Co., 273 Md. 93, 327 A.2d 774 (1974
Pro Gearge's CO. V. Md.-Nat'l Cap., 269 Md
202,306 A.2d 223, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068
94 S.Ct. 577, 38 L.Ed.2d 473 (1973).9

[2] The Regional District Act specifie
that the Montgomery County Council, sittin
as a district council, "may by ordinance adop
and amend the text of the zoning ordi
nance .... " Art. 28, § 8-101(b)(2). The Re
gional District Act sometimes refers to th
zoning enactments of a district council a
"ordinances," sometimes refers to them a
"regulations," and sometimes uses the phras
"ordinance regulations" (e.g., § 8-101(c»
The zoning enactments of the district counc
in Montgomery County are no longer subjec
to the approval or veto of the County Execu
tive, Ch. 643, § 1, of the Acts of 1992.1
Thus, the district council's zoning enactment
do not constitute legislation within the mean
ing of Article XI-A of the Maryland Consti
tution and the Montgomery County Charter

Express Powers Act, and Article Xl-A of th
Constitution, however, is subject to the Count
Executive's veto authority. See § 208 of th
Montgomery County Charter.

2::;0
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See Biggs v. Md.-Nat 'I Cap. P. & P.
Comm'n, 269 Md. 352, 354-355, 306 A.2d 220,
222 (1973) (zoning enactment of a district
council "was not subject to the Charter provisions respecting referendum and emergency
legislation"). Instead, "when it sits as the
District Council in a zoning matter the County Council is an 'administrative agency' .... "
Co. Council v. Carl M. Freeman Assoc., 281
Md. 70, 74, 376 A.2d 860, 862 (1977). See
also Mont. Co. v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280
Md. 686, 711, 376 A.2d 483, 497 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1067, 98 S.Ct. 1245, 55
L.Ed.2d 769 (1978); Mont. Co. v. Nat'l Capital Realty, 267 Md. 364, 376, 297 A.2d 675,
681 (1972); Hyson v. Montgomery County,
242 Md. 55, 67, 71-72, 217 A.2d 578, 585-586,
588 (1966).
[3J Turning to government contracts generally, under Maryland law counties and municipalities are normally bound by their contracts to the same extent as private entities.
See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. Baltimore County, 340 Md. 157, 665 A.2d 1029
(1995); American Structures v. City of Balto., 278 Md. 356, 364 A.2d 55 (1976). Thus,
Maryland law has never recognized the defense of governmental immunity in contract
actions against counties and municipalities.
Board v. Town of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384,
389, 578 A.2d 207, 210 (1990); Md.-Nat'l
Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618,
622, 521 A.2d 729, 731 (1987); American
Structures v. City of Balto., supra, 278 Md.
at 359-360, 364 A.2d at 57. This Court has
repeatedly held that, "as long as the execution of the contract [is] within the power of
the governmental unit," the local government
is answerable in damages for breaching that
contract. American Structures, 278 Md. at
359-360, 364 A.2d at 57, and cases there
cited. Under some circumstances, courts
have ordered that local governments specifically perform their contracts. See, e.g., Cohen v. Baltimore County, 229 Md. 519, 523525, 185 A,2d 185, 187-188 (1962); Bd. of Co.
Comm. v. MacPhai4 214 Md. 192, 199-200,
133 A.2d 96, 101 (1957).
B.

[4] There is a type of contract, particularly relevant to Montgomery County's argu-

ment in this case, which is ordinarily beyond
the authority of local government entities.
Local governments are generally prohibited
from "contracting away the exercise of zoning power," Attman v. Mayor, 314 Md. 675,
686, 552 A.2d 1277, 1283 (1989). "[TJhe zoning authority [cannot] obligate itself by advance contract to provide zoning," ibid.

Attman v. Mayor, supra, involved a controversy between a developer and the City
of Annapolis concerning a "conditional use
authorization" for an office building to be
constructed by the developer. Under the
Annapolis City Code, a "conditional use authorization" could only be issued by the city
council, composed of the mayor and aldermen. The developer was granted a conditional use by the city council and began
construction of the office building. Later,
the developer sought a modification of the
conditional use authorization which would
permit the basement of the building to be
used for purposes other than the housing of
mechanical equipment. The city council
granted the requested modification on the
condition that the developer provide certain
additional parking spaces. The developer,
claiming that these new parking requirements were "arbitrary, capricious, and impossible to fulfill," challenged the city council's action by filing a lawsuit in the circuit
court. Shortly before a scheduled circuit
court hearing, the parties reached an oral
agreement. Nevertheless, a dispute soon
arose concerning the terms of that oral
agreement. It was clear that both sides had
agreed to seek a continuance of the court
hearing and agreed that the developer
should file a new application with the city
council for a conditional use. The developer
contended that the city council had agreed
that it would grant the new application with
certain specified less onerous parking requirements. The city council, howeve~.
maintained that it simply had agreed to consider these parking requirements, but that it
did not purport to bind itself to grant the
application with the less onerous parking requirements. Thereafter, the city council rejected the developer's new application for a
conditional use authorization. The developer
filed, in the pending circuit court proceeding,
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a motion to enforce the oral agreement. Af- future." (County's brief in this Court at 13).
ter some further procedural skirmishes, the The County asserts that "[t]he principles
circuit court denied relief to the developer, stated by this Court in Attman ... apply
and this Court affirmed.
equally to this case." Ibid. According to the
This Court's opinion in Attman v. Mayor, County, the county government is powerless
314 Md. at 685-686, 552 A.2d at 1283, initially to "cede legislative authority ... over zoning
pointed out that the city council's grant of a matters that is specifically granted by state
conditional use authorization was similar to law and County Charter." (ld. at 14).
new zoning or rezoning for purposes of the
Preliminarily, to the extent that the Counprinciple that a government ordinarily cannot ty relies upon legislative authority pursuant
obligate itself by advance contract to provide to the Montgomery County Charter, the relia particular zoning. The Attman opinion, ance is misplaced. As previously discussed,
written by Judge McAuliffe for the Court, the provisions of the Montgomery County
went on to review our prior cases involving Charter granting legislative authority have
this principle, including those invalidating no application to zoning enactments of the
agreements and those upholding agreements district council.
relating to zoning. The Court reasoned that
it is only where "the zoning authority ...
[5] The County's reliance upon the Attobligate[s] itself by advance contract to pro- man opinion is also misplaced. The settlevide zoning" that the principle is applicable. ment agreement in this case did not obligate
314 Md. at 686,552 A.2d at 1283. The Court the district council to rezone or amend the
explained that, if such contracts were upheld, zoning regulations. In fact, unlike either
they would "render meaningless the pre- version of the oral contract involved in Attscribed zoning procedures" and would violate man, the written settlement agreement in
the requirement that the zoning authority the case at bar contemplated no action what"exercise its unconstrained independent soever by the district council. This was simjudgment in deciding matters of reclassifica- ply not a contract providing for any type of
tion ... [and] in deciding requests for special decision by the zoning authority.
exceptions, conditional uses, or variances."
314 Md. at 686-687, 552 A2d at 1283.
We concluded in Attman that, if the developer's version of the oral agreement was
correct, the agreement would be invalid as an
attempt to bind the city council in advance to
render a particular zoning decision. On the
other hand, the Court held that, if the terms
of the oral agreement were as contended for
by the city council, and if the agreement "did
not surrender or impair the right and obligation of the city council to independently
and impartially consider the application in
accordance with procedures established by
law," then the agreement would be valid.
314 Md. at 688-689, 552 A.2d at 1284.
In the case at bar, Montgomery County
principally relies upon the Attman opinion.
The County, citing Attman, argues that it
has no "legal authority to amend or repeal
provisions of the Zoning Ordinance or to
relinquish the District Council's authority under state law and County Charter over billboard zoning matters for 10 years in the

C.

Montgomery County also complains that
the settlement agreement limited executive
authority and discretion in the enforcement
of the County's laws. The County contends
that it may not, by contract, "relinquish the
County Executive's legal obligation to enforce the ... laws and ordinances of the
County." (County's brief in this Court at
13). The County asserts that no county contract "can cede ... executive enforcement
authority over zoning matters .... " (ld. at
14).

Of course, under certain circumstances and
in some contexts, an attempt by a government to linllit future executive discretion by
contract would be invalid. See, e.g., Frater-

nal Order of Police v. Baltimore County,
supra, 340 Md. at 169-171, 665 A.2d at 10341036, and cases there cited. For example, a
contract by a Governor purporting to limit
the Governor's constitutional authority and
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discretion in the future appointment of
judges would clearly be unenforceable.
[6J Nevertheless, as a general matter, executive discretion in the enforcement and
execution of the laws can be limited by contract. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v.
Baltimore County, 340 Md. at 168, 171, 665
A.2d at 1034-1036; Funger v. Mayor of Somerset, 249 Md. 311, 328, 239 A.2d 748, 757
(1968); Greenbelt v. Bresler, 248 Md. 210,
215-217, 236 A.2d 1, 4-5 (1967); Cohen v.
Baltimore County, supra, 229 Md. at 523525, 185 A.2d at 187-188; Bd. of Co. Comm
v. MacPhai~ supra, 214 Md. at 199-200, 133
A.2d at 101. In fact many, if not most,
government contracts limit to some extent
executive discretion in carrying out the laws
and functions of government. If future executive discretion could not lawfully be limited
by contract, a great many government contracts would be unenforceable. As pointed
out earlier, however, governments are generally bound by their contracts.
This Court's opinion in Bd. of Co. Comm.
v. MacPhai~ supra, 214 Md. 192, 133 A.2d

96, specifically rejected an argument by a
local government that a contract, entered
into by that government, was unenforceable
because it limited or interfered with executive discretion. The MacPhail case involved
a contract between the County Commissioners of Harford County 11 and Larry MacPhail, the owner of a large farm in Harford
County. Under the terms of the contract,
the County Commissioners agreed to grade
and pave a four-mile county public road
which ran to and through the farm. In
return, Mr. MacPhail agreed to forebear
from filing a threatened lawsuit against the
County, based on earlier alleged undertakings by the County Commissioners regarding
the road. Mter entering the contract, the
County Commissioners refused to perform,
arguing, inter alia, that the contract was
beyond their authority and interfered with
the future exercise of discretion by the county government. The circuit court rejected
this argument and issued an injunction re11. "County Commissioners, under Art. VII, § L
of the Maryland Constitution, largely 'act as administrators or in an executive capacity' .... "
Legislative Redistricting, 331 Md. 574, 621 n. 6,
629 A.2d 646, 670 n. 6 (1993), quoting City of

quiring the County Commissioners to pel
form the contract. This Court, in an opinio
by Judge Hammond, affirmed, stating (21·
Md. at 199-200, 133 A.2d at 101):

"The chancellor, noting that generally
court will not interfere with the discretio
of public officials and, so, ordinarily wi
not tell the County Commissioners wha
roads to select for improvement or how
improvements should be made, held that in
the case before him, '* * * the Commis
sioners exercised their discretion by agree
ing to improve the road under consider
ation.' He added: 'The purpose of thi
proceeding, therefore, is not to interfer
with the County Commissioners in the ex
ercise of their .discretion but to requir
them to perform and carry out any agree
ments which they made in the exercise o
their discretion. The Court is of the opin
ion that an injunction will lie under such
circumstances.' We concur. We think the
evidence warranted the action the chancel
lor took since the agreement he required
to be executed was sufficiently definite and
certain properly to be the subject of what
in effect, was specific perforniance, and
since the fixing of the amount of a judg
. ment for breach of contract would be al
most impossible and a judgment would no
be a duplicate or substantial equivalent o
the promised performance.... The de
cree merely directed the County Commis
sioners to construct the MacPhail road, as
they had agreed to do .... "

[7] Thus, as the MacPhail oplIllon ex
plains, when the executive branch of the
county government, in carrying out the laws
and functions of government, enters into a
contract, such action constitutes the exercise
of executive discretion. A requirement tha
the government adhere to that exercise o
discretion, and be held to its contract, ordi
narily does not constitute an unlawful inter
ference with future executive discretion.

Bowie v. County Comm'rs, 258 Md. 454. 461, 267
A.2d 172, 176 (1970). See also Boswell v. Prince
George's Co., 273 Md. 522, 533, 330 A.2d 663
669 (1975).
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, 176 (1970). See also Boswell v. Prince
Co., 273 Md. 522, 533, 330 A.2d 663,
i).

D.
Finally, Montgomery County argues that
implementation of the settlement agreement
would clearly be in violation of law because
the local zoning regulations flatly prohibit all .
billboards. Relying upon Hanna v. Bd. of
Ed. of Wicomico Co., 200 Md. 49, 53-58, 87
A.2d 846, 848-850 (1952), Montgomery County asserts that a "public contract must comply with law or be declared null and void,"
(County's brief in this Court at 16).
In determining whether implementation of
the settlement agreement would involve activity in violation of law, however, it is necessary to examine all of the applicable law
and not simply the district council's zoning
regulations. Although a particular activity
Inight be prohibited under local zoning regulations viewed in isolation, when all of the
applicable law is considered, including prevailing state or federal law, the local zoning
prohibition may be invalid or superseded.
See, e.g., Harrison v. Schwartz, 319 Md. 360,
572 A.2d 528, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851, 111
S.Ct. 143, 112 L.Ed.2d 110 (1990); People's
Counsel v. Maryland Manne, 316 Md. 491,
560 A.2d 32 (1989). See also Kirsch v.
Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 626
A.2d 372, cert. denied, U.S. - - , 114
S.Ct. 600, 126 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993); Md.Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Chadwick,
286 Md. 1, 405 A.2d 241 (1979). Local zoning ordinances, regulations or determinations frequently are unenforceable in light of
enactments by the General Assembly. See,
e.g., Mossburg v. Montgomery County, supra, 329 Md. 494, 620 A.2d 886; Chevy
Chase View v. Rothman, supra, 323 Md.
674, 594 A.2d 1131; West Mont. Ass'n v.
MNCP & P Com'n, 309 Md. 183, 196, 522
A.2d 1328, 1329 (1987) ("[Montgomery]
County enjoys no inherent power to zone or
rezone, and may exercise that power only to
the extent and in the manner directed by
the Legislature"); Crozier v. Co. Comm. Pro
12. Although § 122E was placed in the article of
th~ ~ode which primarily deals with county commISSIoners, it seems clear from the statutory reference to municipalities, as well as counties, that
§ 122E is not limited to county commissioner
counties. Moreover, § 122E is contained in a
two-section subtitle in Art. 25, entitled "Outdoor
~dvertising," and the other section in that subtit e relates exclusively to a single county which is

George's Co., 202 Md. 501, 506, 97 A.2d 296,
298 (1953).
[8] When all of the applicable law is considered, it is not at all clear that Revere's
contractual right under the settlement agreement to maintain its 47 billboards for ten
years was in violation of law. Rather, it is
Montgomery County's position in this case
which appears to be in violation of law. In
arriving at this conclusion, we need not reach
the federal and state constitutional provisions
invoked by Revere. Montgomery County's
argument entirely overlooks Code (1957,
1994 RepI.Vol.), Art. 25, § 122E(b), enacted
by the Maryland General Assembly in 1983.
This statute unequivocally mandates that "[a]
county or municipality shall pay the fair market value of an outdoor advertising sign,
removed or required to be removed by the
county or municipality .... " 12
Neither the district council's 1986 regulations prohibiting all billboards, nor any other
enactments by Montgomery County which
have been called to our attention, provide for
compensation to the owner of pre-existing
lawfully erected billboards. Insofar as the
record in this case discloses, Montgomery
County has never offered compensation to
Revere or its predecessors. Instead, prior to
the April 1990 settlement agreement, Montgomery County resisted the demands by Revere's predecessors for compensation.
The district council's regulations purporting to ban billboards must be considered in
conjunction with Art. 25, § 122E. As pointed out by this Court in Hanna V. Bd. of Ed.
of Wicomico Co., supra, 200 Md. at 57, 87
A.2d at 850, a case relied upon by Montgomery County, "no [government agency] ...
has the right to ignore or circumvent the
mandate of the Legislature."
Under
§ 122E, Montgomery County has no authority to ban pre-existing lawfully erected billa chartered county. The Court of Special Appeals, in Chesapeake v. City of Baltimore, 89
Md.App. 54, 64-67, 597 A.2d 503, 508-510
(1991), after reviewing the language and legislative history of the statute, held that "it is clear
that § 122E was intended to apply to all counties
as well as 'to all municipalities, including Baltimore City .... "

~:.ro~:thout pa~ng ::1f:::~::PO:::~2:~:::t oou", not penn;t

of the billboards. In light of § 122E and the
facts disclosed by the record in this case, the
trial court erred in holding that Revere's
right under the settlement agreement to
maintain 47 billboards for ten years was
clearly contrary to law. Considering all of
the applicable law and the circumstances, the
agreement allowing Revere to maintain its 47
pre-existing billboards for ten years appeared to be a reasonable, lawful compromise
and resolution of the dispute. .

E.
There are two provisions of the 1990 settlement agreement which, as Montgomery
County correctly argues, are in violation of
law. Both provisions, therefore, are unenforceable.
[9] The first of these provisions is a
clause in the settlement agreement which
recites that "[t]his Agreement ... shall supersede conflicting law." Of course, neither
government officials nor private parties may
validly contract to "supersede" applicable
law. A contractual provision which is contrary to law is invalid. See, e.g., Larimore v.
American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 552 A.2d
889 (1989); Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 528
A.2d 912 (1987); Maryland Cl. Emp. Ass'n v.
Anderson, 281 Md. 496, 508, 380 A.2d 1032
(1977), Hanna v. Bd. of Ed. of Wicomico Co.,
supra, 200 Md. at 53-54, 87 A.2d at 848
(1952).·
The second of these provisions grants to
the sign owner a remedy before an administrative agency known as the "Sign Review
Board." Montgomery County argues that
this provision is both invalid and non-severable. Consequently, according to the County,
the invalidity of this provision requires the
invalidation of the entire settlement agreement.
In a 1968 regulation adopted by the district council, referred to as "Ordinance No.
6-114," the district council created a "Sign
Review Board" with delineated jurisdiction
and powers. One limitation on the Board's
13. In fact, under the Regional District Act, Code
(1957, 1993 RepI.Vol.), Art. 28, § 8-11O(a), it
appears that the jurisdiction of the Sign Review

any

sign which was prohibited by the zoning
regulations. A section of the 1968 sign regulations adopted by the district council ("01'dinance No. 6-115"), captioned "Right of Appeal," provided for an appeal by the sign
owner to the Sign Review Board when an
application for a sign permit was denied by
county officials but "where a variance may
be permitted" under the regulations.
The 1990 settlement agreement specifically
authorized Revere to apply to the Sign Review Board when Revere believed that a sign
request should be granted under the terms
of the settlement agreement. Montgomery
County argues that, under the district council's zoning regulations, the Sign Review
Board's jurisdiction is limited to the situation
where a sign is permitted under a variance
and that the Board has no jurisdiction to
permit a prohibited billboard. Montgomery
County states that "[tJhe Stipulated Consent
Agreement purports to confer jurisdiction on
the Sign Review Board to permit or approve
billboards while the Zoning Ordinance prohibits such jurisdiction," (County's brief in
this Court at 20). The County asserts that
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency
is delineated by law and "cannot be enlarged
. .. by private agreements or by litigation
settlements between parties." (fd. at 21).

[10] We agree with Montgomery County
that the subject matter jurisdiction of an
administrative agency ordinarily cannot be
enlarged by agreement. See, e.g., Attorney
Griev. Comm'n v. Hyatt, 302 Md. 683, 690,
490 A.2d 1224, 1227 (1985). We further
agree with Montgomery County that the
1990 settlement agreement improperly purports to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Sign
Review Board,l3 We do not agree with
Montgomery County, however, that this one
provision renders invalid the entire settlement agreement.
[l1J The provisions in the sign regulations for an appeal by the sign owner to the
Sign Review Board, and the invalid clause in
the settlement agreement allowing Revere to
Board must be limited to the matter of special
exceptions and variances.
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seek a remedy from the Sign Review Board,
constitute an additional procedural remedy
for the benefit of the sign owner. Revere in
the present case did not attempt to avail
itself of the invalid procedural remedy. Revere ''waived'' any contractual entitlement
purportedly granted by the settlement agreement to appeal to the Sign Review Board. A
party to a contract ordinarily may waive a
contractual provision intended for its benefit.
If the party does so, the other party cannot
rely on the provision to escape liability under
the contract. The provision is treated as
severable under the circumstances. Twining
v. Nat'l Mortgage Corp., 268 Md. 549, 302
A.2d 604, 607 (1973). See also, e.g., University Nat'l Bank v. Wolfe, 279 Md. 512, 523,
369 A.2d 570, 576 (1977); Shoreham v. Randolph Hills, 248 Md. 267, 274-276, 235 A.2d
735,740-741 (1967).

mthority was that it could not permit any
ugn which was prohibited by the zoning
·egulations. A section of the 1968 sign regllations adopted by the district council ("Orlinance No. 6-115"), captioned "Right of Ap)eal," provided for an appeal by the sign
)wner to the Sign Review Board when an
lpplication for a sign permit was denied by
!ounty officials but "where a variance may
)e permitted" under the regulations.
The 1990 settlement agreement specifically
luthorized Revere to apply to the Sign Renew Board when Revere believed that a sign
request should be granted under the terms
)f the settlement agreement. Montgomery
County argues that, under the district council's zoning regulations, the Sign Review
Board's jurisdiction is limited to the situation
where a sign is permitted under a variance
and that the Board has no jurisdiction to
permit a prohibited billboard. Montgomery
County states that "[tJhe Stipulated Consent
Agreement purports to confer jurisdiction on
the Sign Review Board to permit or approve
billboards while the Zoning Ordinance prohibits such jurisdiction," (County's brief in
this Court at 20). The County asserts that
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency
is delineated by law and "cannot be enlarged
. .. by private agreements or by litigation
settlements between parties." (ld. at 21).
[10J We agree with Montgomery County
that the subject matter jurisdiction of an
!ldministrative agency ordinarily cannot be
~nlarged by agreement. See, e.g., Attorney
';riev. Comm'n v. Hyat~ 302 Md. 683, 690,
190 A2d 1224,'--1227(1985). We further
Lgree with Montgomery County that the
.990 settlement agreement improperly pur•orts to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Sign
~eview Board. 13 We do not agree with
iJ.ontgomery County, however, that this one
rovision renders invalid the entire settlelent agreement.
[11] The provisions in the sign regulaons for an appeal by the sign owner to the
19n Review Board, and the invalid clause in
Ie settlement agreement allowing Revere to
Board must be limited to the matter of special
exceptions and variances.

!

Consequently, the invalid provision in the
settlement agreement, giving the sign owner
a right to appeal to the Sign Review Board,
would not excuse Montgomery County's failure to perform its obligations under the
agreement.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND CASE
REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO
VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY
COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO
THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY MONTGOMERY COUNTY.
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Peter Donald HARLEY

v.
STATE of Maryland.
No. 160, Sept. Term, 1993.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Feb. 6, 1996.
Defendant was convicted in the CirCl
Court, Prince George's County, James I
Rea, J., of first-degree felony murder, BE
ond-degree murder, robbery with dead
weapon, attempted robbery with dead
weapon, and use of handgun in commission'
felony. Defendant appealed. The Court 4
Special Appeals remanded. Defendant file
pro se petition for writ of certiorari. T1l
Court of Appeals, 831 Md. 87, 626 A2d 371
denied relief. On remand, the Circuit CoUl
upheld state's use of peremptory challengel
Defendant appealed. After grant of certiorll
ri, 333 Md. 650, 636 A.2d 1027, the Court 0
Appeals held that prosecutor provided suffi
cient race-neutral reasons for exercise of per
emptory challenges against four African
American prospective jurors.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law ~1l58(3)
Trial judge's findings in evaluating Bai
son challenge are essentially factual and ac
corded great deference on appeal and, thm
trial judge's determinatiot\. as to sufficienc:
of reasons offered for peremptory strikes wi
not be reversed unless it is clearlyerroneoUl
U.S.C.A Const.Amend.14 .
2. Constitutional Law ~221( 4)
Jury ~33(5.15)
In determining whether reason offere
for peremptory strike is valid or satisfacto~
questions before trial judge are whether re~
son is pretext for purposeful discriminatio
and whether reason itself does not den
equal protection. U.S.C.A Const.Amend. l'
3. Jury ~33(5.15)
Prosecutor provided sufficient race-nel
tral reasons for exercise of peremptory cha
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Kevin Delray ROBINSON, Appellant,

Robert A Butterworth, Attorney Gener.
ai, and James W. Rogers, Assistant Attor. "
ney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1002-1142.
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
First District.
June 6, 2002.

PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. See Jones v. State, 791
So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
WOLF, VAN NORTWICK and
POLSTON, JJ., concur.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for
Alachua County. R.A. "Buzzy" Green,
Judge.
Appellant, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED. See Luckey v. State, 811
So.2d 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

3
MORGRAN COMPANY,
INC., Appellant,
v.

ORANGE COUNTY, Appellee.
No. 5D01-2621.

WOLF, VAN NORTWICK AND
POLSTON, JJ., concur.

Distlict Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fifth District.
June 7, 2002.

Real estate developer brought breach
of contract and promissory estoppel claim
against county arising out of developer's
2
attempt to develop 437 acres locate in
James POUGH, Appellant,
county into primary residential, mixed·use
land development. The Circuit Court.
v.
Orange County, Ted P. Coleman, J., disSTATE of Florida, Appellee.
missed complaint. Developer appealed.
The District Court of Appeal, Griffin. 3"
No. 1002-1145.
held that: (1) developer was not entitled to
N District Court of Appeal of Florida,
recover on breach of contract claim, and
(J1
First District.
(2) developer was entitled to amend to
attempt to seek some other remedy or
~
June 6, 2002.
plead some other cause of action after
An appeal from the Circuit Court for dismissal.
Duval County. Henry E. Davis, Judge.
Mfirrned in part; reversed in part;
and remanded.
Appellant, pro se.

Deborah L. Martohue and George L.
Hayes, III, of Hayes & Martohue, P.A., St.
Zoning and Planning <3:=>160
Real estate developer was not entitled Petersburg, for Appellant.
to recover on breach of contract claim
Gary M. Glassman, Vivien J. Monaco
brought against county arising out of de- and Marc Peltzrnan, Assistant County Atveloper'S attempt to develop 437 acres lo- torneys, Orlando, for Appellee.
cate in county into primary residential,
mixed-use land development, where conGRIFFIN, J.
tract was "contract zoning"; as part of

1. counties ~ 129

development agreement county had obli-

Morgran Company, Inc. ["Morgran"]
gation to "support" developer's request for sued Orange County for breach of contract
rezoning, and thus, if board of county com- and promissory estoppel and appeals the
missioners had contracted to support dedismissal of its complaint. Although we
I'cloper's request for rezoning, it had inaffirm, we write because Morgran convalidly contracted away its discretionary
tends the decision represents a misapplicalegislative power as final decisionmaking
tion of the law of contract zoning. This
authority. West's F.S.A. §§ 163.3220case may also serve as a cautionary tale
163.3243.
for anyone who enters into a contract with
2. Pretrial Procedure <3:=>695
Orange County.
Real estate developer that brought
Morgran is a developer of real estate.
promissory estoppel claim against county
Its complaint against Orange County rearising out of developer's agreement to
lated to its attempt to develop 437 acres
develop 437 acres locate in county into
primary residential, mixed-use land devel- located in Orange County into a primlllily
opment was entitled to amend to attempt residential, mixed-use land development.
to seek some other remedy or plead some The complaint alleges that the property
other cause of action after dismissal of was originally zoned agricultural; that
initial
complaint.
West's
F.S.A. Morgl'an was required to apply for an
amendment to the County's Comprehen§§ 163.3220--163.3243.
sive Policy Plan ["CPP"] in order to devel3. Estoppel <S=>62.1
op the property as desired; that the propEstoppel cannot be applied against a erty also had to be rezoned to the Planned
governmental entity to accomplish an ille- Development t"PD"] classification; that
gal result.
the amendment to the CPP was approved
by Orange County's Board of County
4. Estoppel <S=>85
Commissioners in November of 1998; that
A party cannot reasonably rely upon a
following the amendment to the CPP, the
promise, the enforcement of which would
County entered into a "Developer's Agreebe contrary to established public policy.
ment" providing that the County would
5. Pleading <S=>233.1, 241
adopt an amendment to the CPP, and
Leave to amend should be granted would "support and expeditiously process"
unless allowing amendment would preju- Morgt'an's rezoning application in exdice the opposing party, the privilege to change for Morgran's agreement to donate
amend has been abused, or amendment 50 acres to the County for use as a park
Would be futile.
once the rezoning was accomplished; that
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Morgran submitted its application for re- with Morgran requires the County to
zoning on March 8, 2000, but the County tract away its police powers.
breached its obligation to "support and
In Hartnett, Burdine's DePartlllent
expeditiously process" the request for re- Store wanted to buy land and bUild
zoning by, instead, affIrmatively advocat- shopping center. It asked the city ~.
ing the denial of the application; and that change the zoning classification of th
their application for rezoning was ulti- property to commerCl'al use. The city reoe
mately denied by the County in a hearing fused to make the change unless Burbefore the Board of County Commission- dine's: (1) built a wall; (2) maintained a
ers. Morgt'an seeks to recover damages, 40' setback; (3) landscaped the setback.
including the difference in the value of the (4) protected the neighbors against glar;
property if zoned PD, delay damages, ex- and disturbance; and (5) paid for addition.
penditures associated with the rezoning al police protection. The ordinance reo
application and attorney's fees.
quired reference to extraneous contract~
Apparently, the cause of Orange Coun- between the city and the developer. Aus.
ty's decision to renege on its agreement tin, who owned property across from the
was a subsequent edict by then County proposed development, opposed the rezon.
Chairman, Mel Martinez, that the county ing. The Supreme Court agreed that the
reject any development requests for rezon- ordinance which provided that the change
ing in areas where the Orange County would be made, if the conditions were met,
School Board considered the schools to be was invalid, explaining:
A municipality has no authOrity w
overcrowded. When Morgran sought to
enter
into a private contract with a
have Orange County abide by its agreeproperty
owner for the amendment of a
ment, the county disavowed the contract as
zoning ordinance subject to various cova void effort to engage in contract zoning.!
enants and restrictions in a collateral
deed or agreement to be executed be·
[1] Contract zoning is, in essence, an
tween the city and the property owner.
agreement by a governmental body with a
Such collateral agreements have been
plivate landowner to rezone property for
void in all of the cases to which we have
consideration. This practice has long been
been referred. Any contrary rule would
disapproved in Florida in cases such as
condone a violation of the long estab·
Hartnett v. Austin., 93 So.2d 86 (Fla.1956)
lished principle that a municipality can·
and Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So.2d
not contract away the exercise of its
1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Orange Counpolice powers.
ty's position is that its agreement to "support and expeditiously process" Morgran's
rezoning application is unambiguously void
as a matter of law, since this agreement

93 So.2d at 89. The Hm-tnett court noted
that "[iJf each parcel of property were
zoned on the basis of variables that could

Orange County also contended that suit was
precluded by virtue of the terms of paragraph
3(0 of the Developer's Agreement:
Notwithstanding the County's agreement to
support and expeditiously process the rezoning of the Property as set forth above,
Developer understands that such rezoning
process is subject to all County ordinances
and regulations governing rezoning, includ-

ing, but not limited to, review by the Devel·
opment Review Committee ("ORe"). all ap'
plicable public hearings, and approval by
the Board of County Commissioners. Fur'
ther, Developer understands and concedes
that the County will not and cannot by law
waive the requirements governing the re·
zoning process.

I.
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. into private contracts then the whole
ente1 e and objectIve
••
f
't
I
0 commUnI y p an~he:nd zoning would collapse." Id.
nmg
R lying on cases such as Hartnett and
e,n Orange County reasons that if the
CllO"",
I
C unty cannot be bound to approve the
r:zoning application, it likewise cannot be
bound to support that application. Moran responds that there is a distinction
fel;\~een an obligation to support the request for rezoning and an obligation to
approve the request. They urge that both
parties, aware of the law of contract zoning, developed this carefully worded, highly negotiated contract language that "does
not purport, either impliedly or expressly,
to restrict or any way interfere with, the
exercise of the Board of County Commissioner's police power as the final zoning
authority in the County."
This argument, we fear, draws too fine a
distinction. Morgran entered into its Developer's Agreement with "Orange County,
a political subdivision of the State of Florida." The governing body of Orange County is the Board of County Commissioners.
The agreement was executed by Mel Martinez, "Orange County Chairman," on behalf of the Board of County Commissioners. Orange County's zoning decisions are
made by the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Board of Zoning Adjustment. See §§ 501 and 502 of the Orange
County Code. However, review of these
initial zoning decisions are taken to the
Board of County Commissioners, which
considers the issue de novo and which has
final authority.

applicable to a property in exchange for
public benefits." Brad K. Schwartz, Development Agreements: Contracting for
Vested Rights, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.Rev.
719 (Summer 2001). Florida law permits
local governments to impose "conditions,
terms and restrictions" as part of these
agreements, where necessary for the public health, safety or welfare of its citizens.
§ 163.3227(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1999). The
problem in this case lies with Orange
County's obligation to "support" Morgran's
request for rezoning, as part of that development agreement. If the Board of County Commissioners has already contracted
to "support" Morgran's request for rezoning, it has invalidly contracted away its
discretionary legislative power as the final
decisionmaking authority. The clause in
the contract which provides that the "rezoning process is subject to all County
ordinances and regulations governing rezoning," does not cure the problem. In
Chung, in rejecting a similar argument,
the court noted that any hearings regarding the issue of rezoning would ''be a pro
forma exercise since the County has already obligated itself to a decision." 686
So.2d at 1360. The court rejected Molina

Development agreements are expressly
permitted by the Florida Statutes. See
§§ 163.3220-.3243, Fla. Stat. (1999). A development agreement has been defined as
"a contract between a [local government]
and a property owner/developer, which
prOvides the developer with vested rights
by freezing the existing zoning regulations

V.

Tradewinds Development Corp., 526

So.2d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) to the
extent it implied that an obligation to comply with applicable zoning regulations precluded a finding of illegal contract zoning.
We have found one court only that has
distinguished a contract for support of an
activity from a contract to rezone. In
Prock V. Town of DanviUe, 655 N.E.2d 553
(Ind.Ct.App.1995), a case not cited by either party, the court found that an agreement between the Town of Danville and a
waste disposal company, which owned land
annexed by the town, whereby the town
agreed to actively "support" the waste disposal company's operation of the landfill,
as well as any future efforts to expand the

:1"·
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landfill, was not an invalid contract for
zoning. The court reasoned that:

CIt.as818 So.2d 645 (FI •.App.2Dlst. 2002)

to be unworkable. Whichever hat it .
wearing, the County is still the Coun;

Although pursuant to the RCA the
Town agreed to actively support Waste
Management's operation of the landfIll
as well as any efforts it may make in the
future to expand the landfill, the Town
was not contractually bound to zone the
property in a particular way or to promise that in the future it would rezone the
property to expand the landfill. Further, the Town did not promise to support Waste Management's efforts regardless of whether those efforts were
in compliance with the Town's statutory
zoning procedures. Thus, we cannot
agree with the Plaintiffs' contention that
by promising to support Waste Management's efforts regarding the landfIll, the
Town bartered away its decision making
authority regarding zoning for the landfill.

[2-4] Morgran next complains that th
trial court erred in the dismissal with pl'e~
udice of its claim for promissory estopp!l.
The rule, however, is that estoppel cannot
be applied against a governmental entit
to accomplish an illegal result. Branca:'
City of Mimntar, 634 So.2d 604 (Fla.1994).
It has been specillcally held that estoppel
cannot be used by a landowner to enforce
a contract which constitutes "contract zoning." P.C.B. Partnership v. City of Largo,
549 So.2d 738, 741-42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) ("A party entering into a contract with a
municipality is bound to know the extent of
the municipality's power to contract, ane!
the municipality will not be estopped to
assert the invalidity of a contract which it
had no power to execute."). Additionally,
a party cannot reasonably rely upon a
promise, the enforcement of which would
Id. at 560. The court noted that the Town be contrary to established public policy.
had already rezoned the annexed propelty Brine v. Fertitta, 537 So.2d 113 (Fla. 2d
when it entered into the agreement to DCA 1988).
"SUPPOlt" future efforts to expand the
[5] The only remaining question in this
landmI. Even this case, therefore, by neg- case is whether Morgran should have been
ative inference, supports the County's po- given leave to amend to attempt to seek
sition. We also note that Florida appears some other remedy or plead some other
to take a stricter view of contract zoning cause of action. Morgran was not given
than many other jurisdictions.
leave to amend after dismissal of its initial
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WELCH v. COMPLETE CARE CORP.

Morgran urges that the contractual
provision that binds the County to supPOlt rezoning means only County staff,
not the Board. First, given the absence
of language of such pivotal importance in
the agreement, we decline to find a latent
ambiguity, Second, we doubt it would
matter.2 Morgran seemingly draws a distinction between the Board acting in its
executive (governing) capacity and the
Board acting in its quasi-judicial capacity
in zoning cases. We find this distinction

complaint and claims the right to do so.
Morgran has failed to identify another viable cause of action, however, in its brief
and was no more specillc at oral argument.
See Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 114 N.M.
699, 845 P.2d 793 (1992); P.C.B. Leave to
amend should be granted unless allowing
the amendment would prejudice the opposing party, the privilege to amend has been
abused, or amendment would be futile.
State Fat"ln Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fleet Fin.
Corp., 724 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

2. It is also doubtful that an agreement for
county staff support only could support a

provable damage claim, even one for restitu·
tion.
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and principals may have had against employer and its insurer, and employee
brought action against employer and insurer asserting claims for declaratory relief,
contractual indemnity, common law indemnity, contribution, and equitable subrogation. The Circuit Court, Pinellas County,
Frank Quesada, J., dismissed all counts
except for those seeking declaratory relief
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in and damages based on contractual indemnillcation, on which summary judgment
part; and REMANDED.
was granted for employer and insurer_
SAWAYA and ORFINGER, R. B., JJ., Employee appealed. The District Court of
Appeal, Northcutt, J., held that: (1) emconeUl'·
ployee could not assert claims of equitable
subrogation against employer and its insurer; (2) record did not show any legal
relationship between employer and landlord which would render landlord vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable to employee because of some
negligence or fault on employer's part,
Michael P. WELCH, as assignee of which precluded imposition of common law
David J. and Adele Pinkster, Howard indemnity on employer; (3) employee's alPinkster d/b/a A.T.I.M.A. Prime Prop- legations that employer's landlord was paserties, and American Rental Dealers sively rather than actively negligent, were
Insurance, Appellant,
not equivalent of pleading vicarious liability; (4) genuine issue of material fact as to'
v.
whether landlord was not legally or factuCOMPLETE CARE CORPORATION
ally responsible for employee's injuries
and Professional Business Owners
sustained while attempting to repair gaAssociation, Inc., Appellees.
rage door precluded summary judgment
No. 2DOO-5250.
on contractual indemnification claim
against employer; and (5) employer's liabilDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida,
ity insurance contract, which provided that
Second District.
insurance .did not cover liability assumed
June 7, 2002.
under contract, precluded imposition of
any liability on insurer for employer's liability to employee, as assignee of employEmployee brought action against emer's landlord, under contractual indemnity
ployer's landlord and its principals after he
theory.
was injured when garage door on storage
Mfirmed in part and reversed in part.
unit malfunctioned and as part of settle-

The trial court apparently concluded,
based on the undisputed facts, that leave
to amend would be futile, and it may prove
'ghl. We conclude, however, that Morn
'
gran should b
e gwen
one more opportunity
to attempt to state a claim or seek a
different remedy, if it chooses. We express no opinion about the viability of any
such claim at this stage, however.

ment, landlord' and its principals assigned
to employee all legal and equitable rights
of action, claims, and interest, including
indemnity and contribution that landlord

1, Subrogation e:>1
Equitable subrogation is generally appropriate when the following five factors

.. l..

I

Page I

."lexisNexis·

/

Caution
As of: May 02, 2009
Raymond E. RODRIGUEZ, et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland, et
al.
No. 1295, September Term, 1988
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
79 Md. App. 537; 558 A.2d 742; 1989 Md. App. LEXIS 120
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PRIOR HISTORY:

[*** I) APPEAL FROM THE Circuit Court for Prince George's County, David G. Ross, Judge.

DISPOSITION: JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S
COUNTY WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE ORDER OF DISTRICT COUNCIL AND REMAND TO
DISTRICT COUNCIL FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE
PAID BY APPELLEES.
CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant county council approved, subject to certain specified conditions, an applicant's plan for the rezoning of a I 86.2-acre tract of land within the county. Plaintiffs plan opponents chaIIenged the plan
approval. The Circuit Court for Prince George's County (Maryland) affirmed the county council's action, and the plan
opponents sought review.
OVERVIEW: The plan opponents claimed that the county council failed to make the required detailed findings offacts
and conclusions, that its action was in violation of the existing area master plans, and that its action was not based upon
substantial evidence. The plan opponents also claimed that approval of the plan as amended constituted an unlawful
conditional zoning. The court agreed, and reversed and remanded the lower court's judgment. The court found that both
Md. Ann. Code art. 28, §8-123 Imd Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-141 required plan approval to be based
upon specific written findings of basic facts and conclusions. The court held that the county council's blanket adoption
of the county planning board's recommendations did not comply with the clear requirements of these provisions. The
court also found that Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-1 95(c)(2) prohibited conditional zoning, but that the plan
amendment clearly violated this proscription. Although the court upheld the right of a plan applicant to amend its plan,
the court held that this right of amendment could not be exercised in such a manner as to violate the prohibition against
conditional zoning.
OUTCOME: In an action that chaIIenged a county council's approval of a rezoning plan, the court reversed the lower
court's judgment that affirmed the approval of the plan, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
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Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans
Governments> Public Improvements> Community Redevelopment
[HN1] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(b) provides, in part, that: (1) Prior to the approval of the application and the Basic Plan, the applicant shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the District Council that the entire development meets the following criteria: (A) The proposed Basic Plan shall either conform to: (i) The specific recommendation of a General Plan map, Area Master Plan map, or urban renewal plan map; including the principles and guidelines
of the plan text which address the design and physical development of the property, the public facilities necessary to
serve the proposed development, and the impact which the development may have on the environment and surrounding
properties; or (ii) The principles and guidelines described in the plan (including the text) with respect to land use, the
number of dwelling units, intensity of nonresidential buildings, and the location of land uses. (B) The economic analysis
submitted for a proposed retail commercial use shall adequately justify a use of the size and scope shown on the Basic
Plan.

Governments> Public Improvements> Bridges & Roads
Governments> Public Improvements> Community Redevelopment
Transportation Law> Public Transportation
[HN2] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(b) provides in part as follows: (C) Transportation facilities (including public streets and public transit) which are existing, under construction, or for which construction funds are contained in either the first six (6) years of the adopted County Capital Improvement Program or the first five (5) years of
the adopted State Highway Administration Construction Program shall be adequate to carry anticipated traffic. The uses
proposed shall not generate traffic which would lower the level of service anticipated by the land use and circulation
systems shown on approved General or Area Master Plans, or urban renewal plans; (D) Other existing or planned private and public facilities which are existing, under construction, or for which construction funds are contained in the
first six (6) years of the adopted County Capital Improvement Program (such as schools, recreation areas, water and
sewerage systems, libraries, and fire stations) shall be adequate for the uses proposed; (E) Environmental relationships
reflect compatibility between the proposed development and surrounding land uses, so as to promote the health, safety,
and welfare of the present and future inhabitants of the Regional District; and CDZ applications filed after October 31,
1978.

Environmental Law > Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans
Governments> Local Governments> Administrative Boards
[HN3] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(b) provides, in part, as follows: (2) Notwithstanding Subparagraphs (C) and (D), above, where the application anticipates a construction schedule of more than six (6) years (§ 27179), public facilities (existing or scheduled for construction within the first six (6) years) shall be adequate to serve the
development proposed to occur within the first six (6) years. The Council shall also find that public facilities probably
will be adequately supplied for the remainder of the project. In considering the probability of future public facilities
construction the Council may consider such things as existing plans for construction, budgetary constraints on providing
public facilities, the public interest and public need for the particular development, the relationship of the development
to public transportation, or any other matter that indicates that public a [sic] private funds will likely be expended for the
necessary facilities.

Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans
[HN4] Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(c)(l) authorizes the District Council, in approving a zoning map
amendment, to impose reasonable requirements and safeguards (in the form of conditions) which it finds are necessary
to either: (A) Protect surrounding properties from the adverse effects which might accrue from the Zoning Map
Amendment; or (B) Further enhance the coordinated, harmonious, and systematic development of the Regional District.
Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-195(c)(2), however, provides that in no case shall the conditions waive or
lessen the requirements of, or prohibit uses allowed in, the approved zone.

Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans
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Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Ordinances
Real Property Law > Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances
[HN5] Md. Ann. Code art. 28, § 8-123 states: In Prince George's County, no application for a map amendment or special exception, which is contested, may be granted or denied except upon written findings of basic facts and written
conclusions. Prince George's County, Md., Code § 27-141 requires a final decision of the Council in any zoning matter
to be supported by specific written findings of basic facts and conclusions.

Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Conditional Use Permits & Variances
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Zoning Methods
[HN6] Conditional zoning is a zoning reclassification subject to conditions not generally applicable to land similarly
zoned. It occurs when an area of land is rezoned from one classification to another, and such change is not outright but
subject to some type of conditions.

Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Statutory & Equitable Limits
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Special Permits & Variances
Real Property Law> Zoning & Land Use> Zoning Methods
[HN7] Conditional zoning is inconsistent with the principle that, while zoning regulations may vary from one district or
classification to another, within a district or classification they should be uniform. Conditional zoning tends to destroy
that uniformity; it subjects some land within a district or classification to restrictions that are not applicable to other land
within the same district or classification and thus tends to create unique mini-districts not provided for in the general
zoning ordinance.

Contracts Law> Types of Contracts> Covenants
Environmental Law> Zoning & Land Use> Comprehensive & General Plans
Environmental Law > Zoning & Land Use> Conditional Use Permits & Variances
[HN8] Although there appears to be no impediment to an applicant entering into private covenants with other parties to
lessen their opposition to an application, or to garner their support for it, such offerings cannot be made to the legislative
body authorized to grant or deny the application.
.

COUNSEL: Gary Alexander (Alexander & Cleaver, P.A., on the brief), all of Fort Washington, Maryland, for appellants.
Russell W. Shipley (Meyers, Billingsley, Shipley, Curry, Rodbell & Rosenbaum, P.A., on the brief), all of Riverdale,
Maryland, for appellee, Ammendale.
Joyce Birkel Hope, Associate County Attorney (Michael P. Whalen, County Attorney, on the brief), both of Upper
Marlboro, Maryland, for appellees, Prince George's County, Maryland, and the County Council.

JUDGES: Gilbert, C.J., and Wilner, and Karwacki, JJ.
OPINION BY: WILNER
OPINION
[*539] [**743] This appeal concerns the rezoning ofa 186.2-acre tract ofland in Prince George's County. The
rezoning was approved by the County Council, sitting as the District Council, subject to certain specified conditions,
and that action was afftrmed by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.
The property in question lies in the Beltsville area; [***2] it fronts on the west side of U.S. Route 1, about three
miles north of the Capital Beltway. Known as the Ammendale Normal Institute, the property was used for many years
by a religious order for the training of novitiates, but that use has ceased, and the buildings, some of which are included
in the National Register of Historic Places, have fallen into disrepair. For purposes of this case, the property consists of
three parcels: a 56.l-acre parcel fronting on U.S. Route 1; a 26.1 -acre parcel, which forms the center part of the tract
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and contains most or all of the buildings; and a 104-acre parcel that was once used for sand and gravel mining and is
largely undeveloped.
The first of these parcels was placed in the E-I-A (Employment -- Institutional Areas) zone in 1976; the other two
parcels have R-R (Rural-- Residential) zoning. In December, 1985, an application was made to place the entire tract in
the E-J-A zone. With the application was a Basic Plan proposing the development of2.7 million square feet of institutional, service, office, and commercial facilities. Construction would take place in two stages, over a period offrom six
to 10 years.
(I) The E-I-A Zone -- Approval [***3] Process

The E-I-A zone is a comprehensive design zone provided for in § 27-499 of the Prince George's County Code. The
essential purpose of the zone seems to be to U[p]rovide for a mix of employment, institutional, retail, and office uses in a
manner which will retain the dominant employment and institutional character of the area. u @ § 27-499(a)(4).
[*540] Because the E-I-A zone is a comprehensive design zone, full approval of the development occurs in three
stages:
First: approval by the District Council of a Basic Plan showing the kinds and amounts of proposed land uses as part
of and as a precondition to approval of a zoning map amendment authorizing those land uses;
Second: approval by the Plarming Board of a Comprehensive Design Plan showing the amounts and locations of
the land uses and circulation systems and indicating the general schedule of development; and
Third: approval by the Planning Board of Specific Design Plans for each portion of the development to be constructed within a particular time period.
We are concerned here with the first of these three stages.
Section 27-499 sets' out a number of standards or conditions which a Basic Plan must meet to qualify the [***4]
property for E-I-A zoning. They are supplemented by other standards or conditions specified in § 27-195, dealing with
map amendment approval of comprehensive design zones. [HNl JSection 27-1 95(b) provides, in that regard, that:
"( 1) Prior to the approval of the application and the Basic Plan, the applicant shall demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the District Council that the entire development meets the following criteria:
(A) The proposed Basic Plan shall either conform to:

(i) The specific recommendation of a General Plan map, Area Master Plan map, or urban renewal
plan map; including the principles and guidelines of the plan text which address the design and physical
development of the property, the public facilities necessary to serve the proposed development, and the
impact which the development may have on the environment and surrounding properties; or

(ii) The principles and guidelines described in the plan (including the text) with respect to land use,
the number [*541] of dwelling units, intensity of nonresidential buildings, and the location ofland uses.
[**744] (B) The economic analysis submitted for a proposed retail commercial use shall adequately justify a use of the size [***5] and scope shown on the Basic Plan;
[HN2] (C) Transportation facilities (including public streets and public transit) which are existing,
under construction, or for which construction funds are contained in either the frrstsix (6) years of the
adopted County Capital Improvement Program or the first five (5) years of the adopted State Highway
Administration Construction Program shall be adequate to carry anticipated traffic. The uses proposed
shall not generate traffic which would lower the level of service anticipated by the land use and circulation systems shown on approved General or Area Master Plans, or urban renewal plans;
(D) Other existing or planned private and public facilities which are existing, under construction, or
for which construction funds are contained in the first six (6) years ofthe adopted County Capital Improvement Program (such as schools, recreation areas, water and sewerage systems, libraries, and frre
stations) shall be adequate for the uses proposed;
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(E) Environmental relationships reflect compatibility between the proposed development and surrounding land uses, so as to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the present and future inhabitants
of the Regional [***6) District; and CDZ applications filed after October 31,1978.
[HN3] (2) Notwithstanding Subparagraphs (C) and (D), above, where the application anticipates a
construction schedule of more than six (6) years (Section ~7 -179), public facilities (existing or scheduled
for construction within the first six (6) years) shall be adequate to serve the development proposed to occur within the first six (6) years. The Council shall also find that public facilities probably will be adequately supplied for the remainder of the project. In considering the probability of future public facilities
construction the Council may consider such things as [*542J existing plans for construction, budgetary
constraints on providing public facilities, the public interest and public need for the particular development, the relationship of the development to public transportation, or any other matter that indicates that
public a [sicJ private funds will likely be expended for the necessary facilities."

[HN4J Section 27-195(c)(l) authorizes the District Council, in approving a zoning map amendment, to
"impose reasonable requirements and safeguards (in the form of conditions) which it finds are necessary to either: [***7]
(A) Protect surrounding properties from the adverse effects which might accrue from the Zoning
Map Amendment; or
(B) Further enhance the coordinated, harmonious, and systematic development of the Regional District. "

Section 27-195(c)(2), however, provides that U[iJn no case shall the conditions waive or lessen the requirements of, or
prohibit uses allowed in, the approved zone."
Finally, both State and county law require the District Council, in approving (or denying) a zoning map amendment
over protest, to make specific findings offact, in writing. [HN5] Md.Ann.Code art. 28, § 8-123 states: "In Prince
George's County, no application for a map amendment or special exception, which is contested, may be granted or denied except upon written findings of basic facts and written conclusions."@ Similarly, § 27-141 of the County Code
requires a final decision of the Council in any zoning matter to be "supported by specific written rmdings of basic facts
and conclusions."

(2) Procedural Background
The instant application was first considered by the Technical Staff of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. In a report filed May 12, 1986, the Staff recommended that [***8J the application be denied.
Among its findings of fact, the Staff stated:
"7. The subject property is affected by two Master Plans: the Adopted and Approved Master Plan for
[*543J Fairland-Beltsville and Vicinity (1968) and the Northwestern Area Plan (1975).
[**745] 8. The Adopted and Approved Fairland-BeltsviIIe Master Plan proposed R-90/R-80 onefamily detached residential zone with a recreation center proposed for the center of the area.
9. The Northwestern Area Plan designates E-I-A zoning for the 56.1+/- acres adjacent to u.S. Route
1, public/quasi-public use for the Ammendale Normal Institute and suburban residential for the northwest portion of the subject property.
10. The Approved General Plan for Prince George's County (1982) identifies the eastern portion of
the site as a 'Major Employment Area.'
11. Prior to approval of the Basic Plan, it must be demonstrated to the District Council that the proposed development is entirely compatible with this existing and propose·d development of the surroundingarea.
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12. Both the Northwestern Area Plan and the Approved General Plan sets guidelines and policies for
employment areas."

The "Detenninations" of the Staff were as foHows: [***9]
"1. The Basic Plan does not take the fuH development of the employment areas into account in forecasting the affect [sic] of the proposed use on roads and surrounding residential areas.
2. The proposed use would significantly increase the flow of traffic through neighboring residential
areas.
3. The roads which will be in place in the vicinity of the proposed use wiH not be able to handle the
amount of traffic which would be attracted to such use.
4. Transportation Systems Management techniques may make some additional E-I-A Zone development feasible.
5. With the addition of automatic fire extinguishing systems, the existing and programmed public facilities will be adequate.
[*544] 6. The proposed development does not confonn to guidelines set forth in the Northwestern
Area Plan relating to traffic impact of employment areas on residential neighborhoods.
7. The proposed E-I-A Zone development is not consistent with the recommendations of the Fairland-BeItsviHe Master Plan for suburban residential development in the R-80/R-90 Zones."

In the concluding paragraphs of its Report, the Staff opined that the road improvements proposed by the applicant
or planned by the State [***10] Highway Administration "are not enough to adequately serve the proposed addition of
2,168,000 square feet of institutional, office and commercial floor space."@ It was "unsure of how much additional
traffic can be accommodated by the roads in the area," and it expressed concern about the diversion of traffic "through
the residential areas west and south of the subject property" which "would have a negative impact on these residential
areas."
The Planning Board reached a different conclusion. In a Resolution adopted November 13,1986, it recommended
approval of the application, subject to nine conditions relating principally to road improvements and the preservation of
trees and historic buildings. It made no detailed fmdings of fact; indeed, aside from the conditions, the Resolution says
no more than that
"[TJhe Planning Board disagreed with the analysis and recommendation of the Technical Staff based
on the following determinations:
1. The publiciquasi-public use of the subject property has been abandoned. The Northwestern Area
Plan's recommendation for a public/quasi-public use for a portion of the subject property is therefore no
longer appropriate.
2. The proposed business [***11] park is compatible with existing and proposed development in
the surrounding area.
[*545J 3. Without proper controls, the traffic generated by the proposed use would exceed planned
road capacities and result in unacceptable levels of service on roads in the area.
4. The proposed business park should be approved in phases which take into [**746J account future road improvements and the ability of area roads to accommodate additional traffic.
5. With the addition of automatic fire extinguishing systems in aH buildings, the existing and programmed public facilities will be adequate."

[r
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The next stage in the process was a hearing before a Zoning Hearing Examiner. He arrived at a third recommendation -- that the Council retain the E-I-A zoning for the 56.1-acre parcel, rezone the middle 26.1 acres to E-I-A, and retain the residential zoning on the balance (104 acres). The Examiner expressed two concerns over the rezoning of the
104 acres. First, he pointed out that the area was in a suburban community and was designed to remain residential in the
two Master Plans to which it is subject. Second, he concluded that, even without this rezoning, by reason of other approved developments in [***12) the immediate vicinity, there was going to be "a major congestion problem at U.S. Rt.
1 and Powder Mill Road for a period of at least six years," and that, without some "mitigating affects [sic)", he could
not find that "transportation facilities will be adequate to carry anticipated traffic."
The District Council, of course, had before it all of these reports and recommendations when it met, in April, 1987,
to consider the matter. The arguments made to the Council focused on three considerations: compatibility of the proposed development with the neighboring residential communities; the traffic problems likely to be caused or exacerbated by the development; and, to a lesser extent, the apparent statutory requirement that the proposed land uses be consistent with existing master plans. After listening to argument, the Council initially continued the hearing, without making a decision, for 30 days, to allow the two sides an [*546) opportunity to try to resolve their differences through the
development of "covenants" that would limit the uses to which the property could be put.
On June 4, 1987 -- four days before the District Council's scheduled reconvening on the matter - the [***13) applicant informed the Council that it had met with the protestants to explore the possibility of entering into covenants "to
exclude undesirable E-I-A uses" and that the protestants were "not willing to enter into any covenants whatsoever with
the applicant."@ It therefore proposed "to fulfill the District Council's intentions" by voluntarily amending its Basic
Plan to exclude certain uses otherwise expressly permitted in the E-I-A zone. Attached to its letter as an appendix was a
proposed revision of the Basic Plan eliminating 15 categories of use. Aware of the strictures set forth in § 27- 195(c)(2),
the applicant hastened to assure the council that
"this is not an offer on the applicant's part to have the Council conditionally zone the property, nor the
proffer of additional evidence, but simply a designation by our Basic Plan that we are binding ourselves
to limit or lessen that which would be otherwise permissible to the E-I-A zone. In this manner, it is
hoped that the Council's April 27, 1987 wishes are fulfilled without any violations of the Prince George's
County Zoning Ordinance. Further, this letter is intended to be in response to the dictate of the Council's
motion [***14] of April 27, 1987."

This amendment was apparently filed pursuant to § 27-181 of the county code, dealing with requests to amend an
application. In relevant part, that section allows an applicant to request an amendment to an application at any time if
the amendment concerns "an error, omission of fact, or other factual change not mentioned below in this Section.... "@
The two changes "mentioned below" were amendments that change the total area or configuration of the property and
those changing the requested zoning classification, for both of which special conditions apply.
[*547J When the District Council reconvened on June 8, it regarded the Basic Plan as having been amended as requested by the applicant. After some further discussion, a motion was made to approve the application, as amended,
subject to the conditions specified by the Planning Board. That motion failed. Several additional conditions [**747)
were then proposed and approved, the two major ones being to require the development to proceed over a 10-year period, limited to 20 acres/year, and to preclude nearly all development within the 1OO-year flood plain without further
approval by the Council. With those additional [***15J conditions, a motion to approve the application was adopted.
The written decision of the Council, embodied in the Zoning Ordinance adopted by it, recited, in skeletal fashion,
the procedural history of the application. The heart of the decision was in three "WHEREAS" clauses and in the 11
conditions imposed. There were no specific findings of fact stated in the ordinance. All that was said in that regard was:
"WHEREAS, having reviewed the record in this case, the District Council has determined that the subject property should be rezoned to the E-I-A Zone; and
WHEREAS, in order to protect adjacent properties and the surrounding neighborhood, the rezoning
herein is granted with conditions; and
WHEREAS, as the basis for this action, the District Council adopts the recommendations of the
Planning Board as its findings and conclusions in this case.
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NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED AND ENACTED: [that the application is approved subject to the enumerated conditionsJ."

The applicant subsequently agreed fonnally to the conditions imposed by the Council, whereupon the Council
adopted a fmal Resolution incorporating those conditions.
In the circuit court, the opponents complained, as [***16J they complain here, that the District Council failed to
make detailed findings of basic facts and conclusions as required [*548] by law, that its action was in violation of the
existing area master plans, that its action was not based upon substantial evidence that the proposed land uses were
compatible with existing uses in the surrounding areas, and that the approval by the Council of the Basic Plan as
amended -- i.e., with some 15 permitted uses deleted -- constituted an unlawful conditional zoning. The court rejected
these arguments, concluding that (1) by adopting the Planning Board's recommendations as its own findings, the Council "ma[dJe the basis of their decision sufficiently clear," (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record to make the
Council's decision fairly debatable, and (3) the Council's action did not constitute an unlawful conditional zoning.
(3) Summary ofOur Conclusions

We think that the court (and the Council) erred in at least two respects. We do not believe that the District Council's blanket adoption of the Planning Board's recommendations sufficed to comply with the clear requirements of art.
28, § 8-123 of the State Code or § 27-141 of [***17J the County Code. Nor do we believe that the clear proscription
of § 27 -195(c)(2) can be circumvented by the artifice of simply amending the Basic Plan to exclude uses that the Council finds, or might find, objectionable but which are expressly permitted in the E-I-A zone.
(4) Statement ofFindings

In Montgomery v. Bd. ofCo. Comm'rs, 256 Md. 597, 261 A.2d 447 (1970), the Court was faced with a circumstance
almost identical to that now before us. The District Council for Prince George's County approved a zoning map change,
adopting as its findings the recommendations of the Technical Staff of the Planning Board. The Technical Staff Report,
however, made no specific findings as to the defmition of the neighborhood, what changes had occurred since the last
comprehensive rezoning, or whether any such changes resulted in a change in the character of the neighborhood. It simply concluded that the new zone was in confonnance with the area plan and that a proposed arterial highway, when
completed, should alleviate any traffic problems.
[*549J The Court of Appeals, citing the statutory requirement that the District Council make "the necessary fmdings [*** 18J and conclusions and ... express them in writing," concluded that the Council had failed to make those
findings and thus remanded the case "for compliance with the mandatory [**748J requirement of the statute."@ 256
Md. at 603. 261 A.2d 447. In that regard, it noted, also at 603, 261 A.2d 447:
"At the argument, counsel for the District Council indicated that the practice of the District Council in
ruling on rezoning applications in which it agreed with the recommendations of the Planning Board or of
the Technical Staff, as the case might be, was to adopt the findings in the report or recommendations relied upon rather than to make specific findings in the order of the District Council, itself. Although this
is not a practice to be encouraged, we are not prepared to rule, as a matter oflaw, that the District
Council may not, in a specific case, comply with the statutory requirement to make written findings of
basic facts and conclusions by incorporating into its order specific findings ofbasic facts and conclusions ofeither the Planning Board or ofthe Technical Staff by specific reference to those findings.
However, in the [*** 19J instant case it is clear that neither the Planning Board nor the Technical Staff
made any such findings of the necessary basic facts or conclusions."

(Emphasis added.)
Although the issues here are not "change" or "mistake," as they were in Montgomery, the same principle applies.
If, despite the Court's editorial comment, the Council wishes to continue the practice of incorporating or adopting by
reference the findings of others as its own findings and conclusions, it must at least make certain that the findings it
proposes to adopt comply with the statutory requirements of specificity. Here, as in Montgomery, they do not; and
therein lies the problem.
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As we observed, §§ 27-] 95(b)(I) and 27-499 set forth certain requirements that a Basic Plan must meet in order
[*550] to qualifY the property for E-I-A zoning. Among those requirements are that (1) the Basic Plan conform either to
the specific recommendations of the existing area plans or to the "principles and guidelines" described in those plans,
(2) transportation facilities, existing, under construction, or funded for construction within a 5-6 year period, be adequate, (3) the proposed uses not generate traffic [***20] that would lower the level of service anticipated in existing
area plans, and (4) there be compatibility between the proposed development and surrounding land uses.
Whether these or other required conditions are met depends on a host of subsidiary findings. It is not permissible
for the Council, or any administrative body, simply to parrot general statutory requirements or rest on broad conclusory
statements. As stated in Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 56,310 A.2d 543 (1973), "citizens are entitled to something
more than boiler-plate resolution."@SeealsoRedden v. Montgomery County, 270 Md. 668, 685,313 A.2d 481 (1974),
and cases cited therein; Ocean Hideaway Condo. v. Boardwalk Plaza, 68 Md.App. 650, 515 A.2d 485 (1986).
We have quoted in full the "determinations" of the Planning Board that the District Council adopted as its findings
and conclusions. They do not suffice -- they do not even begin to suffice -- as "specific written findings of basic facts
and conclusions."@ To the extent that they even address the statutory requirements for an E-I-A zone, they are wholly
conclusory [***2]) and take no account whatever of the specific concerns and issues raised by the parties, the Technical Staff, or the Zoning Hearing Examiner. The area plans appear to call for the land within the 104-acre parcel to remain residential; if the myriad of uses permitted in the E-I-A zone are consistent with those plans or the "principles" of
those plans, as §§ 27-499 and 27-1 95 (b) seem to require, the Council has not informed us, or anyone else, how that is
so. If, unlike the technical staff or the zoning hearing examiner, the Council believed that, with the conditions [*55])
imposed by it, existing or anticipated traffic and transportation facilities will be adequate to handle the increased traffic
from the proposed development, it has not explained the basis upon which it reached that conclusion. In short, the District Council is going to have to do a better job of it.
[**749J Whether the evidence in the record suffices to support a rezoning of the tract, or any part of the tract, depends, of course, on the specific findings of fact and conclusions underlying the zoning decision. Until those findings
are made and clearly articulated, therefore, we cannot properly address that issue. [***22) Compare Floyd v. County
Council o/P.G. Co., 55 Md.App. 246, 461 A.2d 76 (1983).
(5) Conditional Zoning

[HN6) "Conditional zoning," we said in Bd. o/Co. Comm'rs v. H Manny Holtz, Inc., 65 Md.App. 574,579,501
A.2d 489 (1985) (quoting in part from Miller, The Current Status o/Conditional Zoning, Institute on Planning, Zoning
& Eminent Domain 122 (1974», "is a zoning reclassification subject to conditions not generally applicable to land similarly zoned. '[W)hen an area ofland is rezoned from one classification to another, and such change is not outright but
subject to some type of conditions, then we are confronted with a conditional zoning problem.'''
The early view of most courts was that conditional (or, as it is sometimes called, "contract") zoning was unlawful
per se. As noted in Baylis v. City a/Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 170, 148 A.2d 429 (1959), there seemed to be three chief
reasons for this view:
"that rezoning based on offers or agreements with the owners disrupts the basic plan, and thus is subversive of the public policy reflected in the overall legislation, that [***23) the resulting 'contract' is
nugatory because a municipality is not able to make agreements which inhibit its police powers, and that
restrictions in a particular zone should not be left to extrinsic evidence."

[*552) See also] P. Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Controls § 5.02[J} (1989); 2 A. and D. Ratbkopf, The Law o/Zoning and Planning § 27.05 (1989).

For some or all of these reasons, Maryland very clearly adopted this jaundiced view of conditional zoning, first in
Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953) and later in Baylis; and, while a number of commentators have
urged a relaxation of this approach in favor of the flexibility allowed by conditional zoning, so far Maryland has continued to fmd the practice objectionable, at least in the absence of clear statutory authorization. In Mont. Co. v. Nat'l Capital Realty, 267 Md. 364, 373, 297 A.2d 675 (1972), the Court declared that "[t)he invalidity of conditional zoning in
Maryland is not seriously open to question."@Seealso City o/Baltimore v. Crane, 277 Md. 198,205-06,352 A.2d 786
(1976); Bd. o/Co. Comm'rs v. H Manny Holtz, supra, 65 Md.App. 574, 501 A.2d 489. [***24)
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This general proscription against conditional zoning may, of course, be relaxed by statute, and, indeed, it has been
to some extent. See, for example, Md.Ann. Code art. 66B, § 4.01 (b), applicable to non-charter counties. Section 27195(c)(I) of the Prince George's County Code constitutes a similar kind of relaxation; it pennits a limited scope of conditional zoning -- generally of the type pennitted by art. 66B, § 4. 01 (b). But § 27-195(c)(2) makes explicit what, in H
Manny Holtz we found implicit in § 4.01 -- that this limited authority does not allow conditions that prohibit specific
uses otherwise permitted in the approved zone.
Section 27-195(c)(2) seemingly addresses one of the concerns about conditional zoning not clearly articulated in
Baylis, but which we alluded to in H Manny Holtz -- that [HN7] it is inconsistent with the principle that, while zoning
regulations may vary from one district or classification to another, within a district or classification they should be uniform. Conditional zoning tends to destroy that uniformity; it subjects some land within a district or classification to
restrictions that are not applicable to other land within the same [***25J district or classification and thus tends to create [*553] unique mini-districts not provided for in the general zoning ordinance.
To some extent, of course, this dis-unifonnity may be achieved in other ways -- through variances, special exceptions, and, increasingly, through floating or general development zones, such as the E-I-A zone at issue here, and the
site plan review process that governs development in those [**750J zones. But, in terms of use restriction, those appear
to be the only methods authorized; permitted uses cannot be excluded by contract with the zoning authority as part of
the basic rezoning.
The extent to which this specific prohibition can be circumvented by private agreement is very limited. [HN8J Although there appears to be no impediment to an applicant entering into private covenants with other parties to lessen
their opposition to an application, or to garner their support for it, such offerings cannot be made to the legislative body
authorized to grant or deny the application. This was made clear in Mont. Co. v. Nat'l Capital Realty, supra, 267 Md.
364,297 A.2d 675. There too the applicant, faced with substantial opposition, [***26J offered to enter into certain
covenants restricting the use of the property to those shown on an attached site plan, contingent on approval of the application. The Court saw that for the obvious subterfuge that it was. At 373,297 A.2d 675, it stated:
"We think it clear that the covenants, coupled with the site plan attached thereto, if adopted as a basis
for the requested reclassification, would have produced a form of conditional zoning ... , Had the Council then granted the application on the strength of the covenants, ... it would have committed what we
believe would have been a classic illustration of conditional zoning."

The form here was slightly different -- an amendment to the Basic Plan -- but the effect was precisely the same.
The applicant was offering a deal to the District Council: in order to induce the Council to approve its application for
reclassification, the applicant would agree in advance to [*554J exclude from the scope of the approval certain uses
expressly permitted in the approved zone. Whatever the general right of the applicant to amend the Basic Plan may be,
that right cannot be exercised in such manner as to [***27] violate the clear restrictions of § 27-195(c)(2). We think
that what occurred here was no different in either purpose or effect from what was done, and condemned, in Nat'l Capital Realty. Quite apart from the District Council's failure to articulate specific [mdings and conclusions, its action was
invalid for this reason as well.

(6) Conclusion
As we indicated briefly above, it may well be that the evidence of record can support a decision to reclassify all or
part of the land to an E-I-A zone. But such a decision must be made without regard to improper conditions and the
Council will have to comply with the requirements of Md.Ann.Code art. 28, § 8-123 and Prince George's County Code,
§ 27-141.
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE ORDER OF DISTRICT COUNCIL AND REMAND TO DISTRICT
COUNCIL FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEES.
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consequential and inconsequential violations. Thus, the common council has indicated an intent that the housing code be
enforced administratively and not by terms
implied in a lease. Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., supra.
Other indicia of this intent are the enforcement procedures of sec. 75-1 through
75-18. Sec. 75-2 provides that the commissioner of health "shall make inspections
to determine the condition of dwellings
* * *" within the city of Milwaukee.
Sec. 75-3 sets forth the method of enfon:ement which includes service of written notice by the commissioner of health
whenever there has been a violation; hearings before the commissioner which can be
requested by H[a]ny person affected by any
notice which has been issued in connection
with the enforcement of any provision of
this chapter * * * " ; empowering the
commissioner of health, after a hearing, to
sustain, modify or withdraw the notice;
review by the circuit court by certiorari;
and the power of the commissioner to issue
subpoenas. In addition, sec. 75-18 sets
forth penalties, including imprisonment, for
the violation of any order of the commissioner of health based on the provisions
of sections 75-1 through 75-18.
These ordinances implement a method of
enforcement based entirely upon orders
issued by the commissioner of health.
Holding that the housing code is implied in
lease agreements would have more than a
complementary effect-it would circumvent
the existing enforcement procedures. Instead of the commissioner issuing an order
to initiate enforcement, a tenant would
withhold rent and the case would then be
taken into court by the landlord for ejectment, nonpayment of rent, or both. Orders
would be forthcoming, not from a commissioner but from a judge, and judicial
4. For e:cample, 8ee: New York Real Property Actions Law, McKinney Consol.Laws,
ce. 81, 769 et seq.; Cal.Civ.Code sec.
1942; N.Dak.Century Code sec. 47-1613. Bee also Peters v. Kelly (1968), 98
N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635, which discusses n City of Newark ordinance en-

533

definition of terms in the housing code
would supplant administrative regulation.
Some states recognize rent withholding
in considering the problems of substandard
housing; however, those states have done
so by legislation. 4 Neither the legislature
nor the common council of Milwaukee has
adopted any legislation from which this
court can infer an intent that rent withholding under an oral month-to-month lease
agreement be utilized as a means of enforcing the housing code.
We are of the opinion that the defendant
does not have an affirmative defense based
upon alleged violations of the Milwaukee
Housing Code; and there was, therefore,
no prejudicial error committed by the trial
court in refusing to admit evidence based
upon that contention.
Judgment affirmed.

STATE ex rei. Joseph ZUPANCIC,
Respondent,
v.
Mathias F. SCHIMENZ, Inspector of Buildings of the City of Milwaukee,
et aI., Appellants,
Sampson Enterprises, Inc., Defenda,nt.
No. 51.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
March 3, 1970.

Landowner's proceeding for mandamus
to compel city and its building inspector to
grant building permit to construct car wash.
acted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40 :48-2.12a
et seq. which, inter alia, empowers a director, with the approval of the municipal
council, to apply for the appointment of
R. rent receiver for the purpose of collecting the rents and applying the same
to required repairs.
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The city sought by counterclaim to enforce
a declaration of restrictions and prayed for
an Injunction. The Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, Robert M. Curley, J., dismissed the counterclaim and granted a writ
requiring issuance of the permit, The city
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hallows, C.
J., held that a declaration of restrictions
arising out of negotiations and an agreement between homeowners and developers
was not an illegal contract to which the
city was a party merely because only the
city could enforce restrictions; at most, the
city was a third-party beneficiary protecting the public interest, and that the purchase of the land was subject to the recorded restrictions and the purchaser accordingly was not entitled to a building
permit merely because, after the permit
was issued and before it was revoked, he
made a $20,000 down payment on equipment.
Reversed with directions to deny writ
and grant injunction enjoining construction
of building in violation of restrictions.

4. Zoning e::>160

II

"Conditional zoning" properly understood involves only adopted zoning ordinance which provides either that rezoning
becomes effective immediately with automatic repealer if specified conditions are
not met within set time limit or that zoning
becomes effective only upon conditions being met within time limit.
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I. Municipal Corporations
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Municipality may not surrender its
g0vernmental powers and functions or thus
inhibit exercise of its police or legislative
powers.
2. Zoning e::>1, 160

Contract made by zoning authority to
zone or rezone or not to zone is illegal and
ordinance is void.
3. Zoning

~160

When city itself makes agreement with
landowner to rezone, this is contract zoning and contract is invalid, but if agreement
is made by others than city to conform
property in way or manner which makes
it acceptable for requested rezoning and
city is not committed to rezone, it is not
contract zoning in true sense and is not
vitiated if otherwise valid.

Where rezoning was in public interest
and not solely for benefit of developer, it
was not illegal spot zoning.
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8. Zonl ng e::>35

"Spot zoning" is usually understood
to be zoning by which small area situated
in larger zone is purportedly devoted to use
inconsistent with use to which larger area is
restricted.
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9. Zoning e::>63

a

Uniformity provIsIOn of zoning statutes did not require district of any minimum
size and did not require absolute uniformity
with other similar districts but only uniformity within each district, and required
reasonable uniformity rather than identical
similarity. W.S.A. 62.23(7) (b).
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Where deed restrictions which prevented parcel owner from building car
wash were of record when he purchased
parcel, both owner and building inspector
had constructive knowledge of deed restrictions but there was no waiver of enforcement of restrictions by issuance of permit
to construct car wash where inspector. had
no authority or intent to waive enforcement.
13. Covenants €=>103(3)

Building inspector had no authority to
waive enforcement of deed restrictions
which city had power to enforce.
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wash and on other grounds. It also sought
in its counterclaim to enforce the restrictions and prayed for an injunction. After
a hearing, the trial court dismissed the
counterclaim and granted a peremptory writ
requiring a building permit to be issued.
The city appeals.
John J. Fleming, City Atty., Wallace E.
Zdun, John F. Cook, Asst. City Attys., Milwaukee, of counsel, for appellants.
Peregrine, Schimenz, Marcuvitz & Cameron, Hugh R. Braun, Milwaukee, for respondent.
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The respondent Joseph Zupancic sought
a writ of mandamus to require the appellants City of Milwaukee and its building
inspector Mathias F. Schimenz to grant him
a building permit to construct a car wash
in the River Bend Shopping Center in the
city of Milwaukee. The city defended on
the ground a declaration of restrictions
prohibited the use of the property for a car

HALLOWS, Chief Justice.
The basic issue before the trial court and
on this appeal is whether a declaration of
restrictions limiting the use of the land involved was a part of a contract to rezone
the property and therefore was invalid.
On May 11, 1955, the common council of
the city of Milwaukee approved a plat of
the River Bend Shopping Center and provided that any future division of the lots
would be subject to its approval. Part of
this area was zoned "neighborhood shopping" and part "local business." In 1961
the shopping-center developers desired a
change of zoning from neighborhood shopping to local business for a parcel of land
210 by 200 feet in order to sell it for use as
a bowling alley. The request for zoning
was referred to the city plan commission of
Milwaukee which held hearings thereon.
The home owners to the south of this area
were opposed to the change in zoning but
not to a bowling alley. When these objections developed, the matter was laid over
pending negotiations between the home
owners and the developers.
Out of these negotiations arose an agreement that the developers would limit the use
to a bowling alley of the land to be rezoned.
A declaration of restrictions was drafted
which provided that although the parcel
was zoned local business, the only local
business use permitted "shall be a bowling
alley enterprise housed in a building not to
I _
? '11)
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exceed 42,000 square feet in area and to include a restaurant and cocktail lounge."
Any other use of the land was limited to
uses permitted under the then neighborhood-shopping zoning. The declaration also provided a buffer planting strip, certain
structural requirements, the placement of
air-conditioning equipment, and a fence
to prevent pedestrian access to the shopping center from Honey Creek Drive on
the south. The declaration stated the restrictions were for the benefit of the city
of Milwaukee, were to be enforced by the
city by injunction, were to run with the
land, and were binding until January 1,
1982, a period of about 20 years.
At the meeting before the city plan commission, the attorney for neighbors expressing concern about the validity of the
restrictions asked that the declaration be
submitted to the city attorney for his opinion. And, at the conclusion of the meeting, the city plan commission recommended the passage of the rezoning ordinance
which changed the zoning from neighborhood shopping to local business. Two
days later the declaration of restrictions
was executed and on the following day the
staff report of the commission recommending passage was sent to the committee on streets-zoning of the common
council. On August 2nd the declaration of
restrictions was recorded and one week
later on August 9th the rezoning ordinance
became effective.
A few weeks later on August 27th the
common council by resolution divided a
plated lot to create the desired parcel for
the bowling alley. The resolution provided
that compliance with the restrictions was a
condition of the division which created from
the rezoned 21O-by-200-foot area the parcel
sold for the bowling alley and a surplus
parcel of land approximately 190 feet north
and south and 42 feet wide east and west.
This smaller piece rezoned local business
and restricted by the declaration became,
with the land to the west zoned neighborhood shopping, Parcel G which had a front-

age on the north of 107 odd feet and a depth
varying from 175 to 190 feet to the south.
On January 1st, 1968, the respondent and
two others made an offer to purchase Parcel G which offer was accepted. The sale
was conditioned upon the respondent's obtaining a permit to build a car wash on the
east 42 feet of Parcel G zoned local business which permitted a car wash. The
offer to purchase was subject to deed
restrictions of record. At the time, however, the respondent did not know of the
deed restriction which would not permit a
car wash; and seller did not remember it.
On February 2d, 1968, the respondent
applied to the appellant building inspector
for a building permit to use the east 42 feet
of Parcel G for a car wash and on February
21st the permit was issued. Two days later
the respondent entered into a $66,000 contract to buy car-wash equipment and made
a down payment of $20,000. About a week
later on March 4th the building permit was
revoked because the alderman of the ward
wanted the common council to restudy the
zoning of this small piece of land. On
October 18th, 1968, the common council
rezoned the east 42 feet of Parcel G from
local business back to neighborhood shopping upon the recommendation of the city
plan commission. On November 27, 1968,
the petition for a writ of mandamus in the
circuit court was filed.
The city argues the declaration of restrictions is valid because: (1) It is not an incident of a contract for zoning or a condition of rezoning, and (2) this type of contract relating to zoning is not illegal as a
matter of law. The city urges that for a
declaration of restrictions to be an incident
of zoning the municipal body which passes
the zoning ordinance must be a party to the
contract to zone and here the common
council of Milwaukee only acted upon the
recommendations of the planning commission. Zupancic argues the declaration ~s
part of an illegal zoning contract and If
valid, the city waived its rights to enforce
the restriction.
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[1, 2] A contract made by a zoning authority to zone or rezone or not to zone is
illegal and the ordinance is void because a
municipality may not surrender its governmental powers and functions or thus
inhibit the exercise of its police or legislative powers. 62 c.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 139, p. 281; Baylis v. City of
Baltimore (1959), 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d
429; Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township
of Madison (1961), 68 N.J.Super. 197, 172
A.2d 40, affirmed 78 N.J.Super. 471, 189
A.2d 226. See also Trager, Contract Zoning (1963), 23 Md.L.Rev. 121; Comment,
The Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning
(1965), 12 UCLA L.Rev. 897. In Houston
Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products
Credit Association (1952), 9 N.J. 122, 87
A.2d 319, the owner made an agreement
with the city to restrict the use of his land
if the city rezoned it so long as the rezoning was effective. The court held the
agreement void because it violated public
policy. In Baylis the court held an ordinance invalid which rezoned a parcel from
residential to commercial use on the condition the agreement between the owner
and the city restricting the parcel to a
funeral-horne use was executed and recorded so as to run with the land. Contract
zoning is illegal not because of the result
but because of the method.
In the instant case, there is no agreement
with the city. Neither its common council
nor the city plan commission agreed to rezone. The facts give rise to an agreement only between the developers and the
home owners respecting the use of the property if it was rezoned by the city. The
rezoning per se did not require the conditions demanded by the home owners.
True, the developers and the home owners
expected favorable action by the city plan
commission but this was based on two factors: (1) No objection to the rezoning
under the circumstances by the home
owners, and (2) the proposed rezoning was
good-land use and consistent with the developing character of the neighborhood.

When a zoning authority does not make
an agreement to zone but is motivated to
zone by agreements as to lise of the land
made by others or by voluntary restrictions
running with the land although suggested
by the authority, the zoning ordinance in
some jurisdictions is valid and not considered to be contract or conditional zoning.
The leading case for this view is Church
v. Town of Islip (1960), 8 N.Y.2d 254, 203
N.Y.S.2d 866, 168 N.E.2d 680. While this
case has been criticized, it has in its home
state been followed and expanded. Point
Lookout Civic Ass'n et al. v. Town of
Hempstead (1960) , 12 A.D.2d 505, 207 N.
Y.S.2d 121; Longdowd Corp. v. Straight
Improvement Co. (1963), 39 Misc.2d 1005,
242 N .Y.S.2d 260; Matter of City of New
York (Rosedale Avenue) (1963), 40 Misc.
2d 1076, 243 N.Y.S.2d 814; see also Walus
v. Millington (1966), 49 Misc.2d 104, 266
N.Y.S.2d 833.
The virtue of allowing private agreements to underlie zoning is the flexibility
and control of the development given to a
municipality to meet the ever-increasing
demands for rezoning in a rapidly changing area. A quite similar case sustaining
the validity of such zoning is Sylvania
Electric Products, Inc. v. City of Newton
(1962), 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118,
wherein the court although recognizing
the close connection existing between voluntarily imposed restrictions and a rezoning ordinance held the rezoning was
a legislative act without conditions and
valid.
The instant facts find almost their counterpart in Bucholz v. City of Omaha (1963),
174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270. The city
of Omaha rezoned land from residential
use to a commercial use so the owner
could develop a shopping center. After
the rezoning, the city approved a protective covenant limiting the use to which
the property could be put. This agreement
was sustained although the court intimated
it was willing to strike down contract zoning when the evidence showed a bargain
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between the applicants and the city. In
the view of the court the rezoning was
not the result of an agreement but of assurances on the part of the landowner that
he would restrict his land use if the property were rezoned. In Maryland a valid
distinction is made between cases where
the contract is made between the developer
and the zoning authority and cases where
the contract is made between the developer
and a city plan committee or a body which
recommends zoning but does not have the
authority to zone. City of Greenbelt v.
Bresler (1967), 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d
1; Pressman v. City of Baltimore (1960),
222 Md. 330, 160 A.2d 379; Town of
Somerset v. County Council of Montgomery County (1962), 229 Md. 42, 181 A.2d
671.
[3,4) We hold that when a city itself
makes an agreement with a landowner to
rezone the contract is invalid; this is
contract zoning.
However, when the
agreement is made by others than the
city to conform the property in a way
or manner which makes it acceptable for
the requested rezoning and the city is
not committed to. rezone, it is not contract zoning in the true sense and does
not vitiate the zoning if it is otherwise
valid. This latter situation is sometimes
confused with conditional zoning. But
conditional zoning properly understood involves only an adopted zoning ordinance
which provides either: (1) The rezoning
becomes effective immediately with an
automatic repealer if specified conditions
are not met, within a set time limit, or
(2) the zoning becomes effective only
upon the conditions being met within the
time limit. See Schaffer, Vol. 11, The
Practical Lawyer, No.5, p. 43, Contract
and Conditional Rezoning; 5 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations, sec. 15.41. But
see, 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoning
(1%8), sees. 820, 8.21.

Some courts take the view advanced by
Zupancic that the facts in the instant case
give rise to a quid pro quo for rezoning al-

though no express contract with the zoning
authorities can be proved. This "implied
contract" arises from the fact the connection between rezoning and the recording
of restrictions at or soon after the rezoning
which condition the lands for rezoning and
motivate the enacting authorities is sufficient to render the rezoning and contract illegal. This view rests on a "but for" theory
of a bargain.
Rathkopf, in his work on zoning and
planning, states:
"Most courts take a practical view of
such situation and hold that the execution and filing of such assumption of additional restrictions were a quid pro quo
for the rezoning, i. e., zoning by contract.
The general rule in these jurisdictions
in which the validity of such covenants
has been litigated is that they are illegal.
The basis of such rule is that the rezoning
of a particular parcel of land upon conditions not imposed by the zoning ordinance
generally is the particular district into
which the land has been rezoned is prima
facie evidence of "spot zoning" in its
most maleficent aspect, is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan and
is beyond the power of the municipality.
Legislative bodies must rezone in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and
in amending the ordinance so as to confer
upon a particular parcel a particular district designation, it may not curtail or
limit the uses and structures placed or to
be placed upon the lands so rezoned differently from those permitted upon other
lands in the same district. Consequently,
where there has been a concatinated rezoning and filing of a 'declaration of restrictions' the general view (where the
question has been litigated) is that both
the zoning amendment and the restrictive
covenant are invalid for the reasons expressed above." Rathkopf, The Law of
Zoning and Planning, 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, Ch.
74-9, Deed Covenants and RestrictionsEffect of Zoning Ordinance.
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While this view of invalidity is taken by
the courts in New Jersey,l Maryland,2
Michigan,3 and Florida,' we think this is
a too rigid view. At the other extreme we
find State ex reI. Myhre v. City of Spokane
(1967), 70 Wash.2d 207, 422 P.2d 790, 7%,
taking the view "a zoning ordinance and
a concomitant agreement should be declared
invalid only if it can be shown that there
was no valid reason for a change and that
they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable,
and have no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare, or if the city is using the concomitant agreement for bargaining and sale
to the highest bidder or solely for the benefit of private speculators." See also Hudson Oil Co. of Mo. v. City of Wichita
(1964), 193 Kan. 623, 3% P.2d 27l.

[5-8] We think landowners may make
a contract which may legitimately be recognized by the zoning authorities as a motivation for rezoning but such zoning must meet
the test of all valid zoning, i. e., must be
for tlle safety, welfare, health of the community, sec. 62.23(7), Stats., and it should
not constitute spot zoning. Spot zoning per
se is not illegal and we do not consider the
rezoning in this case to be illegal spot
zoning because it was in the public interest
and not solely for the benefit of the developer. See Boerschinger v. Elkay Enterprises, Inc. (1966),32 Wis.2d 168, 145 N.W.
2d 108; Cushman v. Racine (1967), 39
Wis.2d 303, 159 N.W.2d 67. Besides, spot
zoning is usually understood to be zoning
"by which a small area situated in a larger
zone is purportedly devoted to a use inconsistent with the use to which the larger area
is restricted." Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. Co. (1940),235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W. 320,
128 A.L.R. 734. The record does not show
how the shopping-center area is zoned except that part is neighborhood shopping and
part local business. Without proof we canI. Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive
Products Credit Ass'n, Inc. (1952), 9
N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319.

2. Baylis v. City of Baltimore (1959), 219
Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429.

not say a .bowling alley-restaurant-cocktail
lounge complex is inconsistent with a Red
Owl Store, a gas filling station, and a
Marc's Big Boy Restaurant in the shopping
center.
[9] Zupancic's argument that the zoning violates sec. 62.23(7) (b), Stats., is also
without merit. This section does not require a district of any minimum size. The
uniformity provision does not require absolute uniformity with other similar districts but only uniformity within each district. This requires reasonable uniformity,
not identical similarity.

[10] In recognizing the legality of what
was done here, we caution that the procedure might well lead to an agreement with
the zoning authority which might be fatal.
We do not consider the declaration of restrictions, which only the city can enforce,
makes the city a party to the contract; at
most, tlle city is a third-party beneficiary
protecting the public interest. Where the
imposition of conditions on land development is desirable, it might better be done by
uniform ordinances providing for special
uses, special exceptions and overlaid districts. As stated in Cutler, Zoning Law and
Practice in Wisconsin, p. 27, sec. 8: "Conditions imposed in such cases have a
sounder legal basis because guidelines for
their imposition are spelled out in the ordinance."
[11] The instant case is not in effect
much different than the cases of gasoline
filling stations where the ordinance requires special permission for a permit to be
granted upon the meeting of certain standards established by a licensing or permit
agency. See J & N Corp. v. Green Bay
(1965), 28 Wis2d 583, 137 N.W.2d 434.
This technique of authorizing in the zoning
ordinance the plan commission or govern-

3.

Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co.
(1930), 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707.

4. Hartnett v. Austin (1956), Fla., 93 So.
2d 86.
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ing body to grant "special uses and conditional uses" on definite standards from the
automatic permissive uses listed in the
zoning ordinance is preferable to the method used in the instant case. The boundary areas of zones generally present
problems. The technique used in the instant case is an attempt to soften or taper
the periphery between differing automatic
uses. Flexibility might also be attained by
the use of floating zones or overlay districts in zoning ordinances. See Cutler,
supra; Anderson, supra, secs. 5.14-5.16;
also State ex reI. American Oil Co. v. Bessent (1965), 27 Wis.2d 537, 135 N.W.2d
317.

that calls for the issuance of the building
permit.
Judgment reversed, with directions to
deny the peremptory writ and grant an injunction enjoining Zupancic from constructing any building in violation of the
terms of the declaration of restrictions.

AMERY MOTOR CO., Inc., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Y.

(12,13] Zupancic argues the city has
waived its right to enforce the restrictions
on the use of the parcel because it granted
a building permit and he has changed his
position relying thereon. At the time the
permit was granted the deed restrictions
prohibited Zupancic from building a car
wash. These restrictions were not waived
by the building inspector's granting a building permit in the first instance. The inspector had no authority or intention to
waive enforcement of restrictions to confine the use to a bowling alley or uses permitted by neighborhood shopping for 20
years.
[14] It is claimed the building inspector
should have known and he had constructive
knowledge of the deed restrictions; but it
is likewise true that the respondent should
have known and had constructive knowledge of the deed restrictions. His purchase of the land was subject to recorded
restrictions. Bump v. Dahl (1965), 26
Wis.2d 607, 133 N.W.2d 295. Zupancic was
no more misled by the building inspector's
action than by his own ignorance and negligence in not ascertaining what restrictions
were on the land. He has made no improvements on the land and is not obligated
to go through with the purchase if a building permit is denied him. It is true he made
a $20,000 down payment on equipment but
we do not think under the circumstances

Warren W. COREY et al., Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,
I ndianhead Truck Line, I nc., Defendant,
UNLIMITED OPPORTUNITIES, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellants,
AGRICULTURAL INS. CO. et al., Third·
Party Defendant-Respondents.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
March 6, 1970.

Personal inj ury and property damage
actions arising from an explosion and fire
at a gasoline bulk plant. Owner-lessees. of
bulk plant brought a third-party action
against insurers of gasoline transporter alleging that they were additional insureds
under policies. The Circuit Court, Polk
County, Lewis J. Charles, J., entered judgment for insurers, and owner-lessees appealed. The Supreme Court, Hallows, C.
]., held that neither act of owner-lessees of
bulk plant in furnishing a key to unlock
pipes to tanks when no employee of pl~nt
was present nor act of furnishing defectIve
tanks and storage equipment which led. to
gasoline explosion while truck belongtng
to gasoline transporter was being unloaded
constituted a "use of truck during unloadi~g -operation" so as to make owner-Iesse~s
additional insureds under transporter's Itability policy.
Affirmed.
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its product to the plaintiff, in effect has resultcd in the appropriation of plaintiff's
market for such product in violation of
the principles of fair dealing which the
statute was intended to prevent.

[4] In support of this theory plaintiff attempts to read into the statute the explanatory statement of the purpose of the
legislation which was appended to the bill
by the sponsor thereof at the time of its
introduction in the Legislature. This statement related that the purpose of the bill
was: "* .. .. to insure an equitable basis
for competition between all licensed wholesalers of aJ.coholic beverages in N ew Jersey
and to pre\'ent any monopolistic freezing
out of one wholesaler by another by pre"enting the sale of certain products to
him." It is well settled, however, that
such a statement, not being in the nature
of a preamble to a statute, is "not to be
considered an index of legislative intent
in judicial exposition of the enactment."
Raymond v. Township of Teaneck, 118
NIL. 109, 191 A. 480, 481, (E. & A. 1936) ;
Flagg y. Johansen, 124 N.J.L. 456, 459, 12
A.2d 374 (Sup.Ct. 1940); Keyport & M.
P. Steamboat Co. v. Farmers Transportation Co., 18 N.J.Eq. 13, 24 (Ch. 1866), affirmed 18 N.J.Eq. at page 511 (E. & A.
1866); cf. Bass v. AIIen Home Improvement Co., 8 N.J. 219, 84 A.2d 720 (1951).

f'.J

'-J
00

namely, that what is prohibited by this
legislation is an act of arbitrary discrimination between wholesalers by a distiIler
in the sale of a nationally advertised product and that in order to grant the relief
provided for, the Director not only must
find that the complaining wholesaler or
distributor is able to pay for the product
ordered but that the distiller's refusal to
sell to him is discriminatory and arbitrary,
and the inquiry must be limited solely to
such considerations.
[8] Has there be~n such discrimination
here within the intendment of the statute?
Vve think not. We see no evidence anywhere in the statute of an intention to prevent a distiller, importer or rectifier from
seIling its own product directly to retailers if its business policy so dictates, provided it takes out a wholesale license pursuant to RS. 33 :1-2, 9, 11, N.].S.A. In
the instant case Park & Tilford took out
such a license, not because it desired to be
an independent wholesaler, but because it
could not otherwise, as a distiller, sell· its
own product directly to retail liquor dealers.

[9,10] Nor do we find any purpose in
the statute to prohibit such a producer
from acting as the exclusive distributor
or wholesaler of its own products. If a
contrary purpose were intended it should
[5,6] In any event, it is the legislative have been clearly expressed and not left
intent lvhich ultimately controls and we to mere conjecture. "\Ve are enjoined to
find nObhing in the act, nor for that matter interpret and enforce the legislative will
in the aforesaid statement, revealing an as written, and not according to some supintent to give to the Director the broad posed unexpressed intention." Camden v.
sweep of power for which the plaintiff Local Government Board, 127 N.JL. 175,
contends. The plaintiff, according to his liS, 21 A.2d 292, 294 (Sup.Ct. 1941);
interpretation of the statute, would have Burnson v. Evans, 137 N.].L. 511, 514, 60
the Director pass upon purported equitable, A.2d 891 (Sup.Ct. 1948).
of the
[11] TI1e apparent scope 0 f t h e statute
contractual
and ethical obligations
. . .
.
..
be f oun d'111 sectlOn
.
dIstIller to sell1ts product to vanous whole-.
.
111 questton IS to
1
salers and thus confer upon the DIrector th
f h' h b
"d' . .
.
.
a duty and power to regulate the distribuereo W IC
ars. ISCnm1l1atlOn 111 the
f th
d t f b
d tl
f sale of alcoholtc hquors by distillers,
·
t Ion 0
e pro uc ar eyon
1e scope a * * * .
.
"
the terms of the statute itself.
"of natlOn~lIy advertIsed brands
thereof to duly Itcensed wholesalers of
[7] What, then, is the scope of the Di- alcoholic liquors * * *." Thus it is
rector's power? We think the answer is still open to the distiller to sell directly
to be found in the construction of the to retail dealers if licensed so to do. It
statute .contended for by the defendant, and may, of course, sell indirectly through the
adopted by the Director in the instant case, medium of duly licensed wholesalers, if

r
t
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it so chooses, but in the latter event it may the plaintiff's petition (complaint) is acnot discriminate between such wholesalers. cordingly affirmed.
In this view it does not matter that here
For affirmance: Chief Justice VANthe plaintiff, Hoffman, had developed a DERBILT, and Justices CASE, HEHER,
market in the area before the distiller took OLIPHANT, WACHENFELD, BURLover; that was a matter for contractual ING and ACKERSON_7.
protection and involves legal or equitable
For reversal: None.
remedies which, under the plain intent of
the statute, the Director was without authority to apply.
[12, 13] Therefore, on the record before us, there was no discrimination within
the intendment of the statute. The defendant, Park & Tilford, made a policy decision to resume its former practice of
8 N.J. 386"
selling its product directly to retailers and V. F. ZAHODIAKIN ENGINEERING CORI
eliminating entirely the use of distributors
v. ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
or wholesalers in the northern part of the
OF CITY OF SUMMIT et al.
State. Accordingly, it terminated the disNo. A-55.
tributorship which it had given to the
Supreme Court of New Jersey.
plaintiff in Hudson County on a trial basis
and at the same time summarily terminated
Argued Nov. 26, 1951.
all other distributorships which it had
Decided Jan. 21, 1952.
created in the northern part of New Jersey. The fact that the distiller, Park &
PrOCeeding by V. F. Zahodlakln EngineerTilford, still operates t11rough wholesalers ing Corporation against Zoning Board of Adin the southern and. western parts of the justment of the City of Summit and another,
State, whose authorizations are limited to In lieu of certiorari, to review a denial of a
such areas, does not make its action with continuance of a zoning variance theretofore
granted to plaintiff. The Superior Court,
respect to the crowded northern coullties, Law DiYislon, 14 N.J.Super. 53;, 82 A.2d
where retailers are closer together, and 493, entered an adverse judgment, the plainmore easily reached, an arbitrary or unfair tiff appealed to the Superior Court, Appeldiscr,[mination against its former distribu- late Division, and the case was certified on
tors in suoh counties whose authorizations motion of tlte Supreme Court. The Supreme
had been confined thereto.
Court, Heher, J., held that the action of tile
Zoning board of adjustment in granting the
[14] As the Director properly observed, exceptioll on conditions was coram nOll juwe are not concerned here with possible dice and '·oid.
Judgment afilrmed.
remedies, if any, the plaintiff may have relating to fair trade practices or breach of
I. MunIcipal Corporations ~621.14
contract, our inquiry being limited solely
Function of statutory variance from
to the applicability of the statute in queszoning ordinance is relief against unnecestion. The arrangement between the parties
sary and unjust invasion of right of private
hereto was on a trial basis and if the plainproperty which under special conditions
tiff desired a more substantial agreement
to protect his initial investment he should and singular circumstances would ensue
from burden of general rule. L 1949, c.
have contracted therefor.
242, § 1; RS. 40 :55-39, suM c, N.].S.A.
These conclusions render it unnecessary
to consider the questions raised by the de- 2. MunicIpal Corporations ~621.40
Power to authorize statutory variance
fendant with respect to the constitutionality
from general regulation of zoning ordiof the aforesaid supplemental statute.
, The order of the Director of the Division nance is power to vary application of genof Alcoholic Beverage Control dismissing eral regulation to serve statutory policy to
avoid unjust and unnecessary invasion of
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right of private property. L. 1949, c. 242,
§ 1; RS. 40 :55-39, subd. c, N.J.S.A.
3. Municipal Corporations

~621.14

Whatever duration of variance from
zoning ordinance, whether for definite or
an indefinite pedod, variance must ex necessitate be grounded in pelicy of statute.
L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS. 40 :55-39, suoo.
c, N.J.S.A.
4. Municipal Corporations ~621.23

10. !\lrunlclpal Corporations <$:::>S2L40

Purported contract between zoning
board of adjustment and landowner granting landowner Special privilege or exemption on condition to use premises under
variance to general rule as to use restrictions binding upon all other landowners
within zone was ultra vires and all proceedings to effectuate' contract were coram non
judice and void. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS.
40 :5S-39,subd. c, N.J.S.A.

Variant use of property under zoning
ordinance does not derive validity from
mere time limitation.
5. Municipal Corporations ~621.40

Where zoning board. of adjustment
made no pretense of adherence to statutory
principle in granting variance, but intended
to provide measure of relief outside of
statute itself and in direct conflict with
statutory terms, action of quasi judicial
board of adjustment constituted excess of
jurisdiction. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS. 40:
55-39, subd. C, N.J.S.A.

f'0

'V

Where zoning bo-ard of adjustment
contracted to permit variance on condition,
which action effectuated contractual undertaking for private benefit in disregard of
zoning ordinance, and special hardship from
unique circumstances within principle of
statute permitting variance was not determined, and considerations outside statute
controlled, proceedings of board did not
constitute judicial inquiry and adjudication
within frame of statute. L. 1949, c. 242,
§ 1; R.S. 40:55-39, suDd. c, N.J.S.A.

12. Certiorari <$:::>14
Certiorari affords means of containing
Zoning is exercise of police power to
statutory tribunals within their jurisdiction.
serve common good and general welfare.
13. Municipal Carporations ~621.4B, 621.59
7. Constitutional Law ~50
Where zoning board of adjustment
Legislative function may not be surlacked jurisdiction to enter into contract
rendered or cnrtailed by hargain or its exgranting special exception on condition to
ercise controlled by considerations which
zoning regulations and action of board did
enter into law of contraCts.
not constitute inquiry and adjudication
B. Municipal corporations ~601(9), 621.21
within statutory limits, resolution of board
Use restriction placed on property purporting to authorize exception was utunder zoning regulatio-n must have general terly void and subject to collateral attack
application and power to grant variance at any time as well as direct review within
may not be exerted to serve private interest time prescribed by law. L. 1949, c. 242, §
merel y and requirement that use restric- 1; R.S. 40 :55-39, subd. c, N.J,S.A.
ti01.1 have general application to property of
zoned district may not be subverted to that 14. Municipal corporations <$=621.12
Expenditure of moneys by landowner
end.
to render lands suitable for prohibited use
does not operate to validate void grant by
9. Municipal Corporations ~621.40
It was not within authority of zoning zoning hoard allegedly permitting such use.
board of adjustment to vest in landowner
15. Municipal Corporations ~621.13
by contract special privilege or exemption
Where zoning board of adjustment
on condition to use premises in violation granted exception on certain conditions to
of general use restriction }1I1der zoning terms of zoning ordinance and action of
regulations binding upon all other land- board was coram non judice and void and
owners within zone. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; landowner was presumed to know of inR.S. 40:55-39, subd. c, N.J.S.A.

6. Municipal corporations ~601(3)

,

II. Municipal Corporations <$:::>621.40

V. F. ZAHODIAKIN ENG. CORP. v. ZONING BOARD OP ADJUST,
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mit adopted June! 16, 1942 and July 7,
1942 on the recommendation of the local
board of adjustment, purporting to grant
on certain terms and conditions an "exception" to the terms of the local zoning ordinance fOr the use of part of plaintiff's lands
and the buildings thereon, remooeled or
reconstructed as therein particularized, for
16. Municipal Corporations <$:::>621.13
the "proonction, finishing and assembling"
Governmental zoning power may not
of "small mechanical precision devices and
be forfeited Iby action of local officers in
instruments~ and the associated lahoratory
disregard of statute and zoning ordinance.
for research and experimental purposes,
L. 1949, C. 242, § 1; R.S. 40 :55-39, subd.
and affirming <11e action of the local board
c, N.J.S.A.
of adjustment taken February 20, 1951
17. Municipal Corporations <Il=621.12
refusing a continuance of the exception for
Landowner, who contracted with zon- this industrial use on the grounds (a) that
ing board of adjustment for special exemp- such use "would be substantially detrimental
tion on condition from zoning regulation, to the public good and would impair the
would be presumed to have known of in- intent and purpose" of the local "zone plan
validity of exception and to have acted at and zoning ordinance," and (b) there was
his peril. L. 1949, c. 242, § 1; RS. 40: no showing of undue hardship.
55-39, subd. c, N.J.S.A.
The case is here by certification on our
own motion of an appeal taken by plaintiff
lB. Municipal Corporations <$:::>621.25
Where landowner, who obtained special to the Appellate Division of the Superior
exception on condition from zoning regula- Court.
The locus comprises ill excess of 15 acres
tions, agreed that in event of sale or transfer of lands to other than certain named of land situate at the southwest corner of
parties or discontinuance of 'Permitted use the Morris and Essex Turnpike and River
subject to renewal by board of adjustment, Road in the City of Summit, bounded on
exception should be automatically terminat- the west Iby the Passaic River, in an "A-10
ed, and landowner discontinued use, merely Residential Zone" delineated by the local
because refusal of extension of exception zoning ordinance for single-family dwellwould prevent advantageous sale by land- ings. The application for the exception
owner, refusal of extension was not arbi- was made by plaintiff, but titl e to the lands
was not taken until June 25, 1942, presumtrary exercise of discretion by board.
ably under a contract of sale whose consummation was conditioned upen the prior
Stanley W. Greenfield, Elizabeth, argued allowance of a variance or exception in the
terms indicated. The exception was conthe cause for appellant.
ditioned thus: "In the event of the bankFred A. Lorentz, Newark, argued the ruptcy or judicial determination of insolcause for respondent (Peter C. Triolo, vency of the grantee, or the sale or transfer
Summit, attorney).
of the premises to any person other than
The opinion of the court was delivered by the present stockholders of the grantee,
their personal representatives, heirs at law
HEHER, J.
and next of kin, legatees and devisees or a
The plaintiff landowner complains of the transferee by operation of law," or "in the
judgment of the Superior Court, in a civil event that use of the premises for the laboproceeding at law in lieu of certiol·(J.I'i pUr- ratory and business activities of the grantee
suant to Rule 3 :81-2 of this court, adjudg- as described a:bove or such future laboraing as ultra. vires and void two resolutions tory and business activities as may be neof the governing body of the City of Sum- cessarily incidental thereto is discontinued,

validity of exception when he expended
money to make lands suitable for prohibited
use, want of fundamental power by board
to grant variance could not be indirectly
supplied by application of doctrine of estoppel in pais as elements of estoppel were
wanting.

86 A.2d-9
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the right to use the premises for the non- copy of a deed of conveyance of the lands
residential purposes set forth in this para- to plaintiff "embodying the foregoing covgraph shall terminate; provided, however, enants and restrictions," and that it be rethat such use may be continued thereafter quired that the property "be landscaped and
to the extent, in the manner and for the maintaine<i as a. park, as agreed by" plainperiod authorized by" the local board of tiff. The governing body, by resolution
adj ustment "in its discretion, reasonably adopted June 16, 1942, approved the recexercised, and may be continued without ommendation of an exception to plaintiff
such authorization if the premises are at thus made "subject to limitations, restricthat time situated in a district designated tions and agreements" as therein set down.
by" the zoning ordinance "as a business or The resolution of July 7 ensuing approved
industrial district." There were require- an amendment recommended by the board
ments that the plaintiff corporation or the of adjustment to provide for the incorpora"occupant of the p, emises," as the case tion of the foregoing terms and conditions
may be, submit to the local board of adjust- in the deed of conveyance as "covenants
ment written bi-annual reports "describing and restrictions," an<i for the landscaping
the nature of its business and industrial and maintenance of the "property ... * *
operations on" the premises "and certi fy- in such a way as to give it the appearance
ing * * * that the foregoing restrictions of a private park," in keeping with plainand limitations are being adhered to," and tiff's undertaking. The conveyance to
also that the deed of conveyance to the plaintiff was conditioned accordingly.
plaintiff corporation thereafter to be made
The grava-nen of the complaint is that,
contain the foregoing conditions as coven- in reliance upon the "variance" so proants and agreements ;by the grantee, for vided, plaintiff acquired title to the lands,
itself, its successors and assigns, "and for and thereafter, in 1943, under permits
the benefit of the grantor, the City of Sum- issued by the local authority, erected a
mit, N ew Jersey, the owners of residential brick building thereon "especially designed
properties abutting the premises and neigh- for its laboratory, industrial and manufacboring residential properties, situated in the turing purposes" and a building providing
area of Summit, New Jersey, known as the facilities for its employees, and has since
'Canoe Brook Parkway' area, their heirs, made such use of the premises, amI the
personal representatives, successors and refusal of a continuance of the Val ;ance
assigns;" also these further conditions: would defeat an advantageous sale of the
that for a period of 20 years from the date lands presently made by plaintiff conditionof the delivery of the deed of cOlFcyance ~d upon its continuance and in the circumto the plaintiff corporation, except as pro- stances is capricious, arbitrary and unreavided in the granted exception, no building sonable. One of the conditions attached
then on the premises or thereafter erected to the variance is in part a restraint upon
thereon shall be used for any purpose other alienation; and its excision is prayed 011
than as a detached one-family private resi- that account. The City of Summit was
dence or as a garage used in connection given leave to intervene as a party defendwith such residence; and that in case of ant. The board of adjustment and the city
subdivision the lots and buildings shall meet each filed an answer and counterclaim
the minima as to size and floor area therein praying that the resoilltion of the board of
prescribed, and no building or structure adjustment purporting to grant the variance
shall ,be ere·cted on the premises "within in qnestion and the approving resolutions
200 feet easterly of the east bank of the of the governing body be adjudged null and
Passaic River" without the written approval void as excesses of power, and, at all
of the board of adjustment. The board of events, that the variance be adjudged teradjustment also recommended that no build- minated by reason of the discontinuance
ing permit be issued to plaintiff until there on January I, 1950, of plaintiff's "industrial
was filed with the city derk a certified and business activities" on the premises, a.nd

V. r. ZAHODIAKIN ENG. OORP. v. ZONING BOARD OF, ADJUST.
Cite as 8'6 A.2d 127

for violations of the conditions in certain
particulars which need not be stated. The
cessation of the permitted variant use is
established ;by the proofs. Indeed, that
seems to be conceded. Plaintiff had more
than 200 employees in the prosecution of
the enterprise at the time of the grant of
the variance, but only three or four in May,
1950 and thereafter. Manufacturing was
discontinued.
The mere recital of the circumstances
demonstrates the vice of the purported exception cited by the landowner. The action thus taken was COra11t IW,. ju.dice and
void. The local authority di<i not undertake to grant a variance from the terms
of the ordinance grounded in the statutory
consideration of "unnecessary hardship,"
or an exception according to a standard
set by the ordinance in keeping with the
statutory policy (e. g. Schnell v. Township
Committee of Ocean, 120 N.J.L. 194, 198
A. 759 (Sup.Ct. 1938)), but rather to confer
an exception extra the statute and the ordinance to serve the interests of the land
owner in matters foreign to the principle
and policy of zoning as declared by the
statute and invoked thy the ordinance. The
action constituted a special exemption from
the operation of the zoning regulation for
a limited period pursuant to an agreement
made between plaintiff and the local authority prior to the conveyance of the lands
under the cited contract providing for a
transfer of the title only in the event of the
grant of a variance permitting the forbidden use. There was no finding of undue
hardship. Indeed, the action under review
was not professed to be an exercise of the
statutory power to authorize a variance
from the general regulation where, due to
"special conditions a literal enforcement
of the zoning ordinance would result in
unnecessary hardship." R.S. 40 :55-39, c,l
N.J.S.A.

[1-5J The function of the statutory
variance is relief against the unnecessary
and unjust invasion of the right of private
property which under the special condiI. The present pl'o;ision is designed to relieve against "peculiar and exceptional

N.J.

131

tions and singular circumstances would
ensue from the burden of the general rule.
The power is to vary in such circumstances
the application of the general regulation to
serve the statutory policy. Brandon v.
Montclair, 124 N.J.L. 135, 11 A.2d 304
(Sup.Ct. 1940), affirmed 125 N.J.L. 367, 15
A.2d 598 (E. & A. 1940); Potts v. Board
of Adjustment of Princeton, 133 N.J.L.
230,43 A.2d 850 (Sup.Ct. 1945). Whatever
the duration of the variance, whether for a
definite or an indefinite period, it must ex
necessitate be grounded in the policy of the
statute. It is axiomatic that a variant
does not derive validity from a mere
limitation. Lynch v. Hillsdale, 136 N.
129, 54 A.2d 723 (Sup.Ct. 1947), affirmed
137 N.J.L. 280, 59 A.2d 622 (E. & A.
1948); Berdan v. City of Paterson, 1 N.
J. 199,62 A.2d 680 (19+9). Where, as here,
there is no pretense of adherence to the
statutory principle, but a design to provide
a measure of relief outside of the statute
itself and in direct conflict with its terms,
the action of the qll.(!si-judicial agency constitutes an excess of jurisdiction.

[6-10] Zoning is an exercise of the
police power to serve the common good and
general welfare. It is elementary that the
legislative function may not be surrendered
or curtailed by bargain or its exercise controlled by the considerations which enter
into the law of contracts. The use restriction must needs have general applicatic
The power may not be exerted to serve
vate interests merely, nor may the
pie be subverted to that end. Brandon v.
Montclair, supra; Appley v. Township
Committee of the T01.\'11ship of Bernards,
128 N.J,L. 195,24 A,2d B05 (Sup.Ct. 1942),
affirmed 129 N.J.L. 73, 28 A.2d 177 (E. &
A. 1942); CoIl ins v. Board of Adjustment of Margate City, 3 N.J. 200, 69 A.2d
708 (1949); Speakman v. Mayor and
Council of North Plainfield, 8 N.J. 250, 84
A.2d 715 (1951). It was not within the
province of the local authori ty here to vest
in the landowner by contract a special privilege or exemption to use its premises in
practical difficulties" and "exceptional and
undue hardship". L.1949, c. 242, p. 779.
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violation of the general rule binding upon
all other landowners within the zone.
Lynch v. Hillsdale, cited supra; Beckman
v. Township of Teaneck, 6 N.J. 530, 79 A.
2d 301 (1951). The purported contract was
"lI.ra vires and alI proceedings to effectuate
it were coram lion judice and utterly void.
Bauer v. City of Newark, 7 N.J. 426, 81 A.
2d 727 (1951).

licers in disregard of the statute and the·
ordinance. The public has an interest in
zoning that cannot thus be set at naught.
The plaintiff landowner is presumed tohave known of the invalidity of the exception and to have acted at his periJ.

[18] Even under the purported exception, the landowner cannot complain on
this score. As we have seen, it was agreed
[11,12] Here, the action taken was not tha.t in the event of the sale or tnnsfer of
a mere irregular exercise of the quasi- the lands other than to a stockholder of the
judicial function residing in the local au- plaintiff corporation, or the legal representhority. The proceeding was wholly be- tatives of a stockholder, or a transfer by
yond the statute. It was not designed to operation of la.w, or the discontinuance of
advance the statutory policy, but to ef- the permitted use on the lands, the excepfectuate a contractual undertaking for pri- tion should automatically terminate, subvate benefit in disregard of it. It consti- ject to renewal by the board of adjustment
tuted an arrogation of authority in de- "to the extent, in the manner and for the
fiance of the statute and the ordinance. period authorized" by the board "in its
Special hardship from unique circum- discretion, reasonably exercised." In the
stances within the principle of the statute circumstances, the refusal of an extension
and the ordinance was concededly not a of the exception cannot be said to be an arpoint of inquiry. Considerations dehors bitrary exercise of discretion. The prothe statute controlled. There was no pre- viso, related to the contextual design eventense of the exercise of the statutory func- tually to restore the residential character of
tion. Whim and caprice rather than the the area, contemplated a temporary rather
reason and spirit of the statute determined than an indefinite continuance during the
the course taken. There was a deliberate subsistence of the general rule; and it
breach of jurisdiction. The proceeding did would seem, according to the letter, that
not constitute a judicial inquiry and ad- once an extension was granted, however
judication within the frame of the statute. short the period, the power would be exCompare Hen dey v. Ackerman, 103 N.J.L. hausted. And the use itself was also made
305, 136 A. 733 (Sup.Ct. 1927); Petersen subject to modification. There is no 'basis,
v. Falzarano, 6 N.J. 447, 79 A.2d 50 (1951). not even the slightest, for branding the acCertiorari affords the means of containing tion as capricious. It is of no moment that
statutory tribunals within their jurisdic- the lands will bring a substantially greater
tion.
price if the non-conforming use be con[13-17] Thus, for want of jurisdiction tinued. The landowner was well aware of
Df the subject matter, the resolution pur- the limitations of the exception. I.t did not
porting to authorize the exception was ut- improve the lands on the faith of a promise
:erly void and subject to colIateral attack by the municipality to prolong the excepit any time as well as a direct review with- tion in the event of a sale. Quite the con.n the time prescribed by law. It is a corol- trary. The plant was organized to supply
ary to this that the expenditure of moneys the Navy with mechanical devices and instruments during World War II
Pre.0 render the lands suitable for the prolibited use does not operate to validate the sumably, the business was capitalized on
'oid grant. The w.ant of fundamental the basis of this limited user-so long as
lower cannot be indirectly supplied by the plaintiff retained ownership and devoted
.pplication of the doctrine of estoppel in the lands to the stated use .
'a·is. The elements of estoppel are wantIt suffices to add that the application for
l1g. The governmental zoning power may a continuance of the variance was ground.ot be forfeited by the action of local of- ed, not in the statutory principle of un-

necessary hardship,
ment embodied in
and the covenants
subsequent deed of
The judgment is

SCHLICHTING v. WINTER
N. J.
133
Cite as 86 A.2d 133
but rather in the agree- 4. InJunction <$=>58
the original resolution
Where right of a complainant to relief
and conditions of the by enforcement of a restrictive covenant
convey·ance.
is doubtful, an injunction to restrain vioaffirmed.
lation of covenant will be denied.

For affirmance: Chief Justice VANDERBILT and Justices CASE, HEHER,
OLIPHANT, WACHENFELD, BURLING and ACKERSON-7.
For reversal: None.

Joseph H. Galldielle, Hackensack, for
plaintiff.
Sidney Cohn, Palisades Park, for defendants.
GRIMSHA W,
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SCHLICHTING v. WINTER et al.
No. C-136.

SUperior Court of New Jersey
Chancery Division.
Jan. 8, 1952.
Charles B. Schlichting brought action
against Myrtle E, Winter and George P.
Winter to enjoin alleged violation of restrieti ve covenant. The Superior Court, Chan.
cery Division, Grimshaw, J. S. C., held that
violation by plaintiff of the very covenant
which he sought to have enforced against
defendants, was sufficient ground for denying relief sought by plalntiff.
Complaint dismissed.

I. Injunction <$=>109
The violation by plaintiff of the very
restrictive covenant which he sought to
have enforced against defendants, was of
itself sufficient ground for denying injunctive relief to enjoin defendants from violating the restrictive covenant.
2. Covenants e=>51(2)

Restrictive covenant against erection
of a builDing within 35 feet of front or
street line of realty, did not apply to line
of street at side of Corner lot in addition
to line of street on which the lot fronted.

3. Injunction <$=>62(1)
Equity will not aid one person to restrict another person in uses to which he
may lawfully put his realty, unless the right
to snch aid is clear.

J. s.

C.

This matter was before me on an application for an interlocutory injunction.
In the memorandum filed at that time 15
N.J.Super. 600, 83 A.2d 807, most of the
essential facts of the controversy were set
forth. I found that the plaintiff had failed
to establish the existence of a neighborhood
scheme of development and that his right
to relief was based upon his position as a
subsequent grantee from the common
grantor.
(1] At the final hearing it appeared
that the plaintiff Schlichting had violated
the very covenant which he seeks to have
enforced against the defendants. This of
itself is sufficient ground for denying the
relief which he seeks. DeGray v. Monmouth Beach allb House Co., 50 N.}.Eq.
329, 24 A. 388 (Ch. 1892); Roberts v.
Scull, 58 N.}.Eq. 396,43 A. 583 (Ch. 1899).
[2] There is, however, a further point
which requires comment at this time. In
the memorandum filed in connection with
the application for an interlocutory injunction, on the authority of Waters v. Collins,
70 A. 984 eCho 1895), affirmed without
opinion by the Court of Errors and Appeals, I held that a restriction against the
erection of a building within 35 feet of the
front or street line of the property, included, in the case of a corner lot, the line
of the street at the side of the lot as weI!
as the line of the street on which the lot
fronted. After further consideration, I am
now of the opinion that that conclusion
was erroneous. Were it not for the fact
that the defendants' lot is on a corner, there
would be no difficulty. Defendants' lot
fronts on Broad A venue and, under the restriction in her deed, she is required to
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What they need, if they are to prevail, is for us to rewrite the
, contract so that the town will agree to exempt the subject land from
any subsequent zoning legislation changing a multi-family dwelling
from a permissible to a conditionally permissible use in any and all R·3
residential zones in the town. But nothing either in the record before
us or in plaintiffs' arguments suggests that the addition of such a
provision is "indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties," 4
Williston Contracts § 610B at 533 (3d edt 1961); accord, Adkins v.
Adams, 152 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1945); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 143, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970), or that it was omitted by reason of
sheer inadvertence or because it was so obvious as to need no expression. And without that kind of showing we are unwarranted in imposing a contractual obligation upon the town by implication. Refinery
Employees' Union V. Continental Oil Co., 160 F.Supp. 723, 731
(W.n.La. 1958); Lippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 Cal.2d 136, 280
P.2d 775 (955); Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So.2d 658
(Fla.19S0); Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 NJ. 117, 130, 207
A.2d 522, 531 (1965).
This is not to say that in an appropriate case we might not read into
a contract a provision which, although not expressed within the four
corners of the document, was nonetheless obviously contemplated by
the parties when they made their bargain and is necessary to carry their
intentions into effect. In that situation, and subject to the parol
evidence strictures described in Golden Gate Corp. v. Barrington
College, 98 R.L 35, 199 A.2d 586 (1964), it is sometimes permissible
to remedy an inadvertent and clearly apparent omission by reading into
an otherwise integrated written contract what must have been intended
if the writing is to reflect the entire agreement of the parties. Myron V.
Union R.R., 19 R.1. 125,32 A. 165 (l895). But that is impermissible in
this case.
The conclusion we reach makes it unnecessary for us to consider
plaintiffs' further contentions that the February 1970 amendment to the
Westerly zoning ordinance impaired the obligations of their contract in
violation of art. 1, sec. 10 of the Federal Constitution, or that the town
should be estopped from contesting the validity of what under our
decision is a nonexistent provision of the May 1968 agreement.
The plaintiffs' appeal is denied and dismissed and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed.
Roberts, Ch. j., did not participate;

ANNOTATION
VALIDITY, CONSTRUCfION, AND EFFECT OF AGREEMENT
TO REZONE, OR AMENDMENT TO ZONING ORDINANCE,
CREATING SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS OR CONDITIONS NOT
APPLICABLE TO OTHER PROPERTY SIMILARLY ZONED

by
James D. Lawlor,J.D.

I.

INTRODUCTORY MATERiAL

§ 1. Preliminary matters:

(a1 Scope
(b1 Related matters
§ 2. Background, summary, and comment:
[a] Generally
[b1 Practice, ppinters
11.

AGREEMENTS

A.VALIDITY

§ 3. Contracting away governmental powers:

(al Held valid
[b] Held invalid
§ 4. Agreements with governmental bodies, persons, or organizations not
possessing final zoning authority:
(al Held valid
(b] Held invalid
§ 5. Conditional rezoning authorized by ordinance
§ 6. Reversion provisions
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. tural, a street system' would be required for the internal circulation of
traffic, and that to facilitate the establishment of such a street system they
would deed and dedicate such portion or portions of their property as
necessary for the establishment of
such streets, to the city for street and
highway purposes when requested to
do so, provided that the area was
rezoned to medium commercial uses,
the court affirming a decree ordering
a defendant landowner to specifically
perform his agreement to convey certain of his property for street purposes to the city. The court said that
the findings of fact of the lower court
showed that the property owners,. including the defendant, were desirous
II. Agreements
of rezoning their unimproved propA. Validity
erty from agricultural to medium
§ 3. Contracting away governmental commercial, a rezoning consistent
with the comprehensive plan previpowers
ously adopted by the city, and that
[a] Held valid
the city, after the signing but prior to
In the following case, an agreement the filing of the rezoning petition by
between property owners and a city the landowners, insisted that as a
in which the property owners agreed condition of rezoning, the owners
to dedicate portions of their lands for agree to the city's proposed street
a street system in return for the city's system plan and further agree, upon
rezoning their property for commer- the city's request, to deed and dedicial use was held valid, the court cate certain of their lands to the city
stating that an agreement concomi- to help put the plan into effect. The
tant to a rezoning should be held agreement in form did not expressly
invalid only if it could be shown that require the city to rezone, however,
there was no valid reason for a nor provide as to how and when the
street improvements would be inchange.
In Redmond v Kezner (1973) 10 stalled and at whose expense. The
Wash App 332, 517 P2d 625, the agreement, including the owner's obcourt held valid an agreement be- ligations as set forth therein, was,
tween several property owners and however, expressly conditioned upon
the city in which the property owners the area being rezoned. The court
agreed that in order to facilitate com- declared that the agreement concomimercial development of their land, tant with the rezoning in the case
which was at the time zoned agricul- before it was one to neutralize any
possible negative impact of the pro47. Model Land Development Code, posed use of the property, rather
than one seeking to extract some colProposed Official Draft No. I, § 2-312.

adopted ordinance as permissible
upon stated criteria after approval by
the local governing body. Such
amendments may be adopted only if
development at the proposed location
is essential or especially appropriate
in view of the available alternatives
within or without the jurisdiction, or
the development is development of
regional benefit, or could have been
granted a special permit, or there was
a mistake in the original ordinance in
regard to the property.47 The result of
these provisions, taken together,
would seem to be to make small-area
rezoning, or rezoning at the request
of the developer generally, more difficult to obtain.

1'0
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lateral benefit from the property
owner. As such, the court declared
that an amendment to a zoning ordinance and a concomitant agreement
should be declared invalid only if it
can be shown that there was no valid
reason for a change and that they
were clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, or if the city was using the concomitant agreement for bargaining
and sale to the highest bidder."
[b] Held invalid
In the following cases, agreements
to rezone property were held invalid
as attempts to illegally contract away
the zoning authority's governmental
powers.
An agreement to rezone conditioned upon the landowner's acquiescence in certain restrictive covenants
was held invalid and thus unenforceable in Houston Petroleum Co. v Automotive Products Credit Ass'n
(1952) 9 NJ 122, 87 A2d 319, the
court reversing an intermediate appellate decision and reinstating the
trial court's judgment dismissing a
complaint seeking to enforce the restrictive covenant by if1junction. The
common grantor of both plaintiff and
defendant had entered into an agreement with the city in 1947, whereby
in return for the city's reclassifying
the premises from a zoning classification unstated in the agreement to a
light industrial district, the grantor
would make the land subject to covenants and restrictions, including a 75foot setback from the highway, and a
provision that the setback area be
seeded and suitably planted, excepting such part of the area, not to
exceed 50 percent, as should be constructed for driveways and parking
space. The agreement also provided
that the covenants and restrictions

were to continue in effect so long as
the premises remained so zoned or
until 1977, provided that the covenants might be released or modified
at any time by an agreement between
the city and the owner or owners of
all or portions of the premises. Subsequently, an owner of the tract
agreed with the city to modify the
agreement as to 300 feet of the frontage on the state highway so as
relieve that portion of the trae
setback and seeding and
strictions. Still later, the
tion of the tract plus another
subject to the restrictions was conveyed to the petroleum company,
while an unreleased portion of the
tract was conveyed to the credit association. Nevertheless, a building permit was issued to the association for
the construction of a gasoline service
station in conformity with plans showing that the credit association intended to seed and plant less than 10
percent of the land area in the setback area, and to pave the balance of
the setback area, in violation of the
covenants and restrictions of record.
Among other objections to the complaint seeking if1junction, the credit
association asserted that the covenants were unenforceable
they were an illegal contract
city. The court noted at the
its discussion that it was clear
the evidence introduced at the trial
that the rezoning was effected 011
consideration of the making of thf
agreement for restrictive covenants
The court pointed out that it hac
previously held that the zoning powel
may not be exerted to serve privatI
interests merely, nor may the princi
pie be subverted to that end, so tha
a purported contract so made wa

48. Here, the court is applying the

kane (1967) 70 Wash 2d 207, 422 P2,
790, infra § 12[a].

reasoning of State ex reI. Myhre v Spo-
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ultra vires and all proceedings to ef- entered consent judgment embodying
fectuate it were utterly void. A munic- the terms of the contract. The land in
ipality cannot act as an individual question comprised about 1,475 acres
does, the court said. It must proceed of land in the township, which comin conformity with the statutes, or in prised about 40.2 square miles. Previthe absence of statute, agreeably to ously, the landowner had applied to
the common law, by ordinance or the planning board for subdivision of
resolution or motion, the court ex- its entire tract, which application was
plained. Contracts thus have no place approved by the planning board and
in a zoning plan, the court said, and a the township committee upon complicontract between a municipality and a ance with certain conditions pertainproperty owner should not enter into ing to sewage, roads, and in addition,
the enactment or enforcement of zon- that the developer furnish land and
ing regulations. The court pointed certain school facilities to the town.
out that the covenants in question not Subsequently, the township changed
only were imposed on the land for its ordinance governing lot sizes to
the purpose of obtaining its rezoning, increase the size of lots in the area in
but were themselves limited in dura- which the developer's lands were lotion to the period of time during cated, and final approval of some 129
which the premises remained zoned lots was denied on the ground that
for light industry, so that they seemed the developer had failed to meet the
related not to the benefit of individ- conditions concerning the furnishing
ual portions of the tract, but to zon- of school facilities and sewage reing for the entire tract. In addition, quirements. The developer filed suit
the couit noted that the recorded to compel final approval of the lots in
agreement provided for release or question, but this action was not
modification of the covenants at any tried, the developer and the town
time by an agreement to which the instead entering into a written concity was made a necessary party, a tract setting forth the terms under
provision again referable to· zoning. which the developer could proceed
Thus, it could be concluded, the with his development. This contract
court said, that the covenants in became the basis on which a consent
themselves exhibited a plan in contra- judgment was entered, and in reliance
vention of the public policy incorpo- upon which the developer spent aprated in the constitutional and statu- proximately $200,000 to redesign its
tory provisions relating to zoning. development, mostly in engineering
Such a contract, the court concluded, fees. At that point, when the developbeing violative of the public policy of ment plat was filed for final approval,
the state, was illegal and void, and the planning board and the township
thus unenforceable.
committee refused to grant final apAn agreement providing for rezon- proval on the ground that the consent
ing and subdivision of property in judgment was illegal and void. The
-0 return for the developer's agreement contract between the town and the
';C; to certain conditions was held invalid developer bound the developer either
Tl in Midtown Properties, Inc. v Madi- to pay certain moneys or to erect a
son (1961) 68 NJ Super 197,172 certain number of schoolrooms for
A2d 40, affd 78 NJ Super 471, 189 the board of education, not to erect
A2d 226, the court denying a motion more than 1,350 homes in one year,
to specifically enforce a previously and to donate to the township two
140
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locations for the erection of fire- which destroyed the master plan and
houses, police stations, and first aid resulted in haphazard or piecemeal
squads. In return, the town agreed zoning; the township surrendered its
that the terms of the contract were to inherent power, right, and duty to
constitute the approved subdivision keep its zoning and planning ordiplan, and that the township would nances mutable by making necessary
adopt in the future the necessary or- amendments or changes for the bendinances to implement and conform efit of the public; the township cast
to the contract and legalize the au tho- aside the statutory and ardinance rerized uses, that the township would quirements applicable to all persons,
designate certain areas within the in order to make a special deal with
tract as residential, certain areas for the plaintiff; the parties to the congarden apartments, certain areas for tract attempted to create special zonlight and heavy industry, and certain ing benefits for the developer conareas for commercial uses, that the trary to law and the public good; and
procedure for obtaining final ap- the contract recited that the township
pro val for the plat was that set forth had passed appropriate resolutions
in the contract, the developer being authorizing the making of a contract
required only to comply with existing when in fact no such resolution had
township ordinances and planning been adopted. The court observed
board regulations. that the town that the zoning power is an exercise
would not pass any regulations or of police power which the state has
ordinances in any way changing the granted to all municipalities, but
terms of the contract, nor would it which must be exercised in a reasonachange the building code require- ble manner and not arbitrarily, disments, that to the extent that the criminatorily, or capriciously. Further.
contract was in conflict with any stat- more, the court said that the zoning
ute, rule. ordinance, or regulation, power must be exercised so as to
the contract would govern. that the secure the public health, safety, mortown would be bound by the contract als, and welfare. In exercising the
for a period of 7 years, and would not power delegated to a municipality. it
amend or change any of its ordi- must act within such delegated power
nances or regulations in that period and cannot go beyond it, the court
of time, and that the contract would noted. So, the court said, where the
take the place of the statutory tenta- statute sets forth the procedure to be
tive approval. The court declared that followed, no governing body or subthe agreement was illegal and void on division thereof has the power to
its face, as an intent to do by contract adopt any other method of procewhat could only be done by following dure. The contract in question was an
statutory procedure. The court casti- attempt to subdivide the developer's
gated the agreement as the prostitu- property, to rezone it, and to bargain
tion of the zoning power delegated to away the township's delegated legislathe township officials for the special tive function contrary to Jaw, the
benefit of the developer. The evil court declared. Such a contract. in
which the court discerned in the con- attempting to give the developer spetract it summarized as follows: the cial benefits and privileges. was ultra
township. having adopted a master vires. void. and contrary to public
plan, could only amend it in accord- policy. the court said. If the contract
ance with law, and not by a contract and the consent judgment were to be
141
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held valid, the court would be putting accordance with the landowner's proits stamp of approval upon what was posal, and 5 years later demanded
obviously an unauthorized and illegal conveyance of the property to it for
exercise of the township's zoning park purposes, as provided in the
power, permitting special rules to be agreement preceding the rezoning.
established for the developer as The current owner of the land reagainst all other developers, and al- sis ted, on the ground that the agreelowing the parties to circumvent the ment procuring the rezoning was an
state law as well as the township's illegal one, and hence unenforceable,
own ordinances and regulations. In and the court agreed. The court sumconclusion, the court declared that it marized the exchange of letters bewas well established that while a pub- tween the landowner and the city as
lic body may make contracts, it can an offer to dedicate at a future date
only do so within its expressed or certain property in the city to public
implied powers, and that those who park purposes, or to convey it to the
deal with a municipality are charged city for such purposes on condition
with notice of the limitations imposed that the city amend its zoning ordiby law upon the exercise of that ,nance, a police measure, so as to
power.
meet the wishes of the offeror. Upon
An agreement by a city to rezone receipt of this offer the city council
property in consideration of a portion did amend its zoning ordinance so as
of the land so rezoned being re- to meet those wishes, the court constricted to park purposes, with the tinued, saying that there seemed to
city having an option to demand con- be no escape from the conclusion that
veyance of the strip at any time for a the exchange of letters constituted a
50-year period after the rezoning, was contract made for the purpose of
held invalid. In Knoxville v Ambrister unduly controlling or affecting official
(1953) 196 Tenn 1, 263 SW2d 528, conduct, and as such was plainly opthe court affirmed an order sustaining posed to public policy. Such agreea demurrer to the city's bill for a ments, the court said, strike at the
decree requiring the landowner to very foundations of government and
convey the land in question to it. An tend to destroy that confidence in the
exchange of letters between an attor- integrity and discretion of public acney for the previous landowner and tion which is essential to the preserthe city indicated that as an induce- vation of civilized society. Such an
ment in having the city council re- agreement, the court said, being illezone the land in question to a zone gal as against public policy, would not
permitting multiple-unit apartment be enforced at the instance of the
buildings, the landowner would main- city, which was a party to it.
tain a portion of the land for a period
Where the builder of an apartment
of 50 years as a grassed plot or lawn developer entered into an agreement
area for recreational purposes, and with a city's board of zoning appeals,
the landowner further agreed that that if the board would rezone the
upon demand of the city within that property to permit the construction
50-year period, the land could be of apartments, the developer would
conveyed to the city for park or recre- covenant to leave a buffer zone of
ational purposes for the use of the vacant property 200 feet wide bepublic. The city immediately thereaf- tween the apartment development
ter amended the zoni~g ordinance in and the nearest property owner, such
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covenant to run with the land and the other, attempting to enforce a
bind subsequent owners not bo build covenant which was in derogation of
apartments on the buffer strip, and the city's zoning ordinance. The city
the developer's successors in title, could not maintain conflicting positions, the court said, that is, on the
apparently ignorant of the covenant,
one hand, covenanting with private
despite having conducted a profes- parties to maintain certain zoning on
sional title search, made application the property, and on the other hand,
to the board to reduce the buffer subsequently and within the time covstrip to 100 feet to permit the con- enanted, enacting an ordinance construction of additional apartments, trary to the covenant. Contracts made
and, a new board having subsequently for the purpose of unduly controlling
taken office, the board was also igno- or affecting official conduct in the
rant of the existence of the covenant, exercise of legislative, administrative,
and permitted an amendment reduc- and judicial functions were plainly
opposed to public policy, the court
ing the buffer zone from 200 feet to
declared. The court noted that the
100 feet, it was held that both the consensus among other jurisdictions
covenant and the ordinance passed in which had considered the question
consideration of it were void and un- was that contracts entered into in
enforceable, in Haymon v Chatta- consideration of concessions made or
nooga (1973, Tenn App) 513 SW2d to be made favoring the applicant
185, the court affirming an order dis- were frowned upon as being against
missing an action seeking to enjoin public policy, which dictated that zonthe city from enforcing a stop work ing was an instrument of public auorder against construction of more thority to be used only for the comapartments on the land in question. mon welfare of all the people.
The court recited the facts, including
In State ex reI. Zupancic v Schithe fact that the successor in title to menz (1970) 46 Wis 2d 22, 174
the original developer apparently had NW2d 533, an agreement between
at least constructive notice of the the city itself and a landowner to
covenant, since it was duly recorded, rezone would be invalid, it was held,
and that he was advised by the build- the court, however, reversing a judging inspector that there might be ment granting a writ to require issusuch a covenant in existence, but nev- .ance of a building permit for land
ertheless proceeded to have plans covered by a declaration of restricdrawn and lay foundations for new tions executed prior to rezoning, on
apartments in the former buffer zone, other grounds. 49 In essence, the court
at a cost of approximately $35,000 at declared that while the agreement
the point that the city became aware before it, being an agre~ment beof the existing covenant and revoked tween a developer and neighboring
the building permit issued pursuant landowners, made enforceable by the
to the amended zoning ordinance. city by injunction, was enforceable
The court said that it agreed with the because the agreement itself did not
opinion of the trial court that the city directly involve the city, a contract
had placed itself in the untenable made by a zoning authority to zone
position of, on the one hand, finding or rezone or not to zone would be
that the property should be rezoned
49. § 4 [a], infra.
to allow further construction, and on
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illegal, and the ordinance void, because a municipality may not surrender its governmental powers and
functions or thus inhibit the exercise
of its police or legislative powers.
Contract zoning is illegal, the court
declared, not because of the result,
but because of the method.

[a] Held valid
In the following cases, agreements
between landowners and government
bodies or organizations not having
final zoning authority, restricting the
use of land proposed for rezoning,
See Griffin v County of Marin were held valid as not involving an
(1958) 157 Cal App 2d 507, 321 P2d impermissible contract by the govern148, where, in an action by the land- mental body having the final authority
owners against the county to have an in zoning matters.
amendment to the zoning ordinance
A set of agreements between a city
rezoning their property from light and a developer, whereby the city
industrial to single-family residence agreed to recommend rezoning to the
zone declared invalid, it was held that county zoning authorities, in return
the trial court properly refused to for the developer's agreement to limit
admit evidence to the effect that when the development density of the rethe landowners purchased the prop- zoned land, as well as an agreement
erty and the board of supervisors to donate a 3.33-acre lot to the city
rezoned it, the landowners had repre- for use as a park and recreational
sented that they intended to use the area, were held valid in Greenbelt v
properly for a woodworking furniture Bresler (1967) 248 Md 210, 236 A2d
shop and that they would reside on I, the court, however, affirming a
the premises and would use it for no lower court order that the city was
other purpose, the court affirming the estopped' from seeking injunctive retrial court's decision declaring the lief under the contract because it had
ordinance to be invalid as arbitrary failed to institute proceedings within
and discriminatory. The court de- the 30-day period after receiving noclared that the police power to zone tice of breach provided for in the
property may not be limited by pri- contract. The owner of a 50-acre tract
vate agreement, nor could the board of land, as an inducement to obtainof supervisors properly show that the ing a favorable recommendation from
ordinance rezoning the property to the city to the county zoning authorlight industrial was conditioned upon ity on his application to have the land
a secret agreement with the property rezoned from rural residential planowner, since such an agreement ned community zone to medium denwould be illegal and against public sity garden apartment zone, agreed to
policy. Recognition of the county's
limit the number of dwelling units to
defense of unclean hands, based on
seven per acre for the entire tract,
the landowner's apparent effort to thus limiting the permissible number
change the use under such circumof dwelling units in the tract from
stances, would result in the enforce817 to 353, and also agreed, by anment of an illegal agreement, and for
other instrument, to donate a lot conthose reasons, the court concluded,
taining 3.33 acres to the city for exthe evidence was properly excluded.
clusive use as a park and recreational
§ 4. Agreements with governmental area, and to deliver a deed conveying
bodies, persons, or organiza- the property within 2 years. This
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agreement was expressly conditioned or denial of the requested zoning
upon the granting of the requested reclassification, the court continued.
The court said that there was a signifrezoning. In due course, the rezoning icant distinction between those cases
was obtained, and the agreement to where the contract is made between
convey was recorded, although the 3- the developer and the zoning authoracre tract of land was not conveyed to ity, and those cases involving a conthe city. Three years later, the owner tract entered into in good faith beapplied for and received a building tween the developer and a municipalpermit from the county for construc- ity which does not have control over
tion of an eight-story apartment the classification and whose authority
house containing 178 units on a 9- is limited to recommendation. The
acre parcel. Although the building court also said that in one other Marconformed to the zoning reclassifica- yland casellO the contract, though
tion, it violated the density covenant made on behalf of the city by the
of the declaration of covenants filed planning commission, was approved
by the owner, and notice of such was as to form and legal sufficiency by the
sent by the owner by registered letter acting city solicitor and purported to
to the city manager. Some 3 months be made with the mayor and city
after the notice was filed, the city council, the deciding authority. In the
sued to erU0in construction of the case before it, the court continued,
apartment house. In addition to the district council of the county, the
pleading the city'S failure to meet the deciding agency, was in no manner a
notice requirements of the contract, party to the contract. In the instant
the owner also contended that if the case, the court concluded, the condeclaration of covenants was to be tract being a valid one, the city
construed as additional consideration should be bound by its provisions.
for the agreement entered into with The court pointed out that for the
the city, it would be invalid as con- same reasons the agreement by the
trary to public policy. The court landowner to donate land to the city
pointed out that the applicable state for park purposes in return for the
statute provided that in Montgomery city's promise to recommend rezonCounty and Prince George's County, ing was valid and enforceable.
An agreement between a municipalbefore the district council of either
county may reclassify the zoning ity and a developer whereby the dewithin any municipality, the proposed veloper would subject part of its land
change must be referred to the gov- to a scenic and conservation easement
erning body of the municipality for its in return for the town's agreement to
recommendation, but the statute also recommend rezoning was held valid
provided that in Prince George's in Funger v Somerset (1968) 249 Md
County, such a recommendation was 311, 239 A2d 748, the court reversof an advisory nature only and not ing an order dismissing the developbinding on the district council. The er's counterclaim for rescission of the
rule that zoning by contract, or upon contract on the basis that the town by
condition, or by agreement, acquires its actions had made it impossible for
no validity when involving a munici- the developer to build. In addition to
pality, applies to contracts with the
50. Pressman v Baltimore (1960) 222
deciding authority, that is, the agency
having final control over the granting Md 330, 160 A2d 379, infra § 4[bJ.
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the scenic and conservation easement, bors then negotiated an agreement
the developer agreed, in considera- that the developer would limit the use
tion of the town recommending high- of the rezoned land to a bowling
rise residential zoning for 18 acres of alley, and a declaration of restrictions
the developer's 30-acre tract, to limit was drafted providing that although
the development of the tract for a the parcel was zoned local business,
period of 20 years till the density the only use permitted would be a
permitted on a tract of 16 acres, to bowling alley, and any other use of
donate to the town 2 acres of park- the land was to be limited' to uses
land immediately, and 8 additional permitted under existing neighboracres in annual increments of 2 acres hood shopping zoning. The declaraeach, and to grant an option to the tion also provided for a buffer planttown to purchase an additional 2-acre ing strip, certain structural requiretract. Inter alia, the court declared ments, the placement of air-condithat this agreement between the de- tioning equipment, and a fence to
veloper and the township was valid prevent pedestrian access to the
and not contract zoning, the court shopping center from the housing
referring to the reasoning in Green- development to the south, and then
belt v Bresler (1967) 248 Md 210, stated that the restrictions were for
236 A2d I, supra, as support for its the benefit of the city, were to run
with the land, were binding for a 20declaration.
In State ex reI. Zupancic v Schi- year period, and were to be enforced
menz (1970) 46 Wis 2d 22, 174 by the city by injunction. SubseNW2d 533, an agreement between a quently to the execution of the decladeveloper and neighboring homeown- ration of restrictions, the property
ers restricting the use of business- was rezoned. Later still, the common
zoned land to a particular use, and council divided a platted lot to create
providing for enforcement of the re- the desired parcel for the bowling
strictions by the city, was held valid, alley, creating from the rezoned 210the court reversing a judgment grant- by-200-foot area the parcel sold for
ing a writ requiring issuance of a the bowling alley and a surplus parcel
building permit for a use on the land of land approximately 190 by 42 feet,
not permitted by the declaration of which was also rezoned local busirestrictions. In 1955, the city'S com- ness, and restricted by the declaramon council approved a plat for a tion. In 1968, this smaller parcel was
shopping center and provided that sold to a person who desired to build
any future division of the lots would a carwash on the parcel. While the
be subject to its approval. Part of the offer to purchase was subject to deed
area was zoned "neighborhood shop- restrictions of record, and was condiping" and part "local business." In tional upon the buyer's obtaining a
1961, the shopping center developers permit to build a carwash, the buyer
desired to change a parcel of land apparently did not realize that the
from neighborhood shopping to the deed restriction would not permit a
local business zone in order to sell it carwash, and the seller did not refor use as a bowling alley, but it was member it. A building permit was
' " found that the neighboring home- duly issued, and the buyer paid a
owners were opposed to the change $20,000 down payment on a $66,000
)0 in zoning but not to the bowling contract to buy carwash equipment,
alley. The developer and the neigh- whereupon the building permit was
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revoked, and the common council the zoning ordinance in other juristhen rezoned the 42-foot-wide parcel dictions has been held valid and not
back from local business to neighbor- considered to be contract or condihood shopping. A writ of mandamus tional zoning, the court observed.
was then filed to require the issuance The virtue of allowing private agreeof a building permit, and the city ments to underlie zoning, the court
sought by counterclaim to enforce the said, is the flexibility and control of
declaration of restrictions by iJ1iunc- the development given to a municition. In answer to the charge by the pality to meet the ever-increasing decarwash owner that the declaration of mands for rezoning in a rapidly
restrictions was an illegal zoning con- changing area. When an agreement is
tract, the court acknowledged that a made by persons other than the city
contract made by a zoning authority to conform the property in a way or
to zone or rezone or not to zone manner which makes it acceptable for
would be illegal and the ordinance requested zoning and the city is not
enacted pursuant thereto void, be- committed to rezoning, such an
cause a municipality may not surren- agreement is not contract zoning in
der its governmental powers and the true sense and does not vitiate
functions or thus inhibit the exercise the zoning if it is otherwise valid, the
of its police or legislative powers. court declared. The court said that it
However, in the instant case, there was a too rigid view to consider that
was no agreement with the city, the situations like the case before it give
court declared. Neither the common rise to a quid pro quo for rezoning,
council nor the city planning commis- even though no express contract with
sion agreed' to rezone, the court ob- the zoning authorities can be proved.
served, and said that the facts gave On the other hand, the court said
rise to an agreement only between that it found too extreme a view in
the developer and the homeowners the other direction the contention
respecting the use of the property if it that a zoning ordinance and its conwas rezoned by the city. The rezoning comitant agreement should be deper se did not require the conditions clared invalid only if it can be shown
demanded by the homeowners, the that there was no valid reason for a
court noted. True, the court contin- change and that the change was
ued, the developers and the home- clearly arbitrary and unreasonable
owners expected favorable action by and had no substantial relation to the
the city planning commission, but this public health, safety, morals, and genexpectation was based on two factors: eral welfare, or if the city was using
first, no objection to the rezoning the agreement for bargaining and sale
under the circumstances by the home- to the highest bidder, or solely for
owners, and second, the proposed the benefit of private speculators. The
rezoning being good land use and court declared that landowners may
consistent with the developing charac- make a contract which may legititer of the neighborhood. When a mately be recognized by the zoning
zoning authority does not make an authorities as a motivation for rezonagreement to zone but is motivated to ing, but such zoning must meet the
zone by agreements as to USe of the test of all valid zoning, that it, must
land made by others, or by voluntary be for the safety, welfare, and health
restrictions running with the land al- of the community, and should not
though suggested by the authority, constitute spot zoning.
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[b) Held invalid
. In the following case, conditions
imposed by the city's planning commission in order to recommend rezoning of the land from residential to
commercial use were held invalid, the
court taking the position that imposition of such conditions was beyond
the commission's power.
In Pressman v Baltimore (1960)
222 Md 330, 160 A2d 379, conditions
imposed by the city planning commission in recommending the rezoning
of certain land from residential to
commercial use were held invalid, the
court, however, affirming the dismissal of an action seeking to declare
the ordinance rezoning the property
invalid. The land in question had
been strip-zoned to a depth of 150
feet for commercial use, with the remainder zoned as residential, and the
landowner sought to have the residential part of his lots rezoned commercial, to permit the building of a
regional shopping center and its attendant parking areas. The proposed
rezoning ordinance was referred to
the planning commission, which conditioned its approval upon an agreement being entered into between the
developer of the property and the city
providing that if it were subsequently
determined that the project could not
be carried out as substantially proposed and the city took action to
repeal-the rezoning ordinance so that
the property would revert to its existing use, the developer would not interpose any objection to the passage
of the repeal ordinance, and that the
developer also agreed to layout and

51. The court went on to point out,
however, that the city council, the legislative body, was not bound by the recomJ mendations of the planning commission,
...... and did not undertake or attempt to in."'" corporate the invalid conditions in its
:::> rezoning ordinance, not even referring to
148

develop the property as a shopping
center in accordance with plans approved by the planning commission.
The court said that no matter how
moderate, reasonable, or even desirable these conditions might be, it
found no authority for their imposition by the planning commission. The
state's enabling act authorized a zoning board to approve buildings, and
uses limited as to location under such
rules and regulations as might be
provided by local ordinance, but no
such authorization extended to the
planning commission, nor does the
city zoning ordinance undertake to
confer power to impose such conditions, in a case like the one before
the court, upon the planning commission even\ if it could do so, the court
declared. Thus, the court concluded,
the planning commission sought to
impose conditions that it was not
authorized to exact and were therefore invalid. 51
§ 5, Conditional rezoning authorized
by ordinance
An agreement requiring the landowner requesting rezoning to conform to certain conditions was held
valid in the following case, where the
county's zoning ordinance provided
that the board of supervisors could
impose conditions on the zoning reclassification of property where it
found that conditions must be imposed so as not to create problems
inimical to the public health, safety,
and general welfare.
An agreement concomitant with a
requested rezoning requiring the
them. Thus, the court concluded that
while the conditions imposed by the planning commission were invalid, the invalid
conditions did not affect the validity of
the rezoning ordinance ,itself. See Pressman v Baltimore (1960) 222 Md 330, 160
A2d 379, infra § 20.
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landowner requesting rezoning to police power to zone and rezone may
conform to certain conditions was not be restricted by contract, the
held valid in Scrutton v County of court said that the phrase "contract
Sacramento (l969) 275 Cal App 2d zoning" in itself had no legal signifi412, 79 Cal Rptr 872, the court, how- cance, and simply referred to a reclasever, reversing on other grounds a sification of land use in which the
summary judgment for the county landowner agreed to perform condidenying the landowner's petition for tions not imposed on other land in
a declaratory judgment declaring the the same classification. The court
agreement invalid. The county's zon- noted that all contracts are made with
ing ordinance provided' that the reference to possible exercises of the
board of supervisors could impose police power and with the possibility
conditions on the zoning reclassifica- of its exercise as an implied term
tion of property where it found that thereof. Here, the court noted, the
the conditions must be imposed so as county itself did not become party to
not to create problems inimical to the an express contract, though the court
public health, safety, and general wel- granted that when the zoning agency
fare of the county. When the land- exacts a concomitant contract from
owner petitioned for the rezoning the landowner, it holds out an imfrom agricultural to multiple-family plied or moral assurance that it will
residential uses of her property front- not quickly reverse or alter its deciing on a boulevard and bounded on sion. In a sense, the court continued,
one side by a partially improved this assurance tends to freeze the
street, the board decided to exact, as property's status, but the suspension
conditions precedent to the rezoning, of continuing police power is theoretan agreement from the landowner ical rather than real. The court noted
requiring her to dedicate a 10-foot that approval of the landowner's apright of way for widening and improv- plication in the first instance repreing the boulevard on which her prop- sented spot zoning of an individual
erty fronted, and to dedicate a 27- parcel, which, however, was valid
foot strip on the side of her property where long-term changes in the
to form the west half of the partially neighborhood created conditions
improved street bounding the prop- compatible with the proposed new
erty on that side, as well as to pay for use. Thus, the very basis for the acthe improvements to that street. The tion, neighborhood change, provided
contract also provided that any failure the reclassification with a practical
on the part of the landowner to com- assurance of stability, the court deply with the conditions imposed clared. The investments made on the
would cause the property's reversion strength of rezoning had precisely the
to agricultural zoning. The landowner same protection against later arbitrary
objected to the provision that she be action as any other property investrequired to pave the street bordering ment, the court said, noting that a
the side of her property at her own zoning ordinance may not immediexpense, and attacked the county's ately suppress or force removal of an
action as invalid contract zoning by otherwise lawful business or use, all
which the county, in exchange for the such uses being shielded from arbilandowner's covenants, would bargain trariness and all being vulnerable to
away a portion of its future power reasonable exercises of the police
over zoning. While agreeing that the power. Since the contract zoning pfO149
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police power, the court concluded
that it was valid.
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§ 6. Reversion provisions
In the following case, the inclusion
of a provision in an agreement by a
landowner to certain conditions to be
imposed concomitant with requested
rezoning, that upon breach of any of
the conditions imposed, the zoning
would revert from the requested zoning to the former zone, rendered the
agreement invalid.
In Scrutton v County of Sacramento (1969) 275 Cal App 2d 412,
79 Cal Rptr 872, the provision in a
proposed agreement by a landowner
to certain conditions to be imposed
concomitant with a requested rezoning, that the breach of any of the
conditions would result in the reversion of the zoning from the requested
multiple-family residence zone to the
former agricultural zoning, was held
improper, the court reversing a summary judgment denying the landowner's petition for a declaratory judgment declaring the agreement invalid.
The county's zoning ordinance provided that the board of supervisors
might impose conditions on a zoning
reclassification where it found that
such conditions must be imposed so
as not to create problems inimical to
the public health, safety, and general
welfare, and the board, pursuant to
its usual procedures, offered the landowner seeking rezoning of her property from agricultural to multiplefamily use a proposed contract requiring her to dedicate portions of
her property for public ways and pay
for the improvement thereof, as conditions upon which the rezoning
would depend, and also providing
that breach of the conditions would
cause the property to revert to agri150
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cultural zoning. The court pointed
out that such an automatic reversion
would amount to a second rezoning
in violation of the procedural directions of state law demanding that
rezoning be accomplished through
notice, hearings, and planning commission inquiry. Even if procedural
directions were followed, the court
continued, the reversion would violate substantive limitations upon the
supervisors' legislative power. The
board has power to rezone an individual parcel when changed community
conditions have rendered the former
classification unsuitable and the new
one is consistent with the public interest, the court observed. Although
courts do not ordinarily inquire into
legislative motivation, the court said,
in this case the proceedings on their
face would characterize the reversion
ordinance as a forfeiture rather than a
legislative decision on land use. An
ordinance so conceived, the court
concluded, is not a valid exercise of
the zoning power.
B. Construction and effect
§ 7. Relationship between conditions
imposed and use of land
In the following case, it was held
that conditions exacted from a landowner in return for rezoning of her
property required that the conditions
exacted be related in some way to the
use proposed by the landowner, the
exaction of conditions unrelated to
the proposed use being said to be an
improper exercise of the zoning
power.
The exaction of a condition from a
landowner seeking rezoning of her
property which did not show a relationship between the condition exacted and the use proposed by the
landowner was improper, it was held
in Scrutton v County of Sacramento

(1969) 275 Cal App 2d 412, 79 Cal lack of relationship between the exacRptr 872, the court re:versing a sum- tion and the proposed use. This relamary judgment denying the land- tionship, the court continued, preowner a declaratory judgment declar- sents a factual inquiry for the trial
ing the conditions imposed on her court, which can seldom, if ever, be
requested rezoning invalid. The land- resolved without taking evidence. In
owner sought to have the property in the case before it, the court said that
question, which fronted on an arterial the landowner's claim of arbitrary imboulevard and was bounded on one position required that kind of inquiry
side by a partially improved street, by the trial court, and in addition the
rezoned from agricultural to multiple- county's affidavits supporting its mofamily residential use, to permit the tion for summary judgment fell short
erection of apartment buildings. As a of showing that the proposed apartcondition to the requested rezoning, ment project would generate traffic or
the county board of supervisors of- other conditions reasonably necessifered the landowner a contract tating improving the street adjoining
whereby she would oblige herself to her property at her expense. Rather,
dedicate rights of way along the two the court said, the affidavit sought to
streets, as well as bearing the cost of demonstrate that the landowner's
improving one of the streets, to which dedication of land to the proposed
latter proposal she objected. The street and her expenditure for paving
contract also contained a provision it would benefit her proposed develthat failure to abide by ,the covenants opment. While acknowledging that
contained therein would cause the some courts have justified such exacproperty's reversion to agricultural tions not only for the fulfilment of
zoning. The court noted that while public needs caused by the proposed
the police power permitted the impo- development, but also for the benefit
sidon of reasonable conditions upon to the landowner financially, the court
a proposal for rezoning, just as in declared that standing alone, the
connection with the approval of sub- landowner's economic benefit supdivisions, building permits, and vari- plied inadequate underpinning for
ances, not all conditions are valid. the exaction. The police power
Generally speaking, the court said, formed the exaction's constitutional
conditions imposed on the grant of foundation, the court continued, and
land-use applications are valid if rea- that power is aimed at public need
sonably conceived to fulfil public rather than private profit. The landneeds emanating from the landown- owner should be free to reject the
er's proposed use. Two ~inds of need paternalism which forces him into an
have been found to eXIst, the court exaction conceived for his personal
pointed out: the community's need benefit, the court declared~ Rather,
for protection against potentially de- the court concluded, the fulfilment of
leterious effects from the landowner's public needs emanating from the propropos~l: .and the commun~ty's ne.ed posed land use is the sine qua non of
for faCIlIties to meet publIc servIce the exaction's reasonableness.
demands created by the proposal. Decisions invalidating the exaction of § 8. Specific performance
In the following case, a city was
conditions rely upon theories of constitutional invasion, the court ob- held entitled to specific performance
served, but their springboard is the of a contract whereby a landowner
151
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f it is unjustified. 1 The
) not bear alike on all
mditions and circumro sustain a claim of
ting the zoning action
.er is restricted to an. body must show that
discriminatory.3 That
lsufficient alone to esY'does not violate the
:ontained in its zoning
e suspect classificaer the rational-basis
;imate governmental

1, zoning commissions
.se permits to accom-
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The wording in zoning ordinances must be clear and unambiguous so that
persons of ordinary intellect need not guess at its meaning. 1 When an
ordinance is challenged as unconstitutionally vague, a court's inquiry turns
not on whether the ordinance could have provided more specific guidance to
applicants by defining every term in the ordinance, but on whether the
ordinance contains sufficient qualitative standards to guide an applicant and
limit a zoning board's discretion. 2 A failure to define a term in a zoning
ordinance does not render the ordinance unconstitutionally vague. 3
When exercising discretion, a local zoning board must be guided by standards which are specific in order to prevent an ordinance from being invalid
and arbitrary.4 So, subdivision regulations upon which a local zoning commission, acting administratively, should rule must contain known and fixed
standards applying to all cases of a like nature. 5
In determining whether a zoning ordinance is void for vagueness, on the
grounds that it has been arbitrarily enforced, a court will not engage in
speculation to find instances in which the statute might be arbitrarily applied, but will rather consider only a history of actual alleged arbitrary
enforcement, and will find unconstitutionality only if the language of the
statute is so conflicting and confused that arbitrary enforcement is inevitable. 6
A site-review standard that is too vague is void. 7
§ 41

Contract zoning

Research References
'esource conservation. Secu·
Jorp. v. Baltimore County,
234, 655 A.2d 1326 (1995).
imposing landscaping and
nts to mostly undeveloped
r commercial use along a
street extension, without
uirements to other streets
violate the equal protection
mer, in light of the clasbasis related to the legiti·
lSuring that the area of the
developed in a manner that
etyand aesthetics. Craft v.
, 335 Ark. 417, 984 S. W.2d
visors v. McDonald's Corp.,
E.2d 334 (2001).
1. City of St. Charles, Mo.,
. 1993).
'. City of St. Charles, Mo.,
1993).
" capricious, and reason·
35.
Tammany Parish Police
17 (La. 1999).

West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Planning e:041, 43
Validity, construction, and effect of agreement to rezone, or amendment to zoning ordinance,
creating special restrictions or conditions not applicable to other property similarly zoned, 70
A.L.R. 3d 125

A local government is generally prohibited from contracting away the
exercise of the zoning power or obligating itself by an advance contract to
provide a particular zoning.' A contract made by the zoning authorities to
[Section 40]
1State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160
N.J. 156, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999).
The use of the terms "structurally unsound" and "dilapidated" in a zoning ordinance
requiring the removal of nonconforming bill·
boards that become structurally unsound or
dilapidated was not impermissibly vague or
ambiguous. Ex parte City of Orange Beach
Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WL 1591304 (Ala.
2001).
2Britton v. Town of York, 673 A.2d 1322
(Me. 1996).
Developers are entitled to know with reasonable clarity what they must do under state
or local land use control laws to obtain the
permits or approvals they seek. Kosalka v.

Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, 752 A.2d
183 (Me. 2000).
3Britton v. Town of York, 673 A.2d 1322
(Me. 1996).
4Peterson Outdoor Advertising v. City of
Myrtle Beach, 327 S.C. 230, 489 S.E.2d 630
(1997).
6Harris v. Zoning Com'n of Town of New
Milford, 259 Conn. 402,788 A.2d 1239 (2002).
6Lazy Mountain Land Club v. MatanuskaSusitna Borough Bd. of Adjustment &
Appeals, 904 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1995).
7Bragdon v. Town of Vassalboro, 2001 ME
137,780 A.2d 299 (Me. 2001).
[Section 41]
1Montgomery County v. Revere Nat. Corp.,
Inc., 341 Md. 366, 671 A.2d 1 (1996).
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zone or rezone for the benefit of a private landowner is generally illegaF and
is denounced as "contract zoning"3 and as an ultra vires bargaining away of
police power,4
• Practice Guide: In order to sustain a claim of zoning by contract there
must be a clear indication of an agreement binding upon the parties and a
bargaining away of legislative power by the village board. 5

It does not follow, however, that all agreements between municipalities
and private landowners concerning zoning matters are necessarily invalid,S
Zoning amendments enacted pursuant to a contract to purchase planned low~
income housing under the "turnkey" program of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development is not contract zoning,1

B.

PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Research References
West's Digest References
Zoning and Planning ¢::>27, 38, 672, 681, 683

Annotation References
AL.R Digest: Zoning and Land Controls § 28
AL.R. Index: Presumptions and Burden of Proof; Zoning

Trial Strategy References
Zoning: Proof of Inverse Condemnation from Excessive Land Use Regulation, 31 Am. Jur. Proof
of Facts 3d 563
Zoning-Circumstances Warranting Expansion of a Nonconforming Use, 26 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts 3d 467
Zoning-Circumstances Warranting Relief from Zoning Ordinance, 25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts
3d 541
Zoning-Invalidity of Single-Family Zoning Ordinance, 24 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 543

§ 42

Presumption of constitutionality

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Planning ¢::>27, 38,672,681,683
2Haymon v. City of Chattanooga, 513
S.W.2d 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973); State ex
reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22,174
N.W.2d 533 (1970).
3Ford Leasing Development Co. v. Board of
County Com'rs of Jefferson County, 186 Colo.
418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974).
4Ford Leasing Development Co. v. Board of
County Com'rs of Jefferson County, 186 Colo.
418, 528 P.2d 237 (1974); Suski v. Mayor and
Com'rs of Borough of Beach Haven, 132 N.J.
Super. 158, 333 A2d 25 (App. Div. 1975).
5Century Circuit, Inc. v. Ott, 65 Misc. 2d
250, 317 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Sup 1970), judgment
affd, 37 AD.2d 1044, 327 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d
Dep't 1971).

6Funger v. Mayor and Council of To",n of
Somerset, 249 Md. 311, 239 A2d 748 (1968).
A settlement agreement between a county
and a billboard company, allowing the billboard company to maintain its existing billboards for 10 years after which the county
would be able to fully implement a total zoning ban against the billboards, was not an invalid attempt to obligate the district council
by an advance contract for a particular zoning,
as the agreement contemplated no action
whatsoever by
the district council.
Montgomery County v. Revere Nat. Corp.,
Inc., 341 Md. 366, 671 A2d 1 (1996).
7Marino v. Town of Ramapo, 68 Misc. 2d
44, 326 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sup 1971).
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AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

§ 9.21. Contract zoning.

Where a zoning amendment authorizes a particular use only iJ
the landowner enters into a covenant to restrict the use in certain
ways, or where a zoning amendment is adopted only after the
owner of the affected land executes and files a covenant restricting the use of such land, an attack on the validity of the measure
may be based on the contention that it constitutes zoning by
contract. Persons who think themselves aggrieved by the amendment may argue that the municipal legislative authority has
contracted away a portion of its police power, without authority
and in violation of constitutional rights.
It is clear that if conditional zoning of the kind described above
is "contract zoning" in the sense that the municipality has
bargained away a portion of its zoning power, such zoning is
unlawful except in the unusual situation where a statute
authorizes agreements between governmental units. The power
to regulate land use through zoning ordinances is vested in municipal legislatures, and its use is limited by the enabling acts.
Except for the intergovernmental transactions which will be
considered later, these acts do not expressly or impliedly authorize the bargaining away of the police power or any segment of
it.SO
Before the cases dealing with the contract zoning problem are
80. "The power to regulate land use
through zoning ordinances is vested in
municipal legislatures and they cannot bargain away this power." Davis v
Pima County, 121 Ariz 343, 590 P2d
459 (1978, App), cert den 442 US 942,
61 L Ed 2d 312, 99 S Ct 2885, citing
'Anderson, American Law of Zoning
!2nd ed) § 9.21. .

An agreement between a city and a
developer to limit the city's power to
impose conditions on a development
in order to further the health, safety
and welfare of the community is invalid and unenforceable. Miller v Port
Angeles, 38 Wash App 904, 691 P2d
229 (1984), review den 103 Wash2d
1024 (1985).

Municipality has no authority to
enter into a private contract with a
property owner for amendment of a
zoning ordinance subject to various
covenants and restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement when such
agreement results in the contracting
away of police powers. There is no
contracting away of police powers,
however, where a party seeks a variance and not a change in the ordinance. J. C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v Miami, 397 So 2d 979 (1981, Fla App D3).

See also Bartsch v Planning & Zoning Com., 6 Conn App 686, 506 A2d
1093 (1986) (conditional zoning invalid); Board of County Comrs. v Manny
Holtz, Inc., 65 Md App 574, 501 A2d
489 (1985). But cf. People's Counsel for
Baltimore County v Mockard, 73 Md
App 340, 533 A2d 1344 (1987) (and
cases cited therein). And see Chrismon
v Guilford County, 322 NC 611, 370
SE2d 579 (1988) (distinguishing illegal
contract zoning from rezoning with
conditions); Benton v City of Chat-

I
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area of the [proposed] development. This evidence of reasonableness presented
by the Board was sufficient to rebut [the] contention that the Board effectively
imposed a proffer requirement on [the] rezoning application." Id. at 354.

§ 9:21

Contract zonin.g

n.80.
Add to note 80:
United States: See League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of
Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). An application for a conditional use
permit and variances by an Orthodox Jewish congregation to operate a synagogue in a residential district was denied following neighbors' objections.
Subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit by the congregation, RLlITPA was enacted..
Because the city was concerned about the force of RLUIPA and further litigation, the city entered into a settlement agreement with the congregation allowing it to operate the synagogue under certain conditions. Neighbors brought the
current lawsuit, alleging that the city violated state law, provisions of the city
code, and their right to due process by entering into a settlement agreement
without providing notice and a hearing to the affected community. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the city violated state law by failing to
provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court also found that the
city had bargained away its right to exercise its police power over the property.
n.84.
Add to note 84:
Massachusetts: An otherwise valid rezoning that allowed a utility to build a
power plant was not invalidated by·the fact that the utility had offered to donate
$8 million to the town if the rezoning was approved. Durand v. IDC Belling~
ham, LLC, 440 Mass. 45, 793 N.E.2d 359 (2003). The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that a "voluntary offer of public benefits, is not, standing
alone, an adequate ground on which to set aside an otherwise·valid legislative
act." 793 N.E.2d at 368. The court rejected the argument asserted by neighboring landowners that the rezoning was invalid because it was "contract zoning."
The court stated that "labels such as 'contract zoning' may not be helpful or
determinative in resolving the validity of a zoning enactment." 793 N.E.2d at
367. The court found that proper procedures had been followed, and the rezoning was not arbitrary or irrational. "In general, there is no reason to invalidate
a legislative act on the basis of an 'extraneous consideration,' because we defer
to legislative findings and choices without regard to motive. We . . . find no
persuasive authority for the proposition that an otherwise valid zoning enactment is invalid if it is in any way prompted or encouraged by a public benefit
voluntarily offered." 793 N.E.2d at 369.

D. USE RESTRICTIONS
1. RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS
§ 9:26

Residential districts, generally-Exclusion of
commercial uses

n.62.
Add to note 62:
Michigan: See also Soupal v. Shady View, Inc., 469 Mich. 458, 672 N.W.2d
171 (2003). A zoning ordinance did not allow property zoned for single-family
use to be used by a multiple-family association for the operation of a marina
containing 20, boat slips. Furthermore, the court concluded that because the use
of the property as a marina was in violation of the zoning ordinance, it was a
nuisance per se.
30

296

ANDERSON 'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING

483 (1998). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
taking does not result from a zoning ordinance
ralid." The case involved an ordinance which had
:ause of its exclusion of quarrying as a permitted
Jccessfully challenged the ordinance now argued
as unconstitutional it automatically effected a
;0 taking of the landowner's property. The state
oncluded that an exclusionary zoning ordinance
Icing. "Here, the property was zoned residential.
Ted Miller of the use of quarrying, other viable
more, the court found that the U.S. Supreme
.g lish case was inapplicable for several reasons:
~

'l{!lish . . . Miller was not denied all use of its prop·
Ilied the use of quarrying. Second, First English did
1 unconstitutional zoning ordinance. The landowners
the ordinance but merely sought damages pursuant
glish does not support the conclusion reached by the
rivalid zoning ordinance effects a per se temporary
rt erroneously confused the legal concepts applicable
ryplidity issues. Finally, the decision in First English
$ presented.
v'' ,

TYPES OF

The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the township's zoning plan wa
facially exclusionary because the township acknowledged that the heav
industrial use was permissible but still failed to designate any property for tha
use. Further, the court found that the township's action in amending its zonin
ordinance to designate property as heavy industrial did not defeat the plaintiff
claim of exclusionary zoning. Rather, the court found that such action showe
that the township recognized the need for heavy industrial zoning.

n. 24. ,
Add to note 24:
Michigan: But cf. Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Holland, 46
Mich. 675, 625 N.W.2d 377 (2001). A city zoning ordinance prohibiting billboard
and advertising signs did not constitute unlawful exclusionary zoning under thE
Michigan City and Village Zoning Act. Although the ordinance prohibited neV
billboards and signs, and the expansion of existing billboards and signs,
expressly permitted billboard owners to maintain and repair existing signs a
nonconforming uses. The court therefore held that even though the ordinanc
limited the number of billboards within the city, it was not a total prohibitiO
on billboards. Under the Michigan statute, anything less than a complete city
wide prohibition on a land use does not constitute exclusionary zoning.

§ 9:20
•

P1P.~tllOI1!!,

Enterprises, L.P. v. Zoning Hearing
Env:tl. L. Re~. 20218 (3d Cir. 2003), cert.
' which a zorung board denied a variance
_'.~"'''D tower in a residential area. The
Circuit Court of Appeals that the
and w;tlawful under Pennsylvania
"
neIther facially nor de facto
IIIIO;~Ll~g board, it did not totally ban
had twice granted vari1i.W~."""'" district of the township.
. .. showing that no telecomm the township. The Third
' . , based on the .relatively
. 'The relevant mquiry is
Showing that the need of
[Citations omitted.]
the needs of their
F.3d at 394.
. township cannot '
then refuse to
729N.W.2d
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Conditional zoning

n.58.
Add to note 58:
Virginia: It was unlawful for a county board of supervisors to condition
rezoning upon a proffer of a cash paym.ent by the developer. Under Virginia
conditional zoning statutes, "a county is not empowered to require a specifie
proffer as a condition precedent to a rezoning. The statute clearly states thE
proffers of conditions by a zoning applicant must be made voluntarily." Th
court therefore concluded that the board had improperly denied the rezoning a
ter the developer refused to pay the fee "recommended" by the board "to hel
defray costs of capital facilities related to new development." Board of Sup'rs .
Powhatan County v. Reed's Landing Corp., 250 Va. 397, 463 S.E.2d 668 (1995
A Virginia party unsuccessfully challenged the refusal of a county board
supervisors to rezone his property from agricultural to residential. Gregory
Board of Sup/rs of Chesterfield County, 257 Va. 530, 514 S.E.2d 350 (1999). Tl
applicant unsuccessfully claimed that the board had impermissibly required
cash proffer as a condition for the requested rezoning. "The Board responded
this evidence of unreasonableness with evidence that cash proffers were n
required as a condition precedent to a rezoning, and that the rezoning request'
. . . would adversely impact public health, safety, and welfare in the area of t
[proposed] development. This evidence of reasonableness presented by the Boa
was sufficient to rebut [the] contention that the Board effectively imposed
proffer requirement on [the] rezoning application." Id. at 354.
n. 62.
Add to note 62:
Virginia: A Virginia party unsuccessfully challenged the refusal of aCOUI
board of supervisors to rezone his property from agricultural to residenti
Gregory v. Board of Sup'rs of Chesterfield County, 257 Va. 530, 514 S.E.2d ::
(1999). The applicant unsuccessfully claimed that the board had impermissi
required 'a cash proffer as a condition for the requested rezoning. "The BOI
responded to this evidence of unreasonableness with evidence that cash proff
were not required as a condition precedent to a rezoning, and that the rezon
requested . .. would adversely impact public health, safety, and welfare in
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§ 9.20

rized to issue building permits, or an administrative board may
'j be given jurisdiction to hear and decide applications for exceptions. In either case, the determination commonly is one of fact;
/
rarely is the matter committed to the discretion of an officer or
board. Consequently, the exception is a device which, in its most
/ common form, gives relief to a property owner who is disadvantaged by a zoning restriction, without affording protection to ~and
I adjacent to the excepted use.
I
Exceptions pose an administrative problem which is considered
in later sections. 47 The device is briefly noted here, because it is a
1\
method of relieving the imperfections which necessarily result
from the kind of Euclidian zoning ordinance which is used in
( some degree by all municipalities.

I

I

I

§ 9.20. Conditional zoning.

A zoning amendment which permits a use of particular property in a zoning district subject to restrictions other than those
applicable to all land similarly classified is sometimes referred to
as conditional zoning. Such regulations assume a variety of forms.
Where a landowner requests that his property be rezoned to alIowa use not permitted under existing restrictions, he may be
advised that his land will be reclassified if he first executes and
files a covenant which limits the use of his parcel in specific ways
not common to other property similarly classified. When this has
been accomplished, the land is rezoned without overt reference to
the covenant. Nevertheless, the zoning amendment enacted only.
after the covenant was made is sometimes described as conditional zoning. 48
Less common, but occasionally used, is the amendment of a
zoning ordinance to permit certain uses on condition that the
landowner covenant to use the land subject to certain conditions
not generally applicable to other land in the same district, or in
districts of the same class. 49
47. See Chapter 21 in Volume 3.
48. "Conditional zoning" involves
only adopted zoning ordinances which
provide either that rezoning becomes
effective immediately with an automatic repealer if the specified conditions are not met, or that the zoning
becomes effective only upon conditions

being met within a certain time. State
ex reI. Zupancic v Schimenz, 46 Wis
2d 22, 174 NW2d 533 (1970); citing
Anderson, American Law of Zoning
(1st ed) §§ 8.20, 8.21.
49. Where the official public minutes
of the board of commissioners shows
that the board rezoned certain prop167

§ 9.20
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Finally, land may be reclassified subject to conditions not applicable to other property in the same or similar districts. 60
As noted briefly in an earlier section,5) conditional zoning is a
device employed to bring some flexibility to an otherwise rigid
system of land-use contro1. 52 The need for flexibility in general is
too obvious to require extended comment, but two situations illustrate more clearly than most that some flexibility in the
imposition of land-use controls can be of critical importance. Zonerty "pursuant with stipulations pre- ,
sented by" the then owner and applicant for
rezoning,
which
stipulations were incorporated in the
minutes, this amounted to a conditional rezoning, Ervin Co. v Brown,
228 Ga 14, 183 SE2d 743 (1971).
50. Conditional zoning is a phrase
used to describe a zoning change
granted to an owner subject to conditions generally not applicable to land
similarly zoned. Scrutton v County of
Sacramento, 275 Cal App 2d 412, 79
Cal Rptr 872 (1969, 3d Dist); citing
Anderson, American Law of Zoning
(1st ed). Where zoning ordinance provides that auto service stations may
be permitted in district if their location conforms to the objectives of the
master plan, planning commission has
considerable discretion in determining
whether proposed use subserves the .
master plan's basic objectives, and a '
city does not abuse its discretion by
adopting zone classifications with
specific standards and requirements
even though applicant met minimum
standards of the basic zoning ordinance. Van Sicklen v Browne, 15 Cal
App 3d 122, 92 Cal Rptr 786 (1971 1st
Dist).
A zoning ordinance is valid that
permits a car rental subagency to
operate at hotels with 100 or more
guest rooms, under the condition that
none of the cars be stored at the hotel
unless under hire, and that while
parked there no servicing or repairs
be made. Miami Beach v Eason, 194
So 2d 652 (1967, Fla App D3).

Where a zone change was conditioned to permit commercial development of the property only if the entire
parcel were developed, the planning
board properly denied approval of a
plan to construct a free standing restaurant. Dowd v Dowley , 126 Misc 2d
741 , 483 NYS2d 884 (1984).
See generally. Land Use-Goffinet v
County of Christian «(Ill) 357 NE2d
442): New Flexibility In Illinois Zoning Law, 8 Loyola U L J (Chicago) 642
(1977); Strine, Use of Condition in
Land-Use Control, 67 Dick L Rev p 109
(1963); Trager, Contract Zoning, 23
Maryland L Rev p 121 (1963); Comment, The Use and Abuse of Contract
Zoning, 12 UCLA L Rev p 897 (1965);
Comment, Zoning Amendments and
Variances Subject to Conditions, 12
Syracuse L Rev p 230 (1960).
51. See § 9.17, supra.
52. Templeton v County Council of
Prince George's County, 21 Md App
636, 321 A2d 778 (1974), adhered to 23
Md App 596, 329 A2d 428; citing
Anderson, American Law of Zoning
(1st ed) § 8.20.
See generally , Discretionary Land
Use Controls, 1971 Planning, Zoning
and Eminent Dom lnst 1 (1971); Status
of Conditional Rezoning in Illinois-An Argument to Sustain a Flexible Zoning Tool. 63 Illinois BJ 132
(1974).
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§ 9.20

ing presumes the division of a community into fixed districts
marked out by boundaries. Uses are permitted in designated
districts because they ar~ thought to be compatible with other
uses permitted in such district. Unavoidably, districts with unlike restrictions abut one another. Given this kind of arrangement, it follows that land on the periphery of a highly restricted
zone will feel the impact of uses maintained in an adjacent and
less restricted zone. More importantly, the effect of incompatible
adjacent use will fall more heavily upon some property in the
highly restricted district than it does upon other land in the
same district. This unequal hardship finally results in pressure
for reclassification of land lying on the borderline of a district. If
reclassification is permitted without special attention to the
impact upon land abutting the new boundary, the process of
hardship, petition, and relief begins again. Conditional zoning is
a method of giving special attention to such potential impact.53
The second situation in which a flexible, tailor-made restriction
is of singular importance is one in which space is needed in a
particular district for a use not permitted there, and presumably
incompatible with the uses which are allowed. As indicated in
other places, this end may be served through the administrative
devices of special permits,54 exceptions,55 or variances. 56 In addition, it may be accomplished legislatively through use of the
floating zone,s' or by conditional zoning. Where the latter method
is employed, serious legal difficulties may be encountered. These
are discussed in the remainder of this section, and in the next.
Miscellaneous objections to conditional zoning, including the
propriety of certain conditions, the effect of the uniformity
requirement, and the spot zoning challenge, are reviewed below.
Objections to conditional zoning on the ground that it constitutes
"contract zoning" are discussed in § 9.21, infra.
In general, zoning enabling acts do not specifically authorize
zoning subject to conditions. 58 In most states, if such authority ex~
ists, it must be inferred from the general delegation of zoning
53. Conditions imposed are designed
to protect adjacent land from the loss
of use value which might occur if the
newly authorized use were permitted
without restraint of any kind. Templeton v County Council of Princ e
George's County, 21 Md App 636, 321
A2d 778 (1974), adhered to 23 Md App
596, 329 A2d 428.

54. See § 9.18, supra.

55. See § 9.19, supra.
56. See Chapter 20 in Volume 2.
57. See Chapter 11 in Volume 2.
58. In some states, there may be
169
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power. One writer has observed that while the enabling statutes
do not contain language authorizing the imposition of conditions
neither do they expressly negate such authority.59
'
In Church v Islip,60 the New York Court of Appeals reviewed
an ordinance which permitted certain land to be used for bUsiness purposes on the following conditions:
1. The buildings shall not total more than 25% of the area.
2. An anchor post fence, or equal, six feet high, is to be erected
five feet within the boundary line of the property.
3. Live shrubbery, three feet high either within or outside of
the fence is to be planted, and allowed to grow to the height of
the fence.
4. The above must be performed or put in operation before carrying on any retail business on the property.
Authority to impose conditions was inferred from the authority to reclassify land without such conditions. Reclassification
subject to certain restrictions was regarded. as an exercise of a
lesser amount of power contained in the larger delegation of
power to reclassify without such limitations upon use. More
recently, the same court observed: "The standards for judging
the validity of conditional zoning are no different from the standards used to judge whether unconditional zoning is illegal. If
modification .to a less restrictive zoning classification is warranted, then a fortiori conditions imposed by a local legislature
to minimize conflicts among 'districts should not in and of
themselves violate any prohibition against spot zoning."61
express statutory authority for rezoning with conditions under certain circumstances. See Ziegler, Rathkopfs
The Law of Zoning & Planning at
Chapter 29A.

59. Strine, Use of Condition in LandUse Control, 67 Dick L Rev p 109
(1963).
60. Church v Islip, 8 NY2d 254, 203
NYS2d 866, 168 NE2d 680 (1960).
61. Collard v Flower Hill, 52 NY2d
594, 439 NYS2d 326, 421 NE2d 818
(1981), iaterproceeding (2d Dept) 99
App Div 2d 687, 471 NYS2d 731, app
den 62 NY2d 606,472 NE2d 327, later
170

proceeding (ED NY) 604 F Supp 1318,
affd (CA2 NY) 759 F2d 205, cert den
(US) 88 L Ed 2d 72, 106 S Ct 88.
"Conditional zoning is a means of
achieving some degree of flexibility in
land use control by minimizing the
potentially deleterious effect of a zone
change on neighboring properties; reasonably conceived. conditions harmonize the landowner's need for rezoning with the public interest and
certainly fall within the spirit of the
enabling legislation." Collard v Flower
Hill, 52 NY2d 594, 439 NYS2d 326,
421 NE2d 818 (1981), later proceeding
(2d Dept) 99 App Div 2d 687 , 471
NYS2d 731, app den 62 NY2d 606, 472
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The conditions generally imposed are those designed to protect
adjacent land from the loss of use value which might occur if the
newly permitted use were permitted without restraint of any
kind. Undoubtedly, conditions which are imposed must be reasonably related to some legitimate objective of zoning.62
Conditions have been approved which prohibited outdoor storage,63 required offstreet parking and limited hours of operation,64
NE2d 327, later proceeding (ED NY)
604 F Supp 1318, affd (CA2 NY) 759
F2d 205, cert den (US) 88 L Ed 2d 72,
106 S Ct 88.
A municipality has the power to attach reasonable conditions to its zoning reclassifications. D'Angelo v Di
Bernardo, 106 Mise 2d 735, 435 NYS2d
206 (1980); citing Anderson, New York
Zoning Law and Practice (2nd ed)
§ 8.13.
See also Chrismon v Guilford
County, 322 NC 611, 370 SE2d 579
(1988) (holding that conditional zoning, "when carried out properly," is
an approved practice in North Carolina).
See generally Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 Maryland L Rev p 121 (1963).
62. In Georgia, conditional zoning
will be sustained where the conditions
are designed to protect the neighborhood from the impact of the zoning
amendment. Warshaw v Atlanta, 250
Ga 535, 299 SE2d 552 (1983).
Rezoning of property was valid conditional rezoning and not invalid contract rezoning where the rezoning was
based on several conditi ons which
were imposed to protect neighboring
property owners from the effects of the
zoning change. Johnson v Glenn , 246
Ga 685, 273 SE2d 1 (1980).
The party challenging the conditional zoning has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. Dekalb County v Graham, 251 Ga
423. 306 SE2d 270 (1983).

The grant of a special use permit
within an agricultural district, pursuant to a statute that authorizes the
exercise of discretion to condition a
special use permit with protective
restrictions, may be characterized as
"conditional zoning". Generally, such
conditional actions will be upheld
when they are imposed for protection
or benefit of neighbors and ameliorate
the effects of zoning change. Perry v
Planning Com. of County of Hawaii,
62· Hawaii 666, 619 P2d 95 (1980).
Rezoning a residential area to a
business use, on the condition that the
area rezoned be used exclusively for
the business use named in the application, constituted a rezoning without
regard to public health, safety and
welfare and was invalid. Oury v Greany, 107 RI 427, 267 A2d 700 (1970).
The conditional standards applicable to auto wrecking yards and
referring to construction of a sightobscuring fence did not authorize the
expansion of the wrecking yard by
construction of a new building to
house the disassembly operation. Bartz
v Board of Adj ustment, 5 Wash App
497,487 P2d 782 (1971), revd on other
grounds 80 Wash 2d 209, 492 P2d
1374.
63. Cohalan v Lechtrecker, 84 App
Div 2d 775, 443 NYS2d 892 (1981 , 2d
Dept), affd 56 NY2d 861, 453 NYS2d
427,438 NE2d 1142.
64. Warshaw v Atlanta, 250 Ga 535,
299 SE2d 552 (1983).
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and required road improvements. 65 Some courts have subjected
conditional zoning to special scrutiny.66 Conditions which
restricted access 67 and required the dedication of land have been
held invalid. 68 A challenge to conditional zoning may not be
mounted by a landowner who has benefited from the condition. 59
Conditional zoning is vulnerable to the objection that it offends
the requirement that all zoning regulations "shall be uniform for
each class or kind of building throughout each district. "70 It is
reasoned by exponents of this position that property subject to
conditions is treated differently than other property in the same
district, or in districts with the same designation.7I Judicial
construction of the uniformity requirement is reviewed in another place,72 but it should be observed here that this attack is
rarely mounted where conditional zoning is in issue, and that it
has not been notably successfup3
Conditional zoning ordinances have been held invalid where
the performance or nonperformance of the landowner might
65. Cross v Hall County, 238 Ga 709,
235 SE2d 379 (1977).

nance was estopped from challenging
its validity).

66. Nolan v Taylorville, 95 III App
3d 1099, 51 III Dec 479, 420 NE2d 1037
(1981, 5th Dist).

70. Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act § 2 (1926); see generally, Anderson
& Roswig, Planning, Zoning & Subdivision: A Summary of Statutory Law in
the 50 States, Chart No 4 p 194 (1966).

67. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc.·v Colorado Springs, 42 Colo App 15, 592 P2d
1336 (1978).
68. Board of Supervisors v Rowe, 216
Va 128, 216 SE2d 199 (1975).
Conditions requiring an easement
or dedication of land may raise special
constitutional issues under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Chapter 3A, supra.
69. As long as conditional zoning is
otherwise valid, neighbors of the zoned
property cannot successfully attack
the conditions that have been imposed
for their own welfare. Cross v Hall
County, 238 Ga 709, 235 SE2d 379
(1977).
See also Cedar Rapids v McConnellStevely-Anderson, 423 NW2d 17 (1988,
Iowa) (property owner who had requested, and benefitted from, ordi-

71. See generally Comment, Zoning
Amendments and Variances Subject
to Conditions, 12 Syracuse L Rev p 230
(1960).
72. See § 5.25, supra in Volume 1.
73. See, for example, Church v Islip,
8 NY2d 254, 203 NYS2d 866, 168 NE2d
680 (1960).
Uniformity provisions apply to a
legislative enactment but do not serve
to invalidate a condition arising from
a consensual agreement to refrain
from the use or sale of alcoholic beverages on a particular premises even
where similar restrictions are not applied within the same zoning district.
J-Marion Co. v County of Sacramento,
76 Cal App 3d 517, 142 Cal Rptr 723
(1977, 3d Dist).
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result in a reclassification of the land by force of private conduct.
Such an automatic reversion feature was disapproved by a California court.74 A New York court reached the same conclusion
where the ordinance rezoned land on condition "that the grade of
the entire parcel shall be brought down to approximately the
grade of Brush Hollow Road in accordance with grades and
specificiations approved by the Town Engineer."75 But reverter
provisions have been sustained in Pennsylvania,76 Illinois,77 and
Maryland. 78
Conditional zoning measures ordinarily apply to small parcels.
Accordingly, it is frequently asserted in litigation involving
conditional zoning that the amendment is not in accordance with
a comprehensive plan, and that it is invalid as spot zoning. The
bulk of Chapter 5 is devoted to this problem, so it will not be
reviewed here. 79
But see Bartsch v Planning & ZOning Com., 6 Conn App 686, 506 A2d
1093 (1986) (conditional zoning invalid); Board of County Comrs. v Manny
Holtz, Inc., 65 Md App 574, 501 A2d
489 (1985). And cf. People's Counsel
for Baltimore County v Mockard, 73
Md App 340, 533 A2d 1344 (1987) (and
cases cited therein).
74. The automatic reversion feature
in a conditional zoning grant was void
as it would amount to a second rezoning and would violate the procedural
directions of the state law. Scrutton v
County of Sacramento, 275 Cal App
2d 412, 79 Cal Rptr 872 (1969, 3d Dist);
citing Anderson, American Law of
Zoning (1st ed).
.
75. Levine v Oyster Bay, 46 Misc 2d
106,259 NYS2d 247 (1964) .
76. When a township Zoning Administrator cancels approval of a zone
change, for failure to . build the proposed use within 6 months of the approval, the parcel reverts to the zoning status it had prior to the grant of
zoning approval. A trial court cannot
extend the time period. Inn Management Services, Inc. v Upper St. Clair,
52 Pa Cmwlth 46, 415 A2d 915 (1980).

77. "Rezoning land from agricultural to heavy industrial classification
on condition that it be used for syn·
thetic gas production plant and that
upon removal the rezoning should
revert to agricultural use was valid
conditional zoning." Where shift to
industrial use was recognized in comprehensive plan and such use of the
236-acre tract would not decrease the
value of adjacent land and would benefit the public, the rezoning was not
invalid spot zoning. Goffinet v County
of Christian, 30 III App 3d 1089, 333
NE2d 731 (1975, 5th Dist), affd 65 III
2d 40, 2 III Dec 275, 357 NE2d 442
(1976).
78. A provlslOn in an ordinance
whereby land would revert to prior
classification if time requirements as
to site plans, building permits, and
actual construction were not met was
not conditional zoning since the provision applied to all land, not specific
property. Colwell v Howard County,
31 Md App 8, 354 A2d 210 (1976) .
79. See generally Comment, 12 Syracuse L Rev pp 230, 240 (1960).
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examined, it should be noted that municipal action which is
properly taken may limit municipal power to adopt and enforce
police power regulations. For example, in some jurisdictions, approval of a subdivision plat at the request of a landowner results
in the temporary suspension of municipal authority to impose
more stringent minimum lot area requirements upon the land
covered by the approved plat. 81 While this is not land-use ·control
by contract, it contains as many features of agreement with a
landowner as are present in some conditional zoning transactions. Perhaps more closely allied to contracts is a sale of municipalland for a known purpose. It has been held that a municipality may not perfect the sale or lease and then proceed to prohibit
the purpose for which the land was, to the knowledge of the
municipality, purchased and sold. 82 Similarly, a municipality may
not receive a grant of land in return for restrictive covenants on
such land and then authorize use inconsistent with the covenants_ 83 While these decisions are not directly relevant to the
contract zoning issue, they suggest that municipal police power is
not totally insulated from the effect of municipal conduct.
The courts of a growing number of states have upheld zoning
ordinances which were either preceded by the filing of a covenant restricting use, or were followed by such a covenant. In
Massachusetts, a zoning amendment was adopted after the owner
of the rezoned land had filed a covenant, and had given the
municipality a 30-year option to purchase a tract which was to
remain as a park to provide a buffer between the new uses and
tanooga, __ , slip op (1988, Tenn App)
(same).
Annotation: Validity, construction,
and effect of agreement to rezone, or
amendment to zoning ordinance creating special restrictions or conditions
not applicable to other property similarly zoned. 70 ALR3d 125.
81. See Anderson, New York Zoning
Law and Practice (3rd ed) § 21.21.
82. Where a town leased island property for use as a hotel, marina, and
yacht club, including the maintenance
of gasoline facilities, it was without
power to prohibit the reconstruction
of gasoline pumps destroyed by a hurricane . To prohibit the lessee from

maintaining gasoline facilities would
be to impair the obligation of a contract. Wa-Wa-Yanda, Inc. v Dickerson,
18 App Div 2d 251, 239 NYS2d 473
(1963, 2d Dept).
83. Palisades Properties, Inc. v Brunetti, 44 NJ 117, 207 A2d 522 (1965).
But compare American Land Co. v
Keene, 41 F2d 484 (1930, CAl NH). A
written agreement whereby a town
promised to recommend to a county
council the rezoning of about 18 acres
to permit the construction of apartments, in consideration of a builder's
promise to donate a prescribed scenic
easement, to limit development for 20
years, and to donate certain park land,
is not contract zoning. Funger v Somerset, 249 Md 311, 239 A2d 748 (1968).
175
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nearby land. The court fixed its attention on the ordinance and
found it to be untainted by the remainder of the transaction. 84
The same result was reached by the Supreme Court of Nebraska
where the owner-applicant, at the direction . of the legislative
body, filed a covenant before his land was reclassified. 85 An Ohio
court approved an ordinance which rezoned certain land on condition that a restrictive covenant against strip mining be filed. 86 A
California court described "contract zoning" as a phrase having
no legal significance but simply referring to a reclassification of
land in which the owner agrees to certain conditions not imposed
on other land of the same classification. 87
In New York, conditional zoning has been upheld,88 and the
courts have declined to admit proof of the connection between
the filing of the covenant and the enactment of a zoning amendment affecting the same property.89·In fact, New York has upheld
a zoning ordinance which was preceded by the filing of a declaration of restrictions which could not be amended without the
concurrence of the town board, the court saying that the restrictions were voluntary and that the zoning regulations were not
conditioned upon the declaration. 90 Further, a lower New York
court has held that zoning amendments enacted pursuant to a
84. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.
v Newton, 344 Mass 428, 183 NE2d
118 (1962).
85. Bucholz v Omaha, 174 Neb 862,
120 NW2d 270 (1963).
86. Johnson v Griffiths, 74 Ohio L
Abs 482, 141 NE2d 774 (1955, App,
Mahoning Co), app dismd for want of
debat q 164 Ohio St 393, 58 Ohio Ops
188,131 NE2d 397.
87. Scrutton v County of Sacramento, 275 Cal App 2d 412, 79 Cal
Rptr 872 (1969, 3d Dist), citing Anderson, American Law of Zoning (1st ed).
But cf. Delucchi v County of Santa
Cruz, 179 Cal App 3d 814, 225 Cal Rptr
43 (1986), cert den and app dismd 479
US 803, 107 S Ct 46 (1986) (if agreement between landowner and county
to preserve agricultural land were
interpreted to prevent application of
future land use restrictions, the agree-

ment would constitute illegal contract
zoning).
88. Church v Islip, 8 NY2d 254, 203
NYS2d 866, 168 NE2d 680 (1960),
discussed in Court of Appeals, 1959
Term-Zoning, 10 Buffalo L Rev p 245
(1960-61).
.
89. Point Lookout Civic Asso., Inc. v
Hempstead, 22 Misc 2d 757, 200
NYS2d 925 (1960), affd (2d Dept) 12
App Div 2d 505, 207 NYS2d 121, affd
9 NY2d 961, 217 NYS2d 227, 176 NE2d
203.
.
90. Schachter v Burns, 24 Misc 2d
60, 203 NYS2d 499 (1960). Where a
zoning ordinance was enacted after a
landowner had signed an agreement
that in the event of condemnation his
claim would be limited to the residential value of the land, although the
amended ordinance permitted commercial use, the court held that the
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contract to purchase planned low-income housing under the
"turnkey" program of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development was not contract zoning at all .91 In Maryland, the
courts have upheld a zoning amendment which was preceded by
the filing of a covenant restricting use, where the covenant was
not referred to in the ordinance and apparently was not relied
upon by the legislative body.92 The same result was reached where
the legislative body affirmatively spelled out that it neither
imposed conditions nor made them the basis for its action. 93
However, the Maryland courts disapproved a zoning ordinance
which reclassified land on condition that the owners enter into
an agreement with the city to develop the land in a particular
way,94 and detected lack of uniformity in a conditional zoning
agreement was enforceable that the
enactment was not invalid as contract
zoning. Re Rosedale Ave., 40 Misc 2d
1076, 243 NYS2d 814 (1963). An inferior New York court held that a zoning ordinance is invalid which changes
the classification of land on condition
that "the grade of the entire parcel
shall be brought down to approximately the grade of Brush Hollow
Road in accordance with the grades
and specifications to be approved by
the Town Engineer." Such conditional
rezoning "in future" contingent on the
performance of certain acts by the
owners is contract zoning.and is therefore invalid. Levine v Oyster Bay, 46
Misc 2d 106, 259 NYS2d 247 (1964). In
order to sustain a claim of zoning by
contract there must be a clear indication of an agreement binding upon the
parties and a bargaining away of legislative power by the village board. A
mere offer to convey a lot owned by
the defendants (adjacent to a lot on
which they sought a building permit)
and needed by the village to widen a
cross street and a subsequent conveyance of the lot to the village and issuance of a building permit after the village board amended the zoning
ordinance does not sustain a claim of
zoning by contract, where the village
could have enacted the amendment at
any time. Century Circuit, Inc. v Ott,
65 Misc 2d 250, 317 NYS2d 468 (1970),

affd 37 App Div 2d 1044, 327 NYS2d
829. A municipality is without authority to diminish its legislative power by
entering a settlement agreement in a
zoning action which gives a landowner
a vested right to use his land in a
specified way, without regard to subsequent changes in the zoning regulations. Andgar Associates, Inc. v Board
of Zoning Appeals, 30 App Div 2d 672,
291 NYS2d 991 (1968, 2d Dept).
91. Marino v Ramapo, 68 Misc 2d 44,
326 NYS2d 162 (1971), citing Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice (lst ed) ~ 8.14; Anderson, American Law of Zoning (2nd ed) § 8.21.
92. Pressman v Baltimore, 222 Md
330, 160 A2d 379 (1960).
The purchase by a municipality of a
parcel of land from a developer pursuant to a zoning ordinance did not constitute contract zoning since any benefit to the developer was available to
all other landowners under the ordinance. Baltimore v Crane, 277 Md 198,
352 A2d 786 (1976);
93. Somerset v County Council for
Montgomery County, 229 Md 42, 181
A2d 671 (1962).
94. Baylis v Baltimore, 219 Md 164,
148 A2d 429 (1959).
177
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amendment. 95 Zoning amendments encumbered by restrictions
have been upheld by the courts of Alabama,96 Georgia,97 Illinois,98
and Wisconsin. 99 A Florida court did not detect contract zoning
where a legislative refusal to rezone was influenced by representatives of the land in issue.)
95. Carole Highlands Citizens Asso.
v Board of County Comrs., 222 Md 44,
158 A2d 663 (1960).

cr. Board of County Comrs. v Manny
Holtz, Inc., 65 Md App 574, 501 A2d
489 (1985); People's Counsel for Baltimore County v Mockard, 73 Md App
340, 533 A2d 1344 (1987) (and cases
cited therein).
96. A zoning ordinance which provided that the ordinance was subject
to a reservation of a right-of-way for a
parkway and that a second means of
ingress and egress would be provided
to the proposed parkway, was held by
the reviewing court as not invalid on
the ground that it constituted contract
zoning, since the requirements were
reasonable measures in light of anticipated traffic conditions. Haas v Mobile,
2B9 Ala 16,265 So 2d 564 (1972).
97. Rezoning by city council was not
illegal contract zoning even though
council voted to compromise with
landowner who alleged their failure to
rezone was an unconstitutional deprivation of his property and 4 months
later council voted to rezone his land.
Each council member testified the
votes were independent of each other
and procedures required for rezoning
were complied with. Marietta v Traton Corp., 253 Ga 64, 316 SE2d 461
(1984).
Rezoning of residential land to industrial to permit a rock quarry on
condition that the property owner
would make improvements on the
road leading to the quarry was conditional zoning and valid. It was not
contract zoning. Citing Anderson,
American Law of Zoning (2nd ed)

ZOl

enac1
disal
resty
land
recll:
cove
The
statl
cont
not
tion

§§ B.20, 8.21. Cross v Hall County, 238
Ga 709, 235 SE2d 379 (1977).

See also City of Powder Springs v
WMM Properties, Inc., 253 Ga 753,
325 SE2d 155 (1985) (agreement to
provide access to sewer system upheld).
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98. "Ordinance which rezoned land
to CUD was not invalid as contract
zoning by reasons of negotiations and
conf~rences between amusement park
developers and development committee." Rutland Environmental Protection Asso. v Kane County, 31 III App
3d B2, 334 NE2d 215 (1975, 2d Dist),
cert den 425 US 913, 47 L Ed 2d 764,
96 S Ct 1510.
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the ordinance but on the date certain
conditions spelled out in the ordinance
are met is a lawful exercise of the police power and does "not amount to
contract zoning. Konkel v Common
Council, Delafield, 6B Wis 2d 574, 229
NW2d 606 (1975).
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Where a zoning authority does not
make an agreement to zone but is
mot,ivated to do so by agreements
made between others or by voluntary
restrictions running with the land, the
ordinance is valid and is not considered conditional or contract zoning.
State ex reI. Zupancic v Schimenz, 46
Wis 2d 22, 174 NW2d 533 (1970), citing Anderson, American Law of Zoning (1st ed).
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Zoning amendments related to covenants executed prior to the
enactment of the amendment,2 or subsequent thereto,S have been
disapproved by some courts. A New Jersey court held invalid
restrictions which purported to become effective when certain
land was reclassified as a light industrial zone. The land was
reclassified, but the court detected the relationship between the
covenants and the amendment and declared both to be invalid.
The entire proceedings were said to be· ultra vires. The court
stated: "Contracts thus have no place in a zoning plan and a
contract between a municipality and a property owner should
not enter into the enactment or enforcement of zoning regulations."4
The New Jersey courts view this kind of conditional zoning as
an improper bargaining away of legislative power which involves
a hazard that private, rather than public, interests will be served.
In V. F. Zahodiakin Corp. v Zoning Board of Adjustment, the
court said: "Zoning is an exercise of the police power to serve the
common good and general welfare. It is elementary that the
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2. Houston Petroleum Co. v Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 NJ 122,
87 A2d 319 (1952).
The rezoning of an area on the basis
of assurances by the owner of the tract
that it would be developed in accordance with restrictive, already approved plans, was not permissible
where the restrictions were not required or contemplated; in enacting
an ordinance a municipality is engaged in legislating not conti-acting.
Allred v Raleigh, 277 NC 530, 178
SE2d 432 (1971).

at effects a zoneffective date of
;he date certain
n the ordinance
3rcise of the ponot amount to
kel v Common
Nis 2d 574, 229
10rity does not
to Zone but is
y agreements
r by voluntary
;~ the land, the
IS not considntract zoning.
r Schimenz 46
>33 (1970), 'citn Law of Zon-

Jolitan Dade
1974, Fla App

I

An ordinance, requiring property
owners to agree that should their petition for rezoning be granted, and the
property subsequently not be used for
the purpose then permitted it shall
revert to the more restrictive classification, constituted contract zoning
and as such was invalid. Hausmann &
Johnson, Inc. v Berea Bd. of Bldg. Code
Appeals, 40 Ohio App 2d 432, 69 Ohio
Ops 2d 379, 320 NE2d 685 (1974, Cuyahoga Co) citing Anderson, American
Law of Zoning (1st ed) §§ 14.56 et seq.,
and § 15.61.

3. Hartnett v Austin, 93 So 2d 86
(1956, Fla).

4. Houston Petroleum Co. v Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 NJ 122,
87 A2d 319 (1952).
An attempt to escape the effect of a
valid zoning ordinance by agreement
between the borough and a property
owner was on its face illegal, void and
ultra vires. Suski v Mayor & Comrs. of
Beach Haven, 132 NJ Super .158, 333
A2d 25 (1975).
A property owner was not bound by
restrictive covenants executed by contiguous landowners merely because
his land was rezoned and that the selfimposition of an equitable servitude
had been a condition precedent to
reclassification. An equitable servitude
is an interest in land within the Statute of Frauds. Therefore, a written
instrument must be signed by the
owner. Gunnell v Hurst Lumber Co.,
30 Utah 2d 209, 515 P2d 1274 (1973).
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legislative function may not be surrendered or curtailed by
bargain or its exercise controlled by the considerations which
enter into the law of contracts. The use restriction must needs
have general application. The power may not be exerted to serve
private interests merely, nor may the principle be subverted to
that end. . . . It was not within the province of the local authority here to vest in the landowner by contract a special privilege
or exemption to use its premises in violation of the general rule
binding upon all other landowners within the zone. . . . The
purported contract was ultra vires and all proceedings to effectuate it were coram non judice and utterly void."5
A Florida court found similar defects in a conditional zoning
amendment which permitted certain uses subject to restrictions
to be included in a collateral deed or agreement. s Similar disapproval has been registered by the courts in other states. 7
5. V. F. Zahodiakin Engineering
Corp. v Zoning Board of Adjustment, 8
NJ 336, 86 A2d 127 (1951).
6. Hartnett v Austin, 93 So 2d 86
(1956, Fla).
7. Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v
Tucson, 23 Ariz App 385,533 P2d 693
(1975).
Contract zoning is a concept held illegal in most states as an ultra vires
bargaining away of the police power.
Ford Leasing Development Co. v Board
of County Comrs., 186 Colo 418, 528
P2d 237 (1974), citing Anderson,American Law of Zoning (1st ed) § 8.20.
Rezoning is legislative in nature and
one county commission cannot deprive
or restrict a succeeding commission in
the exercise of its legislative power by
entering into a contract or agreement
purporting to limit the authority of
the county commission. Barton v Atkinson, 228 Ga 733, 187 SE2d 835
(1972); County of Ada by Board of
County Comrs. v Walter, 96 Idaho 630,
533 P2d 1199 (1975).
Ordinance which reclassified five
acres of farmland from agricultural to
180

a B-3 commercial use to permit defendant to build and operate a dance hall
tavern allowed plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case that zoning amendment was passed in exchange for restrictive covenant which limited use
of defendant's land and which dedicated certain land to the county. This
constituted invalid conditional zoning.
Ziemer v County of Peoria, 33 III App
3d 612, 338 NE2d 145 (1975, 3d Dist).
Where the record contained no representation by petitioner regarding
their specific plans for development of
the subject property, there was no
unlawful contract zoning involved in
adopting an ordinance which rezoned
a 30 acre parcel. Graham v Raleigh,
55 NC App 107,284 SE2d 742, petition den 305 NC 299, 290 SE2d 702.
See also Chrismon v Guilford County,
322 NC 611, 370 SE2d 579 (1988) (distinguishing illegal contract zoning
from rezoning with conditions).
As contract zoning is invalid, an
agreement between a municipality
and a landowner to rezone property
on· the condition that there be no access road, has no effect. Carlino v
Whitpain Investors, Whitpain Township, 52 Pa Cmwlth 145, 415 A2d 461
(1980), affd 499 Pa 498, 453 A2d 1385.
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§ 9.22. -Statutory authority.
In some jurisdictions specific kinds of contract zoning are authorized by statute. 8 An Indiana statute,9 for example, authorizes
a planning commission, in connection with a petition for an
amendment to the zoning ordinance, to require or allow the landowner to make .written commitments relative to the use or
development of the parcel. Such commitments are recorded and
take effect when the zoning amendment is adopted. The commitments bind the owner and subsequent owners, and there is a procedure for modification or termination. The filing of a commitment by a landowner does not obligate the municipality to make
the zone change in issue.
Perhaps the nearest thing to contract zoning in a literal sense
is a zoning amendment enacted by a municipal legislature pursuant to an agreement with a housing authority. Such agreements
have been approved by the courts notwithstanding that the
municipality agrees to rezone, and does so pursuant to the agreeRestrictive covenants entered in
consideration. of the adoption of a zoning ordinance are not enforceable. Carlino v Whitpain Investors, 499Pa 498,
453 A2d 1385 (1982).
A covenant by property owners to
maintain a buffer zone between apartments on their land and the nearest
property owner and a promise by the
zoning board to rezone the land in
return were void as against public
policy. Haymon v Chattanooga, 513
SW2d 185 (1973, Tenn App). Cf. Benton v City of Chattanooga, slip op
(1988, Tenn App) (distinguishing illegal contract zoning from rezoning with
conditions).
An amendment to the zoning ordinance which required the developer
prior to site plan approval to pledge to
devote 15% of the lots to low-income
housing as defined by H.U.D. was invalid as ultra vires. The legislature did
not intend to permit socio-economic
zoning. Secondly, the amendment, in
establishing maximum rental and sale
prices attempts to control compensation for the use of the land. Board of
Supervisors v De Groff Enterprises,

Inc., 214 Va 235, 198 SE2d 600, 62
ALR3d 874 (1973).
A contract made by the zoning authorities to zone or rezone is illegal
and the ordinance involved is void
because a municipality 'may not surrender its governmental powers or
functions. State ex reI. Zupancic v
Schimenz, 46 Wis 2d 22, 174 NW2d
533 (1970), citing Anderson, American
Law of Zoning (1st ed).
See generally, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Tool for Zoning Flexibility. 23 Hastings LJ 825 (1972);
Contract Zoning: A Flexible Technique
for Protecting Maine Municipalities.
24 Maine L Rev 263 (1972); "Contract
Zoning" Method and Public Policy.
1972 Urban L Ann 219 (1972).
Comment, "Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning". 12 UCLA L Rev 897
(1965).
8. See generally Ziegler, Rathkopfs
The Law of Zoning & Planning at
Chapter 29A.
9. § 36-7-4-607, Ind Stat Ann.
181
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ment. 10 Where two public agencies are involved, the likelihood of
solely private benefit is reduced, and the problem of authority to
enter into the contract may be solved by legislation specifically
authorizing the contract. For example, in New York a state loan
for public housing cannot be made unless the municipality in
which the housing project is to be located has enacted, or agreed
to enact, zoning regulations which will protect the siteY To
permit compliance with this requirement, municipalities are authorized by statute to enter into an agreement with an "authority, housing company or a government" to zone or rezone an area
to protect a proposed housing project.12 It is clear, therefore, that
the legislative authority of a New York municipality has power
to enter into such an agreement, and that such an agreement
does not offend the enabling legislation of the state. IS
It should not be concluded that agreements to impose zoning
10. See, for example, Passaic Junior
Chamber of Commerce v Housing Authority of Passaic, 45 NJ Super 381,
132 A2d 813 (1957); St. Stephen's Club
v Youngstown Metropolitan Housing
Authority, 164 Ohio St 194, 52 Ohio
Ops 3, 115 NE2d 385 (1953).
Property owners and town council
entered into a rezoning contract which
obligated the town to rezone owner's
land to permit construction of multifamily dwellings thereon, but did not
expressly prohibit the town from at
anytime rescinding or amending its
rezoning of subject property. Where
the town two years later amended said
ordinance so that a multi-family dwelling became a conditionally permitted
use and available only if authorized
by the zoning board as a special exception, the court found it could not read
into the contract a provision that the
town would agree to exempt subject
land from any subsequent zoning legislation changing a multi-family dwelling from a permitted use. Nicholson v
Tourtellotte, 110 RI 411, 293 A2d 909,
70 ALR3d 118 (1972).
Where restaurant operators attempted to rectify a deficiency in offstreet parking by a zoning variance
and subsequently entered into an
182

agreement. with the village whereby
neighboring structure would be demolished and the resulting vacant lot
converted into off-street parking
spaces, plaintiffs by accepting the benefit thereof for approximately three
years could not rescind or repUdiate
their contract and attempt to relitigate the issues upon which the agreement was originally predicated. Psyhogios v Skokie, 4 III App 3d 186, 280
NE2d 552 (1972, 1st Dist).
11. NY Pub Housing Law § 71.
12. NY Pub Housing Law § 99.
13. Chase v Glen Cove, 34 Misc 2d
810, 227 NYS2d 131 (1962).
Where petitioners, tax-paying residents, argued that the zoning changes
enacted by the town to enable the
construction of a federally financed
low income housing development in
the vicinity of their property constituted illegal spot zoning, it was found
that the amendments did not offend
the state constitution nor did it constitute impermissible "contract zoning."
Marino v Ramapo, 68 Misc 2d 44, 326
NYS2d 162 (1971), citing Anderson,
New York Zoning Law and Practice
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restrictions are valid simply because they are between two public
agencies. A Florida court held invalid an agreement between a
city and the state whereby the city promised to adopt certain restrictive zoning regulations. The purpose of the regulation was to
prevent the improvement of the land which the state planned to
acquire for a public purpose. The court's opinion was grounded
on its disapproval of the contract aspect of the transaction, as
well as the confiscatory effect of the whole scheme. 14 Absent a
scheme with confiscatory impact, a Florida court held that an
agreement between a city and a public housing authority,
whereby the city agreed to make specified zoning changes to
protect a housing project, was not unlawfu1. 1s
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§ 9.23. Incentive zoning.

The common zoning ordinance has a basically negative impact.
It prohibits certain uses in certain districts, and imposes area
restrictions in terms of yard, setback, .size of lot, frontage and the
like. Recent ordinances contain a growing number of affirmative
provisions which require the construction of fences to conceal
unsightly uses, the building of screens to protect residential users
from glare, or the planting of trees and shrubs to enhance the appearance of the area. Even these provisions have minimal effect
in guiding the development of the community into channels
regarded as desirable.
Incentive zoning (sometimes referred to as bonus zoning)
undertakes to add an affirmative thrust to the land use regulations by encouraging the establishment of uses regarded as desirable, or by inducing developers to add certain amenities when
new construction is carried out. It is a carrot-and-stick technique
which employs administrative concessions to induce needed
construction or desired features thereof.16
The incentive zoning technique can be illustrated by describing
(1st ed) § 8.14; 1 Anderson, American
Law of Zoning (1st ed) § 8.2l.
14. Board of Comrs. of State Institutions v Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co.,
108 So 2d 74 (1958, Fla App D1), cert
quashed (Fla) 116 So 2d 762.
15. Housing Authority of Melbourne
v Richardson, 196 So 2d 489 (1967, Fla
App D4).

16. See generally, Marcus and
Groves, The New Zoning: Legal, Administrative, and Economic Concepts
and Techniques, p 200 (1970); Bonus
or Incentive Zoning-Legal Implications. 21 Syracuse L Rev 895 (1970).
See also Ziegler, Rathkopf's The
Law of Zoning & Planning at Chapter
9 ("Special Zoning Districts ·and Dis183
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ditionaI facts, such as a change in conditions
or other considerations materially affecting
the merits, have intervened since the adoption of the regulations. 13
A change in zoning should be in accord with
the statutory purposes or the general scheme
of a comprehensive zoning plan. 14 Spot zoning
which is not in harmony with an existing
comprehensive plan 15 or ordinance16 is invalid.
On the other hand, where the zoning amendment is part of a comprehensive plan or is in
conformity therewith, it is not illegal spot
zoning. 17 The fact that a zoning ordinance may
allow spot zoning does not make the ordinance
bad; the question instead is whether particular zoning or rezoning is done for reasons
other than the general welfare. 18 Considerations of public health, safety, and welfare
may sometimes justify such a change as part
of a comprehensive, well-considered plan in
the public interest. 19

amendments to the zoning law.

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Land Planning
e:>160

A municipality generally does not have
authority to enter into a contract with a
property owner for the reclassification or
rezoning of property or the enactment of

A municipality generally does not have
authority to enter into a contract with a property owner for the reclassification or rezoning
of property or the enactment of amendments
to the zoning law. 1 Such a contract ordinarily
is in contravention of the public policy embodied in the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to zoning. 2
The term "contract zoning" refers to an
agreement between a property owner and a
local government whereby the owner agrees to
certain conditions in return for the government's rezoning or enforceable promise to
rezone. 3 Zoning, however, must be done
through the exercise of legislative power
rather than by special arrangements with the
owner of a particular piece of property, and
therefore, contract zoning is invalid because a
local government surrenders its authority to
determine proper land use and bypasses the
entire legislative process. 4 The illegal aspect
of contract zoning appears when a zoning
authority binds itself to enact a zoning amend-

13Cal.-Scrutton v. Sacramento County, 275 Cal. App.
2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (3d Dist. 1969).
Miss.-Jitney-Jungle, Inc. v. City of Brookhaven, 311
So. 2d 652 (Miss. 1975).
As to a change of conditions or mistake as a necessary basis for rezoning, generally, see § 73.
14Conn.-Zandri v. Zoning Commission of Town of
Ridgefield, 150 Conn. 646, 192 A.2d 876 (1963).
Ind.-Penn v. Metropolitan Plan Commission of
Marion County, 141 Ind. App. 387, 228 N.E.2d 25 (Div. 2
1967).
As to comprehensive zoning plans, generally, see § 39.
15Mass.-Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee in Dept. of Community Affairs, 363
Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973).
Tex.-McWhorter v. City of Winnsboro, 525 S.W.2d
701 (Tex. Civ. App. Tyler 1975), writ refused n.r.e., (Oct.
1, 1975).
16Miss.-McKibben v. City of Jackson, 193 So. 2d 741
(Miss. 1967).
17Ala.-Grund v. Jefferson County, 291 Ala. 29, 277 So.
2d 334 (1973).
Conn.-Lathrop v. Planning and Zoning Commission
of Town of Trumbull, 164 Conn. 215, 319 A.2d 376 (1973).
18Mo.-Treme v. St. Louis County, 609 S.W.2d 706

(Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1980).
19Conn.-Malafronte v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of
City of Milford, 155 Conn. 205, 230 A.2d 606 (1967).
Wis.-State ex reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d
22,174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
[Section 76J
1Colo.-Ford Leasing Development Co. v. Board of
County Com'rs of Jefferson County, 186 Colo. 418, 528
P.2d 237 (1974).
N.C.-Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187
S.E.2d 35 (1972).
Ohio-Hausmann & Johnson, Inc. v. Berea Bd. of
Bldg. Code Appeals, 40 Ohio App. 2d 432, 69 Ohio Op. 2d
379,320 N.E.2d 685 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1974).
Wis.-State ex reI. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d
22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
20hio-Hausmann & Johnson, Inc. v. Berea Bd. of
Bldg. Code Appeals, 40 Ohio App. 2d 432, 69 Ohio Op. 2d
379, 320 N.E.2d 685 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1974).
As to statutory and constitutional sources of zoning
power, see § 8.
3Ark.-Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 352 Ark.
315, 101 S.W.3d 221 (2003).
~ex.-Super Wash, Inc. v. City of White Settlement,
131 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2004), petition for
review filed, (Apr. 9, 2004).
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ment and agrees not to alter a zoning change
for a specified period of time; when a zoning
authority takes such a step and curtails its independent legislative power, it acts ultra vires
and the rezoning is therefore a nullity.5 Where
the record shows that the zoning action would
not have taken place but for the understanding that impermissible conditions would be in
operation, the impermissible conditional use
zoning will be struck down, even if the impermissible influence is not explicit. 6 However, a
municipality may be authorized by statute to
make an agreement, prior to annexation of an
area, with property owners in the area with
respect to the zoning regulations to be applied
to the owners' land. 7

Grant of change on conditions.
Generally, zone changes may be conditionally granted only when regulations authorize
conditions to be imposed in specific circumstances and when those regulations are uniformly applied. B In the absence of such authorization, the granting of a zoning change on
conditions, or subject to the recording of restrictive covenants, may be an unauthorized

§ 76

exercise of the police power delegated to the
municipality.9 On the other hand, conditional
rezoning is not invalid per se,10 and the
imposition of reasonable conditions on rezoning may be a lawful exercise of the police
power in some circumstances. 11
In the broadest of senses, both "contract
zoning" and "conditional zoning" involve some
sort of understanding between a governmental
unit and developer, whereby the doing of
certain acts by the developer will result in
favorable rezoning treatment by the governmental unit. 12 However, in the context of
conditional use zoning, a local zoning authority maintains its independent decisionmaking
authority, whereas in the contract zoning scenario, it abandons that authority by binding
itself contractually with a landowner seeking
a zoning amendment. 13 Permissible conditional use zoning occurs when a governmental
body, without committing its own authority,
secures a given property owner's agreement to
limit the use of his or her property to a particular use or to subject his or her tract to certain
restrictions as a precondition to any
rezoning. 14
The practice of conditional use zoning is an

5N.C.-Dale v. Town of Columbus, NC, 101 N.C. App.
As to the relationship of zoning to police power, see
335, 399 S.E.2d 350 (1991).
§ 19.
6Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns . 10m.-Goffinet v. Christian County, 65 lll. 2d 40, 2 Ill.
Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002).
Dec. 275, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
7Ill.-Union Nat. Bank v. Village of Glenwood, 38 TIl.
N.Y.-Levine v . Town of Oyster Bay, 26 A.D.2d 583,
App. 3d 469, 348 N.E.2d 226 (1st Dist. 1976).
272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2d Dep't 1966).
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Brookeville
11Ariz.-Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tucson,
Turnpike Const. Co., 246 Md. 117, 228 A.2d 263 (1967).
23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P .2d 693 (Div. 2 1975).
BConn.-Kaufman v. Zoning Com'n of City of
Colo.-King'S Mill Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
Danbury, 232 Conn. 122,653 A.2d 798 (1995).
Westminster, 192 Colo. 305, 557 P .2d 1186 (1976).
9Md.-Montgomery County v. National Capital Realty
Ill.-Goffinet v . Christian County, 30 Ill. App. 3d
Corp., 267 Md. 364, 297 A.2d 675 (1972).
1089, 333 N.E.2d 731 (5th Dist. 1975), judgment aff'd, 65
Miss.-Lewis v. City of Jackson, 184 So . 2d 384 Ill. 2d 40, 2 Ill. Dec. 275, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
(Miss. 1966).
N.Y.-Dexter v. Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36
N.C.-Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C . 530, 178 N.Y.2d 102,365 N.Y.S.2d 506, 324 N.E.2d 870 (1975).
S.E.2d 432 (1971).
R.I.-Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I.
134, 364 A.2d 1277 (1976).
Objections to conditional zoning
12Md.-People's Counsel for Baltimore County v .
The primary objection to conditional zoning is that it
Beachwood I Ltd. Partnership, 107 Md. App. 627, 670
per~its the use of a particular property in a zoning
distnct subject to restrictions other than those applicable A.2d 484 (1995).
13N.C.-Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N .C. 611,
to all land similarly classified; the evils inherent in
370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).
conditional zoning agreements are not inherent in a
regulation which applies equally to all rezoned properties.
14N.C.-Westminster Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary Zon·
Md.-Colwell v. Howard County, 31 Md. App. 8, 354 ing Bd. of Adjustment, 354 N.C. 298, 554 S.E.2d 634
(2001).
A.2d 210 (1976).
As to police power as a basis for zoning, see § 8.

Contingent rezoning not illegal contract zoning
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Zc

potential uses of the area in question, as
approved practice, in some jurisdictions, so
well as to future concerns such as the effect
long as the action of a local zoning authority
on property values and traffic conditions.
in accomplishing zoning is reasonable, neither
arbitrary, nor unduly discriminatory, and so Research References
long as it is in the public interest. 15 The valid- West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Land Planning
e:=>154, 163 to 166
ity of conditions thus may depend on whether
they are reasonably conceived and are nondisThe necessity or advisability of making a
criminatory,16 and an arbitrarily conceived change or amendment in zoning regulations, l
exaction, imposed by a zoning authority upon and the propriety thereof, 2 must be detera landowner as a prerequisite to the grant of mined in the light of all relevant circumstances and conditions existing at the time of
rezoning, is invalid.17
its
enactment. 3 Matters which are required to
The grant of a public privilege such as a zoning change may not be conditioned upon dep- be considered in making the original zoning
regulations must also be considered in makrivation of constitutional protections.18
ing changes in such regulations. 4
It is appropriate, in considering a zoning
§ 77 Other circumstances and
change,
to view the municipality as a whole
conditions to be considered
and to plan for the future. 5 The existing locaThe necessity or advisability of changes
tion of the boundaries of a zoning district is a
in zoning regulations must be determined
circumstance to be weighed in determining
after consideration of alJ relevant circum-
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stances and conditions, and consideration
should be given to the nature of present and

A city council did not engage in illegal "contract zoning" by approving rezoning contingent upon the meeting
of 23 conditions relating to a planned unit development,
which served as a helpful tool in ensuring that the
concerns of many of the area residents were met.
Miss.-Old Canton Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. Mayor
and City Council of City of Jackson, 749 So. 2d 54 (Miss.
1999).
15N.C.-Chrismon v. Guilford County, 322 N.C. 611,
370 S.E.2d 579 (1988).
Amelioration of effects of zoning change
Conditional zoning is permissible and will be upheld
when imposed pursuant to the police power for the protection or benefit of neighbors, in order to ameliorate the effects of a zoning change.
Ga.-Warshaw v. City of Atlanta, 250 Ga. 535, 299
S.E.2d 552 (1983).
As to the prohibition against discrimination in zoning
matters, see § 24.
16Ariz.-Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v . City of Tucson,
23 Ariz. App. 385, 533 P.2d 693 (Div. 2 1975).
Colo.-King's Mill Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of
Westminster, 192 Colo. 305, 557 P.2d 1186 (1976).
Va.-City of Richmond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 211
S .E.2d 56 (1975).
17Cal.-Scrutton v. Sacramento County, 275 Cal. App.
2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (3d Dist. 1969).
18Cal.-Scrutton v. Sacramento County, 275 Cal. App.
2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (3d Dist. 1969).
[Section 77]
lD.C.-Lewis v. District of Columbia, 190 F .2d 25
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
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Ill.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324
N.E.2d 406 (1975).
Population concentration
Prevention of undue population concentration in a
given area is a factor to be considered in changing a zoning classification.
Kan.-Hukle v. City of Kansas City, 212 Kan. 627,
512 P.2d 457 (1973).
2Fla.-MiIes v. Dade County by Board of County
Com'rs, 260 So. 2d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1972).
Ill.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324
N.E.2d 406 (1975).
N.C.-Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178
S.E.2d 432 (1971).
30hio-White v. City of Cincinnati, 101 Ohio App.
160, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 92, 138 N.E.2d 412 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1956).
4Conn.-Mallory v. Town of West Hartford, 138 Conn.
497, 86 A.2d 668 (1952).
D.C.-c-Prentiss v. American University, 214 F.2d 282
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
Ill.-Garner v. City of Carmi, 28 Ill . 2d 560, 192
N.E.2d 816 (1963).
As to matters to be considered in original zoning
enactments, generally, see § 17.
5D.C.-W. C. & A." N. Miller Development Co. v.
District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 340 A.2d 420
(D.C. 1975).
Md.-Jacobs v. County Bd. of Appeals for Baltimore
County, 234 Md. 242, 198 A.2d 900 (1964).
Mass.-Rosko v. City of Marlborough, 355 Mass. 51,
242 N.E.2d 857 (1968).
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proposed chaD;ges, ~ but the fact ~hat the property in questIOn IS on the perImeter of the
district rather than in the center thereof does
not necessarily make it more subject to
rezoning. 7
In making zoning changes, consideration
may and should be given to the nature of the
existing uses in the area, 8 and what would be
an appropriate use of the properties in
question. 9 A change of zoning for a requested
use not compatible with existing uses should
ordinarily be refused. 10 However, conditions
may be such as to support a rezoning of a tract
to a classification different from that of adjoining property.11

Effect on property values.
Incidental benefit or detriment to the owners, either ofthe property sought to be rezoned
or of neighborhood property, is generally of no

l Ohio App.
Dist. Hamil-

Choice between two reasonable uses
A legislative body presented with two property uses,
both reasonable, could choose to retain the use permitted
under present rezoning, even though the proposed use
might have been more appropriate or even the most appropriate use for the land.
Va.-Board of Sup'rs of Roanoke County v.
International Funeral Services, Inc., 221 Va. 840, 275
S.E.2d 586 (1981).
6Mass.-Canteen Corp. v. City of Pittsfield, 4 Mass.
App. Ct. 289,·346 N.E.2d 732 (1976).
7Fla.-Dade County v. Miller, 325 So. 2d 418 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1976).
Ill.-Littlestone Co. v. Cook County, 19 TIL App. 3d
222,311 N.E.2d 268 (1st Dist. 1974).
Tex.-Hunt v. City of San Antonio, 462 S.W.2d 536
(Tex. 1971).

1,138 Conn.

8Ill.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324
N.E.2d 406 (1975).

14 F.2d 282

Md.-Boyce v. Sembly, 25 Md. App. 43, 334 A.2d 137
(1975).

d 107, 324

;ration in a
19ing a zon2 Kan. 627,
of County
Dist. 1972).
ld 107, 324
C. 530, 178

ld 560, 192
inal zoning
lent Co. v.
[0 A.2d 420
r Baltimore
5 Mass. 51,

Preservation of residential area as valid goal
In considering a rezoning request, preserving an
existing residential area is a valid goal.
Miss.-Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So. 2d 902
(Miss. 1987).
9Conn.-Wade v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission
of Town of Hamden, 145 Conn. 592,145 A.2d 597 (1958).
1oMinn._N. R. Fairbanks Co. v. City of Blaine, 308
Minn. 315, 242 N.W.2d 99 (1976).
110kla._City of Tulsa v. Mobley, 1969 OK 85, 454 P.2d
901 (Okla. 1969).
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direct consequence in determining the validity
of rezoning legislation. 12 Thus, the fact that
hardship may result from retention of an
existing use is not of itself sufficient to justify
a rezoning. 13 Similarly, rezoning cannot be justified solely on grounds that it is necessary to
allow the most remunerative use of a tract of
land. 14 On the other hand, in determining the
validity of a zoning amendment or the application therefor, the extent to which the value of
property is affected thereby generally may be
considered. 15 Likewise, the fact that a property for which rezoning is sought has itself
changed so that the property can no longer
reasonably be put to the principal use for
which it had previously been zoned is a factor
which can properly be considered in determining whether the standards for rezoning have
been met. 16
A city may have the right to deny a zoning
change request if it has a reasonable basis to
Pa.-Clawson v. Harborcreek Tp. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 9 Pa. Commw. 124, 304 A.2d 184 (1973).
12Conn.-Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of
Windsor, 30 Conn. Supp. 157,306 A.2d 151 (C.P. 1973).
N.Y.-Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Dekdebrun, 38
A.D.2d 46, 326 N.Y.S.2d 444 (4th Dep't 1971).
13Md.-Cabin John
Limited Partnership
v.
Montgomery County Council, 259 Md. 661, 271 A.2d 174
(1970).
Projection of financial loss insufficient
Where one seeks to change the basic use of his or her
property from one zoning classification to another, a mere
projection of financial loss under the less advantageous
classification, without more, will not justify the change.
Ala.-Hall v. Jefferson County, 450 So. 2d 792 (Ala.
1984).
14Ark._City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437,
619 S.W.2d 664 (1981).
No unconstitutional taking
The fact that property would have been more valuable if rezoned, or the fact that it would have been more
difficult to develop the property as zoned than if rezoned,
failed to show such a significant detriment in existing
zoning as would amount to an unconstitutional taking of
property and was insufficient to warrant rezoning.
Ga.-Delta Cascade Partners, II v. Fulton County,
260 Ga. 99, 390 S.E.2d 45 (1990).
As to the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without compensation, see § 23.
15IlI.-Duggan v. Cook County, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324
N.E.2d 406 (1975).
16Miss.-Thrash v. Mayor and Com'rs of City of
Jackson, 498 So. 2d 801 (Miss. 1986).
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believe that it will conserve the values of other
properties and encourage the most appropriate use thereof. 17 However, the mere fact that
a rezoning will depreciate the value of surrounding property does not establish that the
rezoning is illegal. 18

Traffic conditions.
Traffic conditions in an area involved in an
amendment or change in zoning regulations
or classification, and the effect of such change
on the traffic conditions, must be given
consideration. 19 Traffic problems are matters
rezoning authorities are required to consider
to weigh and balance with and against all
other relevant factors or interests in determining the propriety of a zoning reclassification. 20
However, traffic conditions and problems are
not always controlling as against other considerations involved in a change of zoning,21 especially where they might otherwise be dealt
with by the public authorities. 22
17Utah-Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 70
P.3d 47 (Utah 2003).
.
18Neb.-Giger v. City of Omaha, 232 Neb. 676, 442
N.W.2d 182 (1989).
1IiMd.-Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council, 248
Md. 386, 237 A.2d 53 (1968).
Utah-Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307,
358 P.2d 633 (1961).
2oMiss.-Woodland Hills Conservation Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of Jackson, 443 So. 2d 1173 (Miss. 1983).
Slight increase in traffic insufficient
A slight increase in traffic on an already busy thoroughfare is not a sufficient objection to prevent rezoning
for commercial development.
Kan.-Taco Bell v. City of Mission, 234 Kan. 879, 678
P.2d 133 (1984).
Creation of particular problem due to increase in
traffic
While generally an increase of traffic is not given
great weight in determining whether to rezone a property, creation of a particular traffic problem connected to
a particular use at a particular location could be, in and
of itself, a sufficient reason for a denial of that use at that
location.
Ill.-Amalgamated Trust and Say. Bank v. Cook
County, 82 TIL App. 3d 370, 37 Ill. Dec. 717,402 N.E.2d
719 (1st Dist. 1980).
21Ark.-Lindsey v. City of Fayetteville, 256 Ark. 352,
507 S.W.2d 101 (1974).
Md.-Bigenho v. Montgomery County Council, 248
Md. 386, 237 A.2d 53 (1968).
22N.Y.-Board of Ed., Union Free School Dist. No. 14,

CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM
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Regulations as to particular
uses or restrictions

Particular amendments and changes have
been considered, including changes effecting a rezoning of property from residential
to business, commercial, or industrial use,
and vice versa.

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Zoning and Land Planning
€=>167.1 to 170

Where an amendment or change in the
regulations is reasonable under the circumstances and justified by considerations of the
public welfare, property may be rezoned with
respect to various uses or restrictions, 1 such
as from residential to business or commercial
use, 2 or from a residential classification to an

Town of Hempstead, Nassau County v. Town of
Hempstead, 202 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup 1960).
[Section 78]
1Conn.-Jablon v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission of Town of Newtown, 157 Conn. 434, 254 A.2d 914
(1969).
Mass.-Woodland Estates, Inc. v. Building Inspector
of Methuen, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 757, 358 N.E.2d 468 (1976).
N.J.-Hyland v. Mayor and Tp. Committee of Morris
Tp., 130 N.J. Super. 470, 327 A.2d 675 (App. Div. 1974),
judgment afi'd, 66 N.J. 31, 327 A.2d 657 (1974).
2Ga.-Pendley v. Lake Harbin Civic Ass'n, 230 Ga.
631, 198 S.E.2d 503 (1973).
La.-Carlo Ditta, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish, 315 So. 2d
361 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1975), writ denied, 320 So. 2d
559 (La. 1975) and writ denied, 320 So. 2d 560 (La. 1975).
N.J.-Wallington Home Owners Ass'n v. Borough of
Wallington, 130 N.J. Super. 461,327 A.2d 669 (App. Div.
1974), judgment affd, 66 N.J. 30,327 A.2d 657 (1974).

&~ning not arbitrary or capricious
(1) A city ordinance rezoning a lot from a residential

to a business classification was not arbitrary and capricious, where it was at least fairly debatable that the
character and use of property in the neighborhood was
changing to business and professional offices.
Ala.-City of Gadsden v. Downs, 412 So. 2d 267 (Ala.
1982).
(2) A decision of city council to rezone property from
multifamily residential and single-family residential to
residential offices was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, and was at least fairly debatable, where there
was evidence of change in the neighborhood, and a land
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§ 237

repealed, as respects a particular municipality, or as respects all
municipalities, laws of a general nature, elsewhere in force throughout

the State; yet a charter or special act passed subsequent to the general law, and plainly irreconcilable with it, will to the extent of the
conflict operate a repeal of the latter by implication. But by a wellknown rule, founded on solid reasons, such repeals are not favored'
and the principle of implied repeals ought to be applied with extrem~
caution.'
§ 237 (89). Extent of Power; Llmita.tions; Oa.nons of Construc_
tion. - It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that
I See cases cited to last preceding to license, bawdy houses."
After this
section; also St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 act went into effect, State v. De Bar
Mo. 483; Baldwin v. Green, 10 Mo. 410; supra, arose. The defendant was in~
State v. Binder, 38 Mo. 450, 451; State dicted under the general law of the
v. Young (intoxicating liquors), 17 State for keeping such a house. There
Kan. 414 (where the Kansas cases on was another provision in the general
the subject are discussed by Ho,·ton, law, that the repeal of a law shall not
C. J.); State v. Clarke. 25 N. J. L. 54; by implication revive a former law.
State v. Douglass, 33 N. J. 1. 363; And it was held by a mltjority of the
State v. Mills. 34 N. J. L. 177, 180; court that the amendment of 18H
Montezuma t'. Minor, 70 Ga. 191; St. which repealed the former amendment
Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300.
of 1870, did not thereby revive the genThe case of State v. Clarke, 54 Mo. eral criminal statute in the city of St.
Ii, and of State t'. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395, Louis, and, as a. consequence, that the
relating to the social evil powers of the defendant could not be convicted.
city of St. Louis, are highly instructive This last decision seems to the author
on the question on the effect of a special to be erroneous, on the ground that the
act upon the general law. In each case Act of 1870 did not ipso facto repeal the
the defendant was indicted under the general law in the city, but such repeal,
general criminal code of the State, or suspension rather, was only effected
which prohibited the keeping of bawdy when the city passed the ordinance. If
houses. In the first case the defendant so, a repeal of the ordinance by the
pleaded a license from the city to keep council, without the Act of 1874, would
such a house. In 1870 the charter of have left the general law of the State in
the city was amended, and the previous force within the city, and its repeal by
power to "suppress" such houses was the Act of 1874 would have precisely the
changed to the power "to pass ordi- same effect. These cases may be usenances, not inconsistent with any law of fully consulted on the nature and scope
the State, to regulate or suppress" such of the power to "regulate." See also
houses. Under this power to regulate, Givens t'. Van Studdiford, 86 Mo. 149.
the city regulated such houses by pass- General power in a municipal charter
ing an order licensing them; and such held not to repeal by implIcation the
a.n ordinance was held to be valid not- chartered rights of a railroad company.
withstanding the general law. and to State v. Jersey City, 29 N. J. 1. 170. Or
hsxe the effect to prevent the enforce- to interfere with vested rights. State v.
ment of the general criminal law of the Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. 32, 33.
Stat.e within the city of St. Louis. The
A charter which confers exc/usi"e
question was a close one, but the ma- jurisdiction upon municipal authorijority opinion of Napton, J., in ;-iew of ties operates to repeal the general Ia~
the legislation recited in it, seems to be on the same subject within the municI·
sound. State v. Clark, 54 Mo. 17. The pality; not so ordinarily when.the cha~
next year, 1874, in consequence of the ter confers concurrent authOrIty. SeIdecision, the chart'er of the city was bold v. People, 86 Ill. 33. As to repeal
amended in this respect, by substitut- of special provisions by general laws,
ing the words "to suppress, but not and vice versa, see ante, § 167.
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a m.unicipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second,
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the

declared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not simply
convenient, but indispensable.! Any fair, reasonable, substantial
I Smith t'. Newbern, 70 N. Car. 14.
62; Chicago v. Norton Milling Co., 196
Refer rin " to the text, McAllister, J., in Ill. 580, aff'g 97 III. App. 651; Ladd v.
People ~. Howard, not officiaily re- Jones, 61 Ill. App. 584; Pittsburgh,
orted says: "It is the best summary &c. R. Co. v. Crown Point, 146 Ind. 421;
~f all the decisions upon that point to Walker v. Towle, 156 Ind. 639; McAIbe found in all the books." Text cited len v. Hamblin, 129 Iowa, 329; Anderand approved in the following cases: son v. Wellington, 40 Ran. 173, 176:
Cool' Co. ". McCree.. 93 Ill. ~36; Ottawa In re Pryor, 55 Ran. 724: Henderv. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; helly v. Town son v. Covington, 14 Bush (Ky.),
of Milan, 21 Fed. Rep. 842; Scott v. 312; Nelson v. Homer, 48 La. An.
Shreveport, 20 Fed. Rep. 714: Des- 258; Mayo v. Dover & Foxcroft Vilmond v. City of Jefferson, 19 Fed. Rep. lage Fire Co.,96 Me. 539; Foster v.
483; InreLeeTong. 18 Fed. Rep. 253; Worcester, 164 Mass. 419; Taylor v.
Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588; Henke Bay City St. R. Co., 80 Mich. 7i; Peov. McCord, 55 Iowa, 378: Ravenna pIe v. Holly, 119 Mich. 637; Leach v.
v. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St. 118; Cargill, 60 Mo. 316; State v. Butler,
Corvalis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. 13\); Dn.n- 178 Mo. 2i2, approving text; Joplin v.
ville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325; Bell v. Leckie, 78 Mo. App. 8; Kirkwood v.
Platteville, 71 Wis. 139; Gilman v. Meramec Highlands Co .. 94 Mo. App.
Milwaukee, 61 Wis. 588; Blake v. 637; Christensen v. Fremont, 45 Neb.
Walker, 23 S. Car. 5li; Charleston 1!. 160; State v. Webber, 107 N. Car. 962;
Reed, 27 W. Va. 681; Kansas v. Swope, State v. Eason, 114 N. Car. 787, citing
79 Mo. 446; Portland v. Schmidt, 13 text; Love v. Raleigh, 116 N. Car. 296;
Oreg. 17; Levy v. Salt Lake City, 3 State v. Higgs. 126 N. Car. 1014; RaUtah, 63; Richmond v. McGirr, 78 venna t'. Pennsylvania Co., 45 Ohio St.
118; Markley v. Mineral City, 58 Ohio
Ind. 192, 197.
The doctrine stated in the text is also St. 430; Mcintosh v. Charleston, 45
followed, approved, applied, and ilIus- S. Car. 584; Ysleta v. Babbitt, 8 Tex.
trated jn the following cases: Barne~t Civ. App. 43~; Ogden City v. Bear
v. DenIson, 145 U. S. 135; DetroIt Lake, <Icc. Img. Co., 16 Utah, 440;
Citizens St. Ry. Co. v. Detroit Ry., 171 Winchester v. Redmond, 93 Va. 711;
U. S. 48; s. c. 22 U. S. App. 570, 590; Lynchburg & R. St. R. Co. v. Dameron,
Grand Rapids El., &c. Co. v. Grand 95 Va. 545; Duncan v. Lynchburg
Rapids, &c. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 659; (Va.). 34 S. E. Rep. 964: Donable
Detroit v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 56 Fed. tl. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 533; Tacoma
R~p. 867; Andrews v. Nat. Foundry & Gas & Elec. Li!:?ht Co. v. Tacoma,
Pipe Works, 61 Fed. Rep. 782; Los 14 Wash. 288; l'arwell v. Seattle. 43
An~eles City Water Co. v. Los Angeles, Wash. 141; Trester v. Sheboygan, 87
88 ~'ed. Rep. 720; Fort Scott v. Eads Wis. 496; Schneider v. Menasha, 118
Brokerage Co., 117 Fed. Rep. 51; New Wis. 298; Lewis v. Alexander, 24
Decatur v. Berry, 90 Ala. 432; Gambill Canada S, C. R. 551.
v. Erdrich, 143 Ala. 506; Cleveland
Implied power to appropriate money
School Fum. Co. t'. Greenville. 146 Ala. out of eity treasury to assist in the
559; San Pedro v. Southern Pac. Ry. maintenance of national guard denied.
Co., 101 Cal. 333; Durango v. Reins- Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App.
berg, 16 Colo. 327; Hayward v. Red 485. But the general "'clfare clause tn
Cliff Trustees, 20 Colo. 33: Bridgeport charter was held to authorize pensions
v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn. 475; to members of the police force. ComCrofut v. Danbury, 65 Conn. 294; monwealth v. Walton. 182 Pa. 373.
Jacksonville Electric 1. Co. v. Jackson- Where an act authorized existing corville; 36 Fla. 229; Porter v. Vinzant, 49 porations by vote of their members
Fla. 213; Keen v. Waycross, 101 Ga. to aller, change, and amend the charters,
588; Smith v. McDowell, 148 HI. 51, but did not confer upon (,he corporation
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doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation, and the power is denied. I Of every munici_
pal corporation the charter or statute by which it is created is its
organic act. Neither the corporation nor its officers can do any act
or make any contract, or incur any liability, not authorized thereby'
or by some legislative act applicable thereto. All acts beyond th~
scope of the powers granted are void.' Much less can any power
be exercised, or any act done, which is forbidden by charter or
statute. These principles are of transcendent importance, and lie at
the foundation of the law of municipal corporations. Their reason_
ableness, their necessity, and their salutary character have been often
vindicated, but never more forcibly than by the learned Chief Justice
Shaw, who, speaking of municipal and public corporations, says:
the power to incorporate within its
charter any grant of any privilege not
extsting in the original. charter, it was
beld that the power to establish a public
school could not be inferred from any
power necessary for municipal existence, and that there was no authority
under the act for tbe corporation to so
amend its charter as to authorize the
levying of a tax for the maintenance of
a bigh scbool, or for any other educational purpose. Nelson v. Homer, 48
La. An. 258.
I Text quoted with approval. WiIIiams v. Davidson, 43 Tex. 33; Brenham t'. Water Co., 67 Tex. 542; Hanger
v. Des Moines, 52 Iowa, 193; City of
Corvalis v. Carlile, 10 Oreg. 139; Kirkham v. Russell, 76 Va. 956; Tax Collector v. Dendinger, 38 La. An. 261;
Merrill v. Monticello, 138 U. S. 673;
Hart t'. Buckner, 2 D. S. App. 488;
Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Los
Angeles, 88 Fed. Rep. 720; Ex parte
Florence, 78 Ala. 419; Newport v.
Batesville & B. Railway Co., 58 Ark.
270; Von Schmidt v. Wiber, 105 Cal.
151; St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co., 96 Mo.
623; Knapp v. Kansas City, 48 Mo.
App. 485; Joplin v. Leckie, i8 Mo.
App. 8; Meday v. Rutherford, 65 N. J.
L. 645.
, McCann v. Otoe Co., 9 Neb. 324;
Stewart v. Otoe Co., 2 Neb. 177; Sioux
City & P. R. R. Co. v.Washin~ton
County, 3 Neb. 30, 42; Somerville v.
Bickerman, 127 Mass. 272; Boylston
Market v. Boston, 113 Mass. 528; Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass. 470;
Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19; Peopie v. Weber, 89 Ill. 347 i Bryan v.
Page, 51 tTex. 532; FranCIS v. Troy,
i

eN

II'.)

~ 1~'0

74 N. Y. 338; State v. Passaic 41 N J
L.90; Perrine v. Farr, 22 N. 1. L. 356:
Carron v. Martin, 26 N. J. L. 594' Stat~
v. Hudson, 29 N. J. L. 104; State v
Marion Co., 21 Ran. 419; Green v'
Cape May, 41 N. J. L. 45; Lord v'
Oconto, 47 ·Wis. 386; Garvey, In r;
77 N. Y. 523; Smitb v. Newbura 77
N. Y. 130; Allen v. Galveston, 51'1
302; Dore v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis. 18'
Butler v. Nevin, 88 Ill. 575; Rans~
City v. Flanagan, 69 Mo. 22; Bentlmv. County Com'rs, 25 Minn. 259; Fur.
ton v. Lincoln, 9 Neb. 358; Hurford v.
Omaha, 4 Neb. 336, 350; Reis v. Graff,
51 Cal. 86. Text cited with approval in
Cook Co. v. McCrea, 93 IlL 236; Blrmingham & Pratt M. Ry. Co. v. Birmingham Street Ry. Co., 79 Ala. 465;
Davenport v. Kleinschmidt, 6 Mont.
502; Heiskell v. Baltimore, 65 Md. 125;
Dwyerv. City of Brenham, 65 Tex. 526;
St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 59 Vt. 300;
Christie v. Malden, 23 W. Va. 667;
Spengler v. Trowbridge, 62 Miss. 46 (an
appropriation to pay expenses of a committee in endeavoring to obtain legislation from Congress held illegal, and
payment enjoined); Gas Co. v. Parkersburg, 30 W. Va. 435. The citizens
of a city cannot confer upon its common council powers not granted by
charter. Torrent v. Muskegon, 47
Mich. 115. Applying the rule in tbe
text, an act authorizing the sale of municipal bonds at not less than par was
help not to warrant the allowance of a
commission to a purchaser of the bonds
from the city at par. Whelen's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 162, 197. Post,
chapter on Municipal Bonds.

rcx.
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" They can exercise no powers but those which are conferred upon
them by the act by which they are constituted, or such as are necessary to the exercise of their corporate powers, the performance of
their corporate duties, and the accomplishment of the purposes of
their association. This principle is derived from the nature of corporations, the mode in which they are organized, and in which their
affairs must be conducted."
§ 238 (90). Same Subject. - "In aggregate corporations, as a
general rule," continues Chief Justice Shaw, "the act and will of a
majority is deemed in law the act and will of the whole, - as the
act of the corporate body. The consequence is that a minority must
be bound not only without, but against, their consent. Such an
obligation may extend to every onerous duty, - to pay money to an
unlimited amount, to perform services, to surrender lands, and the
like. It is obvious, therefore, that if this liability were to extend to
unlimited and indefinite objects, the citizen, by being a member of a
corporation, might be deprived oj' his most valuable personal rights
and liberties. The sec:lrity against this danger is in a steady adherence to the principle stated, viz., that corporations can only exercise
their powers over their respective memhers, for the accompli,'ihment of
limited and defined object,,<;. Ann if this principle is important, as a
general rule of social right and municipal law, it is of the highest
importance in these States, where corporations have been extended
and multiplied so as to embrace almost every object of human concern." 1 The language of another learned judge on this subject is
1 Per Shaw, C. J., in Spaulding v.
v. Mobile (market-hou8e case), 5 Port.
Lowell, 23 Pick. (Mas3.) 71, 74; Bangs (Ala.) 279; Head v. Ins. Co., 2 Cranch,
v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181; Stetson v. Kemp- 127; DeRussy v. Davis (sale of ferry
ton, 13 Mass. 272; Willard v. New- lease), 13 La. An. 468; People v.
buryport, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 227; Reyes Oakland County Bank, &c .. 1 Doug.
tJ. Westford, 17 Pick. 273, 279; Com.
(Mich.) 282; Montgomer! v. Montgomv. Turner, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 493, 495; ery & W. Plank Road Co., 31 Ala. 76;
Cooley v. Granville, 10 Cush. 56, 57; Burnett, in re, 30 Ala. 461, and cases
Merriam v. Moody, 25 Iowa, 163; Min- cited; Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y.
turn v. Larue, 23 How. (D. S.) 435; 333; Hayes v. Appleton, 24 Wis. 544;
Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 38; Paine v. People v. River Raisin & L. E. R. Co.,
Spratley, 5 Kan. 525; Vincent v. Nan- 12 Mich. 389; Vance v. Little Rock, 30
tucket, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 103,105; Clark Ark. 435; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis
v. Davenport, 14 Iowa, 494; Mays v. Gas Co., 66 Ind. 396. Text approved in
Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268; GaJlia Co. the following cases; Noyes v. Mason,
v. Holcomb, 7 Ohio, part L, 232; Ham- 53 Iowa, 418; Frank. In re, .52 CaL
ilton County Com'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio 606; Green I'. Cape l\hy, 41 N ..J. L. 4,).
St. 109; Fitch v. Pinckard (taxing
"The powers of all corporations are
power), 5 Ill. 78: Caldwell v. Alton l"mited by the grants in their charlers,
(market ordinance), 33 Ill. 416; Jack- and cannot extend beyond them." Per
sonville, &c v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 138, Breese, J., Petersburg v. Metzker, 21
140; Louisiana Stat.e Bank v. New 111.205. "Corporations have only such
Orleans Nay. Co., 3 La. An. 294; State rights and powers as are expressly
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authorized map amendments on
age requirement was valid because
;tively and harmoniously . . . if
:tions to the floating zone. It held
entire village and was not designed
the floating zone divest the village
~ decision to map a floating zone
g board and governing body. The
g a variance but was enacted "to
the general welfare of the entire
boundaries for the floating zone
Ie ordinance "prescribed specificawed the major problems raised by
e accepted its reasoning. 3
scretionary zoning. 4 In these cases
nunicipality for residential use and
rrresidential uses. The courts held
I regulate land use by dividing the
These cases are a hostile judicial
)cess that is entirely discretionary.
they were not consistent with a
lan is advisory. 5 The consistency
lave a consistency requirement.
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Contract and Conditional Zoning.

Contract or conditional zoning is another zoning technique that provides more
flexibility in the administration of the zoning ordinance. Contract zoning is used
because of problems created by the zoning district system. In the typical zoning
ordinance, each zoning district allows a wide range of permitted uses. An example
is a neighborhood commercial zone, which may allow a wide variety of
neighborhood commercial uses.
Adjacent property owners may object to a rezoning because the landowner
may use his land for any of the uses permitted in the new zone, not just the
use he contemplates. In contract zoning, the landowner agrees to restrict the use
of his land to the use for which he seeks the zoning amendment. The landowner
may agree to other protective conditions, such as a landscaped buffer adjacent
to the residential dwellings. Municipalities may also use contract zoning to secure
street widening or other contributions from the landowner.
Contract zoning can take several forms. One frequently used classification
distinguishes between unilateral and bilateral contract zoning. In unilateral
contract zoning, the landowner unilaterally agrees to impose restrictions on his
land in a written document, which he records. The municipal governing body
or planning commission indicates the restrictions it wants the landowner to adopt
but does not formally agree to a rezoning if the landowner complies. In bilateral
contract zoning, a landowner and the municipality execute a bilateral contract
in which the municipality promises to rezone in return for the landowner's
promise to record a document that contains the restrictions the municipality
requires. A landowner can also execute a bilateral contract with adjacent
landowners.
Some courts refer to the case in which a landowner imposes restrictions on
his land unilaterally as conditional zoning. They apply the term "contract zoning"
only to a true bilateral contract between a landowner and a municipality. This
text uses all of these terms interchangeably.
Contract zoning advocates defend it as an appropriate zoning technique that
tailors land development to its environment and assures its compatibility with
adjacent land uses. The objections to contract zoning are similar to those raised
against floating zones. Contract zoning is claimed to be invalid because it is
~nauthorized by the zoning statute, because it is arbitrary spot zoning and an
Illegal bargaining away of the zoning power, and because it violates the statutory
provision that requires uniform land use regulations within zoning districts.
~eral states now authorize contract zoning. 1
lA m.
O Rev. Stal. Ann. § 11-83 . Idaho Code § 67-651lA, Md. Code Ann. art. 66B, § 4.01(c)(1);
R.I. Gen. Laws. § 45-24-53(h); Va. Code Ann.
. 3, 15.2-2297. See Sweetman v. Town
of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277 (R.I. 1977) (statute held constitutional).
(5 th Ed.-02103)
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The case law on contract and conditional zoning is mixed, although most of
the more recent decisions approve this technique. Whether the conditions on
development are imposed bilaterally or unilaterally makes a difference. The
courts usually disapprove bilateral contract zoning but approve conditions on
development that are imposed unilaterally.
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Despite growing judicial approval of conditional zoning, its use by municipali_
ties is unwise. Individually negotiated zoning agreements undercut the unifOrmity
of the land use regulations imposed by the zoning ordinance. The proliferation
of a large number of zoning agreements throughout a municipality complicates
zoning enforcement. Although a municipality may be able to amend the zoning
ordinance to impose restrictions that conflict with a rezoning agreement, this
problem is also troublesome. 2 Detailed control over land development is possible
under acceptable zoning techniques that impose development standards subject
to approval by the zoning agency. Floating zones and site plan review are two
examples.
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The terminology used by the courts in the "contract" zoning cases is not clear,
and it is difficult to find accepted terms that describe the results in the cases .
The discussion that follows divides the cases into the "bilateral" and "unilateral"
categories, but the text indicates that the courts have different views of these
terms. One court has adopted the term "concomitant agreement zoning" for this
zoning device. 3
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The Nebraska court upheld a rezoning for a mixed use development that
included four agreements executed by the city and the developer incorporating
the development plan. 4 The court held that the distinction between contract and
conditional zoning was irrelevant and that the critical question was whether the
conditions on the rezoning advanced the public health, safety and general welfare.
The court held that the city was entitled to make agreements with developers
requiring them to follow their plans, because otherwise these plans are difficult
to enforce.

§ 6.(i3
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A number of cases have held bilateral contract zoning invalid. 1 In these cases
the municipality and the developer executed a bilateral contract, or the ordinance

287
31d.
4 SCI

2 Delucchi v. County of Santa Cruz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. App. 1986); Nicholson v. Tourtellotte, 293 A.2d 909 (R.I. 1972).
3 State ex reI. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 422 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1967).
4 Giger v. City of Omaha, 442 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 1989) (court also found no bargaining away
of police power). See also Bradley v. City of Trussville, 527 So. 2d 1303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)
delegation of legislative power) .
." 1 ale v. Osborn Coal Enters. , Inc., 729 So.2d 853 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Hartman v. Bucks~n,
A.2d 694 (Del. Ch. 1983); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Cederberg v. CIty

a

Inc. v.
v. Com

(Md. A
Bums,
517,
6 Set

160 A.

(5'· Ed.-02i03l

....• f)

!J L

~

'.,'

6-76

xed, although most of
cher the conditions on
lkes a difference. The
approve conditions on
:, its use by municipali_
undercut the uniformity
.ance. The proliferation
unicipality complicates
Ie to amend the zoning
zoning agreement, this
development is possible
)ment standards subject
ite plan review are two
;oning cases is not clear,
the results in the cases.
ilateral" and "unilateral"
jjfferent views of these
reement zoning" for this
d use development that
developer incorporating
.on between contract and
luestion was whether the
lfety and general welfare.
eements with developers
! these plans are difficult

g invalid. 1 In these cases
contract, or the ordinance

&-77

THE ZONING PROCESS

§ 6.63

that adopted the rezoning included the terms of a bilateral agreement. Houston
Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prods. Credit Ass'n 2 best expresses the reasoning
these cases adopt. The court held invalid an agreement in which the developer
agreed to impose site development restrictions and stated:
Contracts thus have no place in a zoning plan and a contract between a
municipality and a property owner should not enter into the enactment or
enforcement of zoning regulations. 3
The purpose of a rezoning agreement may make it invalid. Municipalities
sometimes insist on "reverter" agreements under which the land reverts to its
initial zoning classification if the landowner does not begin development in a
reasonable period of time. The cases hold these agreements invalid because they
accomplish a rezoning without recourse to the usual notice and hearing requirements that apply to zoning amendments. 4
A court may uphold a bilateral agreement when it is made with third parties,
such as neighbors. In State ex rei. Zupancic v. SchimenZ,5 an applicant for a
zoning change executed an agreement with neighbors that restricted the site to
a specified use and imposed site development restrictions. The agreement was
executed and recorded after the neighbors expressed concern about the rezoning
at a plan commission meeting.
.'

The court upheld the rezoning and noted that there was no agreement with
the city and no agreement to rezone. A rezoning is not invalid contract zoning
when "a zoning authority . . . is motivated to zone by agreements as to use of
the land made by others." Private agreements that "underlie" zoning provide the
"flexibility and control" that allow "a municipality to meet the ever-increasing
demands for rezoning in a rapidly changing area."6 The court also held that the
rezoning must be "otherwise valid" and suggested that the imposition of

...... ,i

of Rockford, 291 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. 1972); Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 148 A.2d 429 (Md.
1959); Rodriguez v. Prince George's Cty., 558 A.2d 742 (Md. App. 1989); Carlino v. Whitpain
Invs., 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1982). See also Chung v. Sarasota County, 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App.
1996) (settlement agreement). But see Broward County v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869 (Fla. App. 1979).
See generally 70 A.L.R.3d 125 (1976).
287 A.2d 319 (N.J. 1952).

(3id. at 32~

). 1986); Nicholson v. Tourtel·

~unty of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. App. 1969); Hausmann & Johnson,

. 1967).
ilso found no bargaining away
~ 1303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)

Inc. Y. Berea Bd. of Bldg. Code Appeals, 320 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio App. 1974). But see Goffmet
Y. County of Christian, 357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. 1976); Colwell v. Howard County, 354 A.2d 210
(Md. App. 1976). See also Dexter v. Town Bd., 324 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1975). Contra, Beyer v.
Burns, 567 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. '1991) (in floating zone ordinance).
5174 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1970).

p. 1997); Hartman v. Buckson ,
[Fla. 1956); Cederberg v. City

6 See also City of Greenbelt v. Bresler, 236 A.2d I (Md . 1967); Pressman v. City of Baltimore,
160 A.2d 379 (Md. 1960).

(5"' Ed.-02IOJ)

(5'" Ed.-02/03)
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conditions on land development "might better be done by uniform ordinances
providing for special uses, special exceptions and overlaid districts."

§ 6.64
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A growing number of cases uphold contract zoning when the restrictions on
the rezoned property are imposed unilaterally by the landowner. 1 Courts
sometimes refer to this type of zoning as conditional zoning. In these cases there
was no evidence of a bilateral contract between the landowner and the municipality, although the rezoning ordinance may have contained the restrictions the
landowner imposed on the land. 2 The cases emphasized the protective function
of restrictions unilaterally imposed on the land that avoided or mitigated the
adverse impacts of the development on adjacent property owners. In other cases
the municipality executed a contract with the developer, concurrent with the
rezoning, in which he agreed to dedicate land or make a contribution to street
widenings and other improvements. Some cases upheld these agreements,
emphasizing that the municipality did not agree to rezone and that the improvements to which the owner contributed were reasonably required by the development. 3
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The favorable judicial view of conditional zoning was expressed in extensive
dictum in Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower Hill.4 The court indicated
conditional zoning is not objectionable as a form of spot zoning. It held that,
if a zoning change is proper, it is not automatically invalid simply because
conditions are imposed. The court pointed out that "imposing limiting conditions
while benefitting surrounding properties, normally adversely affects the premises
on which the conditions are imposed."
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The court held that conditional zoning is not an improper bargaining away
of the police power "absent proof of a contract purporting to bind the local
legislature in advance." It held the zoning act did not prohibit conditional zoning,

§ 6.66

Haas v. City of Mobile, 265 So.2d 564 (Ala. 1972); I-Marion Co. v. County of Sacramento,
142 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Cal. App. 1977); Martin v. Hatfield, 308 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1983); Ogden v.
Premier Props., USA, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 661 (Ind. App. 2001); Sylvania E1ec. Prods., Inc. v. City
of Newton, 183 N.E.2d 118 (Mass. 1962); Rando v. Town of North Attleboro, 692 N.E.2d 544
(Mass. App. 1998); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 120 N.W.2d 270 (Neb. 1963); Church v. Town
of Islip, 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960); Chrismon v. Guilford Cty., 370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988)
(citing this treatise); Hall v. City of Durham, 372 S.E.2d 564 (N.C. 1988) (same).
2 King's Mill Homeowners Ass' n v. City of Westminster, 557 P.2d 1186 (Colo. 1976).
3 Scrotton v. County of Sacramento, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (Cal. App. 1969); Gladwyne Colony,
Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion, 187 A.2d 549 (Pa. 1963); State ex reI. Myhre v. City of Spokane,
422 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1967). But see Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. City of Tucson, 533 P.2d 693
(Ariz. App. 1975). See also §§ 9.11-9.15.
4421 N.E.2d 818 (N.Y. 1981). Accord DePaolo v. Town 6f Ithaca, 694 N.Y.S.2d 235 (App·
. Div. 1999). See also Chrismon v. Guilford Cty., 370 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1988) (reviewing benefits
of conditional zoning; citing this treatise);
1
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hich was "within the spirit" of the enabling legislation as a means of harmoniz"the landowner's need for rezoning with the public interest." It added that
I reventing the legislative body from imposing conditions that protect adjacent
~roperty would not be "in the best interests of the public."

:g

some courts do not approve unilateral conditional zoning. In Bartsch v.
Planning & Zoning Comm 'n, 5 a municipality conditioned a rezoning on the filing

of a restrictive covenant that limited the use of the land to a medical office
building. The court held the covenant was a "blatant violation" of the "strict"
statutory provision that requires uniform regulations within zoning districts.
§ 6.65

Proper Purpose View.

Collard l represents a judicial view which holds that unilateral conditions do
not necessarily invalidate a rezoning if they serve proper zoning purposes and
jf the rezoning is valid under the usual zoning map amendment tests. This point
of view is illustrated by Cross v. Hall County,2 which held that neighbors cannot
attack conditions imposed for their "benefit and protection . . . to ameliorate
the effects of the zoning change." Goffinet v. County of Christian 3 is a similar
case. The county imposed site development conditions on a rezoning for a
synthetic gas production facility. The court held that the conditions "are not of
such a nature as to constitute an abrupt departure from the comprehensive zoning
plan ... , which emphasizes substantial industrial development for the future."
Tne court reviewed and upheld the rezoning under its traditional zoning tests
and rejected a spot zoning objection to the zoning amendment.

These cases treat zoning conditions as a neutral factor in their review of zoning
map amendments. They take the reasonable view that neighbors should not be
allowed to complain of zoning conditions imposed for their benefit. Some courts
still show concern over possible abuses of the conditional zoning process. 4
§ 6.66

Site Plan Review.

Site plan review is a zoning technique that allows municipalities to exercise
control over the site details of a development. In the typical site plan review
procedure, the applicant for an amendment, conditional use, variance, or building
permit submits a detailed site plan to the plan commission, zoning board, or
5506 A.2d 1093 (Conn. App. 1986). Accord Board of County Comm'rs v. H. Manny Holtz,
Inc., 501 A.2d 489 (Md. App. 1985); Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793 (N.M. 1992)
(municipality promised to rezone).
1 § 6.64.
2235 S.E.2d 379 (Ga. 1977).

)f Ithaca, 694 N.Y.S.2d 235 (ApP·
79 (N.C. 1988) (reviewing benefits

3357 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. 1976). See Thornber v. Village of N. Barrington, 747 N.E.2d 513 (Ill .
App. 2001) (contract zoning nol found).
4

Nolan v. City of Taylorville, 420 N.E.2d 1037 (III. App. 1981).
(5" Ed.--mlll3)
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make a fill on land, fix fences, and indemnify him agains
risks in moving the building as to persons and propertyt
since it cannot engage in the work of moving and repairin '
buildings of another nor can it carry casualty and indemnit~
risks for individuals or other corporations. 27
§ 29:11

Contracts prohibited-Contracts limiting
legislative power

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Municipal Corporations
and Planning e=>160
Am. Jur. 2d, Public Contacts § 14

~246;

Zoning

The officers of a municipal corporation cannot confer public
powers upon others, nor delegate legislative powers; nor can
powers conferred upon, or which appertain, or properly
belong, to any office or department be surrendered or
transferred and be performed by others.1 These principles
apply to all municipal contracts. No part of any power

--1

27Mich.-Wheeler v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, 164 Mich. 338, 129
N.W. 685 (1911).
[Section 29:11]
1Ark.-Paving Imp. Dist. No. 105 of Pine Bluff v. Wright, 181 Ark.
919, 28 S.W.2d 1062 (1930).
Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker,
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996).
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006).
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d
41 (Iowa 1991).
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan.
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001).
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc.,
372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002).
N.J.-Contract of municipal corporation will not be construed to
waive or surrender right of corporation to act with freedom with reference
to its revenues unless intention, as well as power, to do so clearly appears.
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Passaic Val. Water Commission, 89 N.J. Super.
111, 214 A.2d 36, 62 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 37 (App. Div. 1965).
N.Y.-Belden v. City of Niagara Falls, 230 A.D. 601, 245 N.Y.S. 510
(4th Dep't 1930).
- N.C.-McGuinn v. City of High Point, 217 N.C. 449,8 S.E.2d 462,
128 A.L.R. 608 (1940).
Dr.-Morris v. City of Salem, 179 Or. 666, 174 P.2d 192 (1946) (cit358
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nferred upon the corporation can be transferred or

~~legated to other persons, 2 nor can the city or ~own, thr?ugh

its officers, gra~t ~w.ay by contract o~ otherwIse to pnvate
rporations or mdividuals the authonty to control the powc~s and functions properly pertaining to the municipal
:overnment. 3 This rule ~s well-illus.tratedJn the cases relating to granting franchIses of varIOUS kmds, market, and
ing this treatise).
Vt.-Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A.2d 553 (2001).
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of
power).
See also §§ 10:1 et seq.
2Cal.-San Diego County v. California Water & Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d
817, 186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747 (1947) (citing this treatise).
Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker,
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996).
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006).
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d
41 (Iowa 1991).
La.-Hudson v. City of Bossier City, 930 So. 2d 881 (La. 2006).
Miss.-Smith v. Mitchell, 190 Miss. 819, 1 So. 2d 765 (1941).
Mo.-Contract to pay for maintenance of fire patrol serv~ce by
revenue derived from insurance license tax held not a delegatIOn of
municipal power to tax. State ex rel. Kansas City Ins. Agent's Ass'n v.
Kansas City, 319 Mo. 386, 4 S.W.2d 427 (1928).
N.C.-Rockingham Square Shopping Center, Inc. v. Town of
Madison, 45 N.C. App. 249, 262 S.E.2d 705 (1980) (citing this treatise).
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of
power).
3Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker,
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996).
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006).
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d
41 (Iowa 1991).
Ky.-City of Middlesboro v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 284 Ky. 833,
146 S.W.2d 48 (1940) Oackofpower of municipal electric utility to contract
with federal agency for term of 20 years as to purchase and distribution of
current).
Mo.-Aquamsi Land Co. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 346 Mo. 524,
142 S.W.2d 332 (1940) (park construction agreement giving federal agency
control of city's operations as being invalid).
359
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other privileges, which may result in a monopoly or COnsti_
tute exclusive rights in the grantee which will prevent or
hamper the municipal authorities in providing the proper local regulations. 4 A governmental function is one undertaken
because of a duty imposed upon the municipality for the
welfare or protection of its citizens. s
The established rule is that municipal corporations have
no power to make contracts which will control them in the
performance of their legislative powers and duties. 6 Accordingly, the law is well-settled that a city cannot by contract

..

~

Neb.-Seidel v . City of Seward, 178 Neb. 345 , 133 N.W.2d 390
(1965).
N.J.-Beckmann v . Teaneck Tp. , 6 N.J. 530, 79 A.2d 301 (1951)
(citing this treatise) (lack of power of municipality to bind itself in contract
to rezone an area) .
N.Y.-Where the council has authority to acquire a waterworks
system, it cannot, before the city has acquired any water system at all,
enter into a contract with an engineer by which he is to have charge for
an indefinite period of the additions to be made to the plant if purchased.
Witmer v. City of Jamestown, 125 A.D. 43, 109 N .Y.8. 269 (4th Dep't
1908), aff'd, 196 N.Y. 553, 90 N.E. 1167 (1909).
Tex.-City of Farmers Branch v. City of Addison, 694 S.W.2d 94
(Tex. App. Dallas 1985), writ refusedn.r .e., (July 10, 1985).
Vt.-Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A.2d 553 (2001).
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of
power).
4ya.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of
power).
See §§ 34:1 et seq.
5Ariz.-Copper Country Mobile Home Park v. City of Globe, 131
Ariz. 329, 641 P .2d 243 (Ct. App. Div. 2 1981) (provision of sewer service
to nonresidents of municipality as being a proprietary function).
Iowa-Marco Development Corp. v. City of Cedar Falls, 473 N.W.2d
41 (Iowa 1991).
6U.S.-Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, P .C. , 564 F.
Supp. 1425 (W.D. Va. 1983), judgment affd, 740 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1984).
Cal.-Wills v . City of Los Angeles, 209 Cal. 448, 287 P . 962, 69
AL.R. 1044 (1930).
Fla.-County of Volusia v. City of Deltona, 925 So. 2d 340 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2006).
Ill.-Selby v. Village of Winfield, 255 Ill. App. 67 , 1929 WL 3387
(2d Dist. 1929).
Ind.-Agreement or contract made by individuals with municipal
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deprive itself of any of its legislative powers7 or governmental
--;iliiiC officials for purpose of influencing exercise of discretion vested in

~em by law, as to manner in which they shall perform public duties, is

oid as against public policy even though consideration for it inures to

~enefit of public. Pippenger v. City of Mishawaka, 119 Ind. App. 397, 88

N.E.2d 168 (1949).
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan.
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001); Landau v. City of Leawood, 214 Kan.
104, 519 P.2d 676 (1974) (covenant limiting assessment for use of city
sewer as unenforceable).
La.-Hudson v. City of Bossier City, 930 So. 2d 881 (La. 2006).
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc.,
372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002). Although a contract or agreement to
zone, where made between a developer and the zoning authority, is
invalid, a contract entered into in good faith between the developer and a
municipality which does not have control over the classification and whose
authority is limited to recommendation is valid. City of Greenbelt v.
Bresler, 248 Md. 210, 236 A.2d 1 (1967).
Minn.-A contract by a city with a railway company to maintain
for all future time a bridge used by the railroad company and the public
and restore it to its former condition of usefulness is invalid on this
ground. State ex reI. City of St. Paul v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 80
Minn. 108, 83 N.W. 32 (1900).
N.Y.-Andgar Associates, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of
Incorporated Village of Port Washington North, 30 A.D.2d 672, 291
N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1968); City of New York v. Second Ave. R. Co., 32
N.Y. 261, 1865 WL 3959 (1865).
Ohio-State ex reI. Gordon v. Taylor, 149 Ohio St. 427, 37 Ohio
Op. 112, 79 N.E.2d 127 (1948) .
S.D.-Ericksen v. City of Sioux Falls, 70 S.D. 40, 14 N.W.2d 89
(1944) (bargaining away police powers with respect to sewers).
Tex.-Fidelity Land & Trust Co. of Texas v. City of West University
Place, 496 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1973), writ
refused n.r.e., (Sept. 25, 1973).
Va.-Concerned Residents of Gloucester County v. Board of Sup'rs
of Gloucester County, 248 Va. 488, 449 S.E.2d 787 (1994) (no delegation of
power).
7Cal.-Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d
724, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1st Dist. 1976) (citing this treatise).
Colo.-Adams County School Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey, 791 P.2d 688,
60 Ed. Law Rep. 964 (Colo. 1990) (school tennination policy handbook as
not binding subsequent school boards).
N.M.-There is a distinction between contracts which merely
involve a city's proprietary or business functions and those attempting to
curtail or prohibit its legislative or administrative authority; the former
are valid, the latter are uniformly invalid. Spray v. City of Albuquerque,
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powers.S Hence, a municipality cannot agree that a sidewalk
shall not be graded beyond a certain depth, 9 that a street or
public way shall be vacated 10 or that a boulevard shall be
constructed. l l Nor maya municipality bind itself to assist in
securing zoning changes and in other matters requiring local
94 N.M. 199, 608 P.2d 511 (1980).
N.Y.-Britton v. City of New York, 12 Abb. Pro 367, 21 How. Pro
251, 1843 WL 4913 (N.Y. 1843); Britton V. City of New York, 12 Abb. Pro
367,21 How. Pro 251, 1843 WL 4913 (N.Y. 1843).
Tex.-City of Marshall V . Allen, 115 S.W. 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909),
writ refused; Waterbury V. City of Laredo, 68 Tex. 565, 5 S.W. 81 (1887)
(contract divesting city of legislative power as void).
Vt.-Larkin V. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A2d 553 (2001).
8U.S.-Joleewu, Ltd. V. City of Austin, 916 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1990),
opinion vacated in part, 934 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas law); Joleewu,
Ltd. v. City of Austin, 916 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1990), opinion vacated in
part, 934 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1991) (timing of acquisition of property).
Cal.-Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d
724, 130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1st Dist. 1976) (citing this treatise).
Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan.
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001).
Minn.-Western States Utilities Co. v. City of Waseca, 242 Minn.
302, 65 N.W.2d 255, 6 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 324 (1954).
Tex.-8outhwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 491 S.W.2d
187 (Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1973), writ refused n.r.e., (July 3, 1973) (by
franchise) .
Vt.-Larkin v. City of Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 772 A2d 553 (2001).
9Tex.-City of Marshall v. Allen, 115 S .W. 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909),
writ refused.
lOCal._An agreement by local officials to abandon, vacate, or sell a
road is void because it constitutes an improper attempt by local officials to
bind themselves in advance as to the exercise of their judgment in the
future and because the receipt of the agreed consideration might influence
their future decision, which is to be made primarily upon considerations of
public necessity for highway purposes. San Diego County V. California
Water & Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 186 P.2d 124, 175 AL.R. 747 (1947).
llInd.-Pippenger v. City of Mishawaka, 119 Ind. App. 397, 88
N.E.2d 168 (1949) (vacation of streets).
Mo.-Thompson v . City of St. Louis, 253 S .W. 969 (Mo. 1923).
N.C.-Bessemer Imp. Co. v. City of Greensboro, 247 N.C . 549, 101
S.E.2d 336 (1958) (promise of city to open street was unenforceable).
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ernmental approval. 12 Such an agreement has been held
gO~d as against public policy since it not only creates the posV?~ilitY of future conflicts of interest but also obligates the
~unicipality to create future legislation. 13
Where a city has the right to lease a part of its wharf for
the purpose of a warehouse and grain elevator, it must
reserve the right to terminate such lease whenever the public
interest demands such action. 14 Also, municipal authorities
cannot bargain away the right to make reasonable laws and
to exercise the police power whenever it becomes necessary
to conserve or promote the health, safety or welfare of the
community.15 So, power conferred upon a city to contract
12Ky._City of Louisville V. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623
S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981).
Md.-Mayor and Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc.,
372 Md. 514, 814 A.2d 469 (2002).
13Ky._City of Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623
S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981).
14Mo.-Belcher Sugar Refining Co. v. St. Louis Grain Elevator Co.,
101 Mo. 192, 13 S.W. 822 (1890).
See also §§ 28:1 et seq.
15Cal.-City's contract to make sewer connections on certain premises
free of charge in exchange for sewer line right-of-way over such premises
was not assailable on ground that it constituted a bargaining of city's
police power to regulate charges for sewerage, since premises involved
were outside city limits and not subject to police jurisdiction of city. Tronslin V. City of Sonora, 144 Cal. App. 2d 735, 301 P.2d 891 (3d Dist. 1956).
Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker,
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996).
Fla.-Housing Authority of City of Melbourne v. Richardson, 196
So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1967) (agreement where city
agreed to cooperate with public housing authority, and, insofar as it might
lawfully do so, make such changes in any zoning of the site and surrounding territory as were reasonable and necessary for the development and
protection of the project and surrounding territory was not illegal on the
ground that it constituted an unlawful delegation of the city's power to
zone); Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. City of Miami, 76 Fla. 277, 79 So. 682,
1 AL.R. 303 (1918) (power of city to compel a railway to put in, maintain,
and operate safety gates at crossing of its railway and a street which had
been dedicated by the railway for street purposes, where a contract
between the city and railway was involved, which granted to the city a
right-of-way over the property of the railway in consideration of the city
bearing the expense of the safety gates, etc., was not a bartering away of
the city's police power).
Ind.-City of New Albany v . New Albany Street R. Co., 172 Ind.
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respecting a particular matter does not confer powe
implication, so to contract with reference to it as to r,
rass and interfere with its future control over the matte
the public interests may require. '6 Hence, all contracts r,
interfere with the legislative or governmental function
the municipality are absolutely void. '7
B
487, 87 N.E. 1084 (1909).
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001).
Ky.-A contract to .keep a pavement in repair for 10 years is
beyond the power of a city to make on the ground that it amounts to an
abrogation by the city of a governmental function or of its police power
Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. City of Louisville, 123 Ky. 687, 29 Ky. L. Rptr'
1255, 97 S.W. 31, 29 (1906).
.
Or.-The installation of parking meters is not a bartering away or '
surrendering of the city's police power. On the contrary, it is an exercise of
that power. Morris v. City of Salem, 179 Or. 666, 174 P .2d 192 (1946).,
Pa.-Contract with two universities relating to the operation
management, and control of the city's general hospital was not an unlaw:
ful delegation of a city's powers and responsibilities. Robinson v. City of
Philadelphia, 400 Pa. 80, 161 A.2d 1, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 14, 1
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 478, 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2922, 1 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) P 9664, 40 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 66539 (1960).
16U.S.-Scofield Engineering Co. v. City of Danville, 35 F. Supp. 668
(WD. Va. 1940), judgment affd, 126 F.2d 942 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1942).
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan.
App. 2d 928, 33 P .3d 869 (2001).
N.M.-City contract with homeowners barring city from erecting
five-foot fence around city golf course and providing for lower fencing
specifications was not void as against public policy inasmuch as maintenance of golf course was proprietary rather than governmental function.
Spray v. City of Albuquerque, 94 N.M. 199, 608 P.2d 511 (1980).
Tex.-City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 4 S.W.
143 (1887).
Municipal contracts with grantees of franchises to use streets, see
§§ 34:1 et seq.
17U.S.-Contract between county and developer to install sewer in
area of proposed shopping center concerned governmental function and
was beyond powers of county since future county governing bodies would
have been bound by agreement as to location of sewer and agreement was
made irrespective of financia l ability of county to complete sewer
construction. Byrd v. Martin, Hopkins, Lemon and Carter, P.C., 564 F.
Supp. 1425 (W.D. Va. 1983), judgment aff'd, 740 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1984).
Ark.-Lamar Bath House Co. v. City of Hot Springs , 229 Ark. 214,
315 S.W.2d 884 (1958) (contract for exemption from city sewer charges
invalid).
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The reserved powers doctrine rests on a fundamental inability of sovereign governments to contract away essential
attributes of their sovereignty.18 Certain core governmental
powers, like the power of eminent domain and the police
power, are reserved to the sovereign and cannot be abdicated
or surrendered by contract,19 and any attempt to do so is
simply unenforceable. 20 Thus, contracts surrendering the
power of eminent domain are void. 21 However, the doctrine
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Colo.-Crossroads West Limited Liability Co. v. Town of Parker,
929 P2d 63 (Colo App 1996); Adams County School Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey,
791 P.2d 688, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 964 (Colo. 1990) (school termination policy
handbook as not binding subsequent school boards).
Ga.-Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ga. 750, 58 S.E.2d 820
(1950) (city agreement to furnish sewer services throughout county as being invalid).
Kan.-Red Dog Saloon v. Sedgwick County Bd. of Com'rs, 29 Kan.
App. 2d 928, 33 P.3d 869 (2001).
Nev.-Agreement between city and power company to place electric
wires above ground in violation of ordinance requiring underground
circuits was void. City of Las Vegas v. Cragin Industries, Inc., 86 Nev.
933, 478 P.2d 585 (1970) (disapproved of by, Sandy Valley Associates v.
Sky Ranch Estate Owners Ass'n, 117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964 (2001» .
N.Y.-Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead,
3 N.Y.2d 434, 165 N.Y.S.2d 737, 144 N .E.2d 409 (1957) (citing this
treatise).
N.C.-Contract between a city director of utilities and persons who
laid out water lines beyond the corporate limits, where those persons
would be reimbursed the amount expended in constructing the lines if and
when the corporate boundaries were enlarged and the lines included
within the new boundaries, was void. Styers v. City of Gastonia, 252 N.C.
572, 114 S.E.2d 348 (1960) .
Tenn.-An agreement to dedicate land for public park purposes
provided that the city amend a zoning ordinance was unenforceable. City
of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1,263 S.W.2d 528 (1953).
Tex.-Bowers v . City of Taylor, 16 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1929).
Utah.-Warm Springs Co. v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 58, 165 P.
788 (1917) (quoting this treatise).
18Colo._Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerston'e
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).
19Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).
2°Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).
21Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone
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implies nothing about the ability of governments to otherwise
enter into contracts involving the exercise of their sovereign
powers.22 A contract with a governmental unit is not
rendered void merely by the fact that it includes a commit_
ment to exercise a core governmental power. 23
§ 29:12

Contracts prohibited-Contract to perform
public duty

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Municipal Corporations e=>246
Am. Jur. 2d, Public Contacts § 14

A city may not enter into a contract under which it exacts
compensation from a citizen for the performance of a public
duty imposed on it by law, either expressly or by implication. 1
For example, a city could not, for compensation, agree to
keep a street open and unobstructed 2 to furnish within the
municipal limits police or fire protection 3 or sewerage
service. 4 A contract by county commissioners with a guardian of a mentally ill person to take care of him or her in the
.•
,• _.i
.-

Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).
22Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).
23Colo.-Wheat Ridge Urban Renewal Authority v. Cornerstone
Group XXII, L.L.C., 176 P.3d 737 (Colo. 2007).
[Section 29:12]
1Ky.-Holbrook v. Letcher County, 223 Ky. 597,4 S.W.2d 382 (1928).
Miss.-Fitzgerald v. Town of Magnolia, 183 Miss. 334, 184 So. 59
(1938).
N.Y.-Brown v. Ward, 246 N.Y. 400, 159 N.E. 184 (1927).
S.C.-Green v. City of Rock Hill, 149 S.C. 234,147 S.E. 346 (1929).
2Me.-Penley v. City of Auburn, 85 Me. 278, 27 A. 158 (1893).
3U.S._"I suppose a city can make no contract for the discharge of a
purely public duty; such a contract as in case of performance it can enforce
compensation for, or for nonperformance expose itself to liability. It cannot use public funds in any such direction. A city cannot contract with me
to put out a fire in my building, and then exact a compensation from. m.e
for the extinguishing of that fire, nor thus expose itself to liability If It
failed to put out that fire. It is discharging a purely public duty." The
Maggie P. , 25 F. 202 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885).
4DI.-Where a residential subdivision, in which property owners had
covenanted to pay certain charges for maintenance services to ~e
performed by a subdivision committee, was incorporated into a city, city
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rights transferred by "permitting a greater than normal intensity of development of the transferee or 'receiving' property. " 349 Development rights not used
by the transferor can be sold to the transferee, compensating the transferor for
the loss caused by the original restriction.
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the constitutional validity
of TDRs, but in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, the court
did mention that TORs should be considered in a taking analysis. "While
these rights [TDRs] may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a
'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever
financial burdens the lot has imposed on appellants and, for that reason, are
to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation." 350 Because
the court held that New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law as applied
to Grand Central Terminal was not a taking, the court did not have to rule
directly on the validity of TORs as compensation. Some state courts, however,
have invalidated the use of TORs as compensation. 351
In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme Court discussed
TDRs in the context of a ripeness question. 352 All nine justices agreed that a
challenge to the Tahoe agency's decision that an undeveloped lot near Lake
Tahoe was ineligible for development was a "final decision" and thus ripe for
review. 353 Justice Souter writing for a six-justice majority considered the facts
that the landowner was entitled to TORs under the applicable regulation and
that no discretionary decision was necessary before she could sell her TORs as
evidence that a "final decision" had been reached. 354
Justice Scalia, writing a concurring opinion joined by Justices O'Connor
and Thomas, objected strongly to the notion that TORs should be considered
"on the taking rather than the just compensation side of the equation."
Because TORs have nothing to do with the use of the property being regulated, they are not relevant to the taking question, he asserted:
I do not mean to suggest that there is anything undesirable or devious about
TORs themselves. To the contrary, TORs can serve a commendable purpose
in mitigating the economic loss suffered by an individual whose property
use is restricted, and property value diminished, but not so substantially as
to produce a compensable taking. They may also form a proper part, or
indeed the entirety, of the full compensation accorded a landowner when
his property is taken.... I suggest only that the relevance of TORs is limited to the compensation side of the takings analysis, and that taking them
into account in determining whether a taking has occurred will render
much of our regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity.355

Conditional Zoning
Municipalities, developers, and affected neighbors compromise many land
use controversies by adding conditions to approval of the particular project.
In a leading case, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld a municipality'S
decision to condition an amendment to its zoning ordinance on the execution
of a declaration of conveyance by the developer that provided in part that "no
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construction may occur on the property so rezoned without the consent of the
municipality."356 An application to enlarge and extend an existing structure on
the premises was later denied. In upholding the condition against the charge
that it was arbitrary and capricious, the court made the following comments
about conditional zoning:
Probably the principal objection to conditional rezoning is that it constitutes illegal spot zoning, thus violating the legislative mandate requiring
that there be a comprehensive plan for, and that all conditions be uniformed within, a given zoning district. When courts have considered the
issue, the assumptions have been made that conditional zoning benefits
particular land owners rather than the community as a whole and that it
undermines the foundation upon which comprehensive zoning depends,
by destroying uniformity within used districts. Such unexamined
assumptions are· questionable. First, it is a downward change to a less
restrictive zoning classification that benefits the property rezoned and not
the opposite imposition of greater restrictions on land use. Indeed, imposing limiting conditions, while benefitting surrounding properties, normally adversely affects the premises on which the conditions are
imposed. Second, zoning is not invalid per se, mainly because only a single parcel is involved or benefitted; the real test for spot zoning is whether
the change is other than part of a well considered and comprehensive
plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the community. Such a
determination, in turn, depends on the reasonableness of the rezoning in
relation to neighboring uses-an inquiry required regardless of whether
the change in zone is conditional in form. Third, if it is initially proper to
change a zoning classification without the imposition of restrictive conditions notwithstanding that such change may depart from uniformity, then
no reason exists why accomplishing that change, subject to condition
should automatically be classified as impermissible spot zoning. . . .
Another fault commonly voiced in disapproval of conditional zoning is
that it constitutes an illegal bargaining away of a local government's
police power.... The imposition of conditions on property sought to be
rezoned may not be classified as a prospective commitment on the part of
the municipality to zone as requested if the conditions are met; nor would
the municipality necessarily be precluded on this account from later
reversing or altering its decision. . . . Conditional rezoning is a means of
achieving some degree of flexibility in land use control by minimizing the
potentially deleterious effect of a zoning change on neighboring properties; reasonably conceived conditions harmonize the landowners' need
for rezoning with the public interest, and certainly fall within the spirit of
the neighboring Ie i ~._
~.u
~.
______

Development Agreements

~d Contract zo~

Because of the uncertainty 0
e more flexible review processes described
previously, developers often seek "developer agreements," authorized in sev-
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eral states, to set the "rules of the game" for the review process. 358 More significantly, however, the developer may want assurance on substantive zoning
issues. The rise in incentive-based urban and suburban redevelopment has
given way to the issue of "contract zoning" -a conclusion that the government has illegally bargained away its legislative obligation to independently
engage in land use zoning and regulation. In virtually all urban and redevelopment projects, the developer and city enter into a development agreement
or redevelopment agreement. The essence of such agreements, which are true
legal agreements, is a promise by the city to provide economic incentives and
often eminent domain rights to the developer in exchange for a promise by the
developer to acquire and develop the property.
In most such agreements, subsequent land use approvals by the very
entity that is a party to the agreement is assumed, but not necessarily contractual. Thus the agreement is entered into, but the developer may not legally
bind the city to a promise to grant subseqent rezonings or subdivision
approvals. The developer will always reserve such items as contingencies,
however. Given the universal validity and use of development agreements,
there is a new relevance to the issue of contract zoning, which involves the
duality of the city's identity as both a private business party or even "partner"
with the developer and as the government, with power and statutory obligation to regulate, independent of its contractual promises.
The states vary in their scrutiny of city commitments or promises to grant
or "cooperate" in approvals. Thus, in one recent case, a Florida court held that
an agreement by a county to "support and expeditiously process" a rezoning
application was unenforceable. 359 The issue of contract zoning is related to the
issue of the government's power to grant, or as detractors would say, "sell to
the highest bidder" its condemnation rights, and the condemnation issue of
what use is public, as discussed in chapter 3. 360
Another species of the development agreement is specifically designed to
protect the developer from changes in land use ordinances over the course of
a long-term project and has been specifically validated as not amounting to
contract zoning. Thus California has enacted legislation vesting rights by
enforceable development agreements between city and developer, limiting the
power of the city to apply new ordinances to pending developments. 361 Such
agreements have survived contract zoning challenges, provided that the city
has not "surrendered control of all of its land use authority," in a case in which
the court affirmed an award of $727,500 in damages to an apartment developer when the city reduced the approved density from 140 to 55 units by
amending the zoning after entering into a development agreement with the
developer. 362 At least ten other states have enacted similar development agreement legislation. 363 Florida has also enacted development agreement legislation but takes a different view regarding the issue of contract zoning. In one
case, a Florida court invalidated as contract zoning, a development agreement
in which the city had agreed to "support and expeditiously process" a rezoning application, even though the statute expressly permits development
agreements establishing vested rights. 364

§ 6.60

2008 SUPPLEMENT

F.
§ 6.60

FLEXIBLE ZONING.

Role and Function

Page 6-72, note 1, add:
See also Town of Rhine v. ~izzell, 751 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2008) (discussing
form based zoning and mixed use zoning).
§ 6.62 . Contract and Conditional Zoning.
Page 6~75, note 1, add:
Md. Code Ann. art. 66B. § 4.01(c)(2). See generally Town of Rhine v.
Bizzell, 751 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 2008) (discussing and contrasting
conditional-use district zoning and conditional zoning), quoting this
Treatise.
Page 6-76, note 4, add.;
Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 2003) (not
contract zoning when utility voluntarily gave eight million to town for high
school so town would rezone property).

Page 6-76, note 1, add:
Mayor & Council v. Rylns Enters., 814 A.2d 469 (Md. 2002) (zoning
agreement in annexation agreement held invalid) (subsequent statutory
authorization enacted at Md. Code Ann. art. 66B. § 4.01 (c)(2».
§ 6.64

m ateral.

Page 6-78, note 1, add:
McLean Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 778 N.E.2d 1016 (Mass. App.
2002) (cannot dispute legality of agreements because received benefit of
agreement); Super Wash, Inc. v. City of White Settlement, 131S.W.3d 249
(Tex. App. 2004), rev'd in part, 198 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. 2006) (en other
grounds) (upholds ordinance requiring fence on car wash as unilateral,
strikes down reversionary clause).
§ 6.66

Site Plan Review.

Page 6-81, note 6, add:
Smith v. T~wn of Mendon, 771 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Div. 2004) (conservation easement in site plan review not an exaction), aff'd 820 N.E.2d 281
(NY 2004).
Page 6-81, note 7, add:
See also Castle Hill Apartments Ltd. Partnership v. Planning Board of
Holyoke, 844 N.E.2d 1098 (Mass. Ct. App. 2006) (site plan review cannot
be based on strictly on aesthetic grounds).
Page 6-81, note 10, add to Compare:
Stratosphere Gaming Corp. v. City of Las Vegas, 96 P.3d 756 (Nev. 2004)
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COMES NOW, PetitionerslPlaintiffs, LINDA CISZEK, et al (collectively "CISZEK") by
and through their attorneys, Wetzel, Wetzel & Holt, P.L.L.C., and hereby presents this
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.

THE REMEDY
A petition for declaratory judgment is appropriate when the validity of a zoning
ordinance is challenged. CISZEK challenges the validity of Kootenai County Ordinance No. 417
adopted August 13,2008 rezoning Lots 1 and 2 of Block 3 and Lots 3 and 4 of Block 4 of
Stepping Stones Subdivision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". CISZEK
complains that the method followed by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners ("BOCC")
in swap zoning two separate parcels of property is in excess of the authority of the BOCC and is
confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. A petition for declaratory judgment is the
appropriate remedy in this case. I CISZEK must prove her case by clear and convincing
evidence. 2 A zoning ordinance enacted without complying with the law is void. 3

THE FACTS
On January 16, 2008 the Kootenai County Planning Department accepted 4 an application
from Coeur d' Alene Paving ("CDA Paving") requesting a concurrent zone change for two
properties which was later explained by CDA Paving as an application requesting that the BOCC

I Burns v. Madison County Board ofCoulllY Commissioners, 09.10 ISCR 528 (2009) amended opinion 09.I5.ISCR 162 (2009).
Black Labrador Investing, LLC v. Kuna City Council, 09.8 ISCR 363 (2009). Neighborsfor Responsible Growth v. Kootenai
County, 09.8 ISCR 389 (2009). McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993). Jerome COl/illy v. Holloway,
118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990). Burt v. City ofIdaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983). Schneider v. Howe 142
Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006).
2 Estes v. City of Moscow, 96 Idaho 922, 539 P.2d 275 (1975). Cole Col/ister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558,
468 P.2d 290 (1979).
3 McCliskey v. Canyon Co., v 123 Idaho 657,85 I P.2d 953 (1993).
4 AR. V. I p. 2003.
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rezone both properties at the same time by swapping the Mining Zoning on one parcel for the
Agricultural Zone on the other parcel. 5
The Planning Department forthwith set this swap zoning request for public hearing and
sent out notices to various affected agencies. The official notice stated in part:
The Applicant is requesting to change the zoning classification on
approximately twenty (20) acres of land from Mining to
Agricultural. This property is no longer contiguous to current
mining activities, and also to change the zoning classification of
approximately twenty (20) acres from Agricultural to Mining.
This property is adjacent to current mining activity.,,6
The Planning Department also sent notices of the impending public hearing to
surrounding property owners which explained the nature ofthe swap and published the same
notice in the official newspaper. 7 The staff report prepared by the Planning Department and
presented at the hearing before the Hearing Examiner also described the benefits of swapping
zones. 8
The first public hearing was held on March 6, 2008 before the Kootenai County Hearing
Examiner. The Hearing Examiner recommended that the application be denied. 9 Following the
recommendation for denial entered by the Hearing Examiner, the swap zone was set for hearing

AR V. I p. 0002, pp. 0005-0006.
AR V. I p. 0072.
7 The official public notice states in part: " .... Case No. ZONOS-OOOI, a request by Coeur d' Alene Paving to change the zoning
classification of approximately 20 acres from Mining to Agricultural and approximately 20 acres from Agricultural to Mining.
(AR V. I p.00S7).
8 CDA Paving's narrative states that they are swapping Mining and Agricultural zoning so that the Mining zoned property will be
closer to the existing mining operations in the area and to surrender Mining zoned property back to Agricultural on property that
is further away from current mining operations and if approved, the mining operations will continue to utilize the current access
and not impact the private roads the area. (AR V.I p.0097).
9 The Hearing Examiner's recommendation for denial states in part that the proposed zoning amendment from Agricultural to
Mining does not appear to be "reasonably necessary or appropriate", given the rural residential character and density of
development of the adjacent property, and testimony received regarding the incompatibility of the requested rezone of
Agricultural land to Mining with the adjacent residential uses. While the proposed zone change results in no net increase in lands
zoned for Mining, it appears to directly benefit one property owner at the expense of others ..... The requested zone change
appears to be inconsistent with the future land use plan contained within the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan, which
designates the area as Rural Residential. The proposed zone change also appears to be inconsistent with Comprehensive Plan
Goal 9, as detailed in Section V of this report, based upon finding listed in 5.01 and 5.02 above, which do not find the request to
be "reasonably necessary" or "in th~ best interest of the public." (AR V. I p. 0420 -0421).
5

6
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before the BOCC on May 8, 2008 .. The public hearing took 4 hours and 45 minutes. Twenty six
(26) people submitted comment sheets, 6 were in favor of the swap zone and 16 were against. IO
The BOCC voted 2 to I in favor of the swap zone and set the case for an additional public
hearing since the action was a material change to the recommendation issued by the Hearing
Examiner. The second public hearing before the BOCC was held June 26, 2008. At the public
hearing 20 comment sheets were presented, 39 were opposed to the swap zone and 2 were in
favor. Two comment sheets were group representations: One with 14 opposed and one with 13
opposed. II The BOCC deliberated on the outcome of the public hearing on July 10, 2008, and
again voted 2 to 1 to approve the swap zone. On August 7, 2008 the BOCC signed the Order of
Decision and Ordinance No. 417 rezoning the properties. Ordinance No. 417 was published on
August 13,2008.
THE SWAP
CDA Paving sought to rezone two parcels. Both parcels are approximately 20 acres each
made up of2 ten acre tracts. One parcel is located on Highway 53 and is adjoined by a
residential neighborhood and a mining pit owned by CDA Paving. The parcel on Highway 53 is
identified as Lots 1 and 2 of Block 3 of Stepping Stones Subdivision and has always been zoned
Agricultural.
The other parcel is landlocked and surrounded by small residential tracts. The landlocked
parcel is identified as Lots 3 and 4 of Block 4 of Stepping Stones Subdivision. 12 The landlocked
parcel was zoned Mining at the time of the application but had originally been zoned
Agricultural as part ofthe Stepping Stones Subdivision. All of the parcels are identified on the

JO AR V. 2 p. 0425.
liAR V. 2 p. 0456.
12AR V. I p. 0097.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEC LARATORY JUDGMENT - 8

352

Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan Map as Rural Residential 13 and the continuing
development of the land in the area is residential. 14
The landlocked parcel is isolated from CDA Paving's current mining operations and
CDA Paving's testimony describes how difficult it would be to mine the parcel. CDA Paving
testified that the parcel had no existing road access except an undefined easement that was never
produced in the record. CDA Paving portrayed mining on this landlocked parcel as
devastating. IS Building an access road along this easement would greatly impact the established
residential acreages that surrounded this parcel. The new road CDA Paving would construct in
the alleged easement would empty out onto unpaved rural roads which had not been designed or
built for heavy traffic. Additionally, CDA Paving testified that during the mining operations,
mined material would be trucked along these rural roads to the current mining operation on
Highway 53 to be weighed before shipment. 16 Because the public access roads that would be
used for transportation of these heavy materials were not designed for heavy truck access and
included a blind intersection, 17 the Lakes Highway District and the Idaho Transportation
Department were also anxious to prevent using this potential route. 18 Finally, CDA Paving

AR V. I p. 0202, AR V. 2 p. 0412.
TR. p. 0102 lines 14-22, p. 0046 lines '20-23, AR. V. I p. 0420-0421.
15 Mr. Cozad testified: We could devastate the property. Tear down the trees for the easement and strip the land. (TR. p. 0143
lines 7 -13) He also testified that in order for us to mine this we have to go down. It's just gonna create a hole out in the middle
of nowhere. (TR. p. 0005 lines 18-20).
16 AR. V. I p. 0200, CDA Paving described this truck traffic as significant (AR. V. 2 p. 0413) and Ms. Young estimated that the
average traffic would be 50 to 100 trucks per day (Tr. p. 0022 lines 19-23.
17 AR. V. I p. 0200.
18 Joseph Wuest of Lakes Highway District stated in the letter to the Commissioners: .... The Board has no objections to the
request of Phil Weist of Coeur d'Alene Paving, to switch the zoning from Agricultural to Mining on two (2) twenty (20) acre
parcels located between Ramsey and Atlas Roads on the south side of Hwy 53. If the zone change is not granted, ingress and
egress for the current lots (lots 3 & 4 of Stepping Stones Subdivision) zoned for mining, would be via a private easement onto
Atlas Road. The amount of truck traffic generated by the mining operation would greatly impact Atlas Road as it is not built to
commercial standards and would not withstand the additional traffic. Therefore, Lakes Highway District is in favor of the zone
change as this would allow the current access for the business to remain on Hwy 53. (AR V. 2 p. 0253). Donald Davis, Senior
Transportation Planner of the Idaho Transportation Department sent an email supporting the proposed rezones stating: It has
come to our attention through Lakes Highway District that the zone change request was not recommended for approval by the
Hearing Examiner and is coming before the County Commission for public hearing this evening (May 8, 2008). The Idaho
Transportation Department, District I, expresses the same concern as did the Lake Highway District if the zone change is not
approved. Mining operations on the parcels as presently zoned would result in truck/mining related traffic on various private
13

14
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explained how disruptive the dust and noise would be to the surrounding neighbors l9 and the
negative impact to the neighbors when the topsoil was stripped from this landlocked parcel in
order to get to the depth where the mining materials were located. 2o
The zoning for the parcel on Highway 53 was Agricultural at the time of the application.
This parcel is surrounded by residential neighborhoods except for the boundary that it shares
with the current CDA mining pit. CDA Paving described this parcel as the perfect place to
locate mining activities. Although this parcel also adjoins residential acreages, this site was
promoted in the application and during the public hearings as a site where mining activities
would affect fewer residential neighbors by a ratio of2 to 11.21 Even the dust and noise from
mining activities would be better at this site because CDA Mining could access the mining
materials from the existing pit on their adjoining site which would reduce the amount of topsoil
stripping activity.. Traffic would, of course, be reduced and the rural roads surrounding the
landlocked parcel would not be impacted.
Actual testimony and evidence supporting the rezoning for the Highway 53 parcel to
Mining is harder to find in the record. The narrative describes the benefits for Coeur d'Alene
Paving if the swap zone for the Highway 53 parcel was approved as follows:
By having this zone changed there will be contiguous mining
parcels, the traffic will retain the same truck traffic routes through
the existing pit. ... By having the mining parcels contiguous, the
land use would have less impact on surrounding property owners.
This zone change would allow for more materials in the
marketplace at a lower price for the benefit of all through increased
competition. 22
easements between the sites and Atlas Road then between Atlas and Coeur d' Alene Paving's main operation on State Highway
53. It seems, from the access and circulation standpoint, that it would be appropriate to keep the mining operation on contiguous
p.arcels. (AR V. 2 p.0430).
9 AR V. I p. 0005.
20 AR V. I p. 0200. Sandy Young testified that they would begin mining at ground level by mobilizing heavy equipment onto the
~arcel and begin to mine to reach a depth of 40 feet which would take several years. TR. p. 0021 lines 24-25, p. 0022 lines 1-2.
I AR V. I p. 0199.
22 AR. V. I p.0005.
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So, the swap was set. As Seth Molding stated at the public hearing" .. , in short, I think
that Coeur d' Alene is running a bluff. They're not going to mine the property that is zoned
mining and it only benefits them if they get the swap.'.23 CDA Paving convinced the BOCC that
the Highway 53 parcel had to be rezoned Mining because mining on the landlocked parcel would
be very bad for everyone. 24 One zone change could not be considered without the other.

TR. p. 0 I 07 lines 24-25, p. 25 lines 1-2. See also testimony of Paul Franz TR. p. 0053 lines 11-15.
Representing the Applicant, Sandy Young presented the reasons to support the rezones as follows: The request before you
tonight is for a zone change that is two-fold. This request takes two ten acre parcels that are zoned agricultural and request to
change their classification to mining and in exchange takes two ten acre parcels that are mining and converts them to agricultural
land..... My client, Coeur d'Alene Paving, wishes to expand their area of mining .... Option - so I'm going to kind of break it
down into two options tonight. And option one is for them to um be granted the zone change so that they can move forward and
the pit can continue in this area. The option two is to move to this 20 acres to the west and the south and to - to start mining
those so already zoned mining - they can start their operations there tomorrow. The downside to that is that they start at grade.
That's downside number one. Number two is they don't have access to these parcels from here. So they create a new access and
they begin at ground surface. Beginning at ground level means mobilizing heavy equipment to the 20 acres and leaving that
equipment in place as they begin to mine. Reaching a depth of 40 feet with today's demand would take several years. . .. just uh
the visual obstruction of having heavy equipment at ground surfaces is certainly going to be more obtrusive than if they stayed in
the pit on this site. '" Mining that 20 acres um of course means the access is cut in ... that traffic would .. , trucks carrying
material would be coming out here onto Atlas ... 50 to 100 trucks a day during a busy peak season day. Revising option one to
grant the zone change to this contiguous portion - no new accesses need to be created. All mining operations remain in the pit.
Noise levels and dust levels do not increase. They stay at the current levels. I'd gone into Building and Planning several times to
look at the file and one thing I didn't find was any letter of comment from Lakes Highway District. And so I was at the Lakes
Highway District's meeting ... I brought up that fact to them. Why hadn't they commented on this when certainly after I had
driven the site, I knew they would have a very definite opinion about that many trucks using Atlas Road ... I did the same
presentation for them, then they were surprised ... they did not realize that that new access would need to be created and the
trucks would access onto - directly onto Atlas Road. They are opposed to - to that idea and they wrote a stronger letter yesterday
which I will submit to you that basically says they support this zone change..... So then I called lTD and talked to Don Davis ...
He stated that he was fully in support of the zone change for that reason and he submitted written documentation today that
shows !DT's support of the project. (TR. p. 0019Iines7-25, p. 0020 lines 1-25, p. 0022 lines 1-25, p. 0023 lines 1-20). The
Hearing Examiner summarized the negative impacts that CDA Paving had described in the public hearing as follows: Mark
Mussman introduced the case.... He testified that the applicants were seeking a zone change from Mining to Agricultural on 20
acres ofland, and requesting at the same time that 20 acres ofland zoned Agricultural be re-zoned to Mining. He testified that
the Comprehensive Plan identified that future land use in the area to be rural residential. (AR. V .2 p. 0412). Phil Weist,
applicant's representative, testified that the applicants were trying to essentially trade zoning designations so that an expansion of
their mining operation could remain contiguous with the existing operation, and allow them to utilize their existing driveway
access to Highway 53 ... , He testified that II properties will be negatively effected if the applicants expand their mining
operations on the twenty acres currently requested to be re-zoned Agricultural, while only 2 property owner will be impact if the
zone change is approved, thus allowing them to expand their mining operation to the area that is requested to be rezoned from
Agricultural to Mining. (AR. V. 2 p. 0412). Craig Conrad, applicant's representative, also testified that the applicant's proposal
would keep the mining operations closer to Highway 53, and generally keep the mining operations in a more concentric area, thus
minimizing impacts..... He also testified that ifthe mining expansion occurred in the area currently zoned Mining it would
require excavation to begin at the level of existing homes in the immediate vicinity. (AR. V. 2 p. 0413). Todd Kauffman,
applicant's representative, testified that expansion into the parcels that are currently zoned for mining would result in
significantly amounts of excavated materials being transported around Atlas Road to Highway 53, to the existing mining
operation in order to weigh the materials prior to shipment. (AR. V. 2 p. 0413). Phil Weist testified that II properties will be
negatively effected if the applicants expand their mining operations on the twenty acres currently requested to be re-zoned
Agricultural, while only 2 property owners will be impacted if the zone change is approved, thus allowing them to expand their
mining operation to the area that is requested to be rezoned from Agricultural to Mining. (AR. V. 2 p. 0412) .. , Craig Conrad,
applicant's representative, also testified in rebuttal. He stated if they don't get the zone change approved, they will expand their
operation in the area currently zone Mining, which will impact more people, and be closer to neighboring houses. (AR. V. 2 p.
0423).
23

24
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THE LAW
SWAP ZONING IS IN EXCESS OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY

1.

There is no statement in The Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) or in the Kootenai County
Zoning Ordinance that directly authorizes swap zones as an approved method for rezoning
property. There is no language that even infers that swapping the zone on two separate parcels
of property is an approved method for zoning property. The Idaho Supreme Court has
specifically stated that zoning districts can only be established by specifically prescribed
procedures.
The legislature clearly intended that the authority to enact
comprehensive plans, establish zoning districts and adopt
amendatory ordinances be exercised exclusively by city and county
legislative or governing bodies and pursuant to specific prescribed
procedures. 25
The comprehensive statutory procedures mandated by LLUP A must be followed in enacting and
amending local zoning ordinances.
Probably before the ink even dried on the final draft of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho, Idaho could have been called a "Dillon's Rule" state. 26 There was never any question in
the judicial branch of the government that legislative authority would be strictly construed and
that local governments, cities and counties would only exercise such powers as were expressly
granted to them or necessarily implied. The Idaho Courts have ruled consistently that:
Legislative grants of power to municipal corporations must be
strictly construed to operate as a surrender ofthe sovereignty of the
state no further than is expressly declared by the language
thereof. 27
Gumprect v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214, p. 618 (1983).
Dillian's rule is a limitation upon municipal powers. It provides that "a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to
the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable" John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law ofMunicipal Corporations, §
237 (51h ed. 1911).
27 Boise City, Idaho v. Boise Artesian Hat & Cold Water Co., 186 F. 705 (1911).
25

26
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A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise only those
powers granted in express words, those necessarily or fairly
implied or incidental to the powers expressly granted, and those
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. 28
Municipalities may exercise only those powers granted to them or
necessarily implied from the powers granted, and if there is a fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt as to the existence of a power, the
doubt must be resolved against the city.29
There is no provision under the general laws governing counties or in LLUP A that
expressly or implicitly grants authority to zone property by pre-agreeing to swap zones. In fact
the extraordinary measures for public notice and public hearings provided for in LLUP A to zone
and rezone property underscore the importance of public involvement and legislative discretion
in zoning property. Kootenai County cannot just make up authority to rezone by swapping the
zone on two separate parcels of property, no matter how convenient the authority might be under
the circumstances. The BOCC acted without authority and the action is void.

2.

SWAP ZONING DENIES DUE PROCESS
The testimony and the evidence recited at the public hearings demonstrate the vice of the

swap zone process. The BOCC did not undertake to rezone each parcel to promote the health,
safety, and general welfare of the people of the state ofIdaho separately based upon the public
benefit and burden of each parcel and each zone as required under LLUP A. 30 CISZEK was
denied the opportunity to present evidence regarding the propriety of zoning the Highway 53
parcel Mining because every statement opposing the extension of Mining into this residential
area was rebutted with evidence that mining activity on this parcel would be better than mining

State v. Frederic, 28 Idaho 709, 155 P. 977 (191 6).
Plummer v. City ofFruitland, 140 Idaho I, 89 P.3d 841 (2003) see also 0 'Bryant v. City ofIdaho Falls, 78 Idaho 3 I 3, 303
P.2d 672 (1956).
30 Idaho Code §67-6502.
28

29
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activity on the landlocked parcel. 3 I Mining activity on the landlocked parcel was not relevant to
the decision of extending mining activity into the Highway 53 parcel. Zoning is not intended to
be a quid pro quo decision. It is about measuring the rules and regulations established in the
local zoning ordinance, comprehensive plan, and the policies and procedures set forth in LLUPA
against each rezone to determine ifthe rezone requested for a particular parcel would not be
detrimental to the neighboring property owners and would be beneficial to and promote the
health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of Kootenai County as a whole. Each rezone
request is to be independently analyzed.
The swap zone process prevents an independent analysis because one rezone request is
always compared against another rezone request and no rezone can occur unless both rezones
occur. Under the facts at bar it is clear that the neighbors and the BOCC would want the
landlocked parcel rezoned from Mining to Agricultural. A mining zone on a landlocked parcel
surrounded by residences does not make any sense as CDA Paving pointed out over and over in
their testimony. It is also clear that extending mining activity anywhere in this residential area
no longer makes sense. 32 The BOCC discussed this fact and it is evident in the discussion of
their motion to approve the swap zone that they were reluctant to add more mining in this area. 33
The BOCC never had the discretion to rezone the landlocked parcel independently. The BOCC
clearly understood that in order to remove the Mining zoning from the landlocked parcel, it had
to add a Mining zone to the Highway 53 parcel. In this zoning decision the BOCC had no
discretion at all.

31 Notice and an opportunity to present and to rebut evidence comprise the common core of procedural due process requirements
constitutionally mandated in all cases in which zoning authorities are requested to change land use. Gay v. County Com 'rs 0/
Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,651 P.2d 560 (1982). Cooper v. Board o/County Com 'rs 0/ Ada COlillty, 10 I Idaho 407,614
P.2d 947 (1980).
32 PTR. p. 0003 lines 1-2, p. 0004 lines 13-15.
33 PTR. p. 0004 lines 3-25, p. 0005 lines 1-25.
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A swap zone is like a "Blue Light Special". It is only available to property owners who
have the advantage of: 1) owing two parcels of land; 2) owning parcels with different zoning
classifications; and 3) if the property owner is really lucky, at least one parcel she owns has an
outdated zoning classification. Then the property owner has the zoning special of the century.
The property owner does not have to suffer the uncertainty of having each property rezoned
independently, the property owner just trades. The uncertainty of rezoning is gone because the
discretion of the BOCC is limited to only one choice and it is the choice that the property owner
controls. What a special! But courts have recognized that this "zoning special" denies due
process. As stated in a New Mexico case:
A contract in which a municipality promises to zone property in a
specified manner is illegal because, in making such a promise, a
municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to zone
the property according to prescribed legislative procedures. Our
statutes require notice and a public hearing prior to passage,
amendment, supplement, or repeal of any zoning regulations.
(citation omitted) The statutes also grant to citizens and parties in
interest the opportunity to be heard at the hearing. By making a
promise to zone before a zoning hearing occurs, a municipality
denigrates the statutory process because it purports to commit itself
to certain action before listening to the public's comments on that
action. Enforcement of such a promise allows a municipality to
circumvent established statutory requirements to the possible
detriment of affected landowners and the community as a whole. 34
In support of this statement, the New Mexico Supreme Court cited an Idaho case, County

ofAda v. Walter, 98 Idaho 630,533 P.2d 1199 (1975), noting that the Ada County Zoning
Ordinance was designed to protect the rights of all affected property owners and the general
welfare ofthe State ofIdaho. Our Supreme Court in Ada held that "commissioners do not have
the authority to enter into an agreement which would constitute a change in zoning.,,35
CISZEK really had nothing she could say about this "Blue Light Special." CISZEK'S
34

35

Dacy v. Village ofRuidoso. 114 N.M. 699, 845 P.2d 793 at 797 (1992).
County 0/Ada Board O/COUllly Com 'rs v. Walter, 96 Idaho 630 at 632, 533 P.2d 1199 (1975).
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testimony that mining should not be extended into Highway 53 parcel was meaningless because
she had no opportunity to persuade the BOCC to rezone one property but not the other property.
The BOCC had agreed in advance that it must rezone both properties as part of the swap zone.
The BOCC had no discretion under this agreement to consider each parcel independently.
CISZEK was effectively prevented from presenting evidence on each parcel independently.
CISZEK'S right to due process under LLUPA was denied in this swap zone process. By
accepting the rezone application and performing the rezoning of properties pursuant to the
limited terms of the application, the BOCC also denied CISZEK equal protection under the
law. 36 The process is illegal, arbitrary and capricious and the action of the BOCC is void.

3.

37

SWAP ZONING LIMITS LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION
The BOCC was deprived oflegislative powers by pre-agreeing that it had the right to

rezone one property "Agricultural" only ifit agreed to rezone another property "Mining".38 The
often cited legal authority on this issue is Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Prod. C. Ass 'n,
87 A.2d 319 (1952) discussing the imposition of conditions proffered by the property owner for
the purpose of obtaining a rezone. The court stated that the conditions sought to be imposed
" ... constituted an abuse of the zoning power by the City, and were therefore ultra vires, illegal
and void." Relying on another well known case the court stated:
The latest exposition of the law applicable to the foregoing
conclusion is contained in V.F. Zahodiakin 39 '" that the zoning
power may not be exerted to serve private interests merely nor may
the principal be subverted to that end, that a purported contract so
made was ultra vires and all proceedings to effectuate it were
36 The equal protection clause is designed to ensure that those persons similarly situated with respect to a governmental action
should be treated similarly. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofAdmin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 663, rehearing
denied (2002).
37 Hartman v. Buckson 467 A.2d 694 (DeI.Ch. 1983). The League ofResidential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los Angeles,
498 F.3d 1052 (2007). Montgomery County v. Revere 671 A.2d I (Md 1996).
38 The enactment of zoning plans and ordinances is legislative action. Cooper id. at 409
39 v.F. Zahodiakin, etc., Corp. v. Zoning Board ofAdjustment of City ofSummit, 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 127 (1952).
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coram non judice and utterly void. 4o ••. A municipality cannot act
as an individual does. It must proceed in conformity with the
statutes or in the absence of statute agreeably to the common law,
by ordinance or resolution or motion .... Contracts thus have no
place in a zoning plan and a contract between a municipality and a
property owner should not enter into the enactment or enforcement
of zoning regulations. 41

The authority to zone property is recognized as part of the police powers of
municipalities. 42 A municipality may not contract its zoning power any more than it can contract
its police power. The court in V. F. Zahodiakin eloquently explained this point:
Zoning is an exercise of the police power to serve the common
good and general welfare. It is elementary that the legislative
function may not be surrendered or curtailed by bargain or its
exercise controlled by the considerations which enter into the law
of contracts. The use restriction must needs have general
application. The power may not be exerted to serve private interest
merely, nor may the principle be subverted to that end. 43

Under the terms of CDA Paving's application for a rezone that the BOCC accepted, the
BOCC agreed that it could not grant a rezone for one property and deny the rezone for the other
property. This private agreement between the BOCC and a property owner limited the authority
of the BOCC to independently analyze and approve or deny a request to rezone property. The
BOCC impermissibly limited its legislative authority to rezone property by private agreement.
Courts reviewing a zoning decision which is produced by an agreement by a governmental body
with a private landowner to rezone property uniformly hold that the zoning decision
impermissibly limits legislative authority and is void. 44

Citing Beckmann v. Township a/Teaneck, 6 N.J. 530 (1951) and Anschelewitz v. Borough a/Be/mar, 2 N.J. 178,65 A.2d 825
(1949).
41 HOllston id. at 322.
42 Dawson Enterprises, inc. v. Blaine Co., 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1997). Gumprecht v. City a/Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho
615,661 P.2d 1214(1983)
43 V. F. Zahodiakin supra at 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 127, 131.
44 Atlantic Beach Property Owners' Association, inc., et al. v. Town o/Hempsted, 3 N.Y.2.ed, 144 N.E. 2.ed (1957). State Ex ReI.
Zupancic v. Schimenz, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970), Ford Leasing Develop. Co. v. Board a/County Com 'rs 528 P.2d 237 (1974).
40

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 17

361

A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract
with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance
..... Any contrary rule would condone a violation of the long
established principle that a municipality cannot contract away the
exercise of its police powers. 45
The BOCC is a public body organized for the governing of the county and the securing of
the common interest of the people of Kootenai County and the State of Idaho. These are public
officers and their statutory powers cannot be abrogated or curtailed by private agreement.
Consequently, the ordinance approving the swap zoning of the properties at issue is void because
it limits the power of the BOCC to rezone property in the county in the interest of the whole
community. An agreement to swap zones is an illegal bargaining away of the zoning power of
the BOCC.
Certain core governmental powers, like the power of eminent
domain and the police power, are reserved to the sovereign and
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by contract, and any attempt to
do so is simply unenforceable. 46
Numerous courts have criticized contract zoning and declared it invalid per se. 47
The New Mexico Supreme Court presented a lengthy analysis of contract zoning:
While these courts have advanced several grounds for
disapproving contract zoning, the most common rationale is that
contract zoning is inherently flawed as a "problematic blend of
contract and police powers. (citation omitted) Their opinions
typically condemn contract zoning as an illegal bargaining away or
abrogation of the police power. 48

Haymon v. Cityo/Chattanooga, 513 S.W.2d 185 (1974). Carlino v. Whipain Investors, 453 A.2d 1385 (Pa. 1982).
Altman/Glazer P.B. Company v. Mayor and Aldermen 0/Annapolis 314 Md. 675; 552 A.2d 1277 (1989). Rodriguez, et al. v.
Prince George's County, 79 Md. App.537; 558 A.2d 742 (1989). Alderman v. Chatham Co. 366 S.E.2d 885 (N.C. App. 1988).
Chung c. Sarasota Co., 686 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App. 2 Dst. 1996). Dacy v. Village 0/ Ruidoso, 114 N.M. 699, 845 P .2d 793
(1992). League 0/ Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City 0/ Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052 (2007).
45 Morgran Co .. Inc. v. Orange County 818 So.2d 640 at 643 (2002) citing Hart/net v Austin 93 So.2d 86 (1956).
46 Eugene McQuillin, The Law ofMunicipal Corporations section (2009 Revised Volume) § 29: 11, p. 365. Daniel R. Mandelker
Land Use Law (Fifth Edition) The Zoning Process § 6.62-6.64.
47 Judith W. Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreement. and the Theoretical
Foundations o/Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C.L.Rev. 976, 892-982 (1987).
48 Dacy v. Village 0/ Ruidoso 114, N.M. 699,845 P.2d 793 at 797 (1992).
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The BOCC bargained away its police powers and by doing so acted without authority.
The approval of Ordinance No. 417 was ulta vires, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
and contrary to public policy. Ordinance No. 417 is void.

ATTORNEY FEES
The BOCC was correctly advised by legal counsel that conditions could not be put on a
zone change. 49 The same legal authorities that propound that conditions cannot be placed on
zone changes also condemn contracts or promise to zone as illegal. 50 It is therefore very difficult
to understand why the BOCC would believe that rezoning by swapping zones would be legal.
The BOCC and county attorneys had been warned by respectable attorneys that a swap zone was
illegal. 51 The BOCC and its legal staff should be thoroughly cognizant that statutory authority is
required before a novel procedure such as swap zoning can be implemented. Swap zoning is not
authorized in Kootenai County Ordinances or Idaho statutes or discussed in any cases cited from
Idaho courts. In all of the research completed by Mr. Duncan and Mr. Wetzel which was
presented to the BOCC, they could not find any reference in zoning treatises, statutes or case law
to rezoning through a procedure of exchanging zones. No reference was ever found in the
extensive review ofthe law required in this Memorandum. It is inexcusable for the BOCC to
assume that a zoning procedure, however convenient, can just be made up out of thin air. It is
unjust that ordinary citizens like CISZEK are required to incur substantial attorney fees and costs

PTR. p. 0005 lines 13-16, p. 0006.
83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and Planning § 42. 10 Corpus Juris Secundum Zoning and Land Planning § 76.2. 2 Anderson,
American Law ofZoning §§ 9.21-9.20 (3fd ed.). 10 Eugene McQuillin, The Law ofMunicipal Corporations § 29: 11, p. 365,
(2009 Revised Volume). Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 6.62-6.64 (Fifth Edition). Salsich Jr. & Tryniecki Land Use
Regulation: A Legal Analysis & Practical Application of Land Use Law (Second Edition, Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law American Bar Association) pp. 186-188. v. 65 p. 957-1038. 70 ALR3d. §§ 3,4,5, pp.139-150, James D. Lawlor, J.D.
Annotation: Validly, Constructioll, and effect ofAgreement to Rezone, or Amendment to Zoning Ordinance, Creating Special
Restrictions or Conditions Not Applicable to Other Property Similarly Zones.
51 TR. p. 0118 line 25; p.0119 lines 1 -25 p. 0121 lines 22 -25; p. lines 1 - II. p. 0125 lines 2 -12.
49

50
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to correct an action taken by the BOCC that had no basis in fact or law. CISZEK is entitled to
attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-117. 52

DATED this

~ fay of August, 2009.
WETZEL, WETZEL
& HOLT, P.L.L.C.

a L. Rayborn Wetzel
mey for Petitioners/Plaintiffs

52 In re Daniel W., _ Idaho _ 183 P.3d 765 (2008). The purpose of 12-117 is to deter groundless or arbitrary action and to
provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or
attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have made. CanallNorcrestiColumbus Action Committee v. City of Boise,
136 Idaho 666, 671 39 P.3d 606,611 (2001). Rincover v. State, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999). Bonner County
v. Bonner County Sheriff Search and Rescue, Inc. 142 Idaho 788, 134 P.3d 639 (2003).
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND/OR DELIVERY

tJ1'V

I hereby certify that on the _..:...'11--- day of August, 2009, I served the foregoing
document upon:

u.s. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 446-1621

Jethelyn H. Harrington
Kootenai County Department of Legal
Services
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000

Attorney for Defondant

u.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile 667-7625

Michael Ryan Chapman
Chapman Law Office, PLLC Services
P.O. Box 1600
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83816

Attorney for Coeur d' Alene Paving

s:lfileslclciszek. Iindalappeal to district courtlplendingslmemorandum in SUPPORT OF
DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT.doc
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STATE OF IDAHO }SS
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

FILED:
AT
::<

~ - :; - 0

q

: OOUCLOCK

[)

G~T~

M

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LINDA CISZEK, et al.,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
KOOTENAI COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO,

CV-08-7074

ORDER TO AMEND BRIEFING
SCHEDULE

RespondentlDefenda nt,
and,
COEUR D'ALENE PAVING, INC.,
Defendant.

WHEREAS, the parties having filed a Stipulation to Amend the Briefing Schedule
in the above captioned matter, and the Court having reviewed said stipulation, as well
as the existing court file, and the Court being fully advised in the matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the briefing schedule in Case No. CV OB-70"ILj be
amended and set out to a ti e convenient to this Court.

/"
DATED this

j

da

C~A)CDQQ .'

Charles

.

r--

osack, Dlstrrct Judge

ORDER TO AMEND BRIEFING SCHEDULES - 1
H:\Building and Planning\Planning\CDA Paving\Dist. Ct. CV-08-7074 - ZON08-001 Ciszek\Order to Amend Briefing
Schedules.doc
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Of~

day
2009, I caused to be served a true
1 hereby certify that on this 5
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

[

]

[ J
[
[

]
]

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[.]

U.S. Mail
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELEFAX(FAX)

Steven C. Wetzel
Kevin B. Holt
WETZEL, WETZEL & HOLT, PLLC
1322 Kathleen Avenue, Suite 2
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83815
Fax: (208) 664-6741

9=r-tf

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELEFAX (FAX)

Jethelyn Harrington, Civil Deputy
Kootenai County Prosecuting Att.
Civil Division
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381q
Fax: (208) 446-1621 ~

U.S. Mail
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELEFAX(FAX)

Michael R. Chapman
Chapman Law Office, PLLC Services
P.O. Box 1600
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Fax: (208) 667-7625 ~
-;:)o3~

Daniel English, Clerk of the District Court

Deputy Clerk

ORDER TO AMEND BRIEFING SCHEDULES - 2
H:\Building and Planning\Planning\CDA Paving\Dist. Ct. CV-OB-7074 - ZONOB-001 Ciszek\Order to Amend Briefing
Schedules.doc

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai
FILED
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AT :2 : 00 O'clock-.J)A
CLERK, DISTRICT COURTP

~A-L~

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
LINDA CISZEK, et ai,

)
)
)
)

Petitioners/Plaintiffs,

v.

CASE NO. CV2008-7074

)

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, et ai,
Respondent/Defendant,
A~,

COEUR D'ALENE PAVING, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

AMENDED ORDER ESTABLISHING
BRIEFING SCHEDULE

------------------------)
The above matter having been assigned to Judge Hosack to address the matter
on Appeal, and the Notice of Settlement and Filing of Transcript and Agency Record
having settled the transcript on May 7, 2009; and parties having stipulated to amend the
previously entered Briefing Schedule, now, therefore;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file their opening Brief no later
than September 10, 2009, at 5:00 p.m.

Amended Order Establishing Briefing Schedule
CV2008-7074
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Respondent shall file their reply Brief no later
than October 8, 2009, at 5:00 p.m.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any final Brief from the Petitioner shall be filed
no later than October 29,2009, at 5:00 p.m.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to any original brief or memorandum
lodged with the Clerk of Court, counsel shall also provide the Court with a copy that is
labeled the Court's copy. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not contained
in the Idaho reports; a copy of each case cited shall be attached to the Court's copy of
the brief or memorandum.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon completion of all briefing, this matter shall
be set for hearing at a time convenient to both the Court and counsel.
DATED this

day of August,

20h

~0CLQQ"

Charles W. Hosack, District Judge
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Clerk's Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on the 5 day of August, 2009, that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed/delivered by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, Interoffice Mail, Hand
Delivered or Faxed to:

~ Steven Wetzel (fax: 208-664-6741)
~ Michael Chapman (fax: 208-667-7625)

-#cr

Kootenai County Department of Legal Services (fax: 208-446-1621)
~03'6

DANIEL J. ENGLISH
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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